The New World Order
   PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF 
                    RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION

                                             --------------

                         WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1977

                            U.S. SENATE,
                     SELECT COMMITTEE on INTELLIGENCE,
                       and SUBCOMMITTEE on HEALTH
                       and SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
                    of the COMMITTEE on HUMAN RESOURCES
                           Washington, D.C.

    The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m. in room 1202, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Senator Daniel K. Inouye (chairman of the 
Select Committee on Intelligence) presiding.

    Present: Senators Inouye (presiding), Kennedy, Goldwater, Bayh, Hathaway,
Huddleston, Hart, Schweiker, Case, Garn, Chafee, Lugar and Wallop.
    Also present: William G. Miller, staff director, Select Committee on Intelligence; 
Fr.Lawrence Horowitz, staff director, Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research;and 
professional staff members of both committees.

    Senator INOUYE. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is meeting today
and is joined by the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research chaired by
Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Senator Richard Schweiker of
Pennsylvania.  Senator Hathaway and Senator Chafee are members of both
committees.  We are to hear testimony from the Director of Central Intelligence, 
Adm. Stanfield Turner, and from other Agency witnesses on issues concerning new
documents supplied to the committee in the last week on drug testing conducted by 
the Central Intelligence Agency.

    It should be made clear from the outset that in general, we are focusing on events 
that happened over 12 or as long as 25 years ago.  It should be emphasized that the
programs that are of greatest concern have stopped and that we are reviewing these
past events in order to better understand what statutes and other guidelines might be
necessary to prevent the recurrence of such abuses in the future.  We also need to
know and understand what is now being done by the CIA in the field of behavioral
research to be certain that no current abuses are occurring.  
   
    I want to commend Admiral Turner for his full cooperation with this committee and
with the Subcommittee on Health in recognizing that this issue needed our attention. 
The CIA has assisted our committees and staffs in their investigative efforts and in
arriving at remedies which will serve the best interests of our country.

    The reappearance of reports of the abuses of the drug testing program and
reports of other previously unknown drug programs and projects for behavioral
control underline the necessity for effective oversight procedures both in the executive
branch and in the Congress.  The Select Committee on Intelligence has been working
very closely with President Carter, the Vice President, and Admiral Turner and his
associates in developing basic concepts for statutory guidelines which will govern all
activities of the intelligence agencies of the united States.

    In fact, it is my expectation that the President will soon announce his decisions on
how he has decided the intelligence agencies of the United States shall be organized. 
This committee will be working closely with the President and Admiral Turner in
placing this new structure under the law and to develop effective oversight
procedures.  

    It is clear that effective oversight requires that information must be full and
forthcoming. Full and timely information is obviously necessary if the committee and
the public is to be confident that any transgressions can be dealt with quickly and
forcefully.

    One purpose of this hearing is to give the committee and the public an
understanding of what new information has been discovered that adds to the
knowledge already available from previous Church and Kennedy inquiries, and to
hear the reasons why these documents were not available to the Church and
Kennedy committees.  It is also the purpose of this hearing to address the issues
raised by any additional illegal or improper activities that have emerged from the files
and to develop remedies to prevent such improper activities from occurring again.
    Finally, there is an obligation on the part of both this committee and the CIA to
make every effort to help those individuals or institutions that may have been harmed
by any of these improper or illegal activities.  I am certain that Admiral Turner will
work with this committee to see that this will be done.

    I would now like to welcome the most distinguished Senator from Massachusetts,
the chairman of the Health Subcommittee, Senator Kennedy.  

    Senator KENNEDY.  Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.  We are delighted to
join together in this very important area of public inquiry and public interest.
    Some 2 years ago, the Senate Health Subcommittee heard chilling testimony
about the human experimentation activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.  The
Deputy Director of the CIA revealed that over 30 universities and institutions ere
involved in an "extensive testing and experimentation" program which included covert
drug tests on unwitting citizens "at all social levels [           ]  , native Americans and
foreign."  Several of these [            ]  the administration of LSD to "unwitting subjects  
in [         ] situations."   

    At least one death, that of Dr. Olsen resulted from these activities.  The
Agency itself acknowledged that these tests made little scientific sense.  The agents
doing the monitoring were not qualified scientific observers.  The test subjects were
seldom accessible beyond the first hours of the test.  In a number of instances, the
test subject became ill for hours or days, and effective follow-up was impossible.
    Other experiments were equally offensive.  For example, heroin addicts were
enticed into participating in LSD experiments in order to get a reward--heroin.
    Perhaps most disturbing of all was the fact that the extent of experimentation
on human subjects was unknown.  The records of all experimentation on human
subjects was unknown.  The records of all these activities were destroyed in January
1973, at the instruction of then CIA Director Richard Helms.  in spite of persistent
inquiries by both the Health Subcommittee and the Intelligence Committee, no
additional records or information were forthcoming.  And no one--no single individual-
-could be found who remembered the details, not the director of the CIA, who
ordered the documents destroyed, not the official responsible for the program,  or a y
of his associates.

    We believed that the record, incomplete as it was, was as complete as it was
going to be.  Then one individual, through a Freedom of Information request,
accomplished what two U.S. Senate committees could not.   He spurred the agency
into finding additional records pertaining to the CIA'S program of experimentation with
human subjects.  These new records were discovered by the agency in March.  Their
existence was not made known to the Congress until July.

    The records reveal a far more extensive series of experiments than had previously
been thought. Eighty-six universities or institutions were involved.  New instances of
unethical were revealed.  The intelligence community of this Nation, which requires a
shroud of secrecy in order to operate, has a very sacred trust from the American
people.  The CIA's program of human experimentation of the fifties and sixties
violated that trust.  It was violated again on the day the bulk of the agency's records
were destroyed in 1973.  It is violated each time a responsible official refuses to
recollect the details of the program.  The best safeguard against abuses in the future
is a completed public accounting of the abuses of the past.

    I think this is illustrated, as Chairman Inouye pointed out.  These are issues, are
questions that happened in the fifties and sixties, and go back some 15,20 years ago,
but they are front page news today, as we see in the major news papers and on the
television and in the media of this country; and the reason they are, I think, is
because it just continuously begins to trickle out, sort of, month after month, and the
best way to put this period behind us, obviously, is to have the full information, and I
think that is the desire of Admiral Turner and of the members of this committee.
    The Central Intelligence Agency drugged American citizens without their
knowledge or consent.  It used university facilities and personnel without their
knowledge.  It funded leading researchers, often without their knowledge.

    These institutes, these individuals, have a right to know who they are and how and
when they were used.  As of today the Agency itself refuses to declassify the names
of those institutions and individuals, quite appropriately, I might say, with regard to
the individuals under the Privacy Act.  It seems to me to be a fundamental
responsibility to notify those individuals or institutions, rather. I think many of them
were caught up in an unwitting manner to do research for the Agency.  Many
researchers, distinguished researchers, some of our most outstanding members of
our scientific  community, involved in this network, now really l do not know whether
they were involved or not, and it seems to me that the whole health and climate in
terms of our university and our scientific and health facilities are entitled to that
response.  

    So, I intend to do all I can to persuade the Agency to, at the very least, officially
inform those institutions and individuals involved.

    Two years ago, when these abuses were first revealed, I introduced legislation,
with Senator Schweiker and Senator Javits, designed to minimize the potential for any
similar abuses in the future.  That legislation expanded the jurisdiction of the National
Commission on Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research to cover all
federally funded research involving human subjects.  The research initially was just
directed toward HEW activities, but this legislation covered DOD as well as the CIA.
    This Nation has a biomedical and behavioral research capability second to none. 
It has had for subjects of HEW funded research for the past 3 years a system for the
protection of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research second to none,
and the Human Experimentation Commission has proven its value.  Today's hearings
and the record already established underscore the need to expand its jurisdiction.

     The CIA supported that legislation in 1975, and it passed the Senate
unanimously last year.  I believe it is needed in order to assure all our people that
they will have the degree of protection in human experimentation that they deserve
and have every right to expect.

     Senator INOUYE.  Thank you very much.  Now we will proceed with the
hearings.  Admiral Turner
     [The prepared statement of Admiral Turner follows:]

     PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL STANFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF    
                         CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

Mr. Chairman: In my letter to you of July 15, 1977, I reported our recent discovery of
seven boxes of documents related to Project MKULTRA, a closely held  IA project
conducted from 1953-1964.  As you may recall, MKULTRA was an "umbrellas project"
under which certain sensitive subprojects were funded, involving among other things
research on drugs and behavioral modification.  During the Rockefeller Commission
and Church Committee investigations in 1975, the cryptonym became publicly known
when details of the drug-related death of Dr. Frank Olson were publicized.  In 1953
Dr. Olson, a civilian employee of the Army at Fort Detrick, leaped to his death
from a hotel room window in New York City about a week after having unwittingly
consumed LSD administered to him as an experiment at a meeting of LSD
researchers called by CIA. 

     Most of what was known about the Agency's involvement with behavioral drugs
during the investigation in 1975 was contained in report on Project MKULTRA
prepared by the Inspector General's office in 1963.  As a result of that report's
recommendations, unwitting testing of drugs on U.S. citizens was subsequently
discontinued.  The MKULTRA-related report was made available to the Church
Committee investigators and to the staff of Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on
Health.  Until the recent discovery, it was believed that all of the MKULTRA files
dealing with behavioral modification had been destroyed in 1973 on the orders of the
then retiring Chief of the Office of Technical Service, with the authorization of the then
DCI, as has been previously reported.  Almost all of the people who had had any
connection with the aspects of the project which interested Senate investigations in
1975 were no longer with the Agency at that time.  This, there was little detailed
knowledge of the MKULTRA sub-projects available to CIA during the Church
Committee investigations.  This lack of available details, moreover, was probable not
wholly attributable to the destruction of MKULTRA files in 1973; the 1963 report on
MKULTRA by the Inspector General notes on page 14: "Present practice is to maintain
no records of the planning and approval of test programs."

    When I reported to you last on this matter, my staff had not yet had an opportunity
to review the newly located material in depth.  This has now been accomplished, and
i am in a position to give you a description of the contents of the recovered material. 
I believe you will be most interested in the following aspects of the recent discovery:
     How the material was discovered and why it was not previously found; 
     The nature of this recently located material;

     How much new information there is in the material which may not have been
previously known and reported to Senate investigations; and 
     What we believe the most significant aspects of this had to be.

    To begin, as to how we discovered these materials.  The material had been sent to
our Retired Records Center outside of Washington and was discovered there as a
result of the extensive search efforts of an employee charged with responsibility for
maintaining our holdings??? on behavioral drugs and for responding to Freedom of
Information Act requests on this subject.  During the Church Committee investigation
in 1975, searches for MKULTRA-related material were made by examining both the
active and retired records of all branches of CIA considered at all likely to have had
association with MKULTRA documents.  The retired records of the Budget and Fiscal
Section of the Branch responsible for such work were not searched, however.  This
was because financial papers associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA
were normally maintained by the Branch itself under the project file, not by the
Budget and Fiscal Section.  In the case at hand, however, the newly located material
was sent to the Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal Section as
part of its won retired holdings.  The reason for this departure from normal procedure
is not known.  As a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval and
destruction in 1973 by the then-retiring Director of the Office as well as discovery in
1975 by CIA officials responding to Senate investigators.

    The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned in his
efforts to respond to FOIA requests.  He reviewed all listings of material of this Branch
stored at the Retired Records Center, including those of the Budget and Fiscal
Section and, this, discovered the MKULTRA-related documents which had been
missed in previous searches.  In sum, the Agency failed to uncover these particular
documents in 1973 in the process of attempting to destroy them; it similarly failed to
locate them in 1975 in response to the Church Committee hearings.  I am convinced
that there was no attempt to conceal this material during the earlier searches.

    Next, as to the nature of the recently located material, it is important to realize that
the recovered folders are finance folders.  The bulk of the material in them consists of
approvals for advance of funds, vouchers, accountings, and the like--most of which
are not very informative as to the nature of the activities that were undertaken. 
Occasional project proposals or memoranda commenting on some aspect of a
subproject are scattered throughout this material.  In general, however, the recovered
material does not include status reports or other documents relating to operational
considerations or progress in the various subprojects, though some elaboration of the
activities contemplated does appear.  The recovered documents fall roughly into three
categories:

     First, there are 149 MKULTRA subprojects, many of which appear to have         
      some connection with research into behavioral modification, drug acquisition and 
      testing or administering drugs surreptitiously.

     Second, there are two boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers, including
audit reports and financial statements from "cut-out" (i.e. intermediary) funding
mechanisms used to conceal CIA's sponsorship of various research projects.
     Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain intelligence         
      activities previously funded under MKULTRA which have nothing to do either with 
       behavioral modification, drugs, and toxins or with any other related matters.

            We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects
into categories under descriptive headings.  In broad outline, at least, this presents
the contents of these files.  The activities are placed in the following 15 categories:

  1. Research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol:

    17 subprojects probably not involving tests on human volunteers;
    14 subprojects definitely involving tests on human volunteers.
    19 subprojects probably including tests on human volunteers.  While not known,
some of these subprojects may have included tests on unwitting subjects as well.

    6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting subjects.

  2. Research on hypnosis: 8 subprojects, including 2 involving hypnosis and drugs in
combination.
  3. Acquisition of chemicals or drugs: 7 subprojects.
  4. Aspects of magicians' art useful in covert operations: e.g. surreptitious delivery of
dug-related materials: 4 subprojects.
  5. Studies of human behavior, sleep research, and behavioral changes during
psychotherapy: 9 subprojects.
  6. Library searches and attendance at seminars and international conferences on
behavioral modification: 6 subprojects.

  7. Motivational studies, studies of defectors, assessment, and training techniques:

23 subprojects.

  8. Polygraph research: 3 subprojects.
  9. Funding mechanisms for MKULTRA external research activities: 3 subprojects.
  10. Research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals in human tissue: provision of exotic
pathogens and the capability to incorporate them in effective delivery systems: 6
subprojects.

  11. Activities whose objectives cannot be determined from available documentation:

3 subprojects.

  12. Subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities connected with
the Army's Special Operations Division at Ft. Detrick, Md.  This activity is outlined in
Book I of the Church Committee Report, pp. 388-389.  (See Appendix A. pp. 68-69. 
Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI, the Army Assisted CIA in developing, testing, and
maintaining biological agents and delivery systems for use against humans as well as
against animals and crops. The objectives of these subprojects cannot be identified
from the recovered material beyond the fact that the money was to be used where
normal funding channels would require more written or oral justification than
appeared desirable for security reasons or where operational considerations dictated
short lead times for purchases.  About $11,000 was involved during this period 1953-
1960: 3 subprojects.

