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The European Super Grid : A Solution To The EU’s Energy Problems

Within the context of the European Green Deal, the electrification of the energy sector is of paramount importance. Only by substituting fossil energies for electricity will the European Union be able to reach its objective of being carbon-free by 2050. Such an ambitious project requires a significant amount of technical infrastructure to sustain it, and this is precisely what the European Commission wants to achieve through what has been unofficially defined as the “European Super Grid”. This article explains more in detail what the European Super Grid consists of, what are its main challenges and what it involves for the European Union on both the local and international level.

In a remarkable step forward, renewable energies reached and surpassed fossil fuels as the European Union’s main electricity source in 2020. According to a study carried out by the focus groups Ember and Agora Energiewende, during the year 2020 renewable power sources generated approximately 38% of the EU’s electricity, whereas fossil fuels accounted for about 37%. While this surely marked a significant stepping stone in the battle to reduce fossil fuel usage, the prized goal of cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 55% before 2030 is still a long way off.

With the demand for electricity rising every year due to the electrification of significant portions of production, the European Union will need to provide European citizens and companies with increasing quantities of electricity while staving off the recourse to fossil fuels. Until now, the matter has generally been addressed by focusing on the construction of more and better renewable energy infrastructure. Nevertheless, such a course of action needs to be complemented by something else. This is because renewable forms of power production tend to lack stability, meaning they cannot provide a continuous flow of electricity to meet demand. Solar panels don’t work when the sun goes down, and eolian turbines can’t produce power when the wind stops blowing. The opposite is true as well: in some cases renewable power production may surpass demand, which would make the surplus power go to waste. This is where the European Super Grid comes into play.

The European Super Grid: what is it exactly?

The European Super Grid is an umbrella term to define a series of projects taking place in Europe and beyond. Upon completion, these projects would result in the creation of a power network interconnecting European countries between themselves and with other regions, such as North Africa and the Middle East. The Super Grid aims at both improving energy interconnectors and creating new ones between European areas, thus increasing the capacity and quality of power transmission among countries. Although the majority of the projects are still in planning phases, many have already begun production.

Concretely, the energy interconnectedness will allow for European states to sell their energy surpluses to other countries, and to buy others’ excesses in times of deficiency. This energy sharing is key in counterbalancing the effects of renewable energy not being a stable and reliable source of electricity. This dynamic can be better seen through an example: during the summer, the power production by solar panels in Southern European Countries increases exponentially, which can make the producing country end up with an energy surplus. Without the European Super Grid, that power produced would go to waste. Through cables and power infrastructure that same energy can be exported to other countries, for example Northern or Western European States, regions that due to a different climate are unable to fully take advantage of solar power.

The same can happen the other way around. During the winter, wind power from turbines or hydropower from dams tend to be more reliable and abundant than solar power. Northern or Western European countries can easily produce both thanks to geographical and climate-related reasons, and as such may be able through the appropriate infrastructure to export their surpluses to countries in need. This would effectively prevent European countries from falling back on fossil fuels for energy production during periods of deficiency.

This monumental project would be beneficial in two main ways. Economically, it is estimated that the Super Grid will make the European Union save between 12 and 40 billion euros every year. Environmentally, it would help remove fossil energy from electricity production for good.

The Super Grid and the European Green Deal: “a match made in heaven”

Within the context of the European Green Deal, the development of a fully integrated European Grid is of great importance. With the production and use of energy accounting for approximately 75% of its carbon emissions, it is one of the main interests of the European Union to decarbonize power production in order to achieve the 2050 goal of a climate-neutral continent. The construction of an interconnected energy system is thus one of the EU’s priorities, which explains its willingness to fund most projects related to the ESG. For example the construction of the Celtic Interconnector, a series of power cables that will connect Ireland to the European grid, is currently benefiting from European funds. The European Commission aims to achieve 15% of interconnection by 2030, meaning that by then each country should possess the appropriate infrastructure to export at least 15% of the electricity produced by its power plants. Considering the numerous projects that are currently under construction, this is an achievable goal.

But the main reason why the European Super Grid perfectly suits the needs of the Green Deal is the fact that it takes into consideration the differences in terms of energy mix of individual European countries. Many EU policies aiming at reducing carbon emissions were often criticised by Member States for not taking into consideration the disparities between countries, and consequently the difficulties that some may encounter to reach objectives that could be easily met by others. The Super Grid respects these differences, allowing countries to specialise in the types of energy production they find most fruitful. Although some broad objectives are defined, the Member-States are allowed to micromanage their specific cases as they please, having a lot of freedom to decide how to move forward.

The geopolitical implications of the Super Grid, a path to energy independence?

The EU’s new energy policy, defined through the European Green Deal, has three objectives: sustainability, competitiveness, and most importantly, security of supply. It is a well-documented truth that the EU remains extremely dependent on imported energy. Some countries of the Baltic and Central European regions are overwhelmingly dependent on one single supplier, Russia being one of the main ones. This puts Europe in an extremely vulnerable situation, with geopolitical incidents in either supplier or transit countries being a very real possibility. For example, the Ukrainian conflict that started in 2014 heavily affected gas supply all throughout Europe, causing inflation and shortages. In a similar fashion, the partnerships with Russia have proven to be convoluted and unstable, most notably due to the participation of the European Union in NATO and the continuous political clashes with the Russian regime over human rights.

Furthermore, with environmental crises making power supply incredibly volatile, the EU risks getting caught in troubles outside of its capabilities. The succession of energy crises that unfolded in the last few months confirm such theory: an increased global demand and a particularly cold winter skyrocketed prices for power and gas, leaving the European Union to deal with the consequences. Within this context of geopolitical uncertainty, the European Super Grid may act as a solution by reducing the reliance on liquid gas and oil, and most importantly by increasing power production within the EU itself. This would put the European Union on the right path to becoming self-sufficient regarding power supply, and thus closer to being energetically independent.

The implementation of the ESG would also increase European integration between Member States, creating a more interconnected and cohesive Union with the capacity to speak with one unified voice on the energy world market, on issues regarding power production, environmental crises or climate change. Diplomatically, an electrically interconnected European Union would carry more weight in the international decision-making arena, with more bargaining power and less concerns over the possibility of countries using resources as leverage in geopolitical negotiations. Furthermore, the Super Grid would not only concern the European Union per se but also its periphery, reaching countries such as Norway, Iceland and the Northern African region. This dynamic has the potential to promote the EU’s external policy objectives and values in other regions, thus increasing international cooperation.

Still a long way to go

As previously stated, the European Super Grid is far from being completed, but numerous projects are currently being built or under active planning. As mentioned before, the Celtic connector is now under construction between Ireland and France. Other examples include the Spain-France underground electrical interconnection; the LitPol link I, an electricity link between Lithuania and Poland, and many others. Work remains to be done, but considering that the objectives for 2020 set by the European Commission were reached and those of 2030 seem within range, the hopes are high for the European Super Grid to be up and running by 2050. Current projects vary in scope, reach, funding and size, but at the end of the day they all contribute to the construction of the most extensive electricity grid the world has ever seen.

The only issue that remains tied to the development of the project is the possibility of a climate crisis. Indeed, for the Super Grid to really start proving its benefits, a certain threshold of interconnection must be reached. Before that happens, the power produced by European renewables might not be enough to fill the need for electricity that could arise from an unforeseen climate event. In case this ever happens, countries would be forced to draw power from fossil fuels in order to keep prices from hyperinflating and retain a somewhat stable supply of electricity. Since climate crises are expected to get worse in the following years, the possibility of countries failing to completely detach themselves from fossil fuels is likely. This would effectively create a vicious cycle where continuous crises lead to more fossil fuels being used, and so forth. To successfully avoid this scenario, projects tied to the ESG need to become a top priority in the next decade in order to make the transitional phase between low to mid-levels of interconnection as short as possible.

According to statistics, Europe is already the largest internationally interconnected grid worldwide, with countries exporting significant portions of surplus power to neighboring states. But the European Union can’t allow itself to rest on the laurels of its achievements, and must push forward in order to make power-sharing the norm. The European Super Grid is not a panacea to all of the EU’s environmental problems, but it surely is a solid foundation upon which the rest of the European Climate Policies can be developed.


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Power Grab: Brussels Plots €600 Billion EU-Wide Electricity Takeover

The European Commission has unveiled a staggering €600 billion plan to centralize control over the continent’s energy grid—a project marketed as green progress, but seen by critics as yet another power grab at the expense of national sovereignty.

