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If the Deagel calculations turn out to be even close to accurate, the most unsafe places to live over the next three years will be the United States, Canada and the U.K., followed by Germany, Australia and the rest of the E.U. nations. This population forecast was so controversial, showing population reductions of 68.5 percent in the United States (from 2017 levels) and between 25 and 70 percent for almost every Western European country, that the study mysteriously disappeared from Deagel’s website in March 2021.
But not all areas of the world will continue to decline. Some will actually have larger populations in the near future, according to the Deagel forecast. The safest places to be living would appear to be Central and South America, China and Africa. Interestingly, Russia came in as neutral, not gaining or losing population.
Is this Deagel forecast map a prediction of who will win a future World War III?
Or will a Global Pandemic or maybe a Vaccine be the reason for this!
Deagel organization predicts massive global depopulation of 50 to 80%
Historically, a change in the economic paradigm
Deagel organization predicts massive global depopulation of 50 to 80%. Deagel.com
Deagel, a true intelligence organization for the US government, predicted a massive 50-80% global depopulation. Few people are familiar with this website and even more say the organization does not legitimately exist. Despite the overwhelming removal of its significance, WikiLeaks documents revealed that it was legitimately used as a reference material in a Stratfor report on the technological capabilities of the North People's Republic of Korea.
According to its own website, Deagel provides news and information on international military aviation and advanced technologies. The website contains articles from 2003, but little is known about the real owners. Many online researchers have mistakenly confused this site with "deagle.com" which is owned by Edwin A. Deagle, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Assistant Secretary of Defense.
Deagel's reports, particularly the aforementioned research on North Korea, were also provided to the president during presidential briefings. Deagel thus provides information which is then used by global intelligence communities and governments. Here is a partial list of known Deagel partners and customers, according to their own websites: National Security Agency, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Russian Defense Procurement Agency, Stratfor, the World Bank and the United Nations.
The advantage of these forecasts is that the Deagel site has no conflict of interest in these forecasts. They are literally mercenaries. The site analyzes which budgets will be allocated to which markets to purchase military aircraft. That’s all that really matters to them. These forecasts are based on the reconciliation of various publicly available reports from institutions such as the CIA, the IMF and the UN. They also include a small amount of data from a variety of "dark sources" such as web gurus. But all of these sources are on the internet. The list is constantly evolving. Forecasts of population growth or decline, military spending, and purchasing power parity across countries around the world have fluctuated somewhat, but since 2015 one prediction has not changed: China will be the largest economy on the planet soon.
This highly regarded intelligence organization has bleak prospects for the United States in the years to come, including an 81% decline in its population, from 327 million in 2017 to 100 million. In fact, it predicted a similar cataclysmic fate for the UK, Australia, Germany, Japan, Denmark, and other US allies. For example, according to Deagel, the population of France will increase from 67 million inhabitants in 2017 to 39 million, that of England will increase from 66 million to 15 million, that of Australia from 23 million to 15 million. , that of Germany from 81 million to 28 million, while the population of Canada will grow from 36 million in 2017 to 26 million.
To make matters even stranger, a statement on Deagel's predictions page apparently claims that the population movements are due to suicide and assures us that the organization is not "a merchant of death or satanic worship":
“Historically, a shift in the economic paradigm has resulted in a death toll that is seldom highlighted by mainstream historians. When the transition from rural areas to large cities occurred in Europe, many people unable to accept the new paradigm committed suicide. They committed suicide by a psychological factor. This is not common but it is true. A new crisis combines old, well-known models with new ones. We are not a dealer in death or in satanic worship or in weapons as there are rumors floating around the Internet about this. "
“Take into account that the forecast is nothing more than a model, whether it is wrong or correct. It is not the word of God or some magical device that predicts the future. "- Deagel.com
Most of the economic and demographic data used to make the forecasts are widely available from institutions such as the CIA, IMF, UN, US government, etc.
There is a tiny fraction of the data coming from a variety of shadow sources such as internet gurus, unsigned reports and others. But all of these sources come from the Internet and are in the public domain for at least a minority. For example, several years ago, Dagong, the Chinese rating agency, published a report analyzing the physical economy of states by comparing it to that of China, Germany and Japan. The conclusion was that the US GDP was between $ 5,000 and $ 10,000 billion instead of $ 15 trillion, as the USG officially stated. We assume that official data, especially economic data, published by governments are false or distorted to some extent. Historically, it is well known that the former Soviet Union drew up false statistics years before its collapse. The West and other countries are now inventing their numbers to hide their real situation. We are sure that many people can find government statistics in their own country which, through their own personal experience, are hard to believe or are so optimistic that they may belong to another country.
Despite the "quantity" of digital data, there is a "quality" model that does not translate directly into digital data. The 2014 strain of Ebola has a death rate of 50-60%, but try to imagine what would happen if there was an Ebola pandemic with hundreds of thousands or millions of people infected with it. virus. So far, the few cases of people infected with the Ebola virus have “benefited” from intensive health care with antiviral and respiratory assistance, but mostly with abundant human support from doctors and nurses. In a pandemic scenario, this type of health care will not be available for the overwhelming number of infected, leading to a dramatic increase in the death rate due to the lack of appropriate health care. The “quality” factor is that the death rate could increase by 80-90% in a pandemic scenario from the reported rate of 50-60%. The number itself does not matter what is relevant is the fact that the scenario may evolve beyond the initial conditions of a 50% balance sheet to over 90%. By the way, no pandemic or nuclear war is included in the forecast.
The key to understanding the process America will enter the next decade is migration. In the past, especially in the 20th century, the key factor that enabled the United States to achieve its status as a colossus was immigration with the benefits of population expansion favoring credit expansion and brain drain. the rest of the world for the benefit of States. The collapse of the Western financial system will wipe out the standard of living of its people while putting an end to ponzi schemes such as the stock market and pension funds. The population will be hit so hard by a full array of bubbles and ponzi schemes that the migration engine will start to work in reverse acceleration due to ripple effects, leading to the demise of states. This situation invisible to states will cascade with unprecedented and devastating effects on the economy. The offshoring of jobs will surely end with many American companies relocating abroad thus becoming foreign companies !!!!
We see a significant portion of the American population migrating to Latin America and Asia while migration to Europe - suffering from a similar illness - will not be relevant. Nonetheless, the death toll will be horrendous. Take into account that the population of the Soviet Union was poorer than Americans today or even then. The ex-Soviets suffered during the next struggle in the 1990s with a significant death toll and loss of national pride. Could we say "twice the pride, twice the fall"? Nope. America's standard of living is one of the highest, well over double that of the Soviets while adding a service economy that will accompany the financial system. When retirees see their retirement disappearing in front of their eyes and there are no service jobs, you can imagine what will happen next. At least young people can migrate. Never in human history have there been so many elders in the population. Over the past centuries, people have been fortunate enough to reach their 30s and 40s. America's downfall is expected to be much worse than that of the Soviet Union. A confluence of crisis with a devastating result.
The demographic crisis in the former Soviet Union countries extended for more than two decades, if we admit that it ended at the beginning of this decade (2010s). The demographic crisis will hit the world in the near future and is expected to last between three and eight decades more or less depending on technological advances and environmental issues. The consequence is more likely a frozen picture with the number of populations remaining the same for a very, very long period of time. Countries expect population figures to reflect births / deaths as well as migratory movements. Many countries will increase their gross populations as a result of immigration while their indigenous populations may decrease.
Over the past two thousand years we have seen Western civilization built around the Mediterranean Sea move to Northern Europe, then in the mid-twentieth century move to an Atlantic axis and finally focus on the United States. United for the past 30 years. The next step will see civilization centered on Asia with Russia and China at the top. Historically, a shift in the economic paradigm has resulted in a death toll that is seldom highlighted by mainstream historians. When the transition from rural areas to large cities occurred in Europe, many people unable to accept the new paradigm committed suicide. They committed suicide by a psychological factor. This is not common but it is true. A new crisis combines old, well-known models with new ones.
Sorry to disappoint many of you with our forecast. They have worsened more and more each year since the start of the pre-crisis in 2007. It is already said that this site is non-profit, built on free time and we provide our information and services AS IS without others. explanations and / or guarantees.
We are not tied to any government in any way. We are not a dealer in death or in satanic worship or in weapons as there are rumors floating around the Internet about this. Be aware that the forecast is nothing more than a model, whether it is wrong or correct. It is not the word of God or some magical device that predicts the future.