  13. Single subprojects in such areas as effects of electro-shock, harassment
techniques for offensive use, analysis of extrasensory perception, gas propelled
sprays and aerosols, and four subprojects involving crop and material sabotage.
  14. One or two subprojects on each of the following:

     "Blood Grouping" research, controlling the activity of animals, energy storage    
      and transfer in organic systems; and 
         stimulae and response in biological systems.

  15. Three subprojects cancelled before any work was done on them having to do
with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and research on
biologically active materials to be tested through the skin on human volunteers.
   Now, as to how much new the recovered material adds to what has previously
been reported to the Church Committee and to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on
Health on these topics, the answer is additional detail, for the most part: e.g., the
names of previously unidentified researchers and institutions associated on either a
witting or unwitting basis with MKULTRA activities, and the names of CIA officials who
approved or monitored the various subprojects.  Some new substantive material is
also present: e.g., details concerning proposals for experimentation and clinical
testing associated with various research projects, and a possibly improper
contribution by CIA to a private institution.  However, the principal types of activities
included have, for the most part, wither been outlined to some extent or generally
described in what was previously available to CIA in the way of documentation and
was supplied by CIA to Senate investigators.  

For example:

    Financial disbursement records for the period 1960-1964 for 76 of the 149
numbered MKULTRA subprojects had been recovered from the Office of Finance by
CIA and were made available to the Church Committee investigators in August or
September 1975.

    The 1963 Inspector General report on MKULTRA made available to both the
Church Committee and Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee mentions electro-shock
and harassment substances (pp. 4, 16); covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens (pp.
7, 10-12); the search for new materials through arrangements with specialists in
universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and
private research organizations (pp. 7, 9); and the fact that the Technical Service
Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control of human behavior
between 1953-1963 (p.21).

    The relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service
Division was also made available to the Church Committee staff.  That report
discusses techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of
communication (p. 201); discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly
administered (pp 201-202); studies on magicians' arts as applied to covert operations
(p. 202); specific funding mechanisms for research performed outside of CIA (pp.
202-203,205); research being done on "K" (knockout) material, alcohol tolerance, and
hypnotism (p. 203); research on LSD (p. 204); anti-personnel harassment and
assassination delivery systems including aerosol generators and other spray devices
(pp. 206-208); the role of Fort Detrick in support of CIA's Biological/Chemical Warfare
capability (p. 208); and material sabotage research (p. 209).  Much of this material is
reflected in the Church Committee Report, Book I, pp. 383-422.  (See Appendix A, pp.
65-102).

    The most significant new data discovered are, first, the names of researchers and
institutions who participated in the MKULTRA project and, secondly, a possibly
improper contribution by CIA to a private institution.  We are now in possession of the
names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants who are identified in there
covered material dealing with the 149 subprojects.  The names of 80 institutions
where work was done or with which these people were affiliated are also mentioned.

    The institutions include 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or
chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics (in
addition to those associated with universities), and 3 penal institutions.  While the
identities of some of these people and institutions were known previously, the
discovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.

    The facts as they pertain to the possible improper contribution are as follows:  One
project involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private medical
institution.  The fact that a contribution was made was previously known; indeed it
was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division
of CIA, pertinent portions os which had been reviewed by the Church Committee staff. 
The newly discovered material, however, makes it clear that this contribution was
made through an intermediary, which made it appear to be a private donation.  As a
private donation, the contribution was then matched by federal funds.  The institution
was not made aware of the true source of the gift.  This project was approved by the
then DCI, and concurred in by CIA's top management at the time, including the then
General Counsel who wrote an opinion supporting the legality of the contribution.

    The recently discovered documents give a greater insight into the scope of the
unwitting drug testing but contribute little more than that.  We now have collaborating
information that some of the unwitting drug testing was carried on in safe-houses in
San Francisco and New York City, and we have identified that three individuals were
involved in this undertaking as opposed to the previously reported one person.  We
also know now that some unwitting testing took place on criminal sexual psychopaths
confined at a State hospital and that, additionally, research was done on a knock-out
or "K" drug in parallel with research to develop pain killers for cancer patients.
    These, then are the principal findings identified to date in our review of the
recovered material.  As noted earlier, we believe the detail on the identities of
researchers and institutions involved in CIA's sponsorship of drugs and behavioral
modification is a new element and one which poses a considerable problem.  Most of
the people and institutions involved are not aware of Agency sponsorship.  We should
certainly assume that the researchers and institutions which cooperated with CIA on a
witting basis acted in good faith and in the belief that they were aiding their
government in a legitimate and proper purpose.  I believe we all have a moral
obligation to these researchers and institutions to protect them from any unjustified
embarrassment or damage to their reputations which revelation of their identities
might bring.  In addition, I have a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly
disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent.  This is
especially true, of course, for those researchers and institutions which were unwitting 
participants in CIA-sponsored activities.

    Nevertheless, recognizing the right and the need of both the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Subcommittee on Health to investigate the
circumstance of these activities in whatever detail they consider necessary.  I am
providing our Committee with al of the names on a classified basis.  I hope that this
will facilitate your investigation while protecting the individuals and institutions
involved.  Let me emphasize that the MKULTRA events are 12 to 25 years in past.  I
assure you that the CIA is in no way engaged in either witting or unwitting testing of
drugs today.

    Finally, I am working closely with the Attorney General and with the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare on this matter.  We are making available to the
Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary to any investigation he
may choose to undertake.  We are working with both the Attorney General and
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to determine whether it is practicable from
this new evidence to attempt to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have
been administered unwittingly.  No such names are part of these records, but we are
working to determine if there are adequate clues to lead to their identification; and if
so, how to go about fulfilling to Governments's responsibilities in the matter.     
     
TESTIMONY OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK LAUBINGER, OFFICE OF TECHNICAL
SERVICES; AL BRODY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL; ERNEST MAYERFIELD,
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL; AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

   Admiral TURNER.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  I would like to begin by thanking you
and Senator Kennedy for having a joint hearing this morning.  I hope this will expedite
and facilitate our getting all the information that both of your committees need to the
record quickly.  

    I would like also to thank you both for prefacing the remarks today by reminding
us all that the events about which we are here to talk are 12- to 24--years-old.  They
in now way represent the current activities or policies of the Central Intelligence
Agency.

    What we are here to do is to give you all the information that we now have and
which e did not previously have on a subject known as Project MKULTRA, a project
which took place from 1953 to 1964.  It was an umbrella project under which there
were numerous subprojects for research, among other things, on drugs and
behavioral modification.  What the new material that we offer today is a supplement to
the considerable material that was made available in 1975, during the Church
Committee hearings, and also to the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific
Research.

    At that time, the CIA offered up all of the information and documents it believed it
had available.  The principal one available at that time that gave the greatest amount
of information on this subject was a report of the CIA's Inspector General written in
1963, and which led directly to the termination of this activity in 1964, 13 years ago.

    The information available in 1973, as detailed by Senator Kennedy a minute ago,
with the concurrence of the then Director of Central Intelligence and under the
supervision of the Director of the Office of Technical Services that supervised Project
MKULTRA.

The material in 1975 was also sparse because most of the CIA people who had
been involved in 1953 to 1964 in this activity had retired from the Agency.  I would
further add that I think the material was sparse in part because it was the practice at
that time not to keep detailed records in this category.

    For instance, the 1963 report of the Inspector General notes:

    Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test
programs.

    In brief, there were few records to begin with and less after the destruction of
1973.

    What I would like to do now, though, is to proceed and let you know what the new
material adds to our knowledge of this topic, and I will start by describing how the
material was discovered and why it was not previously discovered.  The material in
question, some seven boxes, had been sent to our Retired Records Center outside of
the Washington area.  It was discovered there as the result of an extensive search by
an employee charged with the responsibility for maintaining our holdings on
behavioral drugs and for responding to Freedom of Information Act requests on this
subject.  

    During the Church Committee investigation of 1975, searches for MKULTRA-related
material were made by examining both the active and the retired records of all of the
branches of CIA considered likely to have had an association with MKULTRA
documents.  The retired records of the Budget and Fiscal Section of the branch that
was responsible for such work were not searched, however.  This was because the
financial paper associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA were normally
maintained by the branch itself under the project title, MKULTRA, not by the Budget
and Fiscal Section under a special budget file.

    In the case at hand, however, this newly located material had been sent to the
Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal Section of this branch as
part of its own retired holdings.  In short, what should have been filed by the branch
itself was filed by the Budget and Fiscal Section, and what should have been filed
under the project title, MKULTRA, was filed under budget and fiscal matters.  The
reason for this departure from the normal procedure of that time is simply not known,
and as a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval and destruction in 1973,
as well as discovery in 1975.

    The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned in his
efforts to respond to a Freedom of Information Act request, or several of them, in fact. 
He reviewed all of the listings of material of this branch, stored at the Retired Records
Center, including those of the Budget and Fiscal Section, and thus discovered the
MKULTRA-related documents, which had been missed in the previous searches.
    In sum, the agency failed to uncover these particular documents in 1973, in the
process of attempting to destroy them.  It similarly failed to locate them in 1975, in
response to the Church Committee hearings.  I am personally persuaded that there is
no evidence of any attempt to conceal this material during the earlier searches. 

Moreover, as we will discuss as we proceed, I do not believe the material itself is
such that there would be a motive on the part of the CIA to withhold this, having 
disclosed what it did in 1975.

    Next, let me move to the nature of this recently located material.  It is important to
remember what I have just noted, that these folders that were discovered are finance
folders.  The bulk of he material them consists of approvals for the advance of funds,
vouchers, and accountings and such, most of which are not very informative as to the
nature of he activities that they were supporting.  Occasional project proposals or
memoranda commenting on some aspect of a subproject are scattered throughout
this material.  In general, however, the recovered material does not include overall
status reports or other documents relating to operational consideration, or to the
progress on various subprojects, though some elaboration of the activities
contemplated does appear from time to time.

    There are roughly three categories of projects.  First there are 149 MKULTRA
subprojects, many of which appear to have some connection with research into
behavioral modification, drug acquisition and testing, or administering drugs
surreptitiously.  Second, there are two boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers,
including audit reports and financial statements from intermediary funding
mechanisms used to conceal CIA sponsorship of various research projects.

    Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain intelligence activities
previously funded under MKULTRA but which have nothing to do either with
behavioral modifications, drugs and toxins, or any closely related matter.

    We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects into
categories under descriptive headings.  In broad outline, at least, this presents the
contents of these files.  The following 15 categories are the ones we have divided
these into.

    First, research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol.  Within this,
there are 17 projects probably not involving human testing.  There are 14 subprojects
definitely involving testing on human volunteers.  There are 19 subprojects probably
including tests on human volunteers and 6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting
human beings.

    Second, there is research on hypnosis, eight subprojects, including two involving
hypnosis and drugs in combination.     

    Third, there are seven projects on the acquisition of chemicals or drugs.
    Fourth, four subprojects on the aspects of the magician's art, useful in covert
operations, for instance, the surreptitious delivery of drug-related materials. 
    Fifth, there are nine projects on studies of human behavior, sleep research, and
behavioral change during psychotherapy.

    Sixth, there are projects on library searches and attendants at seminars and
international conferences on behavioral modifications.

    Seventh there are 23 projects on motivational studies, studies of defectors,
assessments of behavior and training techniques.

    Eighth, there are three subprojects on polygraph research.
    Ninth, there are three subprojects on funding mechanisms for MKULTRA's external
research activities.

Tenth there are six subprojects on research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals n
human tissue, provision of exotic pathogens, and the capability to incorporate them in
effective delivery systems.

    Eleventh, there are three subprojects on activities whose nature simply cannot be
determined.

    Twelfth, there are subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities
conducted with the Army Special Operations Division at Fort Detrich, Md.  This activity
is outlined in Book I of the Church Committee report, pagers 388 to 389.  (See
Appendix A, pp. 68-69).

    Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI, the Army assisted the  IA in developing, testing,
and maintaining biological agents and delivery systems for use against humans as
well as against animals and crops.

    Thirteenth, there are single subprojects in such areas as the effects of
electroshock, harassment techniques for offensive use, analysis of extrasensory
perception, gas propelled sprays and aerosols, and four subprojects involving crop
and material sabotage.

    Fourteenth, one or two subprojects on each of the following: blood grouping
research; controlling the activities of animals; energy storage and transfer in organic
systems; and stimulus and response in biological systems.

   Finally , 15th, there are three subprojects cancelled before any work was done on
them having to do with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and
research on biologically active materials.

    Now, let me address how much this newly discovered material adds to what had
previously been reported to the Church Committee and to Senator Kennedy's
Subcommittee on Health.  The answer is basically additional detail.  The principal
types of activities included in these documents have for the most part been outlined
or to some extent generally described in what was previously available in the way of
documentation and which was supplied by the CIA to the Senate investigators.

    For example, financial disbursement records for the period of 1960 to 1964 for 76
of these 149 subprojects had been recovered by the Office of Finance at CIA and
were made available to the Church Committee investigators.  For example, the 1963
Inspector General report on MKULTRA made available to both the Church Committee
and the Subcommittee on Health mentions electroshock and harassment substances,
covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens, the search for new material through
arrangements with specialist in hospitals and universities, and the fact that the
Technical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control
of human behavior.  

    For instance also, the relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General report was also
made available to the Church Committee staff, and that report discusses the
techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of communication,
discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly administered, studies on
magicians' arts as applied to covert operations, and other similar topics.

    The most significant new data that has been discovered are, first, the names of
researchers and institutions who participated in  MKULTRA projects, and second,
 a possibly improper contribution by the CIA to a private institution. 

 We are now in the possession of the names of 185 nongovernment
researchers and assistants who are identified in the recovered material dealing with
these 149 subprojects.

    There are also names of 80 institutions where work was done or with which these
people were affiliated.  The institutions include 44 colleges or universities, 15 research
foundation or chemical or pharmaceutical companies or the like, 12 hospitals or
clinics, in addition to those associated with the universities, and 3 penal institutions.

    While the identities of some of these people and institutions were known
previously, the discovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.  

    The facts as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are as follows.  One
project involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private medical
institution.  The fact that that contribution was made was previously known.  Indeed, it
was mentioned in the 1957 report of the Inspector General on the Technical Service
Division of CIA that supervised MKULTRA, and pertinent portions of this had been
reviewed by the Church Committee staff.