The scale is colossal: we are talking about an unprecedented investment aimed at interconnecting national grids, overhauling infrastructure, and ensuring the transition toward a green economy over the next decade—a key objective of the von der Leyen Commission in both its previous and current terms.

The stated goal is ambitious. According to the Commission itself, this investment will be used to strengthen cross-border interconnections, expand transmission and storage capacity, and facilitate the massive integration of renewable energy, which is unreliable and hard to store. The plan, which Brussels claims it will outline by 2026 at the latest, aims to create a deeply integrated “meshed electricity network” that would enable a single energy market, ultimately placing energy oversight under EU control.

Brussels’ justification: Green transition and energy security

The official explanation hinges on two major arguments: on the one hand, the need to advance the economy’s decarbonization to meet Europe’s climate commitments; on the other, the urgency of strengthening energy security after the crisis triggered by the war in Ukraine and the subsequent break with traditional fossil fuel suppliers.

The European Commission and its parliamentary partners from the European People’s Party (EPP) are promoting the idea that “being green is being patriotic” as a strategy to counter conservative criticisms of the lack of competitiveness stemming from limited energy accessibility for businesses and citizens. However, critics say this is little more than sloganeering.

Brussels defends itself by assuring that, although high, the investment will pay off in the medium term. According to ENTSO-e (the European association of electricity network operators), annual savings of over €38 billion could be achieved if cross-border infrastructures are properly developed. This, combined with the promise to reduce external dependency and improve the system’s resilience, is presented as an unavoidable step to prevent new episodes of energy vulnerability.

That is the narrative. The reality is far less reassuring. Renewable technology cannot be stored effectively, and dependency on its supply causes serious headaches.

Because of this, legitimate doubts and suspicions arise. The recent energy crisis in Spain, marked by a blackout that partially paralyzed the country for several hours, has served as a catalyst to accelerate the EU’s pro-integration energy rhetoric. Both MEPs and technical officials have pointed out that greater interconnection with France would have mitigated the effects of the collapse, reinforcing the message that the “solution” lies in handing over more competences to Brussels.

It is striking that this episode, already being used to justify the urgency of the European energy project, coincides with the political timeline. For months, the Commission has been warning about the “insufficiency” of the Iberian network and the need to strengthen interconnections. The question is inevitable: is this a real technical flaw—or just another manufactured justification to advance Brussels’ federalization agenda?

The discourse around energy is not just technical—it is profoundly political. The creation of a “genuine Energy Union,” as demanded by the Commission, is one of the key pillars to consolidate an increasingly centralized European Union that shows less and less respect for the autonomy of its Member States. Electricity isn’t just infrastructure—it’s influence. Subordinating its management to Brussels represents one more step toward building a European superstate that many citizens reject, deeply worried about losing their national identity and democratic control over vital sectors.

REAL ID Enforcement Starts This Week: What You Should Know

After several delays, the REAL ID enforcement deadline is here. Starting Wednesday, you’ll need a compliant identification card to board a domestic flight and enter certain federal facilities.

Enforcement of the ID requirement, which stems back to legislation passed following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, officially begins on Wednesday, May 7.

Here are some things to know before the REAL ID deadline takes effect.

Do I have a REAL ID?

Before you schedule a trip to your DMV, check your wallet: you may already have a REAL ID-compliant driver’s license or state identification card. Many states have been issuing compliant cards for years.

If there is a star on your driver’s license or state ID card, you have a REAL ID-compliant card. The star may be black or gold, completely filled in or just the outline. Either way, you’re compliant.

Some states — Minnesota, Michigan, New York, and Vermont — issue REAL ID-compliant IDs and enhanced driver’s licenses (Washington only issues the latter). State-enhanced driver’s licenses are marked with a flag rather than a star and include a chip that can make it easier to enter the U.S. by land or sea from Canada, Mexico, or the Caribbean, according to U.S. Customs and Border Patrol. REAL IDs cannot be used for crossing the borders.

Can I still get a REAL ID?

The short answer is yes, REAL IDs will still be issued even after the May 7 enforcement date. If you are flying domestically soon and do not have a REAL ID, however, you’ll need to bring along more than your driver’s license to board the flight (more on that in a moment).

If you’re in a rush to get one, however, you may be out of luck. Several states have reported a lack of appointments to get a REAL ID in recent weeks, including offices in New Jersey, Illinois, and Kentucky, the Associated Press reported.

How do I get a REAL ID?

Should you be lucky enough to schedule an appointment for a REAL ID (if that’s necessary in your state), you’ll want to make sure you have the necessary documentation.

At minimum, you’ll need to prove your full legal name, your date of birth, your Social Security number, two proofs of address for your principal residence, and your lawful status.

Four documents — your birth certificate and your Social Security card (or, in some cases, just the number), plus a bill and a pay stub — could help you meet all of those requirements. You may, however, need different or additional documents depending on your situation.

Ultimately, you’ll want to check with your local DMV to determine qualifying documents and roughly how long it will take for your REAL ID to be available.

What if I don’t have a REAL ID?

You will not necessarily be kept from boarding a plane, or other activities that require a valid driver’s license.

If you do not have a REAL ID and have a domestic flight planned for departure after the May 7 deadline, don’t panic: You can use another approved form of identification to board your flight.

TSA lists several on its website, including:

U.S. passport or passport card

Foreign government-issued passport

Veteran Health Identification Card

DHS trusted traveler cards

Department of Defense ID (including those issued to dependents)

Permanent resident card

Border crossing card

Acceptable photo ID issued by a federally recognized Tribal Nation/Indian Tribe, including Enhanced Tribal Cards

HSPD-12 PIV cards

Canadian provincial driver’s license or Indian and Northern Affairs Canada card

Transportation worker identification credential

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Employment Authorization Card (I-766)

U.S. Merchant Mariner Credential

You can find more details about TSA’s screening process here. The TSA notes that even if you arrive at the airport without a valid form of identification, you may still be able to fly by completing an identity verification process with a TSA officer.

Do I need a REAL ID?

It depends. REAL IDs are optional and the need for one will vary based on your situation.

You do not need a REAL ID to drive, vote, receive benefits or services from your state or federal government, buy alcohol, enter a federal facility that otherwise does not require an ID (like a post office), go to a hospital, or “participate in law enforcement proceedings or investigations,” like jury duty.

Generally, if you are flying domestically, or visiting nuclear power plants, military bases, or other sites with federal ID requirements, you may need a REAL ID.

Children under the age of 18 do not need to provide identification while flying within the U.S.


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TSA Begins REAL ID Full Enforcement on May 7

Travelers with a non-compliant ID will face additional screening measures, possible travel delays

Today, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) announced the imminent implementation of its REAL ID enforcement measures at TSA checkpoints nationwide.

“Secretary Noem and the Trump administration are enforcing the 2005 REAL ID Act and regulations on May 7, as directed by Congress and the American people,” said Adam Stahl, TSA Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Administrator. “The Real ID requirement bolsters safety by making fraudulent IDs harder to forge, thwarting criminals and terrorists. TSA will implement REAL ID effectively and efficiently, continuing to ensure the safety and security of passengers while also working to minimize operational disruptions at airports.”

On May 7, TSA will no longer accept state-issued identifications that are not REAL ID compliant at TSA security checkpoints. All airline passengers 18 years and older, including TSA PreCheck® members, must present REAL ID-compliant identification or another acceptable ID, such as a passport, at TSA security checkpoints. Noncitizens illegally present in the U.S. who are voluntarily self-deporting on international flights will not be denied boarding under this requirement.

Passengers who present a state-issued identification that is not REAL ID compliant and who do not have another acceptable alternative (e.g., passport) can expect to face delays, additional screening and the possibility of not being permitted into the security checkpoint.

Currently, 81% of travelers at TSA checkpoints present an acceptable identification including a state-issued REAL ID. TSA expects the number of passengers obtaining REAL IDs to steadily increase and will continue with additional screening measures for those without a REAL ID until it is no longer considered a security vulnerability.




Egyptian Pyramids Were Built Using An Incredibly Clever Machine, New Research Suggests

The research, recently published in the online journal PLOS ONE, explores the techniques used to build the famous Step Pyramid of Djoser in Saqqara.

For decades, Egypt's pyramids have fascinated academics, adventurers, and conspiracy theorists alike. Many have speculated that these ancient structures were built by extraterrestrials, overlooking the ingenuity of humans even 5,000 years ago.

Now, a new study reveals that Egypt's oldest pyramid may have been constructed using technology far more advanced than previously thought- specifically, involving water.

