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On 21st September 2024, something extraordinary happened. Even stranger still is that no-one was surprised by it.
Israeli armoured vehicles crossed the border into Syria, travelled roughly 200 metres and started to dig up farmland between the Syrian Golan and the occupied Syrian Golan.
Not only that, they also began to create barriers in the form of trenches 10 metres wide and 1,700 metres long.
What’s going on?!
Making Israel great(er)
Israel has greater ambitions than just the Golan Heights; it has the intention of creating a path that it calls the David Corridor and stretches from the Syrian Golan to the Iraqi border.
It’s a frightening project. Take one look at the above map, and you’ll realise how this scheme can potentially create a persistent hell for those in the region.
Right now, we’re talking about the level of Israeli influence over our countries; imagine the control that Israel will have if it increases its hold over those economies, not to mention oil and other natural resources.
Can this really be happening? Can the occupation be carrying out its Greater Israel plan? We know that Israel has the gall and the influence to commit war crimes and break international law as it pleases, but what exactly is the Greater Israel plan?
Why Israel doesn’t have a defined border
During an Arab summit held in Cairo in 1990, leaders were gathered together when the Libyan President, Muammar al-Gaddafi, stood up and pulled out a few pieces of paper.
He approached the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat, and presented them to him.
Arafat duly picked up the papers, sifted through them, and then put them aside, preparing himself to give a speech. It was clear that what he had seen had made him very angry. He addressed the Muslim leaders furiously.
These documents contained a map of the Arab lands, shaded in were the borders of a proposal for Israel — except the borders weren’t the ones we are familiar with.
Rather, the borders on this map included all of Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and large swathes of Syria, Iraq, northern Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.
Unsurprisingly, this same map was showcased at an AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) conference a year before.
The other document contained an image of an Israeli coin minted with a picture of this Greater Israel map.
This map, which Yasser Arafat became infuriated with, depicts Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates. As you can see in the main article image, it encompasses huge swathes of Arab lands and, most importantly, controls key geographic resources.
Netanyahu’s zeal for further colonisation
From Arafat’s speech and the documents shared with him by al-Gaddafi, fast-forward 34 years to September 2024.
At a press conference, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, presents a map that people are shocked by, because it is a map not limited to the so-called borders established in 1948.
It does not even fall within the boundaries that some Palestinians have called for from 1967. Rather, it extends into the neighbouring Arab lands.
What is even more worrying and something more people should pay attention to is a line Netanyahu mentioned in his presentation.
Pointing to the map, he said,
“This is the Middle East, and this is the entire Arab world, and this is Israel. It’s one of the world’s tiniest countries.
“I give it the, you know, the thumb test. This is a big one, so you need a bigger thumb. But it’s a tiny country. It’s one of the tiniest countries on the planet.
“It’s, I think one-tenth of one per cent of the territory of the Arab world, maybe I’m wrong. Maybe it’s two-tenths of one per cent.”
The point he was making here is not a casual fact.
He was inferring that what they’ve colonised isn’t enough, and that Israel needs to expand into surrounding Arab lands.
Entire world obsessed with borders except Israel
In case there is any doubt about this colonial ambition, consider whether you have seen a single country in the 20th and 21st centuries that doesn’t have any fixed borders.
If anything, other than Israel, the whole world has become obsessed with borders!
After the the occupation of Palestine, Israel never advertised any border, and the roving band of Zionist thugs who would terrorise the native civilians of Palestine — upon issuing a formal declaration of independence — specified no border with Jordan.
David Ben Gurion, the first Prime Minister of the Zionist regime — when announcing the formation of Israel — didn’t mention any land borders at all. Rather, he made a vague reference to establishing a state in the “western region of our lands”.
Notice he said “our lands”, not defining what that meant. This kind of rhetoric persists to this day. And when he was asked directly what the borders of Israel were, he answered that it was wherever the boots of the furthest Israeli soldier landed!
This view is extremely common in Israeli politics
Let us be clear, this is not a niche and/or extreme view, it is the opposite.
If you were to search online for a necklace or trinket of Israel, you are just as likely to find an image of this so-called Greater Israel map, as you are of occupied Palestine.
Indeed, Israeli Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich, in March 2023, presented this Greater Israel map at a speech he gave in Paris.
Where does this ambition come from?