    The newly discovered material, however, makes it clear that this contribution was
made through an intermediary, which made it appear to be a private donation.  As a
private donation, the contribution was then matched by Federal funds.  The institution
was not made aware of the true source of the gift.  This project was approved by the
then Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by CIA's top management
including the then General Counsel, who wrote an opinion supporting the legality of
the contribution.  The recently discovered documents also give greater insight into the
scope of the unwitting drug testing was carried out in what is known in the
intelligence trade as safe houses in San Francisco and in New York City, and we have
identified that three individuals were involved in this undertaking, whereas we
previously reported there was only one person.

    We also know now that some unwitting testing took place on criminal sexual
psychopaths confined at a State hospital, and that additionally research was done on
a knockout or K drug in parallel with research to develop painkillers for cancer
patients.

    These, then, are the principal findings identified to date in our review of this
recovered material.  As noted earlier, we believe the detail on the identities of
researchers and institutions involved in CIA sponsorship of drug and behavioral
modification research is a new element and one which poses a considerable problem.
Most of the people and institutions involved were not aware of CIA sponsorship.  We
should certainly assume that the researchers and institutions which cooperated with
CIA on a witting basis acted in good faith and in the belief that they were aiding their
Government in a legitimate and proper purpose.

    I believe that we all have a moral obligation to these researchers and institutions to
protect them from any unjustified embarrassmentor damage to their reputations which 
revelation of their identities might bring.

 In addition, I have a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the
names of the individual researchers without their consent. 

    This is especially true, of course, for those researchers, and institutions which were
unwitting participants in CIA sponsored activities.  

    Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I certainly recognize the right and the need of both the
Senate Select Committee on intelligence and the Senate Subcommittee on health and
Scientific Research to investigate the circumstances of these activities in whatever
detail you consider necessary.  I am providing your committee with all of the
documentation, including all of the names, on a classified basis. I hope that this will
facilitate your investigation while still protecting the individuals and the institutions
involved.

    Let me emphasize again that the MKULTRA events are 12 to 24 years in the past,
and I assure you that CIA is in no way engaged in either witting or unwitting testing of
drugs today.

    Finally, I am working closely with the Attorney General on this matter.  We are
making available to the Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary
to any investigation that he may elect to undertake.  Beyond that, we are also working
with the Attorney General to determine whether it is practicable from this new
evidence to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have been administered
unwittingly.  No such names are part of these records.  We have not identified the
individuals to whom drugs were administered, but we are trying now to determine if
there are adequate clues to lead to their identification, and if so how best to go abut
fulfilling the Government's responsibilities n this matter.

    Mr. Chairman, as we proceed with that process of attempting to identify the
individuals and then determining what is our proper responsibility to them, I will keep
both of these committees fully advised.  I thank you, sir.

    Senator INOUYE.  Thank you very much, Admiral Turner.  Your spirit of
cooperation is much appreciated.  I would like to announce to the committee that in
order to give every member an opportunity to participate in this hearing, that we
would set a time limit of 10 minutes per Senator.

    Admiral Turner, please give this committee the genesis of MKULTRA.  Who or what
committee or commission or agency was responsible or dreaming up this grandiose
and sinister project, and why was it necessary!  What is t rationale or justification for
such a project and was the President of the United states aware of this!

    Admiral TURNER.  Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask Mr. Brody on my right, who is
a long-time member of the CIA to address that in more detail.  I believe everything
that we know about the genesis was turned over to the Church Committee and is
contained in that material.  Basically, it was a CIA-initiated project.  it started out of a
concern of our being taken advantage of by other powers who would use drugs
against our personnel, and it was approved in the Agency.  I have asked the question
you just asked me and have been assured that there is no evidence within the
Agency of any involvement at higher echelons, the White House, for instance, or
specific approval.  That does not say there was not, but we have no such evidence.
Mr. Brody, would you amplify on my comments there, please!

    Mr. BRODY.  Mr. Chairman, I really have very little to add to that.  To my
knowledge, there was no Presidential knowledge of this projects at the time. it was a
CIA project, and as the admiral said, it was a project designed to attempt to
counteract what was then thought to be a serious threat by our enemies of using
drugs against us.  Most of what else we know about it is in the Senate Church
Committee report.  

    Senator INOUYE.  Were the authorized members of the Congress made aware of
this project through the budgetary process!

    Mr. BRODY.  We have no knowledge of that, sir.

    Senator INOUYE.  Are you suggesting that it was intentionally kept away from the
Congress and the President of the United States!

    Admiral TURNER.  No, sir. We are only saying that we have no evidence one way
or the other as to whether the Congress was informed of this particular project.  There
are no records to indicate.

    Senator INOUYE.  Admiral Turner, are you personally satisfied by actual
investigation that this newly discovered information was not intentionally kept away
form the Senate of the United States!

    Admiral TURNER.  I have no way to prove that, sir.  That is my conviction fro
everything I have seen of it.

    Senator INOUYE.  Now, we have been advised that these documents ere initially
discovered in March of this year, and you were notified  in July of this year, or June of
this year, and the committee was notified in July.  Can you tell us why the Director of
Central Intelligence was notified 3 months after its initial discovery, why the delay!

    Admiral TURNER. yes, sir.  All this started with several Freedom of Information Act
requests, and Mr. Laubinger on my left was the individual who took it upon himself to
pursue these requests with great diligence, and got permission to go to the Retired
Records Center, and then made the decision to look not only under that would be the
expected subject files, but through every file with which the branch that conducted
this type of activity had any conceivable connection.

    Very late in March, he discovered these seven boxes.  he arranged to have them
shipped from the Retired Records Center to Washington, to our headquarters.  They
varied in early April.  He advised his appropriate superiors, who asked him how long
he thought it would take would take him to go through these and screen them
appropriately, clear them for Freedom of Information Act release.

    The are, we originally estimated, 5,000 pages here.  We now think that was an
underestimation, and it may be closer to 8,000 pages.  He estimated it would take
about 45 days or into the middle of May to do that.  He was told to proceed, and as
he did so there was nothing uncovered in the beginning of these 149 cases that
appeared particularly startling or particularly additive to the knowledge that had
already been given to the Church Committee, some details, but no major revelations.  
      
    He and his associates proceeded with deliberateness, but not a great sense of
urgency.  There were other interfering activities that came and demanded his time
also.  He was not able to put 100 percent of his time on it and there did not appear to
be cause for a great rush here.  We were trying to be responsive to the Freedom of
Information Act request within the limits of our manpower and our priorities.

    In early June, however, he discovered two projects, the one related to K drugs and
the one related to the funding at the institution, and realized immediately that he had
substantial new information, and he immediately reported this to his superiors.

    Two actions were taken.  One was to notify the lawyers of the principal Freedom of
Information Act requestor that we would have substantial new material and that it
would be forthcoming as rapidly as possible, and the second was to start a
memorandum up the chain that indicated his belief that we should notify the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence of this discovery because of the character at least of
these two documents.

    As that proceeded up from the 13th of June, at each echelon we had to go
through the legal office, the legislative liaison office and at each echelon about the
same question was asked of him: Have you gone through all of this, so that when we
notify the Senate Select Committee we do not notify half of the important revelations
and not the other half?  The last thing I want, Mr. Chairman, is in any way to be on
any topic, give the appearance on any topic of being recalcitrant, reluctant, or having
to have you drag things out of me, and my subordinates, much to my pleasure, had
each asked, have you really gone through these 8,000 pages enough to know that we
are not going to uncover a bombshell down at the bottom?       

    By late June, about the 28th, this process reached my deputy.  He notified me
after his review of it on the 7th of July, which is the first I knew of it.  I began reading
into it.  I asked the same probing question directly.  I then notified my superiors, and
on the 15th delivered to you my letter letting you know that we had this, and we have
been working, many people, many hours since then to be sure that what we are
telling you today does include all the relevant material.

    Senator INOUYE.  I would like to commend Mr. Laubinger of his diligence and
expertise, abut was this diligence the result of the Freedom of Information Act or
could this diligence have been exercised during the Church hearings?  Why was it not
exercised?

    Admiral TURNER.  There is no question that theoretically this diligence could have
been exercised at any time, and it may well be that the Freedom of Information Act
has made us more aware of this.  Would you speak for yourself, please.

    Mr. LAUBINGER.  I really don't attribute it, Senator, to diligence os much as
thoroughness.  If you can imagine the pressures under an organization trying to
respond, which I think the CIA did at the time of the Church Committee hearings, the
hallways of the floor I am on were full of boxes from our records center.  Every box
that anyone thought could possibly contain anything was called up for search.  It was
one of a frantic effort to comply.

    When the pressure to that situation cools down, and you can start looking at
things systematically, you are apt to find things that you wouldn't under the heat of a
crash program, and that is what happened here.

    Senator INOUYE.  Thank you very much.  Senator Kennedy?

    Senator KENNEDY.  Admiral Turner, this is an enormously distressing report that
you give to the American Congress and to the American people today.  Granted, it
happened may years ago, but what we are basically talking about is an activity which
took place in the country that involved the perversion and the corruption of many of
our outstanding research centers in this country, with CIA funds, where some of our
top researchers were unwittingly involved in research sponsored by the Agency in
which they had no knowledge of the background or the support for.

    Much of it was done with American citizens who were completely unknowing in
terms of taking various drugs, and there are perhaps any number of Americans who
are walking around today on the east coast or west coast who were given drugs, with
all the kinds of physical and psychological damage that can be caused.   We have
gone over that in very careful detail, and it is significant and sever indeed.

    I do not know what could be done in a less democratic country that would be
more alien to our own traditions than was really done in this narrow area, and as you
give this report to the committee, I would like to get some sense of your own concern
about this type of activity, and how you react, having assumed this important
responsibility with the confidence of President Carter and the overwhelming support,
obviously, of the Congress, under this set of circumstances.

    I did not get much of a feeing in reviewing your statement here this morning of the
kind of abhorrence to this type of past activity which I think the American people
would certainly deplore and which I believe that you do, but could you comment
upon that question, and also perhaps give us what ideas you have to insure that it
cannot happen again?

    Admiral TURNER.  Senator Kennedy, it is totally abhorrent to me to think of using a
human n being as a guinea pig and in any way jeopardizing his life and his health no
matter how great the cause.  I am not here to pass judgment on my predecessors,
but I can assure you that this is totally beyond the pale of my contemplation of
activities that the CIA or any other of our intelligence agencies should undertake.
    I am taking and have taken what I believe are adequate steps to insure that such
things are not continuing today.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Could you tell us a little bit about that?

    Admiral TURNER.  I have asked for a special report assuring me that there are no
drug activities extant, that is, drug activities that involve experimentation.  Obviously,
we collect intelligence about drugs and drug use in other countries, but these are no
experimentations being conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, and I have had
a special check made because of another incident that was uncovered some years
ago about the unauthorized retention of some toxic materials at the CIA.  I have had
an actual inspection made of the storage places and the certification from the people
in charge of those that there are no such chemical biological materials present n our
keeping, and I have issued express orders that that shall not be the case.

    Beyond that, I have to rely in large measure on my sense of command and
direction of the people and their knowledge of the attitude I have just expressed to
you in this regard.

    Senator KENNEDY.  I think that is very commendable.

    Admiral TURNER.  Thank you, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  I think that is important that the American people understand
that You know, much of the research which is our area of interest that was being done
by the Agency and the whole involved sequence of activities done by the Agency, I
am convinced could have been done in a legitimate way through the research
programs of the National Institutes of Mental Health other sponsored activities.  I
mean, that is some other question, but I think you went to an awful lot of trouble,
where these things could have been.

    Let me ask you specifically, on the follow-up of MKULTRA, are there now--I think
you have answered, but I want to get a complete answer about any experimentations
that are being done on human beings, whether it is drugs or behavioral alterations or
patterns or any support, either directly or indirectly, being provided by the Agency in
terms of any experimentation on human beings.

    Admiral TURNER.  There is no experimentation with drugs on human beings,
witting or unwitting, being conducted in any way.

    Senator KENNEDY.  All right.  Or being supported indirectly?  I mean, are you
contracted out?

    Admiral TURNER.  Or being in any way supported.

    Senator KENNEDY.  All right.  How about the nondrug experimentation our
Committee has seen--psychosurgery, for example, or psychological research?

    Admiral TURNER.  We are continually involved in what we call assessment of
behavior.  For instance, we are trying to continually improve our polygraph
procedures to, you know, assess whether a person is lying or not.  This does not
involve any tampering with the individual body.  This involves studying records of
people's behavior under different circumstances, and so on, but it is not an
experimental thing.  Have I described that accurately, Al?
    Mr. BRODY.  Yes.
    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, it is limited to those areas?
    Admiral TURNER.  Yes; it does not involve attempting to modify behavior.  I only
involves studying behavior conditions, but not trying to actively modify it, as was one
of the objectives of MKULTRA.
    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, we are scarce on time, but I am interested in the other
areas besides polygraph where you are doing it.  Maybe you can either respond now
or submit it for the record, if you would do that.  Would you provide that for the
record?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes.

    [The material on psychological assessments follows:]

    Psychological assessments are performed as a service to officers in the operations
directorate who recruit and/or handle agents.  Except for people involved in training
courses, the subjects of the assessments are foreign nationals.  The assessments are
generally done to determine the most successful tactic to persuade the subject to
accept covert employment by the CIA, and to make an appraisal of his reliability and
truthfulness.

    A majority of the work is done by a staff of trained psychologists, some of whom
are stationed overseas.  The assessments they do may be either direct or indirect. 
Direct assessments involve a personal interview of the subject by the psychologist. 
When possible the subject is asked to complete a formal "intelligence test" which is
actually a disguised psychological test.  Individuals being assessed are not given
drugs, now are they subjected to physical harassment or torture.  When operating
conditions are such that a face-to-face interview in not possible, the psychologist may
do an indirect assessment, using as source materials descriptions of the subject by
others, interviews with people who know him, specimens of his writings, etc.   

The other psychological assessments involve handwriting analysis or graphological
assessment.  The work is done by a pair of trained graphologists, assisted by a small
number of measurement technicians.  They generally require at least a page of
handwritten script by the subject.  Measurements are made of about 30 different
writing characteristics, and these are charted and furnished to the graphologist for
assessments.

    The psychologists also give courses in psychological assessment to group of
operations officers, to sharpen their own capabilities to size up people.  As part of the
training course, the instructor does a psychological assessment of each student.  The
students are witting participants, and results are discussed with them.

    It is important to reiterate that psychological assessments are only a service to the
operations officers.  In the final analysis, it is the responsibility of the operations officer
to decide how a potential agent should be approached, or to make a judgement as to
whether any agent is telling the truth.

    Admiral TURNER.  The kind of thing we are interested in is, what will motivate a
man to become an agent of the United States in a difficult situation.  We have to be
familiar with that kind of attitudinal response that we can expect from people we
approach to for one reason or another become our spies, but I will be happy to
submit a very specific listing of these. 