There are 179 countries listed with a forecast. Deagel Forecast For USA – Population Drops 70% Deagel.com is a global military intelligence site. They have had an online presence since 2003. They report on high-level military equipment assets and keep track of military expenditures by country “with nearly impeccable numbers”. Population In Millions, Real Gross Domestic Products In USD Billions, Defense Budget In USD Billions, Power Purchase Parity In USD |
2 India 1,341 $7,320 $110 $5,456
3 Russia 141 $6,177 $186 $43,557
4 Brazil 210 $3,241 $37 $15,412
5 Indonesia 267 $2,608 $14 $9,766
6 Japan 103 $2,431 $17 $23,593
7 Mexico 124 $1,711 $6.1 $13,724
8 United States of America 99 $1,630 $32 $16,374
9 Pakistan 218 $1,179 $26 $5,389
10 Iran 81 $1,174 $18 $14,325
11 Thailand 64 $1,126 $11 $17,333
12 Egypt 105 $1,107 $14 $10,514
13 Malaysia 33 $1,031 $10 $30,920
14 Nigeria 187 $1,012 $5 $5,406
15 Philippines 117 $960 $8.3 $8,207
16 Italy 43 $945 $12 $21,600
17 Turkey 71 $833 $9.8 $11,653
18 Saudi Arabia 25 $806 $36 $31,873
19 Colombia 49 $806 $18 $16,388
20 Netherlands 16 $797 $9.7 $47,451
21 South Korea 37 $775 $13 $20,902
22 France 39 $718 $10 $18,368
23 Vietnam 99 $669 $11 $6,762
24 Canada 26 $663 $6.4 $25,208
25 Taiwan 18 $647 $7.3 $34,942
26 Argentina 41 $640 $4.3 $15,621
27 Poland 33 $599 $6.1 $18,036
28 Bangladesh 178 $565 $4.5 $3,173
29 Iraq 33 $514 $21 $15,235
30 Romania 21 $484 $4.4 $23,041
31 Algeria 43 $483 $13 $11,078
32 Chile 18 $482 $7.9 $26,665
33 Germany 28 $413 $2.9 $14,704
34 South Africa 45 $400 $2.3 $8,725
35 Spain 27 $388 $2.1 $13,986
36 Peru 31 $386 $3 $12,101
37 Kazakhstan 18 $315 $1.9 $17,404
38 Czechia 9.9 $302 $2.1 $30,589
39 Morocco 33 $298 $7.1 $8,853
40 Australia 15 $280 $2.8 $18,441
41 Myanmar 58 $278 $5 $4,749
42 Venezuela 29 $267 $1.7 $9,132
43 Hungary 9.4 $258 $1.5 $27,587
44 Singapore 5 $252 $4.2 $50,863
45 Sri Lanka 22 $241 $3.7 $10,577
46 Ethiopia 100 $238 $1.3 $2,369
47 Finland 5.3 $215 $3.6 $40,857
48 Belgium 8.1 $207 $1.9 $25,767
49 Kenya 50 $180 $2.1 $3,595
50 Dominican Republic 11 $177 $0.7 $15,766
51 Portugal 8.1 $172 $2.2 $21,230
52 Sudan 40 $168 $2.8 $4,149
53 Austria 6.2 $167 $1.1 $26,908
54 Afghanistan 33 $165 $6.3 $4,924
55 Ukraine 31 $164 $2.4 $5,188
56 Uzbekistan 30 $164 $3.2 $5,389
57 Ecuador 15 $164 $2.7 $10,599
58 Azerbaijan 9.6 $158 $4.9 $16,456
59 Sweden 7.2 $157 $1.4 $21,958
60 Slovakia 5.1 $147 $1.1 $29,069
61 Switzerland 5.3 $144 $0.7 $27,124
62 United Kingdom 14 $131 $1.4 $9,068
63 Greece 8.1 $129 $2 $16,105
64 Bulgaria 6.1 $127 $1.2 $20,767
65 Angola 19 $125 $4.1 $6,437
66 United Arab Emirates 4.7 $124 $4.8 $26,651
67 Lebanon 6.6 $120 $3.3 $18,333
68 Oman 3.6 $119 $7.4 $33,011
69 Norway 3.8 $115 $1.5 $30,188
70 Guatemala 16 $112 $0.3 $6,630
71 Tanzania 42 $111 $0.8 $2,611
72 Cuba 10 $110 $3.2 $10,190
73 Cote d'Ivoire 25 $104 $1.1 $4,092
74 Ghana 27 $100 $0.3 $3,590
75 Denmark 3.8 $94 $1 $25,057
76 Cameroon 24 $94 $0.9 $3,872
77 Qatar 1.8 $91 $3.4 $51,731
78 Belarus 7.9 $86 $0.5 $10,968
79 Turkmenistan 5.6 $82 $1.5 $14,774
80 Bolivia 11 $82 $0.8 $6,846
81 Kuwait 2.4 $81 $2.9 $34,104
82 Nepal 33 $81 $0.8 $2,421
83 Panama 3.8 $79 $0.4 $20,694
84 Costa Rica 5.2 $78 $ $15,199
85 Tunisia 10 $77 $0.6 $7,258
86 Lithuania 2.7 $73 $0.6 $27,174
87 Croatia 3.8 $70 $0.7 $18,850
88 Cambodia 17 $69 $0.9 $3,998
89 Uganda 36 $68 $0.7 $1,877
90 Serbia 6 $63 $0.6 $10,717
91 Democratic Republic of Congo 81 $63 $0.7 $776
92 Jordan 6.9 $62 $1.6 $9,144
93 Paraguay 7.2 $62 $0.7 $8,679
94 Syria 16 $61 $4.4 $3,812
95 Yemen 27 $59 $1.3 $2,172
96 New Zealand 3.3 $48 $0.3 $14,711
97 Slovenia 1.7 $47 $0.4 $27,708
98 Israel 4 $46 $1.7 $11,798
99 Zambia 15 $44 $0.4 $2,886
100 Senegal 14 $44 $0.5 $3,066
101 Laos 7.7 $44 $0.1 $5,844
102 Latvia 1.8 $43 $0.4 $24,795
103 El Salvador 5.3 $42 $0.3 $7,965
104 Honduras 9.8 $42 $0.3 $4,282
105 Gabon 1.9 $41 $0.4 $21,794
106 Mali 16 $40 $0.5 $2,472
107 Burkina Faso 18 $40 $0.4 $2,209
108 Republic of the Congo 5.3 $37 $0.6 $7,128
109 Botswana 2.3 $36 $0.6 $16,155
110 Georgia 4.7 $36 $0.6 $7,770
111 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.6 $35 $0.3 $9,756
112 Albania 2.8 $35 $0.3 $12,485
113 Rwanda 12 $33 $0.3 $2,572
114 Brunei Darussalam 0.4 $32 $0.6 $73,859
115 Mozambique 26 $31 $0.2 $1,229
116 Chad 12 $31 $0.5 $2,538
117 Uruguay 2.8 $30 $0.5 $10,761
118 Mongolia 3.1 $30 $0.2 $9,772
119 Madagascar 24 $28 $0.1 $1,139
120 Nicaragua 6.2 $27 $0.1 $4,466
121 North Macedonia 1.9 $27 $0.2 $14,380
122 Benin 10 $27 $0.2 $2,600
123 Tajikistan 9.2 $25 $0.2 $2,732
124 Papua New Guinea 7.6 $23 $0.1 $3,065
125 Mauritius 1.4 $23 $0 $17,566
126 Niger 17 $23 $0.4 $1,321
127 Jamaica 2.8 $21 $0.1 $7,612
128 Zimbabwe 14 $21 $0.3 $1,492
129 Estonia 0.9 $20 $0.4 $21,806
130 Namibia 2.3 $20 $0.5 $8,550
131 Armenia 2.9 $20 $0.5 $6,938
132 Bahrain 0.8 $17 $0.4 $20,778
133 Ireland 1.3 $16 $0 $12,355
134 Trinidad and Tobago 1 $16 $0.1 $16,041
135 Cyprus 0.8 $15 $0.2 $19,087
136 Equatorial Guinea 0.7 $15 $0 $22,236
137 Kyrgyzstan 5.8 $14 $0.1 $2,455
138 Mauritania 3.8 $14 $0.4 $3,715
139 Guinea 11 $13 $0.1 $1,137
140 Malawi 17 $13 $0.1 $789
141 Togo 7.5 $13 $0.2 $1,860
142 Libya 3.3 $11 $ $3,513
143 Montenegro 0.6 $11 $0.1 $18,861
144 Timor-Leste 1.4 $11 $0.2 $8,360
145 Haiti 9.4 $10 $ $1,152
146 Burundi 10 $9.9 $0.2 $941
147 Moldova 2.8 $9.5 $0 $3,463
148 Eswatini 1.4 $9.5 $0.1 $6,989
149 Sierra Leone 5.9 $8.2 $0 $1,390
150 Suriname 0.5 $7.4 $0 $13,621
151 Fiji 0.9 $7.1 $0.1 $7,847
152 Eritrea 6 $6.3 $0.2 $1,046
153 Guyana 0.7 $6.3 $0.1 $8,679
154 Malta 0.3 $6.2 $0 $21,156
155 Maldives 0.4 $6.2 $0.1 $15,824
156 Bhutan 0.8 $5.9 $ $7,515
157 Bahamas 0.3 $5 $ $18,312
158 Cape Verde 0.6 $4.4 $0 $7,725
159 Somalia 9.9 $4.3 $ $430
160 Central African Republic 6 $4.2 $0 $694
161 Djibouti 0.9 $4.1 $0.1 $4,653
162 Luxembourg 0.2 $3.9 $0 $19,402
163 Lesotho 1.7 $3.6 $0 $2,057
164 Guinea-Bissau 2 $3.6 $0.1 $1,821
165 Barbados 0.2 $3 $ $12,857
166 Iceland 0.2 $2.8 $0 $14,185
167 Belize 0.4 $2.7 $0 $7,671
168 Gambia 2 $2.6 $0 $1,303
169 Liberia 3.8 $2.4 $0 $627
170 Grenada 0.1 $1.9 $ $17,098
171 Comoros 0.9 $1.8 $0 $2,020
172 Solomon Islands 0.7 $1.8 $0 $2,734
173 Saint Lucia 0.1 $1.4 $ $10,978
174 Samoa 0.2 $1.4 $ $7,124
175 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.1 $1.3 $ $12,884
176 Sao Tome and Principe 0.2 $0.8 $ $3,418
177 Tonga 0.1 $0.7 $ $6,645
178 Kiribati 0.1 $0.4 $ $3,483
179 Micronesia 0.1 $0.3 $ $3,282
Disclaimer*
In 2014 Deagel.com published a disclaimer about the forecast. Stating in six years the scenario had changed dramatically. This new disclaimer is meant to single out the situation from 2020 onwards. Talking about the United States and the European Union as separated entities no longer makes sense. Both are the Western block, keep printing money and will share the same fate.
After COVID we can draw two major conclusions:
- The Western world success model has been built over societies with no resilience that can barely withstand any hardship, even a low intensity one. It was assumed but we got the full confirmation beyond any doubt.
- The COVID crisis will be used to extend the life of this dying economic system through the so called Great Reset.
The Great Reset; like the climate change, extinction rebellion, planetary crisis, green revolution, shale oil (…) hoaxes promoted by the system; is another attempt to slow down dramatically the consumption of natural resources and therefore extend the lifetime of the current system. It can be effective for awhile but finally won’t address the bottom-line problem and will only delay the inevitable. The core ruling elites hope to stay in power which is in effect the only thing that really worries them.
The collapse of the Western financial system - and ultimately the Western civilization - has been the major driver in the forecast along with a confluence of crisis with a devastating outcome. As COVID has proven Western societies embracing multiculturalism and extreme liberalism are unable to deal with any real hardship. The Spanish flu one century ago represented the death of 40-50 million people. Today the world’s population is four times greater with air travel in full swing which is by definition a super spreader. The death casualties in today’s World would represent 160 to 200 million in relative terms but more likely 300-400 million taking into consideration the air travel factor that did not exist one century ago. So far, COVID death toll is roughly 1 million people. It is quite likely that the economic crisis due to the lockdowns will cause more deaths than the virus worldwide.