The research, recently published in the online journal PLOS ONE, explores the techniques used to build the famous Step Pyramid of Djoser in Saqqara. Covering an area of 13,189 square meters and standing 62.5 meters high, the 4,500-year-old pyramid is one of the most remarkable structures of its time.

While experts previously believed the pyramid was constructed using interconnected ramps and levers to move heavy materials, the new study suggests that the builders may have utilized a hydraulic lift system.

Xavier Landreau of France's CEA Paleotechnic Institute proposed that the ancient Egyptians might have harnessed nearby canals to power lifts for moving heavy stones. Based on new analysis, the study suggests that water was directed into the pyramid through two shafts, which helped raise and lower a float carrying large stone blocks.

The researchers wrote: "Ancient Egyptians are renowned for their pioneering hydraulic engineering, using canals for irrigation and barges to transport massive stones. This research opens up a new area of exploration: the use of hydraulic power in constructing the Pharaohs' massive structures."

The Step Pyramid, built around 2680 BC as a funerary complex for Pharaoh Djoser of the Third Dynasty, remains an enigma, and determining exactly how it was built is challenging.

One nearby structure, the Gisr el-Mudir enclosure, which has long puzzled experts, may provide further insight. Landreau and his team argue that it functioned as a "check dam" to capture water and sediment. The researchers also suggest that the pyramid may have featured a water treatment facility, with a series of compartments allowing sediment to settle as water flowed through, eventually pressurizing the shafts within the pyramid. This process, known as "volcano" construction, could have lifted building blocks using the rising water.

Despite these groundbreaking findings, the team acknowledges that further investigation is needed. They plan to simulate how this hydraulic system might have worked and whether the region's environment at the time could have supported such a method.

The paper also notes that traditional techniques, like ramp systems, were likely used alongside the hydraulic lift. Landreau and his colleagues conclude: "This study opens a new line of research for the scientific community: the use of hydraulic power in building Egypt's pyramids."


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The Step Pyramid of Djoser in Saqqara, Egypt, is considered the oldest of the seven monumental pyramids built about 4,500 years ago. From transdisciplinary analysis, it was discovered that a hydraulic lift may have been used to build the pyramid. 

Based on our mapping of the nearby watersheds, we show that one of the unexplained massive Saqqara structures, the Gisr el-Mudir enclosure, has the features of a check dam with the intent to trap sediment and water. The topography beyond the dam suggests a possible ephemeral lake west of the Djoser complex and water flow inside the ’Dry Moat’ surrounding it. In the southern section of the moat, we show that the monumental linear rock-cut structure consisting of successive, deep compartments combines the technical requirements of a water treatment facility: a settling basin, a retention basin, and a purification system. 

Together, the Gisr el-Mudir and the Dry Moat’s inner south section work as a unified hydraulic system that improves water quality and regulates flow for practical purposes and human needs. Finally, we identified that the Step Pyramid’s internal architecture is consistent with a hydraulic elevation mechanism never reported before. The ancient architects may have raised the stones from the pyramid centre in a volcano fashion using the sediment-free water from the Dry Moat’s south section. 

Ancient Egyptians are famous for their pioneering and mastery of hydraulics through canals for irrigation purposes and barges to transport huge stones. This work opens a new line of research: the use of hydraulic force to erect the massive structures built by Pharaohs.


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New study shows Egypt’s pyramids were built using ingenious machine

The discovery could be a huge step forward in our understanding For millennia, Egypt’s pyramids have captured the minds and imaginations of academics, adventurers and conspiracy theorists alike.

Often people like to suggest that these ancient monuments were the construction of extra-terrestrials, however ignore the fact that us humans are pretty clever things, even almost 5000 years ago.

Now a new study has shown that Egypt’s oldest pyramid was built with technology far more sophisticated than we could have imagined, and it involved water.

The idea comes from a paper recently published on the 5 August on the online journal Plos One and suggested what equipment may have been employed in constructing the famous Step Pyramid of Djoser in Saqqara.

The 4500 year old pyramid covers an area of 13,189m and reaches a height of 62.5m making it one of the most impressive structures of its day.

Previously, experts had thought that the pyramid was built with interconnecting ramps and levers to haul up the heavy building material, however the new study suggest they may have had help from a hydraulic lift system.

Xavier Landreau of France’s CEA Paleotechnic Institute, brought forward the idea that the Ancient Egyptians may have channelled nearby canals to power lifts for moving heavy objects.

Based on new analysis, the study suggests that water was channelled into the pyramid through the use of two shafts which were then used to help raise and lower a float with the heavy stone building blocks aboard.

The researchers wrote: “Ancient Egyptians are famous for their pioneering and mastery of hydraulics through canals for irrigation purposes and barges to transport huge stones.

“This work opens a new line of research: the use of hydraulic force to erect the massive structures built by Pharaohs.”

Like many of the pyramids, the Step Pyramid is thought to have been constructed in around 2680 BC as a funerary complex and tomb for the pharaoh Djoser of the Third Dynasty.

Being erected so long ago, it is hard to ever be certain how these incredible structures were indeed built.

One nearby and previously unexplained structure, the Gisr el-Murdir enclosure could help further our understanding, with Landreau and his colleagues arguing that it was in fact a “check dam” used for capturing water and sediment.

Furthermore, the team postulate that the pyramid may have even had its own water treatment facility, with a series of compartments dug into the ground outside the pyramid, enabling the sediment to settle as water passed through each ensuing section.

The water would then become pressurised as it flowed into the pyramids shafts, enacting a process known as “volcano” construction as the water rose up a vertical shaft inside the pyramid, taking the float with the building blocks on top of it with it.

Despite the researchers’ unprecedented new discovery that “the internal architecture of the Step Pyramid is consistent with a hydraulic elevation device never reported before.” the team admit further investigation is needed.

They now aim to simulate how the hydraulic process would have happened as well as if the environment of the area at the time could support such water usage.

However, the paper maintains that other techniques, such as the classic ramp system, were likely used in the construction of the structure with the hydraulic lift being used in assistance when possible.

Landreau and his colleagues conclude: “This work opens a new research line for the scientific community: the use of hydraulic power to build the pyramids of Egypt.”

Vietnam Mandates Facial Recognition For Digital Payments Above USD 390

Vietnamese authorities have mandated the use of facial recognition technology for digital payments exceeding USD 390.

This new requirement applies to money transfers conducted through both banks and e-wallets, necessitating facial scans via smartphone banking applications.

The State Bank of Vietnam has stated that this measure is intended to enhance the security of online and card-based transactions. Despite this, the regulation has sparked privacy and security concerns among internet users, who worry about the extensive collection of biometric data and potential exposure to cyber threats. These concerns are underscored by Vietnam’s cybersecurity challenges; in 2023, Vietnam's web domain, .vn, ranked as the fifth most vulnerable globally to cyber-attacks and data theft, according to a report by cybersecurity firm Kaspersky.

Global trend towards biometrics

Vietnam's move towards facial recognition for digital payments is part of a global trend where countries are increasingly incorporating biometric technologies into financial systems. Similar measures have been adopted in countries like China and India, where biometric data is used for identity verification and to secure digital transactions. However, these initiatives often face criticism for potential privacy infringements and the risks associated with data breaches.

As Vietnam advances in its digital transformation journey, the balance between enhancing security and protecting individual privacy remains a key point of contention. Financial institutions are now tasked with adapting to the new regulations, which may involve significant technological upgrades and increased compliance costs.

The debate surrounding the necessity and implications of such security measures continues to evolve, with stakeholders closely watching the impact on both the financial sector and individual freedoms.

Technological evolution

Advances in technology are expected to significantly impact the efficacy and security of facial recognition systems. Emerging technologies such as AI and machine learning (ML) are poised to enhance the accuracy and speed of facial recognition systems, reducing errors and improving user experience. AI algorithms are becoming more sophisticated in distinguishing between real and fraudulent attempts to use facial recognition, thereby increasing the system's resilience against spoofing attacks.

However, as technology advances, so do the methods employed by cybercriminals to exploit vulnerabilities. The need for constant vigilance and adaptation of security measures remains critical. Governments and financial institutions must stay ahead of potential threats by continuously updating and improving their facial recognition systems to address new challenges.


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Bank Biometrics to Become Mandatory in Vietnam Starting July 1

The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) has announced that biometric authentication will become mandatory for certain online transactions starting July 1, 2024.

The measure is part of an effort to bolster security amidst the increasing prevalence of cashless payments. Any single online transaction exceeding VND10 million (approximately USD $392.65) or daily transactions surpassing VND20 million will require biometric verification.