You might ask, wasn’t the Zionist project solely about occupying Palestinian lands? But the truth is, this ambition of a Greater Israel is not new.
Suppose you consider that the earliest Zionists, culminating in David Ben Gurion making such aspirations in his speech, had these ambitions; what do you think the generations that have come after them will want?
The same generations that the world has indulged repeatedly in allowing them to commit massacre after massacre.
Just look at the images that adorn the uniforms of the IDF.
This logo is the same that has appeared repeatedly over the whole Zionist project. History is littered with proof of this.
Most recently, the likes of Smotrich and others have openly called for a Greater Israel, but this concept is already deeply embedded in Israeli society.
Consider a book authored by Dennis Avi Lipkin titled Return to Mecca, in which he discusses the rights that Jews have over Makkah and their right to return to it!
In a 2022 interview, he said,
“Eventually, our borders will extend from Lebanon to the great desert, which is Saudi Arabia, and then from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates.
And who’s on the other side of the Euphrates? The Kurds, the Kurds are our friends!”
He then said,
“I believe we are going to take Makkah, Madinah, and Mount Sinai, and purify those places.”
Not only academics and political figures
We have to understand that Israeli society is filled with this dream.
In May 2024 — in the midst of the current genocide — an Israeli comedian called Eli Yatzpan made a prank call to a Lebanese hotel on live television, in which he asked to reserve rooms for 40,000 Israelis. He was promptly told to go to Hell.
Mark Fish, writing in the Jerusalem Post, has openly asked the question of whether Lebanon is part of the “promised Israeli land” while providing “evidence” from Jewish scripture.
And it continues: Israeli academic Amos Azaria — who has established a settler movement in the south of Lebanon — has written a children’s book titled Alon and Lebanon, in which the story teaches children that Lebanon is promised to Israel.
Are there three types of Israeli border?
When Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres was asked on the day of the signing of the Oslo Accords, what are the borders of Israel? His answer was three types. A strange answer indeed.
He said there are geographic borders which will be agreed upon in the future; security borders that extend towards the Gulf; and economic borders which extend far beyond that.
This tells us that Greater Israel doesn’t necessarily mean IDF soldiers will be present in Lebanon, Jordan, or Makkah, or that Israeli control is exerted on those countries that surround it.
Instead, it’s about having free reign to exert control in whatever way it deems fit and benefit from whichever resources are convenient.
America strategically driving this dream forward
The dream of a Greater Israel becomes more of a reality every day.
US President-elect Donald Trump said in August 2024 that the Zionist state “is a tiny little spot … is there any way of getting more?”
The truth is for Israel and the US, Israel is of critical importance.
After all, it was Joe Biden in the 80s who stated,
“Were there not an Israel, then the United States of America would have to invent an Israel to protect her interests in the region.”
Ultimately, America and Israel both recognise that the Zionist project is always under risk.
If the surrounding nations were suddenly invigorated with morality, Israel would cease to exist in a very short period.
The dream of a Greater Israel is adorned with pseudo-religious sentiment, but its true foundation is the reality that Israel is always on the precipice of collapse.
Also:
Greater Israel: an Ongoing Expansion Plan for the Middle East and North Africa
The recent picture of an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldier with a Greater Israel badge on the uniform provoked outrage in Arab countries (Middle East Monitor, 2024). The promised land of Israel, as described in the badge photo, includes regions from the Nile to the Euphrates, from Medina to Lebanon, including territories from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, entire Jordan, and Occupied Palestinian territories. Why it sparked outrage, however, is not clear: the map reflects Theodor Herzl’s more than a century old statement: “Discussed with Bodenheimer the demands we will make. Area: from the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates…” (Herzl, Ed. Patai, & Transl. Zohn, 1960, p. 711), and with newer instances of this territorial expansion desiderate, expressed by Oded Yinon plan and Saul B. Cohen’s geopolitical concepts, among others, and the aggressive stance against Israel’s neighbors and regional countries. Hence, it is probably not the existence of the plan that sparked outrage, but its appearance in the broader social media space.
This view on region’s future is neither new nor rare. In a January 2024 recording, Israeli politician Avi Lipkin was stating: “… eventually, our borders will extend from Lebanon to the Great Desert, which is Saudi Arabia, and then from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates. And who is on the other side of the Euphrates? The Kurds! And the Kurds are friends. So we have Mediterranean behind us, the Kurds in front of us, Lebanon, which really needs the umbrella of protection of Israel, and then we’re gonna take, I believe we’re gonna take Mecca, Medina and Mount Sinai, and to purify those places” (muslimi.official, 2024), (Middle East Monitor 1, 2024).