    Senator KENNEDY.  Would you do that for the Committee? 

    In the follow-ups, in the MKSEARCH, in the OFTEN, and the CHICKWIT, could you
give us also a report on those particular programs?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Did they involve experimentation, human experimentation?

    Admiral TURNER.  No, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  None of them?

    Admiral TURNER. Let me say this that CHICKWIT program is the code name for
the CIA participation in what was basically a Department of Defense program.  This
program was summarized and reported to the Church Committee, to the Congress,
and I have since they have been rementioned in the press in the last 2 days here, I
have not had time to go through and personally review then.  I have ascertained that
al of the files that we had and made available before are intact, and I have put a
special order out that nobody will enter those files or in any way touch then without
my permission at this point, but they are in the Retired Records Center outside of
Washington and they are available.  

    I am not prepared to give you full details on it, because I simply haven't read into
that part of our history, but in addition I would suggest when we want to get into that
we should get the Department of Defense in with us.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, you will supply that information to the Intelligence
Committee, the relevant, I mean, the health aspects, obviously, and the research we
are interested in?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Will you let us know, Admiral Turner?

    Admiral TURNER.  I will he happy to.

    [See p. 169 for the material referred to.]

    Senator KENNEDY.  Thank you.  I am running out of time.  Do you support the
extension of the protection of human subjects legislation to include the CIA and
DOD?  You commented favorably on that 19  before, and I am hopeful we can get that 
on the calendar early in December, and  that is our strong interest.

    Admiral TURNER.  The CIA certainly has no objection to that proposed legislation,
sir.  It is not my role in the administration to be the supporter of it or the endorser of
it.

    Senator, KENNEDY.  As a persona matter, since you have reviewed these
subjects, would you comment?  I know it is maybe unusual, but you can understand
what we are attempting to do.

    Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  From your own experience in the agency, you can understand
the value of it.

    Just finally, in your own testimony now with this additional information, it seems
quite apparent to me that you can reconstruct in very careful detail this whole project
in terms of the responsible CIA officials for the program.  You have so indicated in
your testimony.  Now with the additional information, and the people, that have been
revealed in the examination of the documents, it seems to pretty clear that you can
track that whole program in very careful detail, and I would hope, you know, that you
would want to get to the bottom of it, a the Congress does as well.  I will come back
to that in my next round.  Thank you very much.

    Senator INOUYE.  Senator Goldwater?

    Senator GOLDWATER.  I have no questions.

    Senator INOUYE.  Senator Schweiker?

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Admiral Turner, I would like to go back to your testimony on page 12, where you
discuss the contribution to the building fund of a private medical institution.  You
state, "Indeed, it was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical
Service Division of CIA, pertinent portions of which has been reviewed by the Church
Committee staff."  I would like to have you consider this question very carefully.  I
served as a member of the original Church Committee.  My staffer did a lot of the
work that you are referring to here.  He made notes on the IG's report.  My question
to you is, are you saying that the section that specifically delineates an improper
contribution was in fact given to the Church Committee staff to see?

    Admiral TURNER.  The answer to your question is "Yes."  The information that a
contribution had been made was made available, to the best of my knowledge.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Only certain sections of the report were made available. 
The report had to be reviewed out at Langley; it was not reviewed here and copies
were not given to us here.  I just want you to carefully consider what you are saying,
because the only record we have are the notes that the staff took on anything that
was of significance.

    Admiral TURNER.  My understanding was that Mr. Maxwell was shown the relevant
portion of this report that disclosed that the contribution had been made. 

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  To follow this up further, I'd like to say that I think there was
a serious flaw in the way that the IG report was handled and the Church Committee
was limited.  I am not making any accusations, but because of limited access to the
report, we have a situation where it is not even clear whether we actually saw that material
or not, simply because we could not keep a copy of the report under the procedures we had to
follow. We were limited by note-taking, and so it is rather ambiguous as to just what
was seen and what was not seen.  I certainly hope that the new Intelligence
Committee will not be bound by procedures that so restrict its ability to exercise
effective oversight.

    I have a second question.  Does it concern you, Admiral, that we used a
subterfuge which resulted in the use of Federal construction grant funds to finance
facilities for these sorts of experiments on our own people?  Because as I understand
what you are saying, while the CIA maybe only put up $375,000, this triggered a
response on the part of the Federal Government to provide on a good faith basis
matching hospital funds at the same level.  We put up more than $1 million of
matching funds, some based on an allegedly private donation which was really CIA
money.

    Isn't there something basically wrong with that?

    Admiral TURNER.  I certainly believe there is.  As I stated, the General Counsel of
the CIA at that time rendered a legal opinion that this was a legal opinion that this
was a legal undertaking, and again I am hesitant to go back and revisit the
atmosphere, the laws, the attitudes at that time, so whether the counsel was on good
legal ground or not, I am not enough of a lawyer to be sure, but it certainly would
occur to me if it happened to day as a very questionable activity.   

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Well, I think those of us who worked on and amended the
Hill-Burton Act and other hospital construction assistance laws over the years, would
have a rather different opinion on the legal intent or object of Congress in passing
laws to provide hospital construction project money.  These funds weren't intended
for this.

    It reminds me a little bit of the shellfish toxin situation which turned up when I was
on the Church Committee.  The Public Health Service was used to produce a deadly
poison with Public Health money.  Here are using general hospital construction
money to carry on a series of drug experiments. 

    Admiral TURNER.  Excuse me, sir.  If I could just be, I think, accurate, I don't think
any of this $375,000 or the matching funds were used to conduct drug experiments. 
They were used to build the hospital.  Now, the CIA then put more money into a
foundation that was conducting research on the CIA's behalf supposedly in that
hospital, so the intent was certainly there, but the money was not used for
experimentation.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Well, I understand it was used for bricks and mortar, but
the bricks were used to build the facility where the experiments were carried on; were
they not?

    Admiral TURNER.  We do not have positive evidence that they were.  It certainly
would seem that that was the intent, but I do not want to draw inferences here----

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Well, why else would they give this money for the building
fund if the building was not used for a purpose that benefited the CIA program?         
    Admiral TURNER.  I certainly draw the inference that the CIA expected to benefit
from it, and some of the wording says the General Counsel's opinion was that this was
legal only if the CIA was going to derive adequate benefit from it, but, sir, there is no
evidence of what benefit was derived.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  There must have been some pretty good benefits at stake. 
The Atomic Energy Commission was to bear a share of the cost, and when they
backed out for some reason or another, the CIA picked up part of their tab.  So, at
two different points there were indications that CIA decision makers thought was great
benefit to be derived from whatever happened within the brick and mortar walls of
that facility.

    Admiral TURNER.  You are absolutely right.  I am only taking the position that I
cannot substantiate that there was benefit derived.    

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  The agreement documents say that the CIA would have
access to one-sixth of the space involved in the construction of the wing, so how
would you enter into an agreement that specifically says that you will have access to
and use of one-sixth of the space and not perform something in that space?  I cannot
believe it was empty.

    Admiral TURNER.  Sir I am not disputing you at all, but both of us are saying that
the inference is that one-sixth of the space was used, that experimentation was done,
and so on, but there is no factual evidence of what went on as a result of that
payment or what went on in that hospital.  It is just missing.  It is not that it didn't
happen.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Admiral Turner, one other---- 

    Senator KENNEDY.  Would the Senator yield on that point?

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  I understand that in the agency's documents on the
agreement it was explicitly stated that one-sixth of the facility would be designated for
CIA use and made available for CIA research.  Are you familiar---

    Mr. BRODY.  Senator, as I recall, you are right in that there is a mention of one-
sixth, but any mention at all has to do with planning.  There are no subsequent
reports as to what happened after the construction took place.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Admiral Turner, I read in the New York Times that part of
this series of MKULTRA experiments involved an arrangement with the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics to test LSD surreptitiously on unwitting patrons in bars in New York and
San Francisco.  Some of the subjects became violently ill and were hospitalized.  I
wonder if you would just briefly describe what we were doing there and how it was
carried out?  I assume it was through a safe house operation.  I don't believe your
statement went into much detail.

    Admiral TURNER.  I did mention the safe house operation in my statement, sir, and
that is how these were carried out.  What we have learned from the new
documentation is the location and the dates at which the safe houses were run by the 
CIA and the identification of three individuals who were associated with running those
safe houses.  We know something about the construction work that was done in them
because there were contracts for this.  Beyond that, we are pretty much drawing 
inferences as to the things that went on as to what you are saying here.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Well, the subjects were unwitting.  You can infer that much,
right?

    Admiral TURNER.  Right.

Senator SCHWEIKER.  If you happened to be at the wrong bar at the wrong place
and time, you got it.

    Mr. BRODY.  Senator, that would be--contacts were made, as we understand it, in
bars, it cetera, and then the people may have been invited to these safe houses. 
There really isn't any indication as to the fact that this took place in the bars.

    Admiral TURNER.  We are trying to be very precise with you, sir, and not draw an
inference here.  There are 6 cases of these 149 where we have enough evidence in
this new documentation t substantiate that there was unwitting testing and some of
that involves these safe houses.  There are other cases where it is ambiguous as to
whether the testing was witting or voluntary.  There are others where it was clearly
voluntary.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Of course, after a few drinks, it is questionable whether
informed consent means anything to a person in a bar anyway.

    Admiral TURNER.  Well, we don't have any indication that all these cases where it
is ambiguous involved drinking of any kind.  There are cases in penal institutions
where it is not clear whether the prisoner was given a choice or not.  I don't know that
he wasn't given a choice, but I don't positively know that he was, and I classify that
as an ambiguous incident.

    Senator INOUYE.  Your time is up, Senator.  

    Senator Huddleston?

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Admiral Turner, you stated in your testimony that you are convinced there was no
attempt to conceal this recently discovered documentation during the earlier
searches.  Did you question the individuals connected with the earlier search before
you made that judgment?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes; I haven't, I don't think, questioned everybody who looked
in the files or is still on our payroll who looked in the files back in 1975, but Mr.
Laubinger on my left is the best authority on this, and I have gone over it with him in
some detail.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  but you have inquired, you think, sufficiently to assure
yourself that there was no intent on the pat of any person to conceal these records
from the previous committee?

    Admiral TURNER.  I am persuaded of that both by my questioning of people and
by the circumstances and the way in which these documents were filed, by the fact
which I did not and should have mentioned in my testimony, that these were not the
official files.  The ones that we have received or retrieved were copies of files that
were working files that somebody had used, and therefore were slipped into a
different location, and again I say to you, sir, I can't imagine their deliberately
concealing these particular files and revealing the other things that they did reveal in
1975.  I don't see the motive for that, because these are not that damning compared
with the overall material that was provided.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Is this the kind of operation that if it were continuing now
or if there were anything similar to it, that you would feel compelled to report to the
Select Committee on Intelligence?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes sir.  You mean, if I discovered that something like this were
going on without my knowledge?  Yes, I would feel absolutely the requirement to---
    Senator HUDDLESTON.  But if it were going on with your knowledge, would you
report it to the committee?  I assume you would.

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes.  Well, it would not be going on with my knowledge, but
theoretically the answer is yes, sir.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Well, then, what suggestions would you have as we
devise charters for the various intelligence agencies?  What provision would you
suggest to prohibit this kind of activity from taking place?  Would you suggest that it
ought to be specifically outlined in a statutory charter setting out the parameters of
the permissible operation of the various agencies?

    Admiral TURNER.  I thank that certainly is something we must consider as we look
at the legislation for charters.  I am not on the face of it opposed of it.  I think we
would have to look at the particular wording a e are going to have to deal with the
whole charter issue as to exactly how precise you want to be in delineating restraints
and curbs on the intelligence activities.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  In the case of sensitive type operations, which this
certainly was, which might be going on today, is the oversight activity of the agency
more intensive now than it was at that time?

    Admiral TURNER.  Much more so.  I mean, I have briefed you, sir, and the
committee on our sensitive operations.  We have the Intelligence Oversight Board. 
We have a procedure in the National Security Council for approval of very sensitive
operations.  I think the amount of spotlight focused on these activities is many,
manyfold what it was in these 12 to 24 years ago. 

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  How about the record keeping?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes; I can't imagine anyone having the gall to think that he can
just blithely destroy records today with all of the attention that has come to this, and
certainly we are emphasizing that that is not the case.        

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Admiral, I was particularly interested in the activity that
took place at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Ky., in which a Dr.
Harris Isbell conducted experiments on people who were presumably patients there. 
There was narcotics institution, I take it, and Dr Isbel was, according to the New York
Times story, carrying on a secret series of correspondence with an individual at the
Agency by the name of Ray.  Have you identified who that person is?

    Admiral TURNER.  Sir, I find myself in a difficult position here at a public hearing to
confirm or deny these names in view of my legal responsibilities under the Privacy Act
not to disclose the names of individuals here.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  I am just asking you if you have identified the person
referred to in that article as Ray.  I am not asking you who he was.  I just want to
know if you know who he is.

    Admiral TURNER.  No.  I am sorry, was this W-r-a-y or R-a-y?

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  It is listed in the news article as R-a-y, in quotations.

    Admiral TURNER.  No, sir, we have not identified him.    

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  So you have no knowledge of whether or not he is still a
member of your staff or connected with the Agency in any way.  Have you attempted
to identify him?

    [Pause]

    Admiral TURNER.  Senator, we have a former employee whose first name is Ray
who may have had some connection with these activities.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  You suspect that but you have not verified that at this
time, or at least you are not in a position to indicate that you have verified it?

    Admiral TURNER.  That is correct.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Thank you.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Senator INOUYE.  Senator Wallop?

    Senator WALLOP.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

    Admiral Turner, not all of the--and in no way trying to excuse you of the hideous
nature of some of these projects, but not all of the projects under MKULTRA are of a
sinister or even a moral nature.  Is that a fair statement?

    Admiral TURNER.  That is correct.

    Senator WALLOP.  Looking down through some of these 17 projects not involving
human testing, aspects of the magician's art, it doesn't seem as though there is
anything very sinister about that.  Studies of human behavior and sleep research,
library searches.  Now, those things in their way are still of interest, are they not, to
the process of intelligence gathering?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes sir.  I have not tried to indicate that we either are not doing
or would not do any of the things that were involved in MKULTRA, but when it comes
to the witting or unwitting testing of people with drugs, that is certainly verboten, but
there are other things.     
      
    Senator WALLOP.  Even with volunteer patients?  I mean, I am not trying to put
you on the spot to say whether it is going on, but I mean, it is not an uncommon
thing, is it, in the prisons of the United States for the Public Health Service to conduct
various kinds of experiments with vaccines and, say, sunburn creams?  I know n
Arizona they have done so.