The Bank is pursuing authentication methods that are more secure than traditional password-based systems and one-time passwords (OTPs), which have been deemed vulnerable to cyberattacks. The biometric data will be matched with information stored in the national ID database, thereby enhancing the security of bank accounts and preventing financial fraud.

Pham Anh Tuan, Director General of the SBV’s Payment Department, highlighted the widespread use of personal payment accounts in Vietnam, noting that over 87 percent of adults own at least one account. The use of QR codes for payments has also surged recently.

Experts have pointed out that the new biometric requirements will aid in managing accounts and transactions more effectively, as well as in tracing and recovering money from cyber scams.

Vu Ngoc Son from the National Cybersecurity Association mentioned that biometric authentication could limit the use of virtual bank accounts and aid law enforcement in combating cybercrime. Domestic banks are already preparing for the new regulations by notifying and reminding customers to update their biometric registration.

In 2023, the total financial loss due to online scams in Vietnam was estimated to be around VND8-10 trillion, with 91 percent of these frauds linked to financial schemes. Major General Nguyen Van Giang, Deputy Director of the Department of Cyber Security and High-Tech Crime Prevention (A05) under the Ministry of Public Security, has urged the public to remain vigilant against scams and to utilize multi-factor authentication to safeguard their financial information.

China’s “New Generation” AI-Brain Project

China is pursuing what its leaders call a “first-mover advantage” in artificial intelligence (AI), facilitated by a state-backed plan to achieve breakthroughs by modeling human cognition. While not unique to China, the research warrants concern since it raises the bar on AI safety, leverages ongoing U.S. research, and exposes U.S. deficiencies in tracking foreign technological threats.

The article begins with a review of the statutory basis for China’s AI-brain program, examines related scholarship, and analyzes the supporting science. China’s advantages are discussed along with the implications of this brain-inspired research. Recommendations to address our concerns are offered in conclusion. All claims are based on primary Chinese data.

China’s Plan to “Merge” Human and Artificial Intelligence

Analysts familiar with China’s technical development programs understand that in China things happen by plan, and that China is not reticent about announcing these plans. On July 8, 2017 China’s State Council released its “New Generation AI Development Plan” to advance Chinese artificial intelligence in three stages, at the end of which, in 2030, China would lead the world in AI theory, technology, and applications. The announcement piqued the interest of the world’s techno-literati in light of the plan’s unabashed goal of world hegemony, its state backing, and a well-founded belief that China is already a major AI player. Although China still lags in semi-conductor design and basic AI research, it is moving to address —or circumvent—these problems, lending credence to its long-term aspirations.

Buried in this plan, and absent entirely from the Western dialog on China AI, is what we see as that country’s most interesting and potentially significant research, namely, a top-down program to effect a “merger” (混合) of human and artificial intelligence. These efforts to use neuroscience to inform AI, and vice-versa, date to at least 19996 and precede China’s focus on AI as a standalone discipline. Whereas the earliest appearance of AI in a ministry notification was in July 2015, China’s “National Medium- and Long-term S&T Development Plan” issued in 2006 had already identified brain science and cognition among its top research priorities. The 2016 “Notification on National S&T Innovation Programs for the 13th Five-Year Plan” mentioned AI but did not count it among its major projects. What appeared instead was “brain science and brain-inspired research” defined as “brain-inspired computing” and “brain-computer intelligence.”

This timeline establishes “AI-brain research” as a line of inquiry in China before AI became a household word and a focus of state interest. In March 2016, the “China Brain Project” (中国脑计划) was approved, a 15-year effort that “prioritized brain-inspired AI over other approaches.” In May of the same year, Chinese president Xi Jinping publicly endorsed one of its key pillars:

“Connectomics is at the scientific forefront for understanding brain function and further exploring the nature of consciousness. Exploration in this area not only has important scientific significance, but also has a guiding role in the prevention and treatment of brain disease and the development of intelligent technology.” (our emphasis) Taking these circumstances into account, it is not surprising that the 2017 New Generation AI Development Plan uses the word “brain” 27 times and “brain-inspired/neuromorphic” (类脑) some 20 times. The plan’s “strategic goals” include “major breakthroughs in brain-inspired intelligence, autonomous intelligence, mixed [human-artificial] intelligence, swarm intelligence, and other areas so as to have an important impact in the area of international AI research, and occupy the commanding heights of AI technology.” The document goes on to explain:

“Brain-like intelligent computing theory focuses on breakthroughs in brain-like information coding, processing, memory, learning, and reasoning theories; on forming brain-like complex systems, brain-like control, and other theories and methods; and on establishing new models of large-scale brain-like intelligent computing and brain-inspired cognitive computing models.”

In terms of priorities, “AI-brain” occupies two of the plan’s eight “basic theory” categories: “(3) hybrid enhanced intelligent theory” and “(7) brain intelligent computing theory,” defined as:

“Research on ‘human-in-the-loop’ hybrid enhanced intelligence, human-computer intelligence symbiosis behavior enhancement and brain-computer collaboration, machine intuitive reasoning and causal models, associative memory models and knowledge evolution methods, hybrid enhanced intelligent learning methods for complex data and tasks, cloud robot collaborative computing methods, situational understanding in real-world environments, and human-machine group collaboration.”

and, 

“Research theories and methods of brain-like perception, brain-like learning, brain-like memory mechanisms and computational fusion, brain-like complex systems, and brain-like control.”

In sum, China’s New Generation AI plan aims to “build for China a first-mover advantage in artificial intelligence development,” which to us invokes the self-bootstrapping scenario—a mainstay of the AI safety literature—of a country with an early AI advantage leveraging its lead past the point where others are able to compete.

China’s AI-Brain Academic Research

2016 was a watershed year in terms of China’s AI-brain scholarship. We identified a core group of six papers published that year by leading Chinese researchers that define China’s approach to this hybrid area and signal acceptance of the paradigm:

“Retrospect and Outlook of Brain-inspired Intelligence Research” (类脑智能研究的回顾与展望).

“Brain Science and Brain-inspired Intelligence Technology-an Overview” (脑科学与类脑研究概述).

“Progress and Prospect on the Strategic Priority Research Program of ‘Mapping Brain Functional Connections and Intelligence Technology’.” (“脑功能联结图谱与类脑智能研究”先导专项研究进展和展望).

“The Human Brainnetome Atlas: A New Brain Atlas Based on Connectional Architecture.”

“Neuroscience and Brain-inspired Artificial Intelligence: Challenges and Opportunities” (神经科学和类脑人工智能发展:机遇与挑战).

“China Brain Project: Basic Neuroscience, Brain Diseases, and Brain-inspired Computing” (全面解读中国脑计划:从基础神经科学到脑启发计算).

The content of these and other key studies is described in our technical review of China’s AI-brain program; these samples give a sense of the topics and players. That same year—2016—saw the start of an upward trend in the number of papers by Chinese scientists on brain-inspired AI specifically, one of the discipline’s three defining elements.

Meanwhile, China’s National Natural Science Foundation (NNSF), the main sponsor of state grants to individual scholars, in August 2017 solicited proposals for 25 AI projects, most of which are brain-related, within the following ten approved research areas:

Multi-modal, efficient cross domain perception and augmented intelligence

Machine understanding of perception and behavior under uncertain conditions

New methods for complex task planning and reasoning

Machine learning theory and methods based on new mechanisms (deep reinforcement learning, adversarial learning, brain-like / natural learning)

New brain-inspired computing architectures and methods

New methods of human-machine hybrid intelligence

Chinese semantic computing and deep understanding (machine reading comprehension and Chinese text creation, human-computer dialogue, etc.)

New computing devices and chips for artificial intelligence

Heterogeneous multi-core parallel processing methods and intelligent computing platforms

Machine intelligence test models and evaluation methods

In January 2018, NNSF funding guidelines recognized AI for the first time as an independent category, but also listed nine specific subcategories for “cognitive and neuroscience-inspired AI.” Here are the topics and their respective funding codes:

China NNSF cognitive-neuroscience-inspired AI funding subcategories

F060701 computational modeling of cognitive mechanisms (基于认知机理的计算模型)

F060702 modeling attention, learning, and memory (脑认知的注意、学习 与记忆机制的建模)

F060703 audiovisual perception modeling (视听觉感知模型)

F060704 neural information encoding and decoding (神经信息编码与解码)

F060705 neural system modeling and analysis (神经系统建模与分析)

F060706 neuromorphic engineering (神经形态工程)

F060707 neuromorphic chips (类脑芯片)

F060708 brain-like computing (类脑计算)

F060709 BCI and neural engineering (脑机接口与神经工程)

Besides NNSF support, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), and local municipalities also announced grants for AI-brain research. In terms of scholarship and support, it is clear that China has committed to this alternative paradigm.