This article analyzes the geopolitical and international relations implications of Israel’s expansion plan in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, in connection with the dynamic concept of Greater Israel, from a historical development perspective.
1. Geopolitical lens considerations and Israeli assertions
Geopolitics was supposed to deliver answers and support in addressing various issues for different decision-makers at a certain point in history. From this perspective, it is connected to a state’s external policy and international relations. It thus evolved from the beginnings of the 20th century to the Cold War theses, the subsequent American unipolarism and the post-2001 American War-on-Terror (WoT) approach. Should one consider China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a geopolitical shift, at least a part of the world has moved into a geopolitical setting in which international influence is not resulting from a direct military confrontation with other countries.
However, following classical geopolitical criteria are retained for this study: the dynamic character of a state’s international stance, which according to certain theories, not reflected in present mainstream international relations practice, included the dynamics of borders, the state-centered view on international relations and the concept of state power. The newer “critical geopolitics” literature approaches questions, among others, the self-proclaimed universal character of Western geopolitical concepts, arguing also that after the Cold War, the world has not achieved peace. It also theorizes that geopolitics is “a broad cultural phenomenon” and “its value is not politically neutral” (HU & Dadao, 2016). The following criteria will be added to the geopolitical analysis framework from this article: the relative universalism of demands and the political discourse as distinct tool in achieving geopolitical goals.
No geopolitical theoretical framework can exhaustively describe the evolution of Israel’s power relations with its neighbors and other countries. The classical approaches served the pre-World War II international relations and the subsequent versions also tend to support the view of a particular power center. Therefore, following research directions will be considered in subsequent chapters: the notion of a dynamic state as argument for geopolitical demands, state-centered approach to international relations, universalism of hypotheses and evolution of political discourse as a tool. Instead of filtering the Greater Israel project through a particular lens, this article will analyze three main instances of Israeli geopolitical views/expressions related to Israel’s role as a state vis-à-vis broader international principles and consensus on peaceful coexistence reflected in the United Nations Charter: the Greater Israel maximalist demands expressed in Theodor Herzl’s diaries, the Oded Yinon Plan and more recent geopolitical definitions provided by Saul Cohen, which appear to consistently point towards the direction of an Israel taking over further territories of/from its neighbors.
2. Israeli demands and implications
2.1. Theodor Herzl and the Zionist Movement
Theodor Herzl is not the first proponent of a Jewish state. However, the history of territorial claims to land from Palestine will however not be analyzed in this article. It dates back at least a couple of centuries ago and Palestine was not the only option considered for a Jewish state before Balfour Declaration: the Uganda option, among others, was rejected by the World Zionist Organization at the beginning of 20th century. However, his and his group’s work resulted in the 1948 foundation of Israel as a state, and what the Palestinians call an-Nakba, i.e. the mass, forced, displacement of inhabitants from the future land of Israel. Adrian Stein explains that Herzl personally organized the first Zionist conference between 29th and 31st of August, 1897 at Stadtcasino in Basel (Stein, 2024). In Book 6 of Herzl’s diaries (beginning in 1898), Herzl describes a discussion he had with (German) Imperial Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, in which he is asked how much land is expected to be needed for the envisioned state. His reply was: “We will ask for what we need – the more immigrants, the more land.” In the same discussion, he explains: “We want autonomy and self-protection” (Herzl, Ed. Patai, & Transl. Zohn, 1960, pp. 701-702).
Territorial demands mentioned in various instances of this book vary in formulation, but they essentially describe a territory larger than Israel 1967 broadly recognized borders or the ones of Palestinian occupied territories. An example is: “I wrote on a slip of paper…: Sinai Peninsula, Egyptian Palestine, Cyprus … Sinai – El Arish – Cyprus plan…” (Herzl, Ed. Patai, & Transl. Zohn, 1960, pp. 1294-1295). In the discussion with Bodenheimer related to the area “…from the brooks of Egypt to the Euphrates…” described in Book Two (Herzl, Ed. Patai, & Transl. Zohn, 1960, p. 711), the plan of a two-stage process was discussed, with the aim to introduce it to the Ottoman government: initially a Jewish governor (under Ottoman sovereignty, similar to the Egyptian relation with the Sultan) and as soon as the Jewish population surpasses two thirds a complete Jewish administration.