    Admiral TURNER.  My understanding is, lots of that is authorized, but I am not of
the opinion that this is not the CIA's business, and that if we need some information
in that category, I would prefer to go to the other appropriate authorities of the
Government and ask them to get if for us rather than to in any way---

    Senator WALLOP.  Well, you know, you have library searches and attendants at
the national seminars.  This is why I wanted to ask you if the bulk of these projects
were in any way the kinds of things that the Agency might not do now.  A President
would not have been horrified by the list of the legitimate types of things.  Isn't that probably
the case?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir.

    Senator WALLOP.  And if it did in fact appear in the IG report, is there any reason
to suppose that the President did not know of this project?  You said there was no
reason to suppose that they did, but let me reverse that.  Is there any reason to
suppose that they did not?   

    Admiral TURNER.  No.

    Senator WALLOP.  Well, you know, I just cannot imagine you or literally anybody
undertaking projects of the magnitude of dollars here and just not knowing about it,
not informing your superior that these were going on, especially when certain items of
it appear in the Inspector General's report on budget matters.

    Admiral TURNER.  Well, I find it difficult when it is that far back to hypothesize
what the procedures that the Director was using in terms of informing his superiors
were.  It is quite a different climate from today, and I think we do a lot more informing
today than they did back then, but I find it very difficult to guess what the level of
knowledge was.

    Senator WALLOP.  I am really not asking you to second-guess it, but it just seems
to me that, while the past is past, and thank goodness we are operating under
different sets of circumstances, I think it is naive for us to suppose that these things
were conducted entirely without the knowledge of the Presidents of the United States
during those times.  It is just the kinds of research information that was being sought
was vital to the United States, not the means, but the information that they were trying
to find.

    Admiral TURNER.  I am sorry.  Your question, is, was this vital?  Did we view it a
vital?

    Senator WALLOP.  Well, your implication at the beginning was that it was a
response to the kinds of behavior that were seen in Cardinal Mindszenty's trial and
other things.  I mean, somebody must have thought that this was an important
defensive reaction, if nothing else, on the part of the United States.

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir, I am sure they did, but again I just don't know how
high that permeated the executive branch.

    Senator WALLOP.  But the kinds of information are still important to you.  I mean, I
am not suggesting that anyone go back and do that kind of thing again, but I'm
certain

it would be of use to you to know what was going to happen to one of your agents
assuming someone had put one of these things into his bloodstream, or tried to
modify his behavior.  

    Admiral TURNER  Absolutely, and you know, we would be very concerned if we
thought there were things like truth serums or other things that our agents or others
could be subjected to by use or improper use of drugs by other powers against our
people or agents.

    Senator WALLOP.  Are there?  I don't ask you to name them, but are there such
serums?

    Admiral TURNER.  I don't know of them if there are.  I would have to answer that
for the record, sir.

    Senator WALLOP.  I would appreciate that.
    [The material referred to follows:]

                      "TRUTH" DRUGS IN INTERROGATION

  The search for effective aids to interrogation is probably as old as man's need to
obtain information from an uncooperative source and a persistent as his impatience to
shortcut any tortuous path.  In the annals of police investigation, physical coercion
has at times been substituted for painstaking and time-consuming inquiry in the belief
that direct methods produce quick results.  Sir James Stephens, writing in 1883,
rationalizes a grisly example of "third degree" practices by the police of India: "It is far
pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper in a poor devil's eyes
than to go almost in the sun hunting up evidence." 

  More recently, police officials in some countries have turned to drugs for assistance
in extracting confessions from accused persons, drugs which are assumed to relax
the individual's defenses to the point that he unknowingly reveals truths he has been
trying to conceal.  This investigative technique, however humanitarian as an
alternative to physical torture, still raises serious questions of individual rights and
liberties.  In this country, where drugs have gained only marginal acceptance in police
work, their use has provoked cries of "psychological third degree" and has
precipitated medico-legal controversies that after a quarter of a century still
occasionally flare into the open.

   The use of so-called "truth" drugs in police work is similar to the accepted
psychiatric practice of narco-analysis; the difference in the two procedures lies in their
different objectives.  The police investigator is concerned with empirical truth that
may be used against the suspect, and therefore almost solely with probative truth: the
usefulness of the suspect's revelations depends ultimately on their acceptance in
evidence by a court of law.  The psychiatrist, on the other hand, using the name
"truth" drugs in diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill, is primarily concerned with
psychological truth or psychological reality rather than empirical fact.  A patient's
aberrations are reality for him at the time they occur, and an accurate account of
these fantasies and delusions, rather than reliable recollection of past events, can be
the key to recovery.

   The notion of drugs capable of illuminating hidden recesses of the mind, helping to
heal the mentally ill and preventing or reversing the miscarriage of justice, has
provided an exceedingly durable theme for the press and popular literature.  While
acknowledging that "truth serum" is a misnomer twice over--the drugs are not sera
and they do not necessarily bring forth probative truth--journalistic accounts continue
to exploit the appeal of the term.  The formula is to play up a few spectacular "truth"
drug sucessess and to imply that the drugs are more maligned than need be and
more widely employed in criminal investigation than can officially be admitted.    

   Any technique that promises an increment of success in extracting information from
an uncompliant source is ipso facto of interest in intelligence operations.  If the ethical
considerations which in Western countries inhibit the use of narco-interrogation in
police work are felt also in intelligence, the Western services must at least be
prepared against its possible employment by the adversary.  An understanding of
"truth" drugs, their characteristic actions, and their potentialities, positive an negative,
for eliciting useful information is fundamental to an adequate defense against them.
   This discussion meant to help toward such an understanding, draws primarily upon
openly published materials.  It has the limitations of projecting from criminal
investigation practices and from the permissive atmosphere of drug psycho-therapy.

                       SCOPOLAMINE AS "TRUTH SERUM"

   Early in this century physicians began to employ scopolamine, along with morphine
and chloroform, to induce a state of "twilight sleep" during childbirth.  A constituent of
[chemical word unclear (beohroe? ], scopolamine was known to produce sedation
and drowsiness, confusion and disorientation, incoordination, and amnesia for events
experienced during intoxication.  Yet physicians noted that women in twilight sleep
answered questions accurately and often volunteered exceedingly candid remarks.  
   In 1922 it occurred to Robert House, a Dallas, Texas obstetrician, that a similar
technique might be employed in the interrogation of suspected criminals, and he
arranged to interview under scopolamine two prisoners in the Dallas county jail whose
guilt seemed clearly confirmed.  Under the drug, both men denied the charges on
which they were held; and both, upon trial, were found not guilty.  Enthusiastic at this
success, House concluded that a patient under the influence of scopolamine "cannot
create a lie...and there is no power to think or reason."  [14]  His experiment and this
conclusion attracted wide attention, and the idea of a "truth" drug was thus launched
upon the public consciousness.

   The phrase "truth serum" is believed to have appeared first in a news report of
House's experiment in the Los Angeles Record, sometime in 1922.  House resisted
the term for a while but eventually came to employ it regularly himself.  He published
some eleven articles on scopolamine in the years 1921-1929, with a noticeable
increase in polemical seal as time went on.  What had began as something of a
scientific statement turned finally into a dedicated crusade by the "father of truth
serum" on behalf of his offspring, wherein he was "grossly indulgent of its wayward
behavior and stubbornly proud of its minor achievements." [11]
    
   Only a handful of cases in which scopolamine was used for police interrogation
came to public notice, though there is evidence suggesting that some police forces
may have used it extensively.  [2,16]  One police writer claims that the threat of
scopolamine interrogation has been effective in extracting confessions from criminal
suspects, who are told they will first be rendered unconscious by chloral hydrate
placed covertly in their coffee or drinking water. [16]

   Because of a number of undesirable side effects, scopolamine was shortly
disqualified as a "truth" drug.  Among the most disabling of the side effects are
hallucinations, disturbed perception, somnolence, and physiological phenomena such
as headache, rapid heart, and blurred vision, which distract the subject from the
central purpose of the interview.  Furthermore, the physical action is long, far
outlasting the psychological effects.  Scopolamine continues, in some cases, to make
anesthesia and surgery safer by drying the mouth and throat and reducing secretions
that might obstruct the air passages.  But the fantastically, almost painfully, dry
"desert" mouth brought on by the drug is hardly conducive to free talking, even in a
tractable subject. 

                               BARBITURATES

   The first suggestions that drugs might facilitate communication with emotionally
disturbed patients came quite by accident in 1916.  Arthur S. Lovenhart and his
associates at the University of Wisconsin, experimenting with respiratory stimulanta,
were surprised when, after an injection of sodium cyanide, a catatonic patient who
had long been mute and rigid suddenly relaxed, opened his eyes, and even
answered a few questions.  By the early 1930's a number of psychiatrists were
experimenting with drugs as a adjunct to established methods of therapy.  

   At about this time police officials, still attracted by the possibility that drugs might
help in the interrogation of suspects and witnesses, turned to a class of depressant
drugs known as the barbiturates.  By 1935 Clarence W. Muehlberger, head of the
Michigan Crime Detection Laboratory at East Lansing, was using barbiturates on
reluctant suspects, though police work continued to be hampered by the courts'
rejection of drug-induced confessions except in a few carefully circumscribed
instances.

   The barbiturates, first synthesized in 1903, are among the oldest of modern drugs
and the most versatile of all depressants.  In this half-century some 2,500 have been
prepared, and about two dozen of these have won an important place in medicine. 
An estimated three to four billion doses of barbiturates are prescribed by physicians
in the United States each year, and they have come to be known by a variety of
commercial names and colorful slang expressions: "goof-balls, Luminal, Nembutal,
"red devils," "yellow jackets," "pink ladies, " etc.  Three of them which are used in
narcoanalysis and have seen service as "truth" drugs are sodium amytal
(amobarbital), pentothal sodium (thiopental), and to a lesser extent seconal
(secobarbital).

   As one pharmacologist explains it, a subject coming under the influence of a
barbiturate injected  intravenously goes through all the states of progressive
drunkenness, but the time scale is on the order of minutes instead of hours. 
Outwardly the sedation effect is dramatic, especially if the subject is a psychiatric
patient in tension.  His features slacken, his body relaxes.  Some people are
momentarily excited; a few become silly and giggly.  This usually passes, and most
subjects fall asleep, emerging later in disoriented semi-wakefulness.

   The descent into narcosis and beyond with progressively larger doses can be
divided as follows:

     I.  Sedative state.
     II. Unconsciousness, with exaggerated reflexes (hyperactive stage).
     III. Unconsciousness, without reflex even to painful stimuli.
     IV. Death.

Whether all these stages can be distinguished in any given subject depends largely
on the dose and the rapidity with which the drug is induced.  In anesthesia, stages I
and II may last only two or three seconds.

   The first or sedative stage can be further divided:

     Plane 1. No evident effect, or slight sedative effect.

     Plane 2. Cloudiness, calmness, amnesia.  (Upon recovery, the subject will not
remember what happened at this or "lower" planes or stages.)

     Plane 3. Slurred speech, old thought patterns disrupted, inability to integrate or
learn new patterns.  Poor coordination.  Subject becomes unaware of painful stimuli.
   
   Plane 3 is the psychiatric "work" stage.  I may last only a few minutes, but it can be
extended by farther slow injection  of drug.  The usual practice is to  bring the subject
quickly to Stage II and to conduct the interview as he passes back into the sedative
stage on the way to full consciousness. 

                     CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES

   The general abhorrence in Western countries for the use of chemical agents "to
make people do things against their will" has precluded serious systematic study (at
least as published openly) of the potentialities of drugs for interrogation.  Louis A.
Gottschalk, surveying their use in information-seeking interviews, [13] cites 136
references; but only two touch upon the extraction of intelligence information, and
one of these concludes merely that Russian techniques in interrogation and
indoctrination are derived from age-old police methods and do not depend on the
use  of drugs.  On the validity of confessions obtained with drugs, Gottschalk found
only three published experimental studies that eh deemed worth reporting.

   One of these reported experiments by D.P. Morris in which intravenous sodium
amytal was helpful in detecting malingerers. [12] The subjects, soldiers, were at first
sullen, negativistic, and non-productive under amytal, but as the interview proceeded
they revealed the fact of and causes for their malingering.  Usually the interviews
turned up a neurotic or psychotic basis for the deception.

   The other two confession studies, being more relevant to the highly specialized,
untouched area of drugs in intelligence interrogation, deserve more detailed review.  

   Gerson and Victoroff [12] conducted amytal interviews with 17 neuropsychiatric
patients, soldiers who had charges against them, at Tilton General Hospital, Fort Dix. 
First they were interviewed without amytal by a psychiatrist, who neither ignoring nor
stressing their situation a prisoners or suspects under scrutiny, urged each of them t
discuss his social and family background, his army career, and his version of the
charges pending against him.

   The patients were told only a few minutes in advance that narcoanalysis would be
performed.  The doctor was considerate, but positive and forthright.  He indicated that
they had no choice but to submit to the procedure.  Their attitudes varied from
unquestioning compliance to downright refusal.

   Each patient was brought to complete narcosis and permitted to sleep.  As he
became  semiconscious and could be stimulated to speak, he was held in this stage
with additional amytal while the questioning proceeded.  He was questioned first
about innocuous matters from his background that he had discussed before receiving
the drug.  Whenever possible, he was manipulated into bringing up himself the
charges pending against him before being questioned about them.  If he did this in a
too fully conscious state, it proved more effective to ask him to "talk about that later"
and to interpose a topic that would diminish suspicion, delaying the interrogation on
his criminal activity until he was back in the proper stage of narcosis.

   The procedure differed from therapeutic narcoanalysis in several ways: the setting,
the type of patients, and the kind of "truth" sought.  Also, the subjects were kept in
twilight consciousness longer than usual.  This state proved richest in yield of
admissions prejudicial to the subject.   In it his speech was thick, mumbling, and
disconnected, but his discretion was markedly reduced.  This valuable interrogation
period, lasting only five to ten minutes at a time, could be reinduced by injecting
more amytal and putting the patient back to sleep.  

   The interrogation technique varied from case to case according to background
information about the patient, the seriousness of the charges, the patient's attitude
under narcosis, and his rapport with the doctor.  Sometimes it was useful to pretend,
as the patient grew more fully conscious, that he had already confessed during the
amnestic period of the interrogation, and to urge him, while his memory and sense of
self-protection were still limited, to continue to elaborate the details of what he had
"already described."  When it was obvious that a subject was withholding the truth, his
denials were quickly passed over and ignored, and the key questions would be
reworded in a new approach.  
    