The Soviet system was less able to deliver goodies to the people than the Western one. Nevertheless Soviet society was more compact and resilient under an authoritarian regime. That in mind, the collapse of the Soviet system wiped out 10 percent of the population. The stark reality of diverse and multicultural Western societies is that a collapse will have a toll of 50 to 80 percent depending on several factors but in general terms the most diverse, multicultural, indebted and wealthy (highest standard of living) will suffer the highest toll. The only glue that keeps united such aberrant collage from falling apart is overconsumption with heavy doses of bottomless degeneracy disguised as virtue. Nevertheless the widespread censorship, hate laws and contradictory signals mean that even that glue is not working any more. Not everybody has to die migration can also play a positive role in this.
The formerly known as second and third world nations are an unknown at this point. Their fate will depend upon the decisions they take in the future. Western powers are not going to take over them as they did in the past because these countries won’t be able to control their own cities far less likely countries that are far away. If they remain tied to the former World Order they will go down along Western powers but won’t experience the brutal decline of the late because they are poorer and not diverse enough but rather quite homogenous used to deal with some sort of hardship but not precisely the one that is coming. If they switch to China they can get a chance to stabilize but will depend upon the management of their resources.
We expected this situation to unfold and actually is unfolding right now with the November election triggering a major bomb if Trump is re-elected. If Biden is elected there will very bad consequences as well. There is a lot of bad blood in the Western societies and the protests, demonstrations, rioting and looting are only the first symptoms of what is coming. However a new trend is taking place overshadowing this one.
The situation between the three great powers has changed dramatically. The only relevant achievement of the Western powers during the past decade has been the formation of a strategic alliance, both military and economic, between Russia and China. Right now the potential partnership between Russia and the European Union (EU) is dead with Russia turning definitively towards China. That was from the beginning the most likely outcome. Airbus never tried to establish a real partnership but rather a strategy to fade away the Russian aerospace industry. Actually Russia and China have formed a new alliance to build a long haul airliner. Western Europe (not to mention the United States) was never interested in the development of Russia or forming anything other than a master slave relationship with Russia providing raw materials and toeing the line of the West. It was clear then and today is a fact.
Russia has been preparing for a major war since 2008 and China has been increasing her military capabilities for the last 20 years. Today China is not a second tier power compared with the United States. Both in military and economic terms China is at the same level and in some specific areas are far ahead. In the domain of high-tech 5G has been a success in the commercial realm but the Type 055 destroyer is also another breakthrough with the US gaining a similar capability (DDG 51 Flight IIII) by mid of this decade (more likely by 2030). Nanchang, the lead ship of the Type 055 class, was commissioned amid the pandemic and lockdown in China.
Six years ago the likelihood of a major war was tiny. Since then it has grown steadily and dramatically and today is by far the most likely major event in the 2020s. The ultimate conflict can come from two ways. A conventional conflict involving at least two major powers that escalates into an open nuclear war. A second scenario is possible in the 2025-2030 timeframe. A Russian sneak first strike against the United States and its allies with the new S-500, strategic missile defenses, Yasen-M submarines, INF Zircon and Kalibr missiles and some new space asset playing the key role. The sneak first strike would involve all Russian missile strategic forces branches (bombers and ground-based missiles) at the different stages of such attack that would be strategic translation of what was seen in Syria in November 2015. There was no report that the Russian had such a capability of launching a high precision, multiple, combined arms attack at targets 2,000+ kilometers away. Western intelligence had no clue. The irony is that since the end of the Cold War the United States has been maneuvering through NATO to achieve a position to execute a first strike over Russia and now it seems that the first strike may occur but the country finished would be the United States.
Another particularity of the Western system is that its individuals have been brainwashed to the point that the majority accept their moral high ground and technological edge as a given. This has given the rise of the supremacy of the emotional arguments over the rational ones which are ignored or deprecated. That mindset can play a key role in the upcoming catastrophic events. At least in the Soviet system the silent majority of the people were aware of the fallacies they were fed up. We can see the United States claims about G5 being stolen from them by China or hypersonic technology being stolen by Russia as the evidence that the Western elites are also infected by that hubris. Over the next decade it will become obvious that the West is falling behind the Russia-China block and the malaise might grow into desperation. Going to war might seem a quick and easy solution to restore the lost hegemony to finally find them into a France 1940 moment. Back then France did not have nuclear weapons to turn a defeat into a victory. The West might try that swap because the unpleasant prospect of not being Mars and Venus but rather a bully and his dirty bitch running away in fear while the rest of the world is laughing at them.
If there is not a dramatic change of course the world is going to witness the first nuclear war. The Western block collapse may come before, during or after the war. It does not matter. A nuclear war is a game with billions of casualties and the collapse plays in the hundreds of millions.
UK, US, and Germany look to be “epicenters of slaughter”
Researcher Craig Paardekooper released this report on predictions of global population reduction from military analysis website Deagel.com.
Paardekooper’s article links mass slaughter to vaccines in countries inhabited mainly by White people of European descent.
Quote:
Deagel.com provided the forecast for population of each country. I obtained their forecast data before it was taken down in April of this year. However, the data had been safely archived and was still available for analysis.
I calculated the % population reductions for each country based on the difference between the current population and the forecast, and rank sorted each country in order of largest population reduction.
My hypothesis was that the cull would have an epicentre, centred in the countries/ powers who were running the pandemic – namely the G7.
I also hypothesised that those countries making the vaccines would right at the heart of the slaughter.
Observations
1. The G7 countries are clustered near the top of the list – their % population reductions are:
a. UK - 78.5%
b. USA - 70.2%
c. Germany - 65%
d. France - 41.8%
e. Italy - 30.6%
f. Canada - 29.7%
g. Japan - 17.6%
2. Three countries dominate the top positions:
a. UK
b. USA
c. Germany
These are the very 3 countries involved in the production of the vaccines: Astrazeneca, Moderna and Pfizer vaccines
If Deagel is an accurate forecast, then:
1. It is extremely dangerous to stay in UK, USA or Germany – the epicentres of this slaughter – the places where they make the vaccines (4 in 5 will die here).
2. G7 countries in general are a bad idea (1 in 3 will die at best).
3. European countries in general are unsafe.
4. The Eastern European countries appear to be the safer - Romania, Belize, Chechia, Lithuania, Finland, Hungry, Latvia.
5. There [is] quite a number of countries where there is no culling.
In Summary
It is advised that people temporarily distance themselves from UK, USA and Germany. These governments are planning the utter destruction of their own populations. And most are complying — it is almost like a suicide cult.
China comes in far down the list with just a 2.3% predicted reduction in population, from 1.390 billion to 1.358 billion people.
Population projections 2004-2050
EU25 population rises until 2025, then falls
Working age population expected to decrease by 52 million by 2050
Over the next two decades the t otal population of the EU25 is expected to increase by more than 13 million inhabitants, from 456.8 million on 1 January 2004 to 470.1 million on 1 January 2025 . Population growth in the EU25 until 2025 will be mainly due to net migration, since total deaths in the EU25 will outnumber total births from 2010. The effect of net migration will no longer outweigh the natural decrease after 2025, when the population will start to decline gradually. The population will reach 449.8 million on 1 January 2050 , that is a decrease of more than 20 million inhabitants co mpared to 2025 . Over the whole projection period the EU25 population will decrease by 1.5%, resulting from a 0.4% increase for the EU15 and a 11.7% decrease for the ten new Member States.
The share of the population of working age (between 15 and 64 ) in th e total population is expected to decrease strongly in the EU25, from 67.2% in 2004 to 56.7% in 2050 , that is a fall of 5 2 million inhabitants of working age .
The share of the population aged betwe en 0 and 14 will also be reduced , from 16.4% in 2004 to 13. 4% in 2050, while the proportion of elderly people (aged 65 and more) is expected to almost double over th is period, from 16.4% in 2004 to 29.9% in 2050.
This information on population projections 1 in the EU25, Bulgaria and Romania, issued by Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Communities , has been derived from the analysis and extrapolation of demographic trends. Given the length of the projection period, results should be considered with caution.
Largest declines in most of the new Member States
In 2004 t he population is estimated to have decreased in seven Member States ( the Czech Republic , Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). B y 202 5 the population will decrease in another six ; Italy (from 2013) , Germany and Slovenia (both 2014) , Portugal (2018), Greece (2020) and Spain ( 2022). By 2050, twenty Member States are expected to registe r a decline in their population; the previous thirteen plus Finland (from 2028), Austria (2029), Denmark (2032), the Netherlands (2036), Belgium (2037), the United Kingdom (2040) and France (2042). The population will still be increasing in Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden.
Between 2004 and 2050 , the largest declines are expected to be observed in most of the new Member States : Latvia ( -19.2%), Estonia (-16.6%), Lithuania (-16.4%), the Czech Republic (-12.9%), Hungary and Slovakia (both -11.9%), and Poland ( -11.8%). Over the whole period, the strongest increases will be recorded in Luxembourg (+42.3%), Ireland (+36.0%), Cyprus (+33.5%) and Malta (+27.1%).
In absolute terms the larg est population dec reases are expected in Germany (-7.9 million), followed by Italy (-5.2 million) and Poland ( -4.5 million) , while the highest rises are expected in France (+ 5.8 million) , the United Kingdom (+4.7 million) and Ireland (+1.5 million).
Number of adults and young people down by 67 million by 2050
The proportion of the population in working age (between 15 and 64) is expected to decline sharply in the long run.
In the EU25 it will pass from 67.2% in 2004 to 56.7% in 2050, i.e. in absolute terms from 306.8 million in 2004 to 254.9 million in 2050. In 2050 the lowest shares o f the population of working age will be observed in Spain (52.9%), Italy ( 53.5%), Portugal (55.0%) and Greece (55.2%) and t he highest in Luxembourg (61.3%), Malta (60.8%) and the Netherlands (60.7%).
The share of the EU25 population aged between 0 and 14 will decrease from 16.4% in 2004 to 13.4% in 2050. The largest decreases will be recorded in Cyprus (from 20.0% to 13.3%) an d Ireland (from 20.9% to 16.0%). In 2050 the proportion of young people will range between 11.2% in Italy and 16.6% in Luxembourg.
More than 10% of the population aged 80 or over in 2050
On the other hand, the proportion of elderly people (aged 65 and more) is expected to rise substantially throughout the whole projection period. In the EU25 it will increase from 16.4% in 2004 to 29.9% in 2050, or from 75.3 million in 2004 to 134.5 million in 2050. The largest shares of elderly people in 2050 are expected in Spain (35.6%), Italy (35.3%), and Greece (32.5%), and the lowest in Luxembourg (22.1%), the Netherlands (23.5 %) and Denmark (24.1%).