There are many details related to Zionist developments from this period, but from the perspective of state dynamics as a criterion in this study, Balfour Declaration was not approved yet by the British government. The world had not yet begun to decolonize, and the Ottoman Empire was in regression, allowing colonial powers like the United Kingdom and France to increase their influence in Ottoman territories. In the territory of Ottoman Palestine, the state-centered approach was appearing in the form of national aspirations as defined by the mandates, i.e. an auto determination that also abolished the Ottoman Empire.
It is rather difficult to identify the universalism degree of Herzl’s demands for land. There is a broad agreement among researchers that the Bible does not represent a scientific historical source, hence the narrative of return to Israel, or Greater Israel can be associated with an argumentative discourse, not a detailed history of the region or demographic realities on the ground. Without denying this possibility, it can also observed that the demand looks like deal proposals for certain decision-makers at certain times in history, rather than a clear delimitation of territory: it can be maximalist, in order to obtain as much as possible through negotiation, and it is presented as dynamic when replying to Prince Hohenlohe that more migrants will require more land. Another relative aspect of land demand is the readiness to buy the land from Arab and Greek owners (Herzl, Ed. Patai, & Transl. Zohn, 1960, p. 702). Should this land had been Israeli, why buy it from existing, lawful owners? And should the thesis of “barren” land, propagated in the media, or “vacant land” (Herzl, Ed. Patai, & Transl. Zohn, 1960, p. 1363) holds true, again, why buying it? Consequently, it can be asserted that the character of Herzl’s land demands is not universal. While there were reasons for the Zionist Movement to consider founding an independent Jewish state, the location and modality to implement such a project were subject to longer, previous negotiations with power guarantors of those times, i.e., the former colonial powers, Germany and later the United States. These were subjective agreements.
In 1948, the State of Israel was founded on inhabited Palestinian lands and although land has been bought, reportedly more than 750,000 Palestinians were forcefully displaced from their homes. The displacement of Palestinians and conflicts in the Occupied Palestinian territories continue to take place. Israel also fought wars with its Arab neighboring countries on more occasions, and the region remains relatively unstable.
2.2. The Oded Yinon Plan
The autonomy and self-protection goals stated by Herzl were achieved, although the self-protection aim is heavily reliant on American and European military aid to this day. In the 1982 essay “A strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties” by Oded Yinon (Yinon & Shahak, 1982), further geopolitical ideas related to the region are discussed, in line with Israel’s position and conflicts with its neighbors. This can be equated with a handbook for dissolution of Arab countries. Author’s (Yinon) claims that the world transits to a “new epoch in human history”, can also be seen as a truism: every day is a new day for the entire humanity and the establishment of epochs is different for different cultures despite the increase of globalization. The paper identifies Israel along Western world, mentions the threat of a “multi-dimensional global war” and “the dimensions of the global confrontation which will face us in the future”. It is a paper on war essentially. After extensively presenting various diversity aspects of Arab societies, some of them being cosmopolite for centuries anyway, including Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the “plan” begins to present “dissolution” scenarios for these countries along religious or ethnical lines: a “Christian Coptic State” in Egypt, that could lead to “downfall and dissolution of Egypt,” in its turn triggering the fall of Libya and Sudan. The article further states: “Lebanon’s total dissolution into five provinces serves as a precedent for the entire Arab world including Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula and is already following that track. The dissolution of Syria and Iraq later into ethnically or religiously unique areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel’s primary target on the Eastern front in the long run, while the dissolution of the military power of those states serves as the primary short-term target. Syria will fall apart, in accordance with its ethnic and religious structure, into several states such as in present day Lebanon, so that there will be a Shi’ite Alawi state along its coast, a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni state in Damascus hostile to its northern neighbor, and the Druzes who will set up a state, maybe even in our Golan, and certainly in the Hauran and in northern Jordan. This state of affairs will be the guarantee for peace and security in the area in the long run, and that aim is already within our reach today” (Yinon & Shahak, 1982). This long citation is representative for the Israeli divide et impera view on the region and at least a part of its acting directions, and a conflict between Iraq and Iran was expected, according to the article, to lead to Iraq’s dissolution, which Yinon defined as “…more important for us than that of Syria.” The article uses questionable terms like for example “…liquidation of Jordan under the present regime….”