   Several patients revealed fantasies, fears, and delusions approaching delirium,
much of which could readily be distinguished from reality.  But sometimes there was
no way for the examiner to distinguish truth from fantasy except by reference to other
sources.  One subject claimed to have a child that did not exist,
another threatened to kill on sight a stepfather who had been dead a year, and yet
another confessed to participating in a robbery when in fact he had only purchased
goods from the participants.  Testimony concerning dates and specific places was
untrustworthy and often contradictory because of the patient's loss of time-sense.  His
veracity in citing names and events proved questionable.  Because of his confusion
about actual events and what he thought or feared had happened, the patient at
times managed to conceal the truth unintentionally.

   As the subject revived, he would become aware that he was being questioned
about his secrets and, depending upon his personality, his fear of discovery, or the
degree of his disillusionment with the doctor, grow negativistic, hostile, or physically
aggressive. Occasionally patients had to e forcible restrained during this period to
prevent injury to themselves or others as the doctor continued to interrogate.  Some
patients, moved by fierce and diffuse anger, the assumption that they had already
been tricked into confessing, and a still limited sense of discretion, defiantly
acknowledged their guilt and challenged the observer to "do something about it."  As
the excitement passed, some fell back on their original stories and others verified the
confessed material.  During the follow-up interview nine of the 17 admitted the validity
of their confessions; eight repudiated their confessions and reaffirmed their earlier
accounts.

   With respect to the reliability of the results of such interrogation, Gerson and
Victoroff conclude that persistent careful questioning can reduce ambiguities in drug
interrogation, but cannot eliminate them altogether.

   At least one experiment has shown that subjects are capable of maintaining a lie
while under the influence of a barbiturate.  Redlich and his associates at Yale [25]
administered sodium amytal to nine volunteers, students and professionals, who had
previously, for purposes of the experiment, revealed shameful and guilt-producing
episodes of their past and then invented false self-protective stories to cover them.  In
nearly every case the cover story retained some elements of the guilt inherent in the
true story.     

   Under the influence of the drug, the subjects were cross-examined on their cover
stories by a second investigator.  The results, though not definitive, showed that
normal individuals who had good defenses and no overt pathological traits could
stick to their invented stories and refuse confession.  Neurotic individuals with strong
unconscious self-punitive tendencies, on the other hand, both confessed more easily
and were and were inclined to substitute fantasy for the truth, confessing to offenses
never actually committed.

   In recent years drug therapy has made some use of stimulants, most notably
amphetamine (Benzedrine) and its relative methamphetamine (Methedrine).  These
drugs, used either alone or following intravenous barbiturates, produce an outpouring
of ideas, emotions, and memories which have been of help in diagnosing mental
disorders.  The potential of stimulants in interrogation has received little attention,
unless in unpublished work.  In one study of their psychiatric use Brussel et al. [7]
maintain that Methedrine gives the liar no time to think or to organize his deceptions. 
Once the drug takes hold, they say, an insurmountable urge to pour out speech traps
the malingerer.  Gottschalk, on the other hand, says that this claim is extravagant,
asserting without elaboration that the study lacked proper controls. [13]  It is evident
that the combined use of barbiturates and stimulants, perhaps along with ataraxics
(tranquilizers), should be further explored.

                        OBSERVATIONS FROM PRACTICE

   J.M. MacDonald, who as a psychiatrist for the District Courts of Denver has had
extensive experience with narcoanalysis, says that drug interrogation is of doubtful
value in obtaining confessions to crimes.  Criminal suspects under the influence of
barbiturates may deliberately withhold information, persist in giving untruthful
answers, or falsely confess to crimes they did not commit.  The psychopathic
personality in particular, appears to resist successfully the influence of drugs.
   MacDonald tells of a criminal psychopath who, having agreed to narco-
interrogation, received 1.5 grams of sodium amytal over a period of five hours.  This
man feigned amnesia and gave a false account of a murder.  "He displayed little or
no remorse as he (falsely) described the crime, including burial of the body.  Indeed
he was very self-possessed and he appeared almost to enjoy the examination.   From
time to time he would request that more amytal be injected." [21]  

   MacDonald concludes that a person who gives false information prior to receiving
drugs is likely to give false information also under narcosis, that the drugs are of little
value for revealing deceptions, and that they are more effective in releasing
unconsciously repressed material than in evoking consciously suppressed
information.

   Another psychiatrist known for his work with criminals, L.X. Freedman, gave sodium
amytal to men accused of various civil and military antisocial acts.  The subjects were
mentally unstable, their conditions ranging from character disorders to neuroses and
psychoses.  The drug interviews proved psychiatrically beneficial to the patients, but
Freedman found that his view of objective reality was seldom improved by their
revelations.  He was unable to say on the basis of the narco-interrogation whether a
given act had or had not occurred.  Like MacDonald, he found that psychopathic
individuals can deny to the point of unconsciousness crimes that every objective sign
indicates they have committed.       
  
   F.G. Inbau, Professor of Law at Northwestern university, who has had considerable
experience observing and participating in "truth" drug tests, claims that they are
occasionally effective on persons who would have disclosed the truth anyway had
they been properly interrogated, but that a person determined to lie will usually be
able to continue the deception under drugs.  

   The two military psychiatrists who made the most extensive use of narco-analysis
during the war years, Roy R. Grinker and John C. Spiegel concluded that in almost all
cases they could obtain from their patients essentially the same material and give
them the same emotional release by therapy without the use of drugs, provided they
had sufficient times.  

   The essence of these comments from professionals of long experience is that
drugs provide rapid access to information that is psychiatrically useful but of doubtful
validity as empirical truth.  The same psychological information and a less adulterated
empirical truth can be obtained from fully conscious subjects through non-drug
psychotherapy and skillful police interrogation.

                      APPLICATION TO CK INTERROGATION

   The almost total absence of controlled experimental studies of "truth" drugs and the
spotty and anecdotal nature of psychiatric and police evidence require that
extrapolations to intelligence operations be made with care.  Still, enough is known
about the drugs' action to suggest certain considerations affecting the possibilities for
their use in interrogations.

   It should be clear  from the foregoing that at best a drug can only serve as an aid
to an interrogator who has a sure understanding of the psychology and techniques of
normal interrogation.  In some respects, indeed, the demand on his skill will be
increased by the baffling mixture of truth and fantasy in drug-induced output.  And the
tendency against which he must guard in the interrogate to give the responses that
deem to be wanted without regard for facts will be heightened by drugs: the literature
abounds with warnings that a subject in narcosis is extremely suggestible.  

   It seems possible that this suggestibility and the lowered guard of the narcotic state
might be put to advantage in the case of a subject feigning ignorance of a language
or some other skill that had become automatic with him.  Lipton [20] found sodium
amytal helpful in determining whether a foreign subject was merely pretending not to
understand English.  By extension, one can guess that a drugged interrogatee might
have difficulty maintaining the pretense that he did not comprehend the idiom of a
profession he was trying to hide. 

   There is the further problem of hostility in the interrogator's relationship to a
resistance source.  The accumulated knowledge about "truth" drug reaction has come
largely from patient-physician relationships of trust and confidence.  The subject in
narco-analysis is usually motivated a priori to cooperate with the psychiatrist, either to
obtain relief rom mental suffering or to contribute to a scientific study.  Even in police
work, where an atmosphere of anxiety and threat may be dominant, a relationship of
trust frequently asserts itself: the drug is administered by a medical man bound by a
strict code of ethics; the suspect agreeing to undergo narcoanalysis in a desperate
bid for corroboration of his testimony trusts both drug and psychiatrist, however
apprehensively; and finally, as Freedman and MacDonald have indicated, the police
psychiatrist frequently deals with a "sick" criminal, and some order of patient-physician
relationship necessarily evolves.

   Rarely has a drug interrogation involved "normal" individuals in a hostile or
genuinely threatening milieu.  It was from a non-threatening experimental setting that
Krie Lindemann could say that his "normal" subjects "reported a general sense of
euphoria, ease and confidence, an they exhibited a marked increase in talkativeness
and communicability." [18]  Gerson and Victoroff list poor doctor-patient rapport as
one factor interfering with the completeness and authenticity of confessions by the
Fort Dix soldiers, caught as they were in a command performance and told they had
no choice but to submit to narco-interrogation.

   From all indications, subject-interrogator rapport is usually crucial to obtaining the
psychological release which may lead to unguarded disclosures.  Role-playing on the
part of the interrogator might be a possible solution to the problem of establishing
rapport with a drugged subject.  In therapy, the British narco-analyst William Sargent
recommends that the therapist deliberately distort the facts of the patient's life-
experience to achieve heightened emotional response and at reaction. [27]  In the
drunken state of narco-analysis patients are prone to accept the therapist's false
constructions.  There is reason to expect that a drugged subject would communicate
freely with an interrogator playing the role of relative, colleague, physician, immediate
superior, or any other person to whom his background indicated he would be
responsive.

   Even when rapport is poor, however, there remains one facet of drug action
eminently exploitable in interrogation---the fact that subjects emerge from narcosis
feeling they have revealed a great deal, even when they have not.  As Gerson and
Victoroff demonstrated at Fort Dix, this psychological set provides a major opening for
obtaining genuine confessions.

                            POSSIBLE VARIATIONS

   In studies by Beecher and his associates, [3-6] one-third to one-half the individuals
tested proved to be placebo reactors, subjects who respond with symptomatic relief
to the administration of any syringe, pill, or capsule, regardless of what it contains. 
Although no studies are known to have been made of the placebo phenomenon as
applied to narco-interrogation, it seems reasonable that when a subject's sense of
guilt interferes with productive interrogation, a placebo for pseudo-narcosis could
have the effect of absolving him of the responsibility for his acts and thus clear the
way for free communication.  It is notable that placebos are most likely to be effective
in situations of stress.  The individual most likely to react to placebos are the more
anxious, more self-centered, more dependent on outside stimulation, those who
express their needs more freely socially, talkers who drain off anxiety by conversing
with others.  The non-reactors are those clinically more rigid and with better than
average emotional control.  No sex or I.Q. differences between reactors and non-
reactors have been found.

   Another possibility might be the combined use of drugs with hypnotic trance and
post-hypnotic suggestion: hypnosis could presumably prevent any recollection of the
drug experience.  Whether a subject can be brought to trance against his will or
unaware, however, is a matter of some disagreement.  Orne, in a survey of the
potential uses of hypnosis in interrogation, [23] asserts that it is doubtful, despite
many apparent indications to the contrary, that trance can be induced in resistant
subjects.  It may be possible, he adds, to hypnotise a subject unaware, but this would
require a positive relationship with the hypnotist not likely to be found in the
interrogation setting.

   In medical hypnosis, pentothal sodium is sometimes employed when only light
trance has been induced and deeper narcosis is desired.  This procedure is a
possibility for interrogation, but if a satisfactory level of narcosis could be achieved
through hypnotic trance there would appear to be no need for drugs.  

                            DEFENSIVE MEASURES 

   There is no known way of building tolerance for a "truth" drug without creating a
disabling addiction, or of arresting the action of a barbiturate once induced.  The only
full safeguard against narco-interrogation is to prevent the administration of the drug. 
Short of this, the best defense is to make use of the same knowledge that suggests
drugs for offensive operations: if a subject knows that on emerging from narcosis he
will have an exaggerated notion of how much he has revealed he can better resolve
to deny he has said anything.

   The disadvantages and shortcomings of drugs in offensive operations become
positive features of the defense posture.  A subject in narco-interrogation is
intoxicated, wavering between deep sleep and semi-wakefulness.  His speech is
garbled and irrational, the amount of output drastically diminished.  Drugs disrupt
established thought patterns, including the will to resist, but they do so
indiscriminately and thus also interfere with the patterns of substantive information the
interrogator seeks.  Even under the conditions most favorable for the interrogator,
output will be contaminated by fantasy, distortion, and untruth.

   Possibly the most effective way to arm oneself against narco-interrogation would be
to undergo a "dry run."  A trial drug interrogation with output taped  for playback
would familiarize an individual with his own reactions to "truth" drugs, and this
familiarity would help to reduce the effects of harassment by the interrogator before
and after the drug has been administered.  From the viewpoint of the intelligence
service, the trail exposure of a particular operative to drugs might provide a rough
benchmark for assessing the kind and amount of information he would divulge in
narcosis.

   There may be concern over the possibility of drug addiction intentionally or
accidentally induced by an adversary service.  Most drugs will cause addiction with
prolonged use, and the barbiturates are no exception.  In recent studies at the U.S.
Public Health Service Hospital for addicts in Lexington, Ky., subjects received large
doses of barbiturates over a period of months.  Upon removal of the drug, they
experienced acute withdrawal symptoms and behaved in every respect like chronic
alcoholics.

   Because their action is extremely short, however, and because there is little
likelihood that they would be administered regularly over a prolonged period,
barbiturate "truth" drugs present slight risk of operational addiction.  If the adversary
service were intent on creating addiction in order to exploit withdrawal, it would have
other, more rapid means of producing states as unpleasant as withdrawal symptoms.

   The hallucinatory and psychotomimetic drugs such as mescaline, marihuana, LSD-
25, and microtine are sometimes mistakenly associated with narcoanalytic
interrogation.  These drugs distort the perception and interpretation of the sensory
input to the central nervous system and affect vision, audition, smell, the sensation of
the size of body parts and their position in space, etc.  Mescaline and LSD-25 have
been used to create experimental "psychotic states," and in a minor way as aids in
psychotherapy.

   Since information obtained from a person in a psychotic drug state would be
unrealistic, bizarre, and extremely difficult to assess, the self-administration of LSD-25,
which is effective in minute dosages, might in special circumstances  offer an
operative temporary protection against interrogation.  Conceivably, on the other hand,
an adversary service could use such drugs to produce anxiety or terror in medically
unsophisticated subjects unable to distinguish drug-induced psychosis from actual
insanity.   An enlightened operative could not be thus frightened, however, knowing
that the effect of these hallucinogenic agents is transient in normal individuals.  
   Most broadly, there is evidence that drugs have least effect on well-adjusted
individuals with good defenses and good emotional control, and that anyone who can
withstand the stress of competent interrogation in the waking state can do so in
narcosis.  The essential resources for resistance thus appears to lie within the
individual.
   