The proportion of very o ld people (aged 80 and more) is expected to almost triple in the EU25, from 4.0% in 2004 to 11.4% in 2050, with the highest proportions expected in Italy (14.1%), Germany (13.6%) and Spain (12.8%).
As a consequence, the elderly dependency ratio 2 in the EU25 will rise from 24.5% in 2004 to 52.8% in 2050, while the young dependency ratio 3 would remain more or less constant throughout the projection period, passing from 24.4% in 2004 to 23.7% in 2050. The total dependency ratio 4 in the EU25 would increase from 48.9% in 2004 to 76.5% in 2050. This means that whereas in 2004 there was one inactive person ( young or elderly) for every two persons of working age, in 2050 there would be three inactive persons for every four of working age.
1. The Eurostat set of population projections is just one among several scenarios of population evolution based on assumptions of fertility, mortality and migration. The current trend scenario does not take into account any future measures that could influence demographic trends and comprises four variants: the ‘baseline’ variant presented in this News Release, as well as 'high population', 'low population' and 'zero -migration' variants, all available on the Eurostat website . It should be noted that the assumptions adopted by Eurostat may differ from those adopted by National Statistical Institutes ( for example, assumptions about migration levels in Italy and Slovenia ). Therefore, the results published by Eurostat can be different from those published by Member States.
2. Population aged 65 and more as a percentage of population aged between 15 and 64.
3. Population aged between 0 and 14 as a percentage of population aged between 15 and 64.
4. Sum of young and elderly dependency ratios.
5. Data for France refer to metropolitan France.
Issued by:
Eurostat Press Office:
Philippe BAUTIER
BECH Building
L-2920 Luxembourg
Tel: +352-4301-33 444
Fax: +352-4301-35 349
eurostat-pressoffice@cec.eu.int
Eurostat news releases on the Web:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/
For further information:
Giampaolo LANZIERI
Fabio SARTORI
Konstantinos GIANNAKOURIS
Tel: +352-4301-35 336
Fax: +352-4301-36 049
giampaolo.lanzieri@cec.eu.int
fabio.sartori@cec.eu.int
konstantinos.giannakouris@cec.eu.int
Total population
Population at 1 January
(1000 inhabitants)
Percentage increase with
respect to 1.1.2004
2004 2015 2025 2050 2015 2025 2050
EU25 456 815 467 307 470 057 449 831 2.3 2.9 -1.5
EU15 382 674 394 727 398 780 384 356 3.1 4.2 0.4
New Member States 74 141 72 580 71 278 65 475 -2.1 -3.9 -11.7
Belgium 10 396 10 674 10 898 10 906 2.7 4.8 4.9
Czech Republic 10 212 10 012 9 812 8 894 -2.0 -3.9 -12.9
Denmark 5 398 5 498 5 557 5 430 1.9 2.9 0.6
Germany 82 532 82 864 82 108 74 642 0.4 -0.5 -9.6
Estonia 1 351 1 279 1 224 1 126 -5.3 -9.4 -16.6
Greece 11 041 11 390 11 394 10 632 3.2 3.2 -3.7
Spain 42 345 45 264 45 556 42 834 6.9 7.6 1.2
France5 59 901 62 616 64 392 65 704 4.5 7.5 9.7
Ireland 4 028 4 555 4 922 5 478 13.1 22.2 36.0
Italy 57 888 58 630 57 751 52 709 1.3 -0.2 -8.9
Cyprus 730 828 897 975 13.3 22.8 33.5
Latvia 2 319 2 174 2 068 1 873 -6.3 -10.8 -19.2
Lithuania 3 446 3 258 3 134 2 881 -5.5 -9.1 -16.4
Luxembourg 452 499 544 643 10.4 20.5 42.3
Hungary 10 117 9 834 9 588 8 915 -2.8 -5.2 -11.9
Malta 400 439 468 508 9.8 17.0 27.1
Netherlands 16 258 16 957 17 429 17 406 4.3 7.2 7.1
Austria 8 114 8 358 8 501 8 216 3.0 4.8 1.3
Poland 38 191 37 429 36 836 33 665 -2.0 -3.5 -11.8
Portugal 10 475 10 762 10 730 10 009 2.7 2.4 -4.4
Slovenia 1 996 2 019 2 014 1 901 1.1 0.9 -4.8
Slovakia 5 380 5 309 5 237 4 738 -1.3 -2.7 -11.9
Finland 5 220 5 354 5 439 5 217 2.6 4.2 -0.1
Sweden 8 976 9 373 9 769 10 202 4.4 8.8 13.7
United Kingdom 59 652 61 934 63 792 64 330 3.8 6.9 7.8
Bulgaria 7 801 7 130 6 465 5 094 -8.6 -17.1 -34.7
Romania 21 711 20 917 19 746 17 125 -3.7 -9.1 -21.1
Population structure – Main age groups
Percentage aged 0-14 Percentage aged 15-64 Percentage aged 65+
2004 2025 2050 2004 2025 2050 2004 2025 2050
EU25 16.4 14.4 13.4 67.2 63.0 56.7 16.4 22.6 29.9
EU15 16.3 14.4 13.5 66.7 62.8 56.5 17.0 22.8 30.0
New Member States 16.7 14.4 13.2 69.7 64.5 57.7 13.6 21.1 29.1
Belgium 17.3 15.6 14.7 65.6 61.9 57.6 17.1 22.5 27.7
Czech Republic 15.2 13.5 12.6 70.8 64.1 56.5 14.0 22.4 30.9
Denmark 18.9 15.9 15.7 66.2 62.9 60.2 14.9 21.2 24.1
Germany 14.7 12.9 11.9 67.3 62.5 56.5 18.0 24.6 31.6
Estonia 16.0 16.2 14.8 67.9 63.9 59.6 16.1 19.9 25.6
Greece 14.5 13.3 12.3 67.7 63.9 55.2 17.8 22.8 32.5
Spain 14.5 12.8 11.5 68.6 65.2 52.9 16.9 22.0 35.6
France5 18.6 16.7 15.8 65.1 60.9 57.0 16.3 22.4 27.2
Ireland 20.9 18.2 16.0 68.0 65.3 57.8 11.1 16.5 26.2
Italy 14.2 12.1 11.2 66.6 62.9 53.5 19.2 25.0 35.3
Cyprus 20.0 15.6 13.3 68.1 65.2 60.5 11.9 19.2 26.2
Latvia 15.4 16.2 14.8 68.4 64.1 59.1 16.2 19.7 26.1
Lithuania 17.7 15.1 13.7 67.3 65.7 59.6 15.0 19.2 26.7
Luxembourg 18.8 17.1 16.6 67.1 64.9 61.3 14.1 18.0 22.1
Hungary 15.9 14.3 13.8 68.6 63.7 58.1 15.5 22.0 28.1
Malta 18.2 15.6 14.5 68.7 63.1 60.8 13.1 21.3 24.7
Netherlands 18.5 16.1 15.8 67.6 63.3 60.7 13.9 20.6 23.5
Austria 16.3 13.8 12.3 68.2 64.1 57.3 15.5 22.1 30.4
Poland 17.2 14.6 13.0 69.8 64.3 57.6 13.0 21.1 29.4
Portugal 15.7 14.2 13.1 67.4 63.7 55.0 16.9 22.1 31.9
Slovenia 14.6 13.4 12.8 70.4 63.8 56.0 15.0 22.8 31.2
Slovakia 17.6 14.0 12.8 70.9 67.1 57.9 11.5 18.9 29.3
Finland 17.6 16.0 15.3 66.8 59.4 57.8 15.6 24.6 26.9
Sweden 17.8 17.1 16.3 65.0 60.7 59.4 17.2 22.2 24.3
United Kingdom 18.3 16.1 14.7 65.7 63.0 58.7 16.0 20.9 26.6
Bulgaria 14.2 11.7 11.5 68.7 64.5 55.0 17.1 23.8 33.5
Romania 16.4 14.1 12.5 69.1 66.9 57.9 14.5 19.0 29.6
Indicators of population structure
Young dependency ratio3 (%) Elderly dependency ratio2 (%) Total dependency ratio4 (%)
2004 2025 2050 2004 2025 2050 2004 2025 2050
EU25 24.4 22.9 23.7 24.5 35.7 52.8 48.9 58.7 76.5
EU15 24.5 23.0 23.9 25.5 36.3 53.2 50.0 59.3 77.1
New Member States 24.0 22.4 22.8 19.6 32.7 50.4 43.5 55.1 73.2
Belgium 26.4 25.2 25.4 26.1 36.5 48.1 52.5 61.7 73.5
Czech Republic 21.5 21.1 22.2 19.7 35.0 54.8 41.2 56.1 77.1
Denmark 28.5 25.3 26.0 22.5 33.8 40.0 51.0 59.1 66.0
Germany 21.9 20.7 21.1 26.8 39.3 55.8 48.7 60.0 76.9
Estonia 23.6 25.3 24.8 23.8 31.3 43.1 47.4 56.6 67.9
Greece 21.4 20.9 22.3 26.4 35.5 58.8 47.8 56.4 81.1
Spain 21.2 19.7 21.7 24.6 33.6 67.5 45.8 53.3 89.2
France5 28.5 27.4 27.7 25.2 36.9 47.9 53.7 64.3 75.6
Ireland 30.7 27.9 27.7 16.4 25.2 45.3 47.1 53.0 73.0
Italy 21.3 19.3 21.0 28.9 39.7 66.0 50.2 59.0 86.9
Cyprus 29.4 24.0 22.0 17.5 29.3 43.2 46.9 53.3 65.2
Latvia 22.5 25.2 25.0 23.6 30.7 44.1 46.1 55.9 69.1
Lithuania 26.2 23.1 23.0 22.3 29.2 44.9 48.6 52.2 67.8
Luxembourg 28.0 26.4 27.1 21.0 27.7 36.1 49.0 54.1 63.3
Hungary 23.1 22.4 23.7 22.6 34.5 48.3 45.7 56.9 72.0
Malta 26.5 24.7 23.9 19.0 33.8 40.6 45.5 58.4 64.6
Netherlands 27.4 25.4 26.1 20.5 32.5 38.6 47.9 57.9 64.7
Austria 23.9 21.5 21.5 22.8 34.5 53.2 46.7 56.0 74.6
Poland 24.7 22.6 22.6 18.6 32.8 51.0 43.3 55.4 73.5
Portugal 23.3 22.3 23.8 24.9 34.7 58.1 48.3 57.0 81.9
Slovenia 20.8 21.1 22.9 21.4 35.8 55.6 42.1 56.9 78.5
Slovakia 24.8 20.9 22.2 16.3 28.1 50.6 41.0 49.0 72.9
Finland 26.4 27.0 26.4 23.3 41.4 46.7 49.7 68.3 73.1
Sweden 27.4 28.2 27.5 26.4 36.5 40.9 53.8 64.6 68.4
United Kingdom 27.8 25.5 25.0 24.3 33.2 45.3 52.1 58.7 70.3
Bulgaria 20.6 18.1 21.0 24.9 36.9 60.9 45.5 55.0 81.9
Romania 23.8 21.0 21.6 20.9 28.5 51.1 44.6 49.5 72.6
The Deagel corporation is a minor branch of US military intelligence, one of the many secretive organizations which collects data for high-level decision-making purposes and prepares confidential briefing documents for agencies like the National Security Agency, the United Nations, and the World Bank. It is known, for example, to have contributed to a Stratfor report on North Korea. With this kind of pedigree, Deagel should be seen as a legitimate player in the intelligence community and not merely a disinformation asset. If so, then it must be assumed that its population predictions for 2025, as well as its industrial output predictions on a nation-by-nation basis, are based on strategic assumptions which are shared and well understood by other players in the intelligence community.