What Constitutes “AI-Brain” Science in China?

As confirmed by a survey of its practitioners, three areas of research contribute to China’s AI-brain program: brain-inspired artificial intelligence (BI-AI, 类脑智能), connectomics (“brain mapping”人脑连接组), and brain-computer interfaces (BCI, 脑机接口).

BI-AI seeks mathematical descriptions of brain processes that contribute to behavior. This is understood literally, not as metaphor—the models match the actual “computation performed by biological wetware.”

Connectomics involves empirical and computational efforts to replicate brain structure and functioning. The link with AI derives from a need to invoke AI to test simulations, and from AI’s role in interpreting (aligning) images of brain sections. BCIs acquire electrical signals from the brain, interpret them, and optionally transform the signals into actions. Their link with AI is two-fold: AI is used to process brain signals and, potentially, support direct access to computing resources.

Although some goals of this research mirror mainstream AI, the difference is while the latter may seek to replicate brain behavior, the new approach emulates the actual neuronal functioning that gives rise to behavior. The motivation for BI-AI (and its companion discipline connectomics) is the empirical observation that the human brain, with minimal resources, effortlessly performs many high-order tasks beyond the reach of today’s machine learning (ML).

A short list of these tasks, culled from standard references, includes object/scene vision, attention modeling, continual learning, episodic memory, intuitive understanding, imagination, planning, and sensemaking. Two other goals are effective BCI (minimally invasive interfaces with useful throughput) and neuromorphic computing (hybrid digital-analog chips that mimic brain structure). In this context, we examined 561 Chinese papers and found 352 of them binning into one or more of the aforementioned categories, indicating that Chinese BI-AI research aligns with worldwide scientific aspirations.

Further testimony to China’s commitment comes from the number of institutes, state and university affiliated, engaged in BI-AI, connectomics, or BCI as their primary research area. We identified 30 such institutes, including concentrations in Beijing and Shanghai, and in provincial locations such as Chengdu, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Harbin, Hefei, Nanjing, Qingdao, Shenzhen, Suzhou, Tianjin, Wuhan, Xiamen, and Zhengzhou, exclusive of facilities working the disciplines peripherally.

We are struck by the caliber of personnel, collaborative networks, and research directions at three of these “outlying” institutes: the Fujian Key Laboratory for Brain-like Intelligent Systems (福建省仿脑智能系统重点实验) operating since 2009 in Xiamen; the HUST-Suzhou Institute for Brainsmatics (华中科技大学苏州脑空间信息研究院) established 2016 at Wuhan’s Huazhong University of S&T; and Hefei’s National Engineering Laboratory for Brain-inspired Intelligence Technology and Application (NEL-BITA) (类脑智能技术及应用国家工程实验室), a government-sponsored lab set up in 2017 with China’s major AI companies and Microsoft Research Asia.

NEL-BITA researches brain cognition and neural computing, brain-inspired multimodal sensing and information processing, brain-inspired chips and systems, “quantum artificial intelligence,” and brain-inspired intelligent robots. The HUST-Suzhou “Brainsmatics” facility, whose work has been praised by the Allen Institute’s chief scientist, has pioneered research in micro-optical sectioning tomography on its way to creating a high-resolution mammalian brain atlas. Bear in mind that these are institutes outside the main research nexus.

Meanwhile, Pu Muming’s Center for Excellence in Brain Science and Intelligence Technology (中国科学院脑科学与智能技术卓越创新中心), one of three major complexes in Shanghai, is host to a “G60 Brain Intelligence Innovation Park” established in 2018 with a U.S. $1.5 billion budget for BI-AI research and $2.85 billion more promised in 2020. The facility uses cloned monkeys. A final example, from Beijing, is Tsinghua University’s Center for Brain-inspired Computing Research (清华大学类脑计算研究中心), established in 2014 to study neural coding, ML algorithms, and chip architecture.

The China-ROW Balance Sheet

China enjoys several advantages over other nations in AI-brain research. We lay this out for consideration without judgment on how these advantages may play out. Similar research is being conducted worldwide and we have no crystal ball to foretell what nation will prevail in the global AI competition (if “prevail” is the right way to frame the matter). For China, seven such factors come to mind, the first three being the usual staples about China’s more permissive experimental ethos, abundance of data, fewer privacy concerns on data collection and use, and the fourth being national commitment, which we have been at pains to demonstrate. The other advantages require elaboration.

Fifth, and most obvious, is China’s AI talent, as shown in a breakdown of papers accepted at the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence’s (AAAI) 2020 conference, a central event for the world’s AI community.

The key takeaway is that ownership of the event has slipped from U.S. institutions, which dominated previous years. A China-ROW comparison of papers at the NeurIPS 2019 conference, a more focused gathering where China is a relative newcomer, had scholars from Tsinghua University placing 13th in number of accepted papers. In 2020, Tsinghua papers ranked 7th behind AI giants Google, Stanford University, MIT, Microsoft, UC Berkeley, and Carnegie Mellon, all of which are targets of PRC “talent” co-option programs, if not actively cooperating with China already (see technology transfer discussion below).

Both the AAAI and NeurIPS conferences had roughly the same paper acceptance rate (20.6 percent and 21.2 percent), so it is clear China is playing with the best. Chinese participation at these two key events would be skewed more in China’s favor if we account for co-authorship and the national origins of authors with non-China affiliations. Here is another breakdown of the AAAI 2020 event that accommodates co-authorship:

Papers by authors with China-only affiliations are 26 percent of the total. Papers by authors with China affiliations collaborating with authors claiming other (rest-of-world) affiliations constitute another 24 percent. Together they account for half of the papers. Statistics for the NeurIPS 2019 gathering show 42 percent of accepted papers having “Chinese authorship” (华人作者). The importance of Chinese AI talent can also be measured by the stream of arguments from our own Georgetown center for measures to retain Chinese students and other diaspora talent to keep the U.S. competitive, a position we wholly support.

A sixth advantage is China’s near monopoly on non-human primates (NHP) regarded by most AI-brain researchers as essential. By 2016, when China’s AI-brain project had come into its own, high-tech primate facilities already existed in Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Shenzhen, Suzhou, and elsewhere in Guangxi, Hainan, and Yunnan. While other countries were scaling back NHP production, China was raising laboratory grade monkeys in volume at a fraction of the cost for export and as a lure to foreign scientists, inhibited by domestic restrictions, to conduct their research in China

Nikos Logothesis, director of the Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, one of several brain scientists who migrated some or all of their research to China, announced plans to co-direct with Shanghai neuroscientist Pu Muming (Mu-ming Poo) an International Center for Primate Brain Research44 built at a cost of U.S. $106 million. Pu’s success in cloning monkeys, which speeds breeding and eliminates genetic variation, is another draw.

Finally, we consider foreign technology transfer, generally seen as a sign of weakness but which we regard—from China’s perspective—as a stunning advantage. For more than six decades China has operated a comprehensive program of foreign technology appropriation to remedy shortcomings in indigenous science and technology without the cost, risk, and political challenges incurred by the world’s liberal democracies. The phenomenon has been documented in scholarly and government studies both in general and for AI. It has been briefed to U.S. and allied elected and counterintelligence officials, who are well-informed on the matter, and is a mainstay of media reporting, so that the discussion turns not on whether these illegal and extralegal transactions take place but rather on what to do about it.

We raise the matter to emphasize that whatever else one thinks of it, China’s hybrid system of indigenous innovation and foreign “borrowing” has been extraordinarily effective. China through its outreach efforts, talent programs, diaspora exploitation, cooperative ventures, open source tracking, overseas support guilds, indigenization enclaves, “two-bases” and “short-term return” schemas, and other hidden or barely disguised practices has mastered the skill of adapting useful technologies created abroad into its own (under-rated) indigenous enterprises.

If these are China’s advantages, what are its disadvantages? Two deficits are commonly cited: chip design and fabrication, and foundational research. We defer judgment on the former, which is outside our fields of expertise. As for the latter, China is seen as weak in basic research, specifically in AI theory, by the country’s top practitioners. Sinovation founder and best-selling AI author Kai-Fu Lee argues that China’s forte is its ability to create practical AI products, not revolutionize the field. His point is supported by top Chinese scientists. Here is a sample:

Sun Maosong (孙茂松), Tsinghua University professor of computer science, argues that China lacks leaders in world-class scientific research and falls behind other countries in training “top talent in the basic sciences.”