                                CONCLUSIONS

   The salient points that emerge from this discussion are the following.  No such
magic brew as the popular notion of truth serum exists.  The barbiturates, by
disrupting defensive patterns, may sometimes be helpful in interrogation, but even
under the best conditions they will elicit an output contaminated by deception, fantasy
garbled speech etc.  A major vulnerability they produce in the subject is a tendency
to believe he has revealed more than he has.  It is possible, however, for both 
normal individuals and psychopaths to resist drug interrogation; it seems likely that
any individual who can withstand ordinary intensive interrogation can hold out in
narcosis.  The best aid to a defense against narco-interrogation is foreknowledge of
the process and its limitations.  There is an acute need for controlled experimental
studies of drug reaction, not only to depressants but also to stimulants and to
combinations of depressants, stimulants, and ataraxics.

                                REFERENCES

   1. Adams, E. Barbiturates.  Sci. Am., Jan. 1958, 198 (1), 60-64. 
   2. Barkham, J. Truth Drugs: The new crime solver  Coronet, Jan. 1951, 29, 73-76.
   3. Beecher, H. K. Anesthesia.  Sci. Am., Jan. 1957, 198, p. 70.
   4. ----. Appraisal of drugs intended to alter subjective responses, symptoms.  J.
Amer. Med. Assn., 1955, 158, 399-401.
   5. ----. Evidence for increased effectiveness of placebos with increased stress. 
Amer. J. Physiol., 1956. 187, 163-169.
   6. ---. Experimental pharmacology and measurement of the subjective response. 
Science, 1953, 116. 157-162.
   7. Brussel, J. A., Wilson, D.C., Jr., & Shankel, L.W.  The use of Methedrine in
psychiatric practice.  Psychiat. Quart., 1954. 28, 381-394.
   8. Delay, J. Pharmacologic explorations or the personality.  Psychanalysis and
"Methedrine" shock.  Proc. Roy, Soc. Med., 1949, 42, 492-?.
   9. deRopp, R.S. Drugs and the Mind.  New York: Grove [2 words unclear]., 1960.
   10 Freedman. [abr. unclear] Z. "Truth" drugs. Sci. Am., March [date unclear], 43-
154.
   11. Geis, G. In scopolamine verital.  The early history [word unclear] drug-induced
statements.  J. of Crim. Law, Criminal, & Pol. Sci., Nov, Dec. [numbers unclear] (4),
347-358.
   12. Gerson, M. J., & Victoroff, V. Experimental investigations into the validity of
confessions obtained under sodium amytal narcosis. J. Cli?. and Exp. Psychopath.,
1348, 9, 350-375.
   13. Gottschalk, L.A. The use of drugs in information-seeking interviews.  Technical
report #2, ARDC Study SR 177-D Contract AF 18 (600) 1797. Dec. 1958.  Bureau of
Social Science Research Inc.
   14. House, R. E.  The use of scopolamine in criminology.  Teres St, J. of Med.,
1922, 18, 259.
   15. Houston, F. A. preliminary investigation into abreaction comparing Methedrine
and sodium amytal with other methods.  J. Ment. Sci., 1952, 98. 707-710.
   16. Inbau, F. G. Self-incrimination.  Springfield: C.C. Thomas, 1950.
   17. Kidd., W.R. Police interrogation. 1940.
   18. Legal dose of truth.  Newsweek, Feb. 23, 1959, 28.
   19. Lindemann, E. Psychological changes in normal and abnormal individuals
under the influence of sodium amytal interview.  A review. Amer. Practit, Digest Treat.,
1950, 1, 148-163.
   21. MacDonald, J. M. Narcoanalysis and criminal law.  Amer. J. Psychiat., 1954,
111, 283-288.     
  22. Morris, D.P.  Intravenous barbiturates: an aid in the diagnosis and treatment of
conversion hysteria and malingering.  Mil. Surg., 1945, 96, 509-513.
  23. Orne, M. T.  The potential uses of hypnosis in interrogation.  An evaluation. 
ARDC Study SR 177-D Contract AF 18 (600) 1797, Dec. 1938.  Bureau of Social
Science Research, Inc.
   24. Pelikan, E. W., & Kensler, C. J. Sedatives: Their pharmacology and uses. 
Reprint from The Medical Clinics of North America.  W. B. Saunders Company, Sept.
1958.      
   25. Redlich, F. C., Ravits, L. J., & Dession, G. H.  Narcoanalysis and truth.  Amer. J.
Psychiat., 1951, 107, 586-593.
   26. Rolin, J. Police Drugs.  Translated by L. J. Bendit. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1956.
   27. Sargant, W., & Slater, E. Physical methods of treatment in psychiatry.  (3rd. ed.) 
Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1954.
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Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960.

    Senator WALLOP.  If they are, I would assume that you would still try to find from
either theirs or somebody else's information how to protect our people from that kind
of activity.   
    Admiral TURNER.  Yes.
    Senator WALLOP.  Thank you very much.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator INOUYE.  Senator Chafee?
    Senator CHAFEE.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
   
    Admiral Turner, I appreciate that these tawdry activities were taking place long
before your watch, and I think you have correctly labeled them as abhorrent, but not
only were they abhorrent, it seems to me they were rather bungled, amateurish
experiments that don't seem to have been handled in a very scientific way, al least
from the scanty evidence we have.

    It seems to me that there were the minimum of reports and the Agency didn't have
the ability to call it quits.  It went on for some 12 years, as you as you mentioned. 
What I would like to get to is, are you convinced now in your Agency that those
scientific experiments, legitimate ones that you were conducting with polygraph and
so forth, were being conducted in a scientific manner and that you are handling it in a
correct manner to get the best information that you are seeking in the end?  

    Admiral TURNER.  yes, I am, and I also have a sense of confidence that we are
limiting ourselves to the areas where we need to be involved as opposed to areas
where we can rely on others.

    Senator CHAFEE.  I am convinced of that from your report.  I just do hope that
you have people who are trained in not only handing this type of experiment, but in
preparing the proper reports and drawing the proper data from the reports.  You are
convinced that you have this type of people?

    Admiral TURNER.  yes, sir.

    Senator CHAFEE.  The second point I am interested in was the final lines your
testimony here, which I believe are very important, and that is that the Agency is
doing all it can in cooperation with other branches of the Government to go about
tracking down the identity of those who were in some way adversely affected, and
see what can be done to fulfill the government's responsibilities in that respect.  I
might add that I commend you in that, and I hope you will pursue it vigorously.
    A hospital in my State was involved in these proceedings, and it is unclear exactly
what did take place, so I have both a parochial interest in this and a national interest
as well, and I do hope you will press on with it.  It involves not only you, I appreciate,
but also HEW and perhaps the Attorney General.

    Admiral TURNER.  Thank you, sir.  We will.

    Senator CHAFEE.  Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  
   
    Senator INOUYE.  Thank you very much.

    Admiral TURNER.  MKULTRA subproject 3 was a project involving the surreptitious
administration of LSD on unwitting persons, was it not? 

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir.

    Senator INOUYE.  In February 1954, and this was in the very early stages of
MKULTRA, the Director of Central intelligence wrote to the technical services staff
officials criticizing their judgment because they had participated in an experiment
involving the administration of LSD on an unwitting basis to Dr. Frank Olson, who
later committed suicide.  Now, the individuals criticized were the same individuals
who were responsible for this subproject 3, involving exactly the same practices. 
Even though these individuals were clearly aware of the dangers of surreptitious
administration and had been criticized by the Director of Central Intelligence, subproject
3 was not terminated immediately after Dr. Olson's death.

    In fact, according to documents, it continued for a number of years.  Can you
provide this committee with any explanation of how such testing could have
continued under these circumstances?

    Admiral TURNER.  No, sir, I really can't.

    Senator INOUYE.  Are the individuals in the technical services who carried on
subproject 3 still on the CIA payroll?

    Admiral TURNER.  I am sorry.  Are you asking, are they today?

    Senator INOUYE.  Yes.

    Admiral TURNER.  No, sir.

    Senator INOUYE.  What would you do if you criticized officials of the technical
services staff and they continued to carry on experimentation for a number of years? 

    Admiral TURNER.  I would do two things, sir.  One is, I would be sure at the
beginning that I was explicit enough that they knew that I didn't want that to be
continued anywhere else, and two, if I found it being continued, I would roll some
heads.

    Senator INOUYE.  Could you provide this committee with information as to whether
the individuals involved had their heads rolled?   

    Admiral TURNER.  I don't believe there is any evidence they did, but I will double
check that.

    [See p 170 for material referred to.]

    Senator INOUYE.  As you know, Senator Huddleston and his subcommittee are
deeply involved in the drafting of charters and guidelines for the intelligence
community.  We will be meeting with the President tomorrow.  Our concern is, I think,
a basic one.  Can anything like this occur again?   

    Admiral TURNER.  I think it would be very, very unlikely, first, because we are all
much more conscious of these issues than we were back in the fifties, second,
because we have such thorough oversight procedures.  I cannot imagine that this of
activity could take place today without some member of the CIA itself bypassing me,
if I were authorizing this, and writing to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and blowing
the whistle on this kind of activity.

    I am also doing my very best, sir, to encourage an openness with myself and a
free communication in the Agency, so that I am the one who finds these things if they
should happen.  The fact is that we must keep you and your committee and now the
new committee in the House informed of our sensitive activities.  I think all of these
add up to a degree of scrutiny such that this kind of extensive and flagrant activity
could not happen today without it coming to the attention of the proper authorities to
stop it.    

    Senator INOUYE.  A sad aspect of the MKULTRA project was that it naturally
involved the people who unwittingly or wittingly got involved in experimentation.  I
would appreciate it if you would report back to this committee in 3 months on what
the Agency has done to notify these individuals and these institutions, and
furthermore, to notify us as to what steps have been taken to identify victims, and if
identified, what you have done to assist them, monetarily or otherwise.

    Admiral TURNER.  All right, sir.  I will be happy to.

    Senator GOLDWATER.  Will the Senator yield?
   
    Senator INOUYE.  Yes, sir.

    Senator GOLDWATER.  I wonder if he could include in that report for our
information only a complete listing of the individuals and the experiments done on
them, and whether they were witting or unwitting, volunteer or nonvolunteer, and what
has been the result in each case.  I think that would be interesting.  

    Admiral TURNER.  Fine.  Yes, sir.

    Senator INOUYE.  Senator Kennedy?

    Senator KENNEDY.  Thank you.  It is your intention to notify the individuals who
have been the subjects of the research, is that right, Admiral Turner?  Do you intend
to notify those individuals?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes.

    Senator KENNEDY.  If you can identify them, you intend to notify them?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes.

    Senator KENNEDY.  And you intend to notify the universities or research centers
as well?

    Admiral TURNER.  Senator, I am torn on that.  I understand your opening
statement.  I put myself in the position of the president of one of those universities,
let's say.  If he were witting---if his university had been witting of this activity with us,
he has access to all that information today.  If he were not witting, I wonder if the
process of informing him might put his institution's reputation in more jeopardy than
letting them go on the way they are today, not knowing.  I really don't know the
equities here.    

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, the problem is, all you have to do is pick up the
newspapers and you see these universities mentioned.  In many instances, I think you
are putting the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage, where there is a
complete change of administration, and they may for one reason or another not have
information that they are under suspicion.  There is innuendo; there is rumor.  I
cannot help but believe that it will just get smeared all over the newspapers in spite of
all the security steps that have been taken.

    It seems to me that those universities should be entitled to that information, so that
the ones with other administrations can adapt procedures to protect those
universities.  The importance of preserving the independence of our research areas
and the communities seems to me to be a very fundamental kind of question about
the protection of the integrity of our universities and our research centers.

    Admiral TURNER.  You are saying that you feel that if we identify them privately to
themselves, we can benefit them in an adequate way to cover the risk that this will
lead to a more public disclosure?  There are lots of the 80 who have not been
identified publicly at this point.

    Senator KENNEDY.  I think the universities themselves should be notified.  I think
then the universities can take whatever steps in terms of their getting up the
procedures to protect their own kinds of integrity in terms of the future.  I would
certainly hope that they would feel that they could make a public comment or a
public statement on it.  I think it is of general public interest, particularly for the people
that are involved in those universities, to have some kind of awareness of whether
they were used or were not used and how they were used.

    I think they are entitled to it, and quite frankly, if there is a public official or an
official of the university that you notify and he wants for his own particular reasons 
not to have it public, I don't see why those in a lesser echelon or lower echelon 
who have been effectively used by it should not have the information as well.

    So, I would hope that you would notify the universities and then also indicate to
the public.  I can't conceive that this information will not be put out in the
newspapers, and it puts the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage, and
of curse some of it is wrong, which is the fact of the matter, and I think some
university official saying, well, it isn't so, is a lot different that if they know it is
confirmed or it is not confirmed in terms of the Agency itself.  I think that there is a
responsibility there.  

    Admiral TURNER.  I have great sympathy with what you are saying.  I have already
notified one institution because the involvement was so extensive that I thought they
really needed to protect themselves, and I am most anxious to do this in whatever
way will help all of the people who were perhaps unwitting participants in this, and
the difficulty I will have is, I can't quite do, I think, what you suggested, in that I may
not be able to tell an institution of the extent and nature of its participation.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, you can tell them to the best of your information, and it   
seems to me that just because the university or an individual is going to be
embarrassed is not a reason for classifying the information.  So, I would hope---I
mean, I obviously speak as an individual Senator, but I feel that that is an incredible
disservice to the innocent individuals and, I think, a disservice to the integrity of the
universities unless they are notified, to be able to develop procedures you are
developing with regards to your own institution and we are trying to in terms of the
Congress.  Certainly the universities are entitled to the same.  

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes.  Not all of these, of course, were unwitting.

    Senator KENNEDY.  That's right.

    Admiral TURNER.  Many of them were witting, and therefore they can take all
those precautionary steps on their own, but I am perfectly open to doing this.  I am
only interested in doing it in a way that when identifying a university it will not lead to
the public disclosure of the individuals, whom I am not allowed to disclose, and so
on. 

    Senator KENNEDY.  That could be done, it seems to me.

    Admiral TURNER.  So, we will see if we can devise a way of notifying these
institutions on a private basis so that they can then make their decision whether their
equities are best served by their announcing it publicly or their attempting to maintain
it----

    Senator KENNEDY.  Or you.  I wonder.  What if they were to ask you to announce
or indicate?

    Admiral TURNER.  My personal conscience, sir, at this time, is that I would be
doing a disservice to these universities if I notified the public.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Would you meet with some university officials and ask what
their views are or whether they feel that the preservation of the integrity or the
universities would be better served or not?  I think that would be useful to find out
from small, large, private, and public universities' officials how they view the integrity--

    Admiral TURNER.  Fine.  I will phone several university presidents today who are
my friends and who are not involved in this, and ask them what they think the equities
would be.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Al right.  You let us know, too.