Ralph Schoenmann, an author criticized for “personal ideological bias” and attributing “some of Israel’s misdeeds to US instigation” (Killgore, 2024), lists in his book, “The Hidden History of Zionism” (Schoenman, 1988, pp. 103-113), what he calls a “Strategy for Conquest” based on the analysis of Yinon’s plan: divide and rule, dissolving Lebanon and fragmenting Syria, an “assault” on Iran, targeting Iraq, “double-crossing Mubarak”, weakening Saudi Arabia and dissolution of Arabian peninsula states and depopulation of Palestine. Schoenman claims that Yinon’s ideas were not isolated: they had been presented by Ariel Sharon and Moshe Arens, as well as the Labor Party. He also lists the four “NOs” of Labor Party’s 1984 political platform: NO to a Palestinian state, NO to negotiations with Palestinian Liberation Organization (which must be assessed from the perspective of results), NO to the 1967 borders and NO to the removal of settlements (Schoenman, 1988, p. 113).
In the 1980s, Israel was already a dynamic state, with new territories occupied after the 1967 war and maintained in the 1973 war, and with an ongoing settler colonialism project (Gluskin, 2018).
The approach remained very state-focused, and the only focus was basically the State of Israel, while the (Yinon) plan saw all surrounding and other Arab states as candidates for dissolution based on ethnical or religious criteria.
2.3. Saul Cohen’s geopolitical definitions and other current views
Saul Cohen’s “Geopolitics” was published initially in 2003, and republished in 2009 and 2015 (Cohen, 2015). Two aspects of his work appear to confirm a geopolitical view that are connected with Israel’s regional situation and its geopolitical constraints: the definition of a nation’s claim to power and the concept of geopolitical structures that includes “highly autonomous regions” and “quasi states”.
The four pillars of a nation’s claim to power mentioned in his book are: an overwhelming military strength and the will to use this power, “surplus economic energy” to be provided as aid or investment to other countries, ideological leadership, and a cohesive governance system (Cohen, 2015, p. 2). While his work is generally very descriptive on Western concepts, this definition can be perceived rather as a definition of US military power if one considered the first two pillars. Assuming that Israel is still working on the development of economy, and that overall military power included massive exogenous support, the claim of Israel to power could be eventually accommodated in a regional setting. Although the author does not detail on superpower competition’s impact on Israel, the work states that “radical geopolitical restructuring is a continuous process” in the context of an increasing number of states on the globe, and an advance of multipolarity and regionalism. Potentially as a confirmation of Oded Yinon’s plan, the book also states that the Middle East “has become even more fractured as a shatterbelt” (Cohen, 2015, p. 33). Further confirming on Yinon’s dissolution view, Cohen claims that in approx. 25 years, the number of national states could increase from 200 to 250, in what he calls a devolution process.
However, although mentioning the “national states,” Cohen immediately switches to the notion of “these new geoterritorial entities” that are expected to become highly autonomous “quasi states,” and not national states as initially mentioned. Another term that appears to confirm the idea of possible dissolution of states is that of (national) state’s “demise”, associated in this book with strengthening of world and regional governing bodies, influence of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), economic developments, etc. (Cohen, 2015, p. 49). Cohen even suggests regions with the potential to become, in his view independent or quasi states: Quebec, Crete, Catalonia, Scotland, Wales, Chechnya, Somaliland, Arab Palestine, (Iraqi) Kurdistan, among others and possible new “confederations”, listing China and Taiwan, Former Yugoslav states and the Baltic States, among others (Cohen, 2015, pp. 57-59).
In Chapter 12, “The Middle East Shatterbelt”, the author presents a map (fig. 12.1) that includes Turkiye in the “shatterbelt” region. The map does not mark large parts of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Yemen as “Effective National Territory.” Neom, for example, was not marked as an Effective National Territory in this book. It marks the entire Israeli territory either as ecumenes or effective national territory, a small part of West Bank and no region from Gaza as effective national territory. Most of Jordan’s territory is also not marked as Effective National Territory. Ecumenes are defined as “areas of greatest density of population and economic activity” and Effective National Territories and Effective Regional Territories as “moderately populated areas with favorable resource bases” (Cohen, 2015, pp. 39-40).