Tan Tieniu (谭铁牛), deputy director of CAS (see below), claims “At present, China is still in the ‘follow-up’ position in terms of frontier theoretical innovation of artificial intelligence. Most of the innovations are focused on technology applications.”

Xu Kuangdi (徐匡迪) former head of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) said, “The cornerstone of artificial intelligence is mathematics, and the key element is algorithms. But China’s investment in this field is far behind the United States.” Yau Shing-Tung (丘成桐), Harvard professor and Fields Medal winner, concludes that China “is still some distance from the United States and Britain in terms of basic theory and algorithm innovation.”

Zheng Nanning (郑南宁), another CAE academician, believes it will take China another 5 to 10 years to reach world levels in basic theoretical and algorithmic research. Hardware design is also an issue.

We regard these complaints as valid but vacuous: theory cannot be embargoed and there is no will to do so either by governments or by scientists, who embrace collaboration as part of their enterprise. Accordingly, to the extent this is a problem at all, China is addressing it as it always has, by a robust program of foreign interaction, cooperation, co-option, licit and illicit transfers, and—like everyone else—by monitoring publicly available information.

The Chimera of AGI

China’s decision to focus on AI-brain research leads to speculation that the effort may be aimed at the “holy grail” of artificial general (human level) intelligence (AGI), or will end up there as an unintended consequence of this brain-centric pursuit. Indeed, as will be shown, that view is held by many Chinese researchers. The issue in a nutshell is this: in contrast to AI, which focuses on narrow problems of “creating programs that demonstrate intelligence in one or another specialized area,”  AGI aims at, “the construction of a software program that can solve a variety of complex problems in a variety of different domains, and that controls itself autonomously, with its own thoughts, worries, feelings, strengths, weaknesses and predispositions.”

In other words, the elements of human cognition—with instant access to the sum of the world’s knowledge and ability to process that information at lightning speed. Since BI-AI models brain function to enhance AI programs, there is a tendency among scientists working in brain-inspired AI to equate their research with this outcome. A survey of China’s AI scientists revealed 74 percent believe BI-AI will lead to general AI. The number rises to 83 percent among China’s BI specialists. These figures are buttressed by statements from BI-AI principals of standing:

Xu Bo (徐波), director of the CAS Institute of Automation—host to Beijing’s Research Center for Brain-inspired Intelligence (home of the “Brainnetome” connectomics project), Associate Director of Shanghai’s Center for Excellence in Brain Science and Intelligence Technology (中国科学院脑科学与智能技术卓越创新中心, CEBSIT), and chair of the “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Strategic Advisory Committee” is cited in the Ministry of Science and Technology’s official newspaper S&T Daily:

“As General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out in the collective study of the Politburo, artificial intelligence research must explore ‘unmanned areas.’ In the areas of swarm intelligence, human-machine hybrid intelligence and autonomous intelligence, there are large unmanned areas to be explored… We believe that autonomous evolution is a bridge from weak artificial intelligence to general artificial intelligence.”

Shi Luping (施路平), director of the Center for Brain-inspired Computing Research, Tsinghua University and leader of the research group that created the Tianjic neuromorphic chip, has a novel epistemological take on the emergence of AGI: “Our human intelligence is built on carbon, and we have built the current digital universe on silicon. The structure of carbon and silicon is very similar, so we believe what can be realized on carbon, must be possible on silicon… Moreover, nanodevices have enabled us to develop electronic devices such as neurons and synapses at the level of human brain energy consumption, so now is the best time to develop artificial general intelligence.”

Tan Tieniu (谭铁牛), deputy director of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, deputy chief of the PRC’s liaison office in Hong Kong, and a leading AI figure, explained in Qiushi, the Communist Party’s main theoretical journal:

“How to make the leap from narrow artificial intelligence to general artificial intelligence is the inevitable trend in the development of the next generation of artificial intelligence. It is also a major challenge in the field of research and application.”

Zeng Yi (曾毅), deputy director of CAS’s Research Center for Brain-inspired Intelligence, 2019 member of the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Governance Expert Committee, and keynote speaker at “AGI-19,” the 12th annual international conference on AGI:

“Whether to develop general artificial intelligence, or limit it to specific AI is a major point of divergence among many proposals for artificial intelligence guidelines… In fact, the development of dedicated [专用, ‘narrow’] AI does not completely avoid risk, because the system is likely to encounter unexpected scenarios in its application. Having a certain general ability may improve the robustness and adaptiveness of an intelligent system.”

Huang Tiejun (黄铁军), chair of Peking University’s Department of Computer Science, dean of the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence, and also a 2019 member of the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Governance Expert Committee:

“My point is different from that of the other colleagues. Absolutely we should [build superintelligence]. Our human race is only at one stage. Why stop? Humans evolve too slowly. It’s impossible for humans to compare to machine-based superintelligence. It will happen sooner or later, so why wait? Even from the perspective of human centrism or human exceptionalism, superintelligence is needed to face big challenges that we can’t figure out. That’s why I support the idea.” (Future of Life conference)

Other such prognostications are commonplace. As part of the trajectory, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology and the Beijing city government in 2020 stood up a “Beijing Institute for General Artificial Intelligence” (北京通用人工智能研究院, BIGAI) headed by returned UCLA professor and renowned AI scientist Zhu Songchun (朱松纯), in concert with Peking University’s Institute for Artificial Intelligence and Tsinghua University’s own (planned) AGI institute. The facility is in Beijing’s Haidian districts and will be staffed by some 1,000 researchers drawn from China and, as usual, “all over the world.”

The move will lead to clones, first in Shanghai then the other major cities and provinces. Our concerns are two-fold. Firstly, AI hype tends to outpace its accomplishments, and the former should not become the basis for fear and countermeasures. In our view, a move toward AGI is a natural feature of AI research, in China or anywhere, as AIs become more capable. While the research warrants scrutiny, we believe AGI, understood literally, is not imminent (five years out) but possible in some form by the end of the decade.

Secondly—and more ominously—AGI may not be the best way to envision the result of brain-inspired or other lines of AI research. One need not subscribe to an AGI scenario to appreciate that all AI research entails risks. Nor is AGI a necessary condition for “superintelligence.” Here is one scenario, for example, which is plausible over a shorter term and comes directly from a credible Chinese source:

“Speaking of the brain-computer interaction of tomorrow, we will move from intelligence [of one type] to intelligence [of another] (从智能而来,到智能而去). The future is not about replacing human beings with artificial intelligence, but making AI a part of human beings through interconnection and interoperability. A blend of human and computer without barriers is the inevitable end of the future.”

This potential outcome, a way station on the path to AGI, portends fundamental changes in the human condition, indeed, in the nature of humanity and is cause for concern by itself.

Policy recommendations

The authors are daunted by the expectation that we propose policies addressing the issues we write about—something not encouraged in our former lives. Here are three, offered in good faith.

1. Pay greater attention to AI safety

We assess the likelihood of China achieving artificial general intelligence (AGI) through BI-AI within the next five years as improbable. Chinese scientists agree. The project is in its infancy and there is nothing in the open literature to suggest China has made breakthroughs in key areas. We are less confident other troublesome aspects of this research will not emerge sooner rather than later. We encourage the U.S. government, allied nations, and scientists worldwide to draw China and its AI cadre into a strong safeguards regime to manage these common dangers.

2. Mitigate greyzone technology transfers

China’s appetite for foreign technology, obtained with or without permission, is insatiable and we see no indication that China’s status as an emerging S&T power will impact this behavior. Absent a concerted effort to control technology transfers, the rest of the world is disadvantaged as it invests resources in technologies that China acquires gratis. We propose the creation of dedicated centers, nationally and internationally, to monitor “informal” technology transfers and refer them to cognizant authorities. The framework should also encompass legal transfers of sensitive technology where national security is at risk.

3. Build a “National S&T Analysis Center”

China’s AI-brain project blossomed in 2016, yet there has been no significant reporting about it outside China. As we describe elsewhere, U.S. intelligence agencies, unlike China’s, are ill-equipped to detect emerging technologies because their secrets-based platforms, a Cold War relic, are not tuned to capture worldwide scientific trends. Open source intelligence, by contrast, is well poised to provide the “indications and warnings” to reduce technology surprise. Realizing its full value will happen under the auspices of an organization established outside the IC to provide assessments and forecasts of S&T developments without institutional biases. PRISM

Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World

National Intelligence Council

The international system—as constructed following the Second World War—will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, an historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of nonstate actors.  By 2025, the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries.