On 4/20/21, Deagel.com deleted their mysterious 2025 forecast spreadsheet that predicted a major collapse of the western countries but I have saved some archive links. The first one is interactive like it was when it existed on the Deagel website:
https://web.archive.org/web/20200629112402/http://www.deagel.com/country/forecast.aspx
https://www.thevoid.uk/void-post/deagel-2025-population-and-output-forecast-revisited-essential-guide/
PDF: https://www.ahava528.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Deagel-Analysis-updated.pdf
As you can see from their current website this information is no longer there: https://deagel.com/
Info on the NWO/Great Reset: https://therealtruthnetworkcom.wordpress.com/2022/04/20/agenda-21-nwo/
Deagel Forecast
Country Pop. 2017 Pop. 2025 Pop. Change GDP Change ME Change PPP Change
United Kingdom 63,390,000 14,517,860 -77.1 -92.1 -97.7 -0.8
Ireland 4,770,000 1,318,740 -72.4 -88.9 -97.7 -0.7
United States of America 316,440,000 99,553,100 -68.5 -85.4 -95.6 -0.7
Puerto Rico 3,640,000 1,165,780 -68.0 -77.6 -0.3
Germany 80,590,000 28,134,920 -65.1 -83.0 -93.3 -0.7
Luxembourg 514,862 199,020 -61.3 -90.4 -97.8 -0.8
Israel 7,710,000 3,982,480 -48.3 -74.2 -89.3 -0.7
Libya 6,000,000 3,253,820 -45.8 -75.6 -0.7
Iceland 339,747 195,927 -42.3 -83.2 -96.0 -0.7
France 67,100,000 39,114,580 -41.7 -58.1 -81.5 -0.6
Spain 47,370,000 27,763,280 -41.4 -59.0 -81.8 -0.5
Bahrain 1,410,000 837,800 -40.6 -49.8 -75.9 -0.6
Cyprus 1,220,000 791,720 -35.1 -45.3 -57.9 -0.5
Australia 23,230,000 15,196,600 -34.6 -69.8 -90.1 -0.6
Angola 29,310,000 19,564,500 -33.2 10.8 13.4 -0.1
Switzerland 7,990,000 5,342,540 -33.1 -66.4 -84.8 -0.4
Denmark 5,600,000 3,771,760 -32.6 -56.3 -72.2 -0.5
Belgium 11,490,000 8,060,900 -29.8 -32.5 -55.2 -0.4
Austria 8,750,000 6,215,000 -29.0 -34.7 -61.2 -0.5
Ukraine 44,570,000 31,628,980 -29.0 -34.6 -50.3 -0.3
Italy 61,480,000 43,760,260 -28.8 -36.7 -63.0 -0.3
Malta 409,836 295,243 -28.0 -23.5 -54.4 -0.2
Syria 22,460,000 16,201,040 -27.9 -19.9 16.4 -0.3
Canada 35,620,000 26,315,760 -26.1 -35.9 -60.6 -0.5
Sweden 9,650,000 7,191,400 -25.5 -57.1 -78.8 -0.5
Estonia 1,250,000 932,320 -25.4 -14.4 -37.1 -0.3
Greece 10,770,000 8,055,960 -25.2 -39.4 -62.1 -0.4
Portugal 10,790,000 8,113,860 -24.8 -19.9 -43.9 -0.1
New Zealand 4,360,000 3,290,300 -24.5 -59.9 -83.2 -0.5
Country Pop. 2017 Pop. 2025 Pop. Change GDP Change ME Change PPP Change
Norway 5,080,000 3,833,960 -24.5 -66.3 -79.8 -0.5
South Korea 48,950,000 37,092,820 -24.2 -25.6 -59.2 -0.4
Moldova 3,620,000 2,750,860 -24.0 -2.5 -8.7 0.0
Lithuania 3,510,000 2,709,640 -22.8 10.3 36.4 0.2
Saint Lucia 162,781 127,192 -21.9 -5.7 -0.2
Barbados 292,336 229,598 -21.5 -22.1 -0.3
Taiwan 23,300,000 18,538,200 -20.4 -6.5 -29.1 -0.1
Latvia 2,180,000 1,755,520 -19.5 8.2 31.1 0.3
Japan 127,250,000 103,047,280 -19.0 -39.0 -63.7 -0.4
Belarus 9,550,000 7,863,440 -17.7 14.4 -28.8 -0.4
Serbia 7,240,000 5,966,200 -17.6 2.5 -39.6 0.0
New Caledonia 264,022 218,667 -17.2 -37.0 0.2
Bahamas 329,988 273,460 -17.1 -20.2 -0.3
Micronesia 106,104 89,473 -15.7 -81.2 -0.6
Uruguay 3,320,000 2,818,460 -15.1 -20.3 -59.2 -0.4
United Arab Emirates 5,470,000 4,664,700 -14.7 -52.2 -77.4 -0.1
Trinidad and Tobago 1,220,000 1,044,320 -14.4 -21.4 -21.1 -0.2
El Salvador 6,170,000 5,291,860 -14.2 7.6 9.2 -0.1
Bulgaria 7,100,000 6,128,360 -13.7 59.2 46.8 0.0
Qatar 2,040,000 1,764,240 -13.5 -54.0 -81.3 -0.5
Poland 38,380,000 33,230,780 -13.4 -18.4 -38.2 -0.1
Slovenia 1,990,000 1,723,800 -13.4 -7.5 -30.1 0.0
Croatia 4,290,000 3,754,250 -12.5 -7.4 -2.8 -0.2
Tanzania 48,260,000 42,526,920 -11.9 143.4 130.0 0.5
Equatorial Guinea 778,358 688,511 -11.5 16.9 -5.0 -0.4
Haiti 10,650,000 9,439,880 -11.4 18.5 -0.4
Turkey 80,690,000 71,556,440 -11.3 -4.9 -48.3 -0.2
Kuwait 2,690,000 2,401,080 -10.7 -43.8 -68.5 -0.2
Lesotho 1,940,000 1,749,080 -9.8 9.2 -22.9 -0.1
Burkina Faso 20,110,000 18,227,580 -9.4 113.7 143.8 0.2
North Macedonia 2,100,000 1,903,800 -9.3 67.8 67.2 -0.1
Country Pop. 2017 Pop. 2025 Pop. Change GDP Change ME Change PPP Change
Singapore 5,460,000 4,958,900 -9.2 -33.3 -58.8 -0.2
Montenegro 653,474 596,753 -8.7 74.3 45.2 0.6
Burundi 11,470,000 10,516,440 -8.3 104.3 106.7 0.2
Eswatini 1,470,000 1,358,340 -7.6 64.9 91.7 -0.3
Czechia 10,670,000 9,873,060 -7.5 0.8 0.5 -0.1
Slovakia 5,490,000 5,078,180 -7.5 6.6 0.3 0.2
Argentina 44,290,000 41,008,200 -7.4 -1.6 -27.4 -0.2
Aruba 115,120 107,067 -7.0 -1.6 0.1
Albania 3,050,000 2,840,580 -6.9 91.0 76.1 0.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3,860,000 3,613,500 -6.4 41.3 50.3 -0.1
Saudi Arabia 26,940,000 25,297,620 -6.1 -21.4 -35.6 0.0
South Africa 48,600,000 45,945,100 -5.5 -8.0 -42.8 -0.2
Armenia 3,050,000 2,891,200 -5.2 27.2 6.9 -0.2
Benin 11,040,000 10,493,240 -5.0 103.0 86.0 0.2
Jamaica 2,910,000 2,763,480 -5.0 9.5 -9.8 -0.2
Liberia 3,990,000 3,789,280 -5.0 10.3 -25.0 -0.1
World 7,226,458,211 6,871,665,908 -4.9 -15.9 -38.7 -0.2
Hungary 9,850,000 9,378,040 -4.8 37.2 15.1 0.0
Ecuador 16,290,000 15,519,180 -4.7 16.8 61.0 -0.1
Finland 5,520,000 5,268,640 -4.6 8.8 8.2 -0.1
Ethiopia 105,350,000 100,710,020 -4.4 109.4 150.7 0.1
Georgia 4,930,000 4,724,560 -4.2 68.7 67.3 -0.3
Guinea 12,410,000 11,896,000 -4.1 3.1 -34.9 -0.4
Suriname 566,846 543,830 -4.1 3.5 16.7 0.1
Thailand 67,500,000 64,978,140 -3.7 96.7 91.7 0.8
Romania 21,790,000 21,014,080 -3.6 84.4 85.0 0.7
Azerbaijan 9,960,000 9,630,860 -3.3 182.9 239.4 -0.1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 103,220 99,763 -3.3 34.5 0.1
Somalia 10,250,000 9,940,700 -3.0 150.4 -100.0 -0.3
Belize 360,346 351,422 -2.5 3.7 -19.0 -0.1
Cuba 11,150,000 10,871,820 -2.5 32.4 25.6 -0.1
Country Pop. 2017 Pop. 2025 Pop. Change GDP Change ME Change PPP Change
Fiji 920,938 899,721 -2.3 8.2 32.7 -0.2
Gambia 2,050,000 2,007,240 -2.1 76.1 0.0 -0.2
Cameroon 24,990,000 24,507,400 -1.9 116.7 92.6 0.1
Democratic Republic of Congo 83,300,000 81,698,120 -1.9 9.8 20.3 0.0
Brunei Darussalam 443,593 435,478 -1.8 88.3 39.4 0.0
Afghanistan 34,120,000 33,539,680 -1.7 448.9 3,284.5 1.6
Guyana 737,718 725,063 -1.7 22.7 3.9 0.0
Tunisia 10,830,000 10,644,240 -1.7 11.8 -15.6 -0.3
China 1,380,000,000 1,358,440,000 -1.6 42.1 37.0 0.1
Tonga 106,322 104,961 -1.3 30.8 -0.2
Grenada 111,724 110,668 -0.9 23.5 0.2
Russia 142,500,000 141,830,780 -0.5 104.9 98.3 1.4
Iran 82,020,000 81,976,680 -0.1 92.2 62.1 -0.3
Kiribati 103,248 103,179 -0.1 45.7 -0.5
Maldives 393,988 390,153 -1.0 98.9 28.6 0.7
Netherlands 16,800,000 16,809,740 0.1 7.2 -4.8 0.1
Brazil 207,350,000 210,314,920 1.4 35.2 36.9 0.0
Mali 15,970,000 16,208,120 1.5 146.7 228.7 1.2
Cape Verde 560,899 569,749 1.6 78.1 45.5 0.1
Chile 17,790,000 18,098,060 1.7 52.7 61.2 0.1
Djibouti 865,267 880,573 1.8 54.2 0.3
Ghana 27,500,000 27,991,840 1.8 54.7 44.5 -0.2
Eritrea 5,920,000 6,048,240 2.2 4.2 -0.3
Samoa 195,476 199,745 2.2 56.2 0.1
Kazakhstan 17,740,000 18,141,480 2.3 -1.7 -30.7 0.2
Botswana 2,210,000 2,262,280 2.4 52.9 11.9 -0.1
Indonesia 260,580,000 267,136,480 2.5 80.6 60.7 -0.2
Venezuela 28,460,000 29,243,520 2.8 -24.7 -55.8 -0.3
Chad 12,070,000 12,431,280 3.0 126.7 89.6 0.1
Colombia 47,700,000 49,240,520 3.2 83.7 74.5 0.1