All these concepts appear to support/justify Israel’s regional expansion aspirations, and previous concepts like “barren”/” vacant” land. Although this book is a theoretization and probably author’s opinion, this type of opinion has the potential to move the discussion from the “territorial integrity or political independence of any state” (UN Charter article 2) to another area in which regions from sovereign states, be they strong or weak, are not marked as Effective National Territories, based on subjective definitions. Of course, this does not directly infringe upon territorial sovereignty of these countries, but the possibility of interpretation cannot be ruled out especially in this terminology setting, and in the context of political declarations of certain Israeli politicians related to Ottoman Palestine: Jordan may feel threatened, Egypt as well, and President Erdogan stated in May 2024: “…if this … state of Israel is not stopped, it will set its eyes on Anatolia with its delusion of a promised land…” (Middle East Monitor 05, 2024). Another important concept from this book is that of “equilibrium”, along with turbulence and world order, from a system perspective, that, again points to a “developmental approach”, mentioning Herbert Spencer’s “organic growth analogy” (Cohen, 2015, p. 59).
Yossi Sarid published in 2011 an opinion on Haaretz website, according to which the two traditional pillars of Israel’s occupation were history and security, and called the back-then newly added pillar “not a pillar but a snake”, arguing against the alleged appearance of what he called the need for “lebensraum” (Sarid, 2011). His statement related to the security dilemma that Israel faces was: “The second, security-based school of thought stipulates that we need virtually all the territories for self-defense” (Sarid, 2011). While it is not clear whether the author identifies with this statement or not, the reflection emphasizes on an argument that serves both the security of Israel and the Greater Israel expansionist cause.
The leitmotif of “new age” or “new era” continues to be employed in multiple instances. In Adrian Stein’s blog series (Stein 2, 2024), Mr. Stein explains that “Zionism 2.0” is set to establish “the foundation for a new emerging civilization centered and based in Israel, propelled by Israel’s culture, language and gifted people”. The scope is global, according to the author: “Zionism 2.0 seeks to alter and transform the existing material and economic basis of the world, and through these efforts give rise to a new global structure or civilization if you may”. Technological, scientific development is envisioned, along with the spread of start-ups.
Therefore, how is Greater Israel goal reflected in contemporary literature and media reports analyzed above? Probably the most important aspect is that it is not much different than it was at the beginning of 20th century, or the 1980s, from the geopolitical perspective. Adrian Stein utilizes the title “From the Euphrates to the Nile” (Stein 2, 2024), Saul Cohen insists on the same terminology that accommodated overtaking land by force and by defining characteristics for the so-called “new” ages. The theses that appear to drive the Greater Israel expansion appear to be connected to the notion of a dynamic state, in the sense of territorial expansion for Israel if one considers the security threat discuss above, and the dissolution of Arab states discussed in the Oded Yinon plan. All materials analyzed appear to have been state-centered, irrespective of their direction. The universalism character of geopolitical hypotheses appears to be rather inexistent and inconsistent from a possible replication perspective. Likewise, the universalism of claims related to a potential new global civilization centered in Israel is yet to be demonstrated. And even if it was demonstrated, there is no clear hint on how long such a civilization could potentially last.
The political discourse development as a tool in supporting greater Israel (Behnam, 2023) is reflected by the refinement of “hasbara” policy, i.e. the Civic Public Diplomacy. This is equated with “the control of Narrative as an Element of Strategy” by Ambassador Chas W. Freeman (Freeman, 2024), with “Art of Deception” by a TRT World article (TRT World, 2021), and with a “propaganda machine” by Sam Hamad (Hamad, 2023).
3. Potential geopolitical implications of Greater Israel project
Although not new, the Greater Israel project appears to receive renewed attention in the light of the most recent war from Gaza, that reportedly led to the death of more than 34,000 and wounding of over 78’000 Palestinians, and the prospect for a potential war in Lebanon.