Concurrent with the shift in power among nation-states, the relative power of various nonstate actors—including businesses, tribes, religious organizations, and criminal networks—is increasing.  The players are changing, but so too are the scope and breadth of transnational issues important for continued global prosperity.  Potentially slowing global economic growth; aging populations in the developed world; growing energy, food, and water constraints; and worries about climate change will limit and diminish what will still be an historically unprecedented age of prosperity. 

Executive Summary

Historically, emerging multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones.  Despite the recent financial volatility—which could end up accelerating many ongoing trends—we do not believe that we are headed towards a complete breakdown of the international system—as occurred in 1914-1918 when an earlier phase of globalization came to a halt.  But, the next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught with risks.  Strategic rivalries are most likely to revolve around trade, investments, and technological innovation and acquisition, but we cannot rule out a 19th century-like scenario of arms races, territorial expansion, and military rivalries. 

This is a story with no clear outcome, as illustrated by a series of vignettes we use to map out divergent futures.  Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States’ relative strength—even in the military realm—will decline and US leverage will become more constrained.  At the same time, the extent to which other actors—both state and nonstate—will be willing or able to shoulder increased burdens is unclear.  Policymakers and publics will have to cope with a growing demand for multilateral cooperation when the international system will be stressed by the incomplete transition from the old to a still forming new order.

Economic Growth Fueling Rise of Emerging Players

In terms of size, speed, and directional flow, the transfer of global wealth and economic power now under way—roughly from West to East—is without precedent in modern history.  This shift derives from two sources.  First, increases in oil and commodity prices have generated windfall profits for the Gulf States and Russia.  Second, lower costs combined with government policies have shifted the locus of manufacturing and some service industries to Asia.

Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India, and China indicate they will collectively match the original G-7’s share of global GDP by 2040-2050.  China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next 20 years than any other country.  If current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world’s second largest economy and will be a leading military power.  It also could be the largest importer of natural resources and the biggest polluter.  India probably will continue to enjoy relatively rapid economic growth and will strive for a multipolar world in which New Delhi is one of the poles.  China and India must decide the extent to which they are willing and capable of playing increasing global roles and how each will relate to the other.  Russia has the potential to be richer, more powerful, and more self-assured in 2025.  If it invests in human capital, expands and diversifies its economy, and integrates with global markets, by 2025 Russia could boast a GDP approaching that of the UK and France.  On the other hand, Russia could experience a significant decline if it fails to take these steps and oil and gas prices remain in the $50-70 per barrel range. No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia, and none is likely to match their individual global clout.  We expect, however, to see the political and economic power of other countries—such as Indonesia, Iran, and Turkey—increase. 

For the most part, China, India, and Russia are not following the Western liberal model for self-development but instead are using a different model, “state capitalism.”  State capitalism is a loose term used to describe a system of economic management that gives a prominent role to the state.  Other rising powers—South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore—also used state capitalism to develop their economies.  However, the impact of China following this path is potentially much greater owing to its size and approach to “democratization.”  Nevertheless, we remain optimistic about the long-term prospects for greater democratization, even though advances are likely to be slow and globalization is subjecting many recently democratized countries to increasing social and economic pressures with the potential to undermine liberal institutions.

Many other countries will fall further behind economically.  Sub-Saharan Africa will remain the region most vulnerable to economic disruption, population stresses, civil conflict, and political instability.  Despite increased global demand for commodities for which Sub-Saharan Africa will be a major supplier, local populations are unlikely to experience significant economic gain.  Windfall profits arising from sustained increases in commodity prices might further entrench corrupt or otherwise ill-equipped governments in several regions, diminishing the prospects for democratic and market-based reforms.  Although many of Latin America’s major countries will have become middle income powers  by 2025, others, particularly those such as Venezuela and Bolivia which have embraced populist policies for a protracted period, will lag behind—and some, such as Haiti, will have become even poorer and less governable.  Overall, Latin America will continue to lag behind Asia and other fast-growing areas in terms of economic competitiveness.    

Asia, Africa, and Latin America will account for virtually all population growth over the next 20 years; less than 3 percent of the growth will occur in the West.  Europe and Japan will continue to far outdistance the emerging powers of China and India in per capita wealth, but they will struggle to maintain robust growth rates because the size of their working-age populations will decrease.  The US will be a partial exception to the aging of populations in the developed world because it will experience higher birth rates and more immigration.  The number of migrants seeking to move from disadvantaged to relatively privileged countries is likely to increase.

The number of countries with youthful age structures in the current “arc of instability” is projected to decline by as much as 40 percent.  Three of every four youth-bulge countries that remain will be located in Sub-Saharan Africa, nearly all of the remainder will be located in the core of the Middle East, scattered through southern and central Asia, and in the Pacific Islands.

New Transnational Agenda

Resource issues will gain prominence on the international agenda.  Unprecedented global economic growth—positive in so many other regards—will continue to put pressure on a number of highly strategic resources, including energy, food, and water, and demand is projected to outstrip easily available supplies over the next decade or so.  For example, non-OPEC liquid hydrocarbon production—crude oil, natural gas liquids, and unconventionals such as tar sands—will not grow commensurate with demand.  Oil and gas production of many traditional energy producers already is declining.  Elsewhere—in China, India, and Mexico—production has flattened.  Countries capable of significantly expanding production will dwindle; oil and gas production will be concentrated in unstable areas.  As a result of this and other factors, the world will be in the midst of a fundamental energy transition away from oil toward natural gas and coal and other alternatives.

The World Bank estimates that demand for food will rise by 50 percent by 2030, as a result of growing world population, rising affluence, and the shift to Western dietary preferences by a larger middle class.  Lack of access to stable supplies of water is reaching critical proportions, particularly for agricultural purposes, and the problem will worsen because of rapid urbanization worldwide and the roughly 1.2 billion persons to be added over the next 20 years.  Today, experts consider 21 countries, with a combined population of about 600 million, to be either cropland or freshwater scarce.  Owing to continuing population growth, 36 countries, with about 1.4 billion people, are projected to fall into this category by 2025.

Climate change is expected to exacerbate resource scarcities.  Although the impact of climate change will vary by region, a number of regions will begin to suffer harmful effects, particularly water scarcity and loss of agricultural production.  Regional differences in agricultural production are likely to become more pronounced over time with declines disproportionately concentrated in developing countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Agricultural losses are expected to mount over time with substantial impacts forecast by most economists by late this century.  For many developing countries, decreased agricultural output will be devastating because agriculture accounts for a large share of their economies and many of their citizens live close to subsistence levels. 

New technologies could again provide solutions, such as viable alternatives to fossil fuels or means to overcome food and water constraints.  However, all current technologies are inadequate for replacing the traditional energy architecture on the scale needed, and new energy technologies probably will not be commercially viable and widespread by 2025.  The pace of technological innovation will be key.  Even with a favorable policy and funding environment for biofuels, clean coal, or hydrogen, the transition to new fuels will be slow.  Major technologies historically have had an “adoption lag.”  In the energy sector, a recent study found that it takes an average of 25 years for a new production technology to become widely adopted. 

Despite what are seen as long odds now, we cannot rule out the possibility of an energy transition by 2025 that would avoid the costs of an energy infrastructure overhaul.  The greatest possibility for a relatively quick and inexpensive transition during the period comes from better renewable generation sources (photovoltaic and wind) and improvements in battery technology.  With many of these technologies, the infrastructure cost hurdle for individual projects would be lower, enabling many small economic actors to develop their own energy transformation projects that directly serve their interests—e.g., stationary fuel cells powering homes and offices, recharging plug-in hybrid autos, and selling energy back to the grid.   Also, energy conversion schemes—such as plans to generate hydrogen for automotive fuel cells from electricity in the homeowner’s garage—could avoid the need to develop complex hydrogen transportation infrastructure.   

Prospects for Terrorism, Conflict, and Proliferation

Terrorism, proliferation, and conflict will remain key concerns even as resource issues move up on the international agenda.  Islamic terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025, but its appeal could diminish if economic growth continues and youth unemployment is mitigated in the Middle East.  Economic opportunities for youth and greater political pluralism probably would dissuade some from joining terrorists’ ranks, but others—motivated by a variety of factors, such as a desire for revenge or to become “martyrs”—will continue to turn to violence to pursue their objectives.