Mauritius 1,320,000 1,363,960 3.3 40.9 36.4 0.1
Country Pop. 2017 Pop. 2025 Pop. Change GDP Change ME Change PPP Change
Morocco 32,650,000 33,767,920 3.4 99.7 90.7 0.6
Kyrgyzstan 5,550,000 5,753,600 3.7 36.8 229.0 0.0
Bhutan 758,288 787,650 3.9 78.6 -0.1
Malawi 16,770,000 17,488,020 4.3 162.5 76.5 -0.1
Sierra Leone 5,610,000 5,864,940 4.5 23.8 6.1 0.0
Costa Rica 4,930,000 5,154,640 4.6 14.3 -0.1
Dominican Republic 10,730,000 11,228,820 4.6 65.5 52.6 -0.1
Togo 7,150,000 7,477,160 4.6 126.4 136.8 0.7
India 1,280,000,000 1,341,720,000 4.8 110.0 85.7 -0.2
Uganda 34,760,000 36,458,240 4.9 112.0 111.6 0.3
Mexico 118,820,000 124,717,740 5.0 -1.1 -22.0 -0.1
Niger 16,900,000 17,764,280 5.1 125.0 376.6 0.7
Sri Lanka 21,670,000 22,791,540 5.2 159.1 133.1 0.6
Cote d'Ivoire 24,180,000 25,463,460 5.3 82.8 132.6 0.0
Iraq 31,860,000 33,754,520 5.9 62.3 240.4 1.1
Jordan 6,480,000 6,888,740 6.3 29.4 2.8 0.5
Myanmar 55,120,000 58,638,300 6.4 191.1 81.4 -0.2
Algeria 40,970,000 43,638,280 6.5 92.8 22.0 -0.3
Uzbekistan 28,660,000 30,541,480 6.6 108.8 78.7 0.4
Central African Republic 5,620,000 6,005,920 6.9 46.6 0.0
Peru 29,850,000 31,899,960 6.9 28.5 12.7 0.1
Rwanda 12,010,000 12,856,620 7.0 200.6 204.7 0.7
Nicaragua 5,790,000 6,202,240 7.1 71.9 47.9 0.0
Vietnam 92,470,000 99,030,160 7.1 175.7 177.0 0.7
Mongolia 2,910,000 3,118,360 7.2 91.5 50.8 0.7
Nigeria 174,510,000 187,254,300 7.3 142.7 91.2 0.9
Bolivia 11,140,000 11,981,200 7.6 52.0 41.4 -0.1
Gabon 1,770,000 1,904,720 7.6 100.8 78.0 0.1
Cambodia 16,200,000 17,454,060 7.7 119.5 113.6 0.0
Namibia 2,180,000 2,348,840 7.7 18.0 18.6 0.0
Zambia 14,220,000 15,322,840 7.8 39.2 17.2 0.6
Country Pop. 2017 Pop. 2025 Pop. Change GDP Change ME Change PPP Change
Mozambique 24,100,000 26,006,520 7.9 52.5 50.4 0.0
Panama 3,560,000 3,841,600 7.9 41.7 18.5 0.3
Senegal 13,300,000 14,384,940 8.2 101.0 144.1 0.5
Egypt 97,040,000 105,306,900 8.5 133.2 47.4 -0.2
Yemen 25,340,000 27,486,640 8.5 1.7 -23.6 -0.1
Turkmenistan 5,110,000 5,552,820 8.7 41.6 27.5 0.5
Honduras 9,040,000 9,840,640 8.9 30.1 -9.7 -0.2
Paraguay 6,620,000 7,238,960 9.3 43.9 31.6 0.3
Comoros 808,080 885,869 9.6 90.1 0.3
Guatemala 15,460,000 16,963,080 9.7 11.2 4.0 -0.2
Madagascar 22,590,000 24,842,620 10.0 88.1 47.2 0.1
Guinea-Bissau 1,790,000 1,979,800 10.6 95.7 104.5 0.0
Philippines 105,720,000 117,031,940 10.7 147.0 156.2 0.7
Solomon Islands 597,248 663,561 11.1 30.0 16.7 -0.2
Zimbabwe 13,180,000 14,638,960 11.1 45.9 4.9 1.5
Nepal 30,430,000 33,825,620 11.2 196.4 187.1 0.6
Mauritania 3,440,000 3,843,620 11.7 139.1 82.2 0.7
Malaysia 29,630,000 33,358,220 12.6 131.1 125.2 0.8
Bangladesh 157,830,000 178,356,440 13.0 58.5 24.1 -0.2
Pakistan 193,240,000 218,871,280 13.3 249.1 262.8 0.7
Vanuatu 261,565 298,136 14.0 61.6 -0.1
Kenya 44,040,000 50,320,160 14.3 179.5 141.5 1.0
Laos 6,690,000 7,665,700 14.6 210.5 106.5 0.9
Oman 3,150,000 3,616,920 14.8 2.0 5.7 0.1
Tajikistan 7,910,000 9,214,940 16.5 106.4 83.3 0.2
Timor-Leste 1,170,000 1,363,200 16.5 30.1 -1.7 -0.6
Republic of the Congo 4,570,000 5,330,360 16.6 86.6 382.9 0.5
Sudan 34,850,000 40,691,900 16.8 181.5 81.4 0.6
Papua New Guinea 6,430,000 7,571,120 17.7 44.6 41.4 0.1
Sao Tome and Principe 186,817 221,306 18.5 100.6 0.6
Lebanon 4,130,000 6,585,900 59.5 94.3 87.8 0.2
A Manufacturing Industry Outlook
Manufacturers
prioritize targeted investments in their digital and data foundation to
boost innovation and tackle ongoing skills gap and supply chain
challenges
In 2024, US manufacturing experienced continued
investment even as higher interest rates and a challenging business
environment have created obstacles to near-term industry growth.
Deloitte’s analysis of S&P Global data reveals that while 2024 began
with the manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) moving into
expansion for the first time since April 2023, which continued for the
first half of the year, weaker demand nudged the PMI back into
contraction in July 2024. In addition, the November 2024 PMI report
identified an ongoing combination of falling orders and rising customer
inventories, which could signal the need for manufacturers to further
cut production in the coming months. While the rate of inflation has
diminished, manufacturers continue to face higher costs: The producer
price index for input materials and components seems to have stabilized
but remains high, while total compensation, which includes wages and
benefits, has continued its upward climb.
Meanwhile, weaker
demand due in part to the challenging business climate and higher
interest rates may have helped to ease talent and supply chain
pressures. Data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that
the labor market has continued to stabilize through 2024 as quits,
hires, and job openings in manufacturing have steadily declined, and
employment has leveled off at around 13 million as production levels
have stabilized.6 However, talent challenges persist. Even as labor
markets have loosened, nearly 60% of manufacturers in the National
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) outlook survey for the third quarter
of 2024 cited the inability to attract and retain employees as their top
challenge. Supply chains have also improved, with the average delivery
time for raw materials dropping to 81 days by October 2024, representing
a 2% year-over-year decline. However, they still have not returned to
pre-pandemic norms.
At the same time, 2024 demonstrated
continued, albeit cooling, investment in US manufacturing that could
lead to longer-term growth. For instance, a total of more than US$31
billion in investment in 192 clean-technology-manufacturing facilities
has been announced during the year through October, and these
investments are expected to create close to 27,000 new jobs.
Construction spending in manufacturing—that is, dollars invested to
build new or expand existing manufacturing facilities—reached a new
record of US $238 billion in June 2024, and this is also likely to
continue to spur investment in new equipment and intellectual
property.10 However, the year-over-year pace of growth slowed from 41.3%
in September 2023 to 20.5% in September 2024.
Looking ahead to
2025, manufacturers are expected to continue to face a challenging and
uncertain business climate due to a combination of higher costs,
potential policy changes following the US and global elections, and
geopolitical uncertainty. Surveyed manufacturers in NAM’s 2024
third-quarter outlook expect raw material and other input costs to grow
by 2.7% over the next 12 months. However, lower interest rates have the
potential to fuel investment and business and consumer spending, which
could spark higher demand for manufactured goods. On the other hand,
while the Federal Reserve has expressed confidence that it can achieve a
“soft landing,” there is still a risk that the recent cooling in the
labor market could accelerate, potentially leading to an economic
slowdown. For instance, consumer spending has remained relatively robust
through September 2024, but this could slow in 2025 if unemployment
accelerates, which might affect the manufacturing industry.