This recent Gaza development appears to at least pause the Abraham Accords with Saudi Arabia, but should Israel pursue its Greater Israel project, whose maps match Herzl’s territorial demands and clearly hints at extending its territory in Saudi Arabia, including Neom and according to Avi Lipkin Mecca and Medina, the envisioned regional peace becomes an unclear concept. There is no long term, core concept identified in analyzed publications that hint at a possible restraint of Israel from expanding its territory. It is thus difficult to distinguish, based on analyzed data, between a potential strategic patience of Greater Israel planners – that could envision a longer timing for this project and a step-by-step approach, and a potential agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia along other neighbors, to form a sort of alliance/union with a map that the Israeli soldiers recently displayed. However, given the situation at this point in history, and the historic tendency of Israeli strategists towards a state-centered approach, the latter option is probably unlikely.
The regional geopolitical dynamics appear to be marked by various forms of conflict that hint towards an active Greater Israel project, a potential normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and an increasing confrontation between Iran and its allies and Israel, the US and their allies on the other hand. In this confrontation, Türkiye appears to play no significant role and Saudi Arabia appears to wait for a certain event to pick a direction. And this event would be reportedly the recognition (by Israel) of a Palestinian state.
Saul Cohen’s view was that global organizations tend to weaken state sovereignty. This state-centered approach was expressed, probably, from a geopolitical perspective that does not include the importance of trade. It must be however emphasized that Israel is relying particularly on the US, the UK, and other allies, rather than United Nations Security Council, to carry out its defense policy. Furthermore, the tensions derived from a potential arrest warrant for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by the International Criminal Court have resulted in a further distancing between Israel and international organizations.
The approach to Greater Israel project may determine various regional and global reactions. Until recently, the essentially grey line approach to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which could be perceived as a long-term slow-pace settlement project, since it resulted in the increase of settlement units, along with what the media often calls Egyptian and Lebanese economic and financial “difficulties” have ensured a certain advancement of Israel outside its 1967 borders. However, although other successes were marked, like the recent Abraham Accords, it must also be emphasized that it was not able to maintain the occupation of Sinai peninsula or the puppet state it helped create and supported in Southern Lebanon back in the ‘80s. Likewise, although Syria is facing serious hardships, it did not disintegrate. Likewise, the deal that Ankara signed with Baghdad will probably increase security in the Iraqi Kurdistan region, rather than creating further potential for wider conflicts. From this perspective, the “shatterbelt” characteristic of this region appears to be a rather stable instability than an unstable one: no major geopolitical change has occurred so far and no border has been redrawn. Furthermore, states like Iran, Türkiye and Egypt have become very vigilant from this perspective, and Iraq appears to reemerge as a regional economic power that can catalyze regional power relations. These short-term regional tendencies appear to strengthen region’s capacity to react to a potential extension of Israel’s borders by force.
While Israel’s support in the US remains strong across the entire political spectrum, the political and economic costs of a potential broader war near Israel’s borders can rise for the traditional superpower. In the wider context of superpower confrontation paradigm, a generally increasing confrontational scene and a potential global arms race, whose alleged goals are self-defense, whatever the meaning is, American priorities may become more pronounced in this context. Whatever they might be.
A potential plan by Israel to become a trade hub/route connecting Europe to Asia, and to win leverage as a hydrocarbon supplier especially for Europe is facing challenges from more directions: China will probably remain a user of the existing Suez Canal. Probably India as well, unless it receives more economic and political incentives from the proponents of alternatives. Likewise, Türkiye is already an important hub for gas and oil pipelines and is emerging as a route for the Middle Corridor trade route as well. Hence, while Israel can offer alternatives to old and new trade routes, the same regionalism and multipolarity that Saul Cohen mentioned can lead to new economic development patterns that will demand Israel to imagine new, efficient regional policies, that could or could not rely on the same level of support from traditional security partners. Whether these potential new paradigms are compatible with the traditional and actual Greater Israel goal remains to be analyzed, primarily by Israel, its neighbours and its regional partners in the first instance.
4. Conclusions
This article aimed to characterize the “Greater Israel” concept from a geopolitical perspective. After analyzing classical and revisionist theories on geopolitics, four indicators were defined to assess the historical evolution of this term from the beginning of 20th century until present. The indicators were: the dynamic characteristic of a state, the (degree of) state-centered approach to geopolitics, universalism as a hypothesis in demands and negotiations, but also in political speech, and the (degree to which) political discourse is employed as a tool in implementing geopolitical goals, including Greater Israel project.
Three major instances of Israel’s foundation and development as a state were analyzed: the foundation negotiations carried out by Theodor Herzl and his supporters, the Oded Yinon plan and the 21st century geopolitical concepts presented by Saul Cohen and other writers. The data analyzed indicates a systematic, long-term, desire to achieve a Greater Israel that would stretch from Egypt to Iraq, potentially including regions from Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.