In the absence of employment opportunities and legal means for political expression, conditions will be ripe for disaffection, growing radicalism, and possible recruitment of youths into terrorist groups.  Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long-established groups—that inherit organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks—and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized.  For those terrorist groups that are active in 2025, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach.  One of our greatest concerns continues to be that terrorist or other malevolent groups might acquire and employ biological agents, or less likely, a nuclear device, to create mass casualties. 

Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, other countries’ worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions.  It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear-weapons capable Iran.  Episodes of low-intensity conflict taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established.

We believe ideological conflicts akin to the Cold War are unlikely to take root in a world in which most states will be preoccupied with the pragmatic challenges of globalization and shifting global power alignments.  The force of ideology is likely to be strongest in the Muslim world—particularly the Arab core.  In those countries that are likely to struggle with youth bulges and weak economic underpinnings—such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Yemen—the radical Salafi trend of Islam is likely to gain traction.

Types of conflict we have not seen for awhile—such as over resources—could reemerge.  Perceptions of energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies.  In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regimes.  However, even actions short of war will have important geopolitical consequences.  Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue-water naval capabilities.  The buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes.  With water becoming more scarce in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to become more difficult within and between states. 

The risk of nuclear weapon use over the next 20 years, although remaining very low, is likely to be greater than it is today as a result of several converging trends.  The spread of nuclear technologies and expertise is generating concerns about the potential emergence of new nuclear weapon states and the acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorist groups.  Ongoing low-intensity clashes between India and Pakistan continue to raise the specter that such events could escalate to a broader conflict between those nuclear powers.  The possibility of a future disruptive regime change or collapse occurring in a nuclear weapon state such as North Korea also continues to raise questions regarding the ability of weak states to control and secure their nuclear arsenals.

If nuclear weapons are used in the next 15-20 years, the international system will be shocked as it experiences immediate humanitarian, economic, and political-military repercussions.  A future use of nuclear weapons probably would bring about significant geopolitical changes as some states would seek to establish or reinforce security alliances with existing nuclear powers and others would push for global nuclear disarmament.

A More Complex International System

The trend toward greater diffusion of authority and power that has been occurring for a couple decades is likely to accelerate because of the emergence of new global players, the worsening institutional deficit, potential expansion of regional blocs, and enhanced strength of nonstate actors and networks.  The multiplicity of actors on the international scene could add strength—in terms of filling gaps left by aging post-World War II institutions—or further fragment the international system and incapacitate international cooperation.  The diversity in type of actor raises the likelihood of fragmentation occurring over the next two decades, particularly given the wide array of transnational challenges facing the international community. 

The rising BRIC powers are unlikely to challenge the international system as did Germany and Japan in the 19th and 20th centuries, but because of their growing geopolitical and economic clout, they will have a high degree of freedom to customize their political and economic policies rather than fully adopting Western norms.  They also are likely to want to preserve their policy freedom to maneuver, allowing others to carry the primary burden for dealing with such issues as terrorism, climate change, proliferation, and energy security. 

Existing multilateral institutions—which are large and cumbersome and were designed for a different geopolitical order—appear unlikely to have the capacity to adapt quickly to undertake new missions, accommodate changing memberships, and augment their resources. 

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—concentrating on specific issues—increasingly will be a part of the landscape, but NGO networks are likely to be limited in their ability to effect change in the absence of concerted efforts by multilateral institutions or governments.  Efforts at greater inclusiveness—to reflect the emergence of the newer powers—may make it harder for international organizations to tackle transnational challenges.  Respect for the dissenting views of member nations will continue to shape the agenda of organizations and limit the kinds of solutions that can be attempted. 

Greater Asian regionalism—possible by 2025—would have global implications, sparking or reinforcing a trend toward three trade and financial clusters that could become quasi-blocs:  North America, Europe, and East Asia.  Establishment of such quasi-blocs would have implications for the ability to achieve future global World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements.  Regional clusters could compete in setting trans-regional product standards for information technology, biotech, nanotech, intellectual property rights, and other aspects of the “new economy.”  On the other hand, an absence of regional cooperation in Asia could help spur competition among China, India, and Japan over resources such as energy. 

Intrinsic to the growing complexity of the overlapping roles of state, institutions, and nonstate actors is the proliferation of political identities, which is leading to establishment of new networks and rediscovered communities.  No one political identity is likely to be dominant in most societies by 2025.  Religion-based networks may be quintessential issue networks and overall may play a more powerful role on many transnational issues such as the environment and inequalities than secular groupings.

The United States:  Less Dominant Power 

By 2025 the US will find itself as one of a number of important actors, albeit still the most powerful one, on the world stage.  Even in the military realm, where the US will continue to possess considerable advantages in 2025, advances by others in science and technology, expanded adoption of irregular warfare tactics by both state and nonstate actors, proliferation of long-range precision weapons, and growing use of cyber warfare attacks increasingly will constrict US freedom of action.  A more constrained US role has implications for others and the likelihood of new agenda issues being tackled effectively.  Despite the recent rise in anti-Americanism, the US probably will continue to be seen as a much-needed regional balancer in the Middle East and Asia.  The US will continue to be expected to play a significant role in using its military power to counter global terrorism.  On newer security issues like climate change, US leadership will widely perceived as critical to leveraging competing and divisive views to find solutions.  At the same time, the multiplicity of influential actors and distrust of vast power means less room for the US to call the shots without the support of strong partnerships.  Developments in the rest of the world, including internal developments in a number of key states—particularly China and Russia—are also likely to be crucial determinants of US policy. 

2025—What Kind of Future? 

The above trends suggest major discontinuities, shocks, and surprises, which we highlight throughout the text.  Examples include nuclear weapons use or a pandemic.  In some cases, the surprise element is only a matter of timing:  an energy transition, for example is inevitable; the only questions are when and how abruptly or smoothly such a transition occurs.  An energy transition from one type of fuel (fossil fuels) to another (alternative) is an event that historically has only happened once a century at most with momentous consequences.  The transition from wood to coal helped trigger industrialization.  In this case, a transition—particularly an abrupt one—out of fossil fuels would have major repercussions for energy producers in the Middle East and Eurasia, potentially causing permanent decline of some states as global and regional powers. 

Other discontinuities are less predictable.  They are likely to result from an interaction of several trends and depend on the quality of leadership.  We put uncertainties such as whether China or Russia becomes a democracy in this category.  China’s growing middle class increases the chances but does not make such a development inevitable.  Political pluralism seems less likely in Russia in the absence of economic diversification.  Pressure from below may force the issue, or a leader might begin or enhance the democratization process to sustain the economy or spur economic growth.  A sustained plunge in the price of oil and gas would alter the outlook and increase prospects for greater political and economic liberalization in Russia.  If either country were to democratize, it would represent another wave of democratization with wide significance for many other developing states. 

Also uncertain are the outcomes of demographic challenges facing Europe, Japan, and even Russia.  In none of these cases does demography have to spell destiny with less regional and global power an inevitable outcome.  Technology, the role of immigration, public health improvements, and laws encouraging greater female participation in the economy are some of the measures that could change the trajectory of current trends pointing toward less economic growth, increased social tensions, and possible decline. 

Whether global institutions adapt and revive—another key uncertainty—also is a function of leadership.  Current trends suggest a dispersion of power and authority will create a global governance deficit.  Reversing those trend lines would require strong leadership in the international community by a number of powers, including the emerging ones.

Some uncertainties would have greater consequences—should they occur—than would others.  In this work, we emphasize the overall potential for greater conflict—some forms of which could threaten globalization.  We put WMD terrorism and a Middle East nuclear arms race in this category.  The key uncertainties and possible impacts are discussed in the text and summarized in the textbox on page vii on relative certainties.  In the four fictionalized scenarios, we have highlighted new challenges that could emerge as a result of the ongoing global transformation.  They present new situations, dilemmas, or predicaments that represent departures from recent developments.  As a set, they do not cover all possible futures.  None of these is inevitable or even necessarily likely; but, as with many other uncertainties, the scenarios are potential game-changers.

    In A World Without the West, the new powers supplant the West as the leaders on the world stage.

    October Surprise illustrates the impact of inattention to global climate change; unexpected major impacts narrow the world’s range of options.

    In BRICs’ Bust-Up, disputes over vital resources emerge as a source of conflict between major powers—in this case two emerging heavyweights—India and China.

    In Politics is Not Always Local, nonstate networks emerge to set the international agenda on the environment, eclipsing governments.

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