Potential
policy changes after the 2024 US elections, as well as elections across
the globe, may have impacts on supply chains, demand, and long-term
investment in manufacturing. Changes to trade policy and tariffs could
drive up raw material and component costs and could have ripple effects
throughout the supply chain. Potential adjustments to parts of the
Inflation Reduction Act could impact investment in certain aspects of
clean technology manufacturing in the United States.
Deloitte’s
2025 Manufacturing Industry Outlook explores the following trends to
help leaders shape strategies and priorities in the coming year:
Talent: Positioning for renewed demand and maintaining a long-term workforce strategy
Artificial intelligence and generative AI in manufacturing: Prioritizing targeted, high-ROI investments
Supply chain: Tackling disruptions and elevated costs with agility and efficiency
Smart operations: Building the foundation while prioritizing high-value projects
Clean technology manufacturing: Moving ahead strategically amid uncertainty
1. Talent: Positioning for renewed demand and maintaining a long-term workforce strategy
Labor
market tightness in the manufacturing industry has been declining in
2024, and, in fact, July was the first month since May 2021 that the
number of unemployed in manufacturing exceeded the number of job
openings. The quits rate in manufacturing reached 1.6% in September
2024, marking a 0.2 percentage point drop since January 2024. Weakening
demand for manufactured goods and labor market loosening seems to have
created a better balance, at least in the near term, between labor
supply and demand in manufacturing.
However, talent challenges
are still salient. The Employment Cost Index for total compensation in
manufacturing, which includes employee wages and benefits, has continued
to climb in 2024, gaining 3.8% year over year as of September. Labor
participation rates have been declining in the United States for over
two decades, due in part to an aging population, and this may continue
through at least 2030. Challenges such as workers’ access to child care,
reliable transportation, and their desire for flexibility also remain. A
study conducted by Deloitte and The Manufacturing Institute in 2024
showed that 1.9 million manufacturing jobs could go unfilled over the
next 10 years if talent challenges are not addressed. The study also
found that roles that require higher-level skills could grow the fastest
between 2022 and 2032, and that a combination of technical
manufacturing, digital, and soft skills will likely be required.
Favorable
economic conditions in 2025 such as lower interest rates and continued
investment in US manufacturing may reignite demand in the industry,
which could intensify labor shortages. Though wages are likely to
continue to rise, manufacturers have a cost lever that they can pull:
reducing turnover. According to a 2024 survey of more than 300 human
resources leaders at US manufacturing companies conducted by the UKG
Workforce Institute, 60% of respondents indicate that the average cost
to replace one skilled frontline worker ranges from US $10,000 to US
$40,000, while 56% say that employee turnover has a moderate to severe
impact on their bottom-line finances.
To help meet workers’
changing expectations, reduce turnover, and plan for demand volatility,
companies seem to be increasingly focusing on improving the worker
experience, taking an ecosystem approach to talent development, and
leveraging digital tools that offer advanced talent planning and
workforce management capabilities. A recent report by Gartner suggests
that by 2025 over 80% of large businesses that have hourly employees
will have invested in advanced workforce management software solutions.
In addition to supporting broader digital initiatives to improve
operational efficiency, a key goal of these investments is to improve
the worker experience, including capturing employee sentiment,
suggesting adjustments to shift patterns, enabling flexible scheduling,
and improving company communication with hourly workers, according to
the report.
The study also indicates that by 2030, AI-based
management of employee skills and how people are deployed to meet
business needs will be a core capability. By tracking and connecting
important parameters like employee skills and certifications (that is,
using a skills matrix), the number of people and skills required to
produce certain products, and accurate demand forecasts, these tools
could allow companies to efficiently plan for the specific workforce
needed for upcoming production runs. If gaps are identified, companies
could offer upskilling opportunities for existing employees, which can
increase retention, or work within the talent ecosystem to find and
develop workers with the requisite skills.
Taking this approach
could also enable tailored upskilling that helps prepare employees for
future work, for example, working alongside advanced technology such as
gen AI. Advanced talent-planning tools can also support manufacturers
taking a skills-based approach, which may be increasingly important for
broadening the talent pool. These investments and a focus on long-term
talent strategies may help manufacturers build and retain a skilled
workforce for 2025 and beyond.
2. AI and generative AI in manufacturing: Prioritizing targeted, high-ROI investments
As
the enthusiasm surrounding gen AI shifts from “…unbridled excitement”
to “a more nuanced and critical evaluation of its real impact on
business outcomes,” manufacturers have already made significant
investments in AI and gen AI, and this trend is expected to continue in
2025 and beyond. Deloitte’s 2024 Future of the Digital Customer
Experience survey found that 55% of surveyed industrial product
manufacturers are already leveraging gen AI tools in their operations,
and over 40% plan to increase investment in AI and machine learning over
the next three years. However, companies seem to be taking a more
measured approach toward gen AI and AI implementation by following their
traditional, holistic return on investment processes. A 2024 survey of
manufacturers by the Manufacturing Leadership Council found that 78% of
respondents indicate that their AI initiatives are part of the company’s
overall digital transformation strategy. And, as is typically the case
with technology investments, a primary measure of success for gen AI
will be its ability to drive value in the organization.
A
prerequisite for AI adoption is access to quality data, and companies
seem to be shifting their focus in this direction: Three-quarters of
respondents in a recent Deloitte survey indicated that their
organization has increased investment around data life cycle management
to support their generative AI strategy. However, challenges still
exist—in another survey, nearly 70% of manufacturers indicated that
problems with data, including data quality, contextualization, and
validation, are the most significant obstacles to AI implementation. To
help overcome these challenges and maximize ROI, manufacturers might
consider starting with use cases where there is already a strong data
foundation in place.
One example is customer service
applications, which are often digital and language-based, and offer
access to a wealth of data that typically doesn’t require significant
data harmonization or modernization, such as call records, technical
documents, warranty data, and claims information. In fact, 74% of
surveyed manufacturers in Deloitte’s 2024 Future of the Digital Customer
Experience survey indicated that they plan to use or are already using
gen AI to enhance their customer experience. Example use cases include
gen AI–based virtual chatbots that can allow customers to efficiently
evaluate product specifications and features during their buying
journey, or gen AI–based service manuals combined with augmented reality
that can facilitate rapid and efficient remote assistance for
maintenance and repair.
Another example is product design. For
instance, according to data provider IDC, by 2028, the demand for
product innovation will drive 50% of large manufacturers to evaluate
engineering archives using generative AI to uncover new opportunities
for innovation on legacy products. Tying the use cases to critical
business initiatives or priorities, such as enhancing customer
experience or product innovation, can also be important for securing
internal funding and support.
Identifying targeted
opportunities to invest in AI, including gen AI, may be key for
manufacturers in 2025 as elevated costs and uncertainty are expected to
continue in the coming year. Improved efficiency, productivity, and cost
reduction have been identified as important benefits achieved through
generative AI implementation. In addition, in a recent survey,
manufacturers indicated that AI and machine learning have the largest
impact on business outcomes relative to other smart manufacturing
technologies, and that gen AI or causal AI offer the largest ROI behind
cloud and software-as-a-service technologies. To support AI use case
implementation in 2025 and lay the groundwork for the future, it will be
important for manufacturers to focus on building an overall AI and data
strategy, including establishing an operating model, setting up
governance, and identifying risks. Yet in a 2024 survey by the
Manufacturing Leadership Council, only 51.6% of manufacturers indicated
that they have a corporate AI strategy. A dedicated focus on organizing
and structuring data will also be important to create the foundation to
facilitate long-term investments in AI and gen AI.
3. Supply chain: Tackling disruptions and elevated costs with agility and efficiency
Supply
chain challenges have eased since the height of the COVID-19 pandemic,
but pressures remain. For instance, average lead times for production
materials have shown significant improvement since their peak in 2022
but remain stubbornly higher than pre-pandemic levels. While global
supply chain disruptions persist, such as attacks on container vessels
in the Red Sea, costs also remain high. Over 35% of surveyed
manufacturers cited transportation and logistics costs as a primary
business challenge in the third quarter of 2024.
In 2025,
companies are expected to face continued supply chain risks,
disruptions, potential delays, and elevated costs due to several
contributing factors:
Shipping delays: Geopolitical
tensions and additional factors may contribute to ongoing shipping
challenges in 2025. For example, route changes in response to Houthi
militia attacks on cargo containers in the Red Sea are likely to
continue. The increased transit time on these routes has impacted
shipping capacity across the globe since the attacks began in October
2023, causing significant delays and shipping rates to double by the
summer of 2024. Starting in 2023, low water levels in the Panama Canal
due to drought caused delivery delays and rising costs for goods and raw
materials between the United States and Asia, as well as additional
global routes. The drought has subsided and low-water-level restrictions
have eased in 2024, with the average number of daily trips through the
canal approaching pre-drought levels as of August. However, drought
conditions could return.
Labor challenges throughout the value chain: Ongoing labor shortages from production to transportation to warehousing could contribute to delays and higher costs throughout the value chain in 2025. The shortage of truck drivers in the United States continues and is expected to accelerate in the years ahead. In a 2024 survey of more than 600 manufacturing professionals, over 80% said that labor turnover had disrupted production, which can lead to slower deliveries. Labor turmoil in supply chains is also a growing challenge across the globe. For example, while the October 2024 strike by US dockworkers on the East and Gulf Coasts was resolved in just three days, supply chains were impacted and the worker contract expires on January 15, which could potentially lead to additional disruptions in 2025.
Rising input costs: According to the NAM third-quarter 2024 outlook survey, respondents expect both wages and raw material prices to continue to rise by another 2.7% over the next 12 months.
Potential government policy changes following US and global elections: 2024 was considered a “super year” for elections with 72 countries going to the polls and approximately 3.7 billion people—nearly half of the world’s population— potentially voting, according to the United Nations.