There is no clear indication that Israel would renounce this goal, or that it would compromise on Greater Israel project. However, the leitmotif that appears in the argumentation of Greater Israel project, i.e., the a perpetual “new” era/age, might indeed represent a reason for reflection. As the world is reportedly moving towards an end of big oil era, and trade routes multiply at global and regional level, new paradigm changes will be required for the traditional superpowers in order to peacefully compete with the emerging industrial and trade powers. And while Israel is enjoying autonomy and increases its stake in own self-protection, the importance of foreign support may still be a core component of its regional policy. When analyzing the Greater Israel project, one must consider whether a potential perpetual war state is compatible with aspirations towards a peace-time economic development, that is supposed to compete with new-era, fast-developing economic powers. Likewise, given the existing precarious security situation, it remains unclear what security guarantees can Israel and Arab countries can offer and ask to move towards a more predictable development.
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AI Overview - is the greater Israel plan good or bad
The idea of a "Greater Israel" is a highly contested concept, viewed by supporters as a biblical and historic aspiration, and by opponents as a dangerous and illegal expansionist ideology. It is not a formal government plan, but rather an aspiration with different interpretations, which is viewed very differently by various Zionist and Christian groups.
Zionist perspectives
Zionist support for a "Greater Israel"
The term "Greater Israel" has deep roots within the Zionist movement, dating back to the late 19th century.
Some interpretations are based on biblical passages (e.g., Genesis 15:18-21), claiming a historic Jewish homeland stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates.
Since the 1967 Six-Day War, many Israeli right-wing and religious-Zionist factions have embraced a more modern version of the idea, focused on the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. They refer to the West Bank by the biblical names Judea and Samaria.
For these groups, the return to and retention of this land is central to their nationalist and religious identity. Key political figures and parties, including some within the Likud party, have espoused versions of this vision.
Zionist opposition to a "Greater Israel"
Many Zionists, particularly in the more secular and liberal camps, do not subscribe to this vision.
They believe that holding on to the occupied territories through the “Greater Israel” project creates an undemocratic and untenable situation by perpetually ruling over millions of Palestinians.
Some argue that a contiguous Palestinian state is necessary for peace and that continued expansion is a violation of international law.
Groups like Americans for Peace Now and Jewish Voice for Peace actively protest Israeli expansionism.
Christian perspectives
Christian support for a "Greater Israel"
Christian Zionists, particularly in the U.S., provide some of the most vocal support for the concept, believing it to be a precursor to the Second Coming of Jesus.
Theological basis: This movement is often based on an interpretation of Genesis 12:3 ("I will bless those who bless you, and I will curse those who curse you"). They believe that supporting modern-day Israel and its expansion aligns with God's will.
Political influence: Christian Zionist organizations, such as Christians United for Israel (CUFI), have millions of members and exert significant political pressure to influence U.S. foreign policy toward unconditional support for Israel.
Financial support: These groups provide millions of dollars in donations and volunteer support to Israel, including settlements in the West Bank.
Christian opposition to a "Greater Israel"
A diverse coalition of Christians opposes the "Greater Israel" plan, often citing justice, peace, and humanitarian concerns.
Mainline Protestantism: Several mainline denominations, such as the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (ELCA) and the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), have taken stances critical of Israeli policies and occupation, sometimes divesting from companies that profit from the occupation.
Peace and justice concerns: These groups argue that unconditional support for Israel disregards the suffering of Palestinians and violates international law. They emphasize a need for peace and justice for all people in the region.
Biblical interpretation: Some argue that a selective and unconditional reading of biblical prophecy ignores the conditional nature of God's covenant and leads to unjust outcomes.
Local Christian communities: Indigenous Christians in the Holy Land are often critical of Israeli policies and are negatively affected by the ongoing conflict and expansion.
Summary: Good or bad?
The question of whether the "Greater Israel" plan is good or bad cannot be answered with a single word, as it is a complex and highly divisive issue.
Proponents see it as a fulfillment of biblical prophecy and a just return to a historic homeland.
Opponents condemn it as an expansionist, colonial, and illegal project that denies the rights of Palestinians and is a primary driver of conflict in the Middle East.