Governmental
changes and ensuing policy changes can affect global supply chains due
to a number of factors, including geopolitical tensions, trade, tariffs,
and industrial policy. For instance, changes to government policy could
bolster supply chain restructuring efforts to balance cost and
resilience, such as the nearshoring activity that has led Mexico to
become the leading trade partner for the United States. Respondents in
the 2024 Fortune/Deloitte CEO survey indicated international trade as
the third top area where US elections could have the greatest impact,
behind regulations and taxes. And manufacturers may already be bracing
for potential changes: According to the NAM 2024 outlook surveys, the
proportion of manufacturers citing trade uncertainties (such as actual
or proposed tariffs) as a primary business challenge increased sharply
to 34.3% in the second quarter from 25.8% in the first quarter, and
continued to rise to 36.8% in the third quarter.
As supply chain
pressures have abated since the COVID-19 pandemic, companies have
shifted their strategy from a primary focus on resilience to a new
emphasis on balancing optimized cost and resilience. Techniques such as
diversifying sources, pursuing mergers and acquisitions, enhancing
partnerships, and building internal capabilities are helping some
companies achieve this goal. Amid the disruptions and high costs that
could characterize supply chains in 2025, these approaches are likely to
remain important.
Staying focused on investment in digital tools
that enable advanced supply chain planning techniques, better
collaboration with suppliers, simulation, and enhanced visibility may
provide an additional boost. In a recent study, 78% of manufacturers
indicated that they have implemented or are planning to invest in supply
chain planning software. Respondents also ranked this software fifth
out of 10 technologies that drive the most significant ROI. According to
another 2024 report, some of the top trends expected to impact
industrial product manufacturers’ supply chains by 2027 are big data and
advanced analytics, supply chain digitization, and data management. The
top priority for sourcing and procurement in 2024 for all companies
surveyed (across industries) was implementing new technologies and
capabilities, and this trend is likely to continue in 2025.
4. Smart operations: Building the foundation while prioritizing high-value projects
Manufacturers
have continued investing in digital technologies over the last several
years despite economic uncertainty, rising costs, and a challenging
business climate. For instance, Deloitte’s Digital Maturity Index 2023
survey found that 98% of 800 surveyed manufacturers in four major global
economic regions have started their digital transformation journey,
compared with 78% in 2019, and respondents reported cost optimization,
operational efficiency, product innovation, and improving customer
experience as key drivers for the shift. Further analysis showed that
technology investments made by manufacturing companies accounted for 30%
of their operating budget in 2024, compared with 23% in 2023, with
cloud, gen AI, and 5G being the top three technologies with the greatest
ROI.
Given the need to address elevated material and labor
costs, an ongoing skills gap, and potential disruptions from
geopolitical factors, investments in digital technologies across
manufacturing organizations—in other words, the push toward smart
operations—is likely to continue in 2025.
Falling
interest rates and the potential for growth could even accelerate
investment. Manufacturers will likely continue to prioritize investments
in their digital core and data foundation that can enable targeted,
high-ROI use cases for cutting-edge technologies such as AI, gen AI, and
extended reality (XR). Investments in the following technologies and
systems are likely:
Manufacturing operations management and
manufacturing execution systems can connect the enterprise to the shop
floor and provide visibility into data across the organization.
The Unified Namespace data architecture strategy can provide a central source of real-time standardized data that can be utilized by a variety of systems across the business. Unified Namespace can eliminate the need for complicated direct connections between disparate systems that often create significant interoperability challenges. It may also lay the foundation for software-defined manufacturing, which aims to further simplify how new technologies are integrated into manufacturing environments in the future.
5G technologies support data collection and communication: According to Deloitte’s 2024 Future of the Digital Customer Experience survey, 34% of industrial product manufacturers plan to invest in 5G technology over the next one to three years.
The model-based enterprise can support the digital thread: One in five (21%) of industrial product manufacturers plan to invest in model-based enterprise over the next one to three years.
XR and AI may help meet ongoing needs like efficient workforce
training, retaining the knowledge of retirees, and augmenting human
capabilities. Nearly 30% of industrial product manufacturers plan to
invest in XR technologies over the next one to three years, while more
than 40% plan to invest in AI and machine learning.
The use
of simulation in the manufacturing industry could also continue to grow,
especially given the potential for business disruptions, the need to
control costs, and the continued proliferation of AI tools. For example:
Causal AI can be used to more effectively simulate cause-and-effect
relationships, thereby enhancing decision-making capabilities.
Production line simulation can help eliminate bottlenecks and optimize the workflow before any physical changes are made.
Process simulation is the top use case that surveyed manufacturers implemented using metaverse technologies, according to the 2023 Deloitte and Manufacturing Leadership Council Industrial Metaverse Study, while factory simulation was also prevalent. Higher throughput and reduced costs were the primary benefits that companies gained from implementation.
Business scenario simulation is also being employed by manufacturers.
Using a model of the enterprise, challenges such as employee absences,
raw materials that arrive with quality issues, and supply chain
disruptions can be simulated, and potential actions can be identified to
optimize the response.
Another trend to watch in 2025 is the
likely continued evolution of manufacturing toward a software-driven
industry—not just within the factory but also for connecting to products
in the field—similar to what has occurred in the auto industry.
According to the 2024 Future of the Digital Customer Experience study,
industrial manufacturers are increasingly enhancing the digital
connection to their products to gather usage and operational performance
data that can help improve performance and serviceability. As one
example, customers can access portals to monitor fleet performance,
schedule maintenance, and chat with company representatives to resolve
issues. Overcoming interoperability challenges between new and legacy
systems, prioritizing cybersecurity and data protection, and developing
talent with a blend of technical knowledge, digital skills, and soft
skills are likely to be important factors for success in these efforts.
They will also likely be key to supporting the broader evolution toward
smart operations in 2025. Clean technology manufacturing: Moving ahead
strategically amid uncertainty
According to Deloitte’s analysis
of Clean Investment Monitor data, significant investment in clean
technology manufacturing has continued throughout 2024, but there has
been a decline since 2023. In 2024, some automakers have also reduced
investment in electric vehicles in response to slower-than-anticipated
passenger electric vehicle adoption. For example, some companies’ goals
to create 100% electric model lineups are stretching further into the
future, while others are shifting toward hybrids for the models
initially planned for 100% electrification.
However, while
overall investment in US clean technology manufacturing seems to have
decelerated in 2024, Deloitte’s analysis of investor reports suggests a
sustained commitment to electrification and decarbonization of products
made by US industrial manufacturers, which aligns with their customers’
apparent continued focus on reducing operational emissions. The number
of reports from industrial companies that mention “electrification” or
“scope 3 emissions” has increased since January 2020 and has continued
to rise in 2024. The same is true for company reports that mention
either “electrification” or “scope 1 emissions” from the engineering and
construction, and mining and metals industries, which often serve as
customers to industrial manufacturers. The data suggest that industrial
companies seem to be maintaining their focus on reducing the emissions
of their products. The findings also suggest that customers seem to
remain intent on lowering their operating emissions, which should
continue to drive demand for lower-emission products.
According
to Deloitte’s analysis of investor reports of several heavy equipment
and engine manufacturers, some companies have continued to make
cautious, targeted investments in adding lower-carbon options, such as
electric and hydrogen power, to their product lines. They seem to be
moving toward the goal of meeting previously set scope 3 emissions
targets even in a challenging business climate. For example, one heavy
equipment manufacturer plans to add over 20 electric and hybrid model
options to its lineup by 2026. A diesel engine manufacturer reports that
it continues to make progress on its 2030 goal for a 25% reduction in
product lifetime greenhouse gas emissions (scope 3) from new products.
Customers
of industrial product manufacturing companies also seem to be
maintaining commitments to the adoption of clean technologies to meet
their scope 1 emissions goals. For example, a strategic alliance has
been formed to develop electric underground mining trucks, aiming for
net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, and the first prototype was delivered
to a mine for testing in October 2024.
Several suppliers to
industrial product manufacturing companies continue to strategically
transform their portfolios to align with electrification and reduced
emission trends, according to Deloitte analysis of company reports.
These companies are emphasizing electrification as part of their
strategic focus, particularly in clean energy and sustainable solutions.
Some companies are also expecting growth driven by electrification and
the energy transition.
Though industrial product manufacturers
seem steadfast in meeting company-imposed emissions goals for their
products, looking ahead to 2025, there are several factors that could
potentially impact further investment in the development and delivery of
clean technology products.
Government incentives and
regulatory policy: With the possibility of policy and regulatory changes
following the US elections, companies may employ a “wait and see”
approach in 2025. In fact, regulations and taxes were tied as the top
factors surrounding the US elections that could impact businesses,
according to the 2024 Fortune/Deloitte CEO survey. The global super
elections year could also impact regulations and climate policy across
the globe, which in turn may influence companies’ appetites for
investment as well as customer demand for clean technologies.
Falling interest rates: Further rate cuts expected from the Federal Reserve could fuel increased investment and business spending, including on clean technology products.
Higher costs: The demand for clean technologies is driven in part by a
“green premium” some customers are willing to pay, in addition to
regulatory requirements for emissions. With costs likely to remain high
for industrial product manufacturers in 2025, they may need to pass on
these costs to customers, which could make a green premium even more
difficult for customers to justify. On the other hand, although costs
remain high, they may stabilize in 2025 if inflation remains in check.
This could provide an opportunity for manufacturers to reduce prices
and, consequently, the green premium that customers are asked to pay.
Given these factors, companies will likely continue making
cautious, targeted investments in manufacturing clean technology
products that can maximize profitability and help customers meet their
net-zero targets.
Tackling familiar challenges in 2025 with targeted innovation
In
2025, the manufacturing industry is likely to face familiar challenges.
However, there are new approaches and tools that can be leveraged
across the business to maximize efficiency, build resilience, and
prepare for a potential new era of industry expansion. In fact, an
optimistic scenario in Deloitte’s third quarter 2024 US economic
forecast outlines the potential for an uptick in productivity and
accelerated gross domestic product growth over the next several years
due in part to technology investment. To position themselves as leaders
in the market, manufacturers might consider taking advantage of targeted
investments in their digital and data foundation, advanced
technologies, and high-ROI use cases, such as:
Advanced
talent planning and management tools that can support a skills-based
approach, lead to better retention, and build a workforce for the
future
AI and generative AI to enhance customer service, retain the knowledge of retirees, and bring new products to market faster
Supply chain digitalization and tools like AI for advanced analytics and value chain simulation
Smart operations use cases such as leveraging extended reality for efficient workforce training or customer support
Technologies like the model-based enterprise that can support seamless collaboration with new partners and customers, which may be necessary to bring innovative low-emission products to market