    Admiral TURNER.  But I am not sure that I see that there is any great benefit in my
notifying the public as opposed to the university notifying them.  Let him have his
choice whether he wants---each institution wants to have it made public.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Yes.  the fact would remain that the institution's credibility
would be better served if the institution's president were to deny it and the university
indicated that it did not participate in that program than if the university were to deny
it and the Agency says nothing.  It seems to me that that would be the strongest, and
the only way that that is going to be credible.  I would value it if you would get some
input from universities as to what they believe is the fairest way in terms of the
preservation of the integrity of the universities. 

    Let me, if I could, ask on the question of the users of these safe houses, as I
understand from information that was provided to us in the course of our last
committee, the testing of various drugs on individuals happened at all social levels,
high and low, it happened on native Americans and also on foreign nationals.  That is
what I understand was the nature of the project itself. 

    Now, I am just wondering whether those tests were conducted at the two locations
on the east coast and the west coast which were known as safe houses.  To your
knowledge, is that correct?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes.

    Senator KENNEDY.  In terms of the research in this particular program, it did not
go beyond the safe houses located on the eat coast and the west coast?  I believe I
am correct on that.

    Admiral TURNER.  That type of unwitting testing of sort of randomly selected
individuals, yes. 

    Senator KENNEDY.  It was just located in those two places?

    Admiral TURNER.  To the best of our knowledge, there were only two locations.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, how do we interpret randomly selected?

    Admiral TURNER.  Well, as opposed to prisoners in a prison who were somehow
selected.

    Senator KENNEDY.  All right.  Do you know from this information how many
people were recruited during this period?

    Admiral TURNER.  No idea.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Do you know approximately?

    Admiral TURNER.  I asked that question the other day, and we just don't have--
apparently we are very--well, either there were no records kept of the actual numbers
and types of people tested or they were destroyed.  

    Senator INOUYE.  Senator Schweiker.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Admiral Turner, I would like to come back to the experiments which may have
been conducted at the hospital research facilities which the CIA helped to finance.  It
wasn't clear to me from your previous answers what kind of work was done there.  I
gather you are unclear on that, too, from your remarks, yet I find in the CIA
documentation which you have supplied us, a list describing some of the advantages
the Agency hoped to gain.  It says:

   (a) One-sixth of the total space in the new hospital wing will be available to the
Chemical Division of TSS * * * ; (b) Agency sponsorship of sensitive research
projects will be completely deniable; (c) Full professional cover will be provided for up
to three biochemical employees of the Chemical Division; (d) Human patients and
volunteers for experimental use will be available under controlled clinical conditions
with the full supervision of and there is a blank , something has been deleted.

    It seems pretty clear to me what they intended to do in that particular wing. 
Doesn't it to you?  Why would you go to such elaborate preparations, to buy part of
the wing, bring three of your own personnel there, give them a cover, and give them
access to patients?  Why would you go to such trouble and expense to arrange all
that, if you weren't planning to experiment on people in the hospital? 

    Admiral TURNER.  I agree with you 100 percent, air.  Those were clearly the
intentions.  I have no evidence that it was carried out in that way.  I am not trying to
be defensive, Senator.  I am only trying to be absolutely precise here.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Well, then, as to the nature of what was done there, the last
paragraph on the same page of the document says, "The facilities of the hospital and
the ability to conduct controlled experimentations under safe clinical conditions using
material with which any agency connection must be completely deniable will augment
and complement other programs recently taken over by TSS, such as," and then
there's another deletion.

    Now, the words following "such as" have been deleted.  That is still classified, or al
least it was removed when this document was sanitized and released.  It seems to be
that whatever was deleted right there would give you a pretty good clue as to what
they were doing, since it says that the activities would "augment and complement
other programs" undertaken by TSS.  So, I have trouble understanding why you don't
know what was contemplated  Just the fact that similar programs are referred to in
the document, though what they are is still deleted, should enable you to check it out.
    You could look at what went on in the similar programs mentioned following the
"such as " in the classified version of this document.

    Admiral TURNER.  Senator, I have not said that we don't know what was
contemplated being done there.  We do not know what was done there.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Why did you delete that reference?  Why is that still
classified, that particular project of whatever it is?

    Admiral TURNER.  I don't know this particular case.  We will get you the exact
answer to that one and inform you about it, but it is quite probable that that other
case is unrelated to this in the...well, not unrelated, but that that was a project that still
deserves to be classified.

    [The material referred to follows:]

   Construction of the Gorman Annex was begun in 1937 and the Annex was
dedicated in March 1950.  Of the several MKULTRA projects conducted at
Georgetown only one involving human testing covered a time span subsequent t
March 1959.  Subproject 15 ran from 1955 to 1963, thus it is possible that the final
four years (1959-1963) of the subproject could have been spent in the Gorman
Annex.  However, there is no reference to the Gorman Annex or a "new Annex" in
Subproject 15 papers, neither is there any mention of the subproject moving to a new
location in 1959 or later years.

    Authorization to contribute CIA funds toward construction of the Gorman  Annex is
contained in Subproject 35 of MKULTRA.  Recently discovered material indicated that
Dr. Grachikter continued his research for sleep and amnesia-producing drugs under
Project MKSEARCH through July 1967 at Georgetown University Hospital.  But is
impossible to determine if the facilities of the Gorman Annex were involved.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  I think that would give us a pretty good clue as to what was
going to be done in the wing the CIA helped to finance.

     Was there any indication al all in the records you found that the project ultimately
used cancer patients or terminally ill patients in connection with this facility?

    Admiral TURNER.  I'm sorry.  I missed your question because I was trying to get
the data on the last one.  I will read you the blank. 

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Go ahead.

    Admiral TURNER.  QKHILLTOP.  It doesn't help you, but...

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Can you tell us what that is, or is it still classified?

    Admiral TURNER.  I don't know, and I assume from the fact that we deleted it, it is
still classified, but I will get you that answer, sir.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Thank you.  I'd like to see that information.

    [See p. 171 for material referred to.]

    Now my next question was: Is there any indication, Admiral, that projects in that
particular center involved experimentation on terminally ill cancer patients? 

    Admiral TURNER.  I missed the first part of your question, sir, I am very sorry.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Do you have any indication that some experiments in the
facility used terminally ill cancer patients as subjects?

You do acknowledge in your statement and it is clear from other documents that
these kinds of experiments were at some point being done somewhere.  My question
is, is there any indication that cancer patients or terminally ill patients were
experimented with in this wing?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, it does appear there is a connection here, sir.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  The other question I had relates to the development of
something which has ben called the perfect concussion.  A series of experiments
toward that end were described in the CIA documents I wonder if you would just tell
us what your understanding of perfect concussion is.

    Admiral TURNER.  Is that in my testimony, sir, or in some other document?

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Subproject 54, MKULTRA, which involved examination of
techniques to cause brain concussions and amnesia by using weapons or sound
waves to strike individuals without giving warning and without leaving any clear
physical marks.  Someone dubbed it "perfect concussion"--maybe that was poetic
license on the part of our staff rather than your poets over there.  I wonder if you
could tell us what brain concussion experiments were about?

    Admiral TURNER.  This project, No. 54, was canceled, and never carried out.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Well, I do believe the first year of the project in 1955 was
carried out by the Office of Naval Research, according to the information that you
supplied us.  The CIA seems to have been participating in some way at that point,
because the records go on to say that the experimenter at ONR found out about
CIA's role, discovered that it was a cover, and then the project was transferred to
MKULTRA in 1956.  Again, this is all from the backup material you have given us.  So,
it was canceled at some time.  I am not disagreeing  with that, but apparently for 
at least a year or two, somebody was investigating the production of brain concussions 
with special black-jacks, sound waves, and other methods as detailed in the backup material.

    Admiral TURNER.  The data available to me is that this project was never funded
by the CIA, but I will double-check that and furnish the information for the record for
you as to whether there was ever any connection here and if so, what the nature of
the work was.

    [The material referred to follows:]

   Mr. Laubinger corrected his testimony regarding Subproject 54 during the
September 21, 1977 hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific
Research of the Human Resources Committee.  The relevant portion is reproduced
below:

  Mr. LAUBINGER.  On project 54, it has got a rather sensational proposal in there, in
terms of the work that they propose to do, and you asked about the proposal and I
said, in fact, it was never funded under MKULTRA.  Now, I overlooked...at least, my
memory did not serve me correctly when I went through that file folder to see one
memorandum dated January 10, 1956, which makes it quite clear, as a matter of fact,
that that proposal was based on prior work that was funded by the Agency.

  Senator SCHWEIKER.  By what?

  Mr. LAUBINGER.  By the CIA.  So, that information was in their file folder.  It did not
happen to be in my head when I testified.

  Senator SCHWEIKER.  I think I might have read you that, and that is why I argued at
the time with you, because I think I had in front of me, a I recall, some indication that
it was funded there.  I did read that to you.  So, you did supply it to us; there is no
argument about that information.

  Mr. LAUBINGER.  Perhaps I am sort of headstrong, myself, and in my own view, I
am reading under the ULTRA project, that if it had been funded under ULTRA, it
would have had a project number and identified a such.  The thing that threw me was
that it was funded, apparently, outside of any MKULTRA activity and it was under the
normal contracting process, so that it was not included in MKULTRA as any work
done under that funding umbrella.

  The file folder that you have and I have, right here, makes it quite clear, however,
that a year's work was done through navy funding--a navy funding mechanism--on
which the proposal was based that ultimately came into the MKULTRA program.  That
second proposal was never funded.  So, there was conflict and I, personally, I think,
introduced a little bit of confusion in that in my testimony.

  Senator SCHWEIKER.  Well, do you agree or not agree with DOD's statement here
that even though the initial funding was navy, it was really a conduit for the CIA?

  Mr. LAUBINGER.  I think that is correct.

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Yes; I would appreciate that.  I would like to know how it
went from ONR to CIA after a year.  Somebody made a decision to make that
transfer, and to make this an MKULTRA subject.  There had to be some sort of review
that led to a decision to continue that kind of concussion--total blackout, maximum
amnesia, and whatever else it was you were interested in--study and testing.

    Mr. LAUBINGER.  Senator, if I may try to say a few words on that, the files that
were available to us for inspection, which are limited, indicated that there was a
project being carried on by the Navy having to do with the effects of brain
concussion.  The CIA developed an interest in that, and considered funding it, but
actually never did, and as the admiral testified, the MKULTRA is merely a funding
mechanism, a place they go for money to do such things, but there is no evidence
that I know of that that project was ever funded.


    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Well, I am confused, because here again is another quote
from a document that we have seen, which you have released and supplied to us:  

  Following is the technical progress made under the current [deleted] contract: (a)
Specialized instrumentation and numerous testing techniques have been developed
to obtain the desired dynamic data; (b) considerable data has now been obtained
supporting the resonance-cavitation theory of brain concussion; and (c) preliminary
acceleration threshold data has been obtained for a fluid-filled glass simulated skull. 

It goes on to talk about a blast range and a 2,500-square-foot laboratory.  The
document notes that "Three blast test series have been run to date."  It describes a
special blackjack device, "a pancake-type blackjack giving a high peak impact force
with a low unit surface pressure."

    I agree the records are inconclusive as to the results of this work, but it certainly
seems that some testing was done.

    Mr. LAUBINGER.  Senator, you are putting us in the same position I think you were
stating that you were in earlier in referring to documents not before us, but I believe
you are quoting from a proposal that someone sent to the Agency to fund this work,
and he is referring to past work.  The past work would have encompassed a lot of
things like that, but CIA was not involved with that.

    Senator SCHWEIKER: What do you mean, Admiral, on page 6 of your testimony
when you say past work on projects using magician's art?  How do magicians get
into [word unclear] work business?

    Admiral TURNER.  [word unclear] interpreted this as to how to slip the mickey into
the finn, but I would like to ask my advisers here to comment.

    Mr. BRODY.  I think that is essentially it, Senator.  It id surreptitious administration
of material to someone, deceptive practices, how to distract someone's attention
while you are doing something else, as I understand it.  It was also some type of a
covert communication project involved with the study of how magicians and their
assistants perhaps communicate information to one another without having other
people know it.  This is the type of thing that was involved, sir. 

    Senator SCHWEIKER.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Senator INOUYE.  Senator Huddleston?

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Admiral, in your checking these newly discovered documents and interviewing
members of the CIA staff, did you find information that would confirm the contention
described by the reporters for the New York Times that this type of experimentation
was begun out of a fear at the Agency that foreign powers might have had drugs
which would allow them to alter the behavior of American citizens or agents or
members of the Armed Forces who were taken into custody, and which would have
resulted in false confessions and the like?  Is my question clear?   

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir.  I haven't personally read the documentation on that. 
In my discussions with the people who are well informed in this area at the Agency, I
am told that that is the case.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Was there any evidence or any indication that there were
other motives that the agency might also be looking for drugs that could be applied
for other purposes, such as debilitating an individual or even killing another person? 
Was this part of this kind of experimentation?    
  
    Admiral TURNER.  Yes; I think there is.  I have not seen in this series of
documentation evidence of desire to kill, but I think the project turned its character
from a defensive to an offensive one as it went along, and there certainly was an
intention here to develop drugs that could be of use. 

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  The project continued for some time after it was learned
that, in fact, foreign powers did not have such a drug as was at first feared, didn't it?

    Admiral TURNER.  That is my understanding.  Yes, sir.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Is there any indication that knowledge gained as a result
of these experiments has been useful or is being applied in any way to present
operations? 
    Mr. BRODY.  Senator, I am not sure if there is any body of knowledge.  A great
deal of what there was, I gather, was destroyed in 1973.  I would like to defer to
Frank here.  Do you know of any?

    Mr. LAUBINGER.  I know of no drugs or anything like that developed under this
program that ever reached operational use or are in use today.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  So apparently any information that was gathered was
apparently useless and not worth continuing, not worth further development on the
part of the Agency.

    Mr. LAUBINGER.  I am having difficulty hearing your questions.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  I can hardly hear myself.

    Admiral TURNER.  I think the answer to your question is that we have no evidence
of great usefulness on this, and yet I think we should remember....

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Well, is it accurate to say that this experimentation
produced few useful results or had little application at all to the operations of the
Agency or anybody else as far as we know?

    Admiral TURNER.  I think that is basically correct.   At the same time, I would point
out that we had two CIA prisoners in China and one in the Soviet Union at this time,
and we were concerned as to what kinds of things might be done to them, but I am
not saying that....   

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Have you detected any sign that any other nation is
continuing or has in the past conducted experiments similar to this or with a similar
objective?

    Admiral TURNER.  I am not prepared to answer that one off the top of my head,
sir, but I will get it to you.

    [The material referred to follows:]

    We maintain no files of up-to-date information on the testing of drugs in foreign
countries.  Some years ago we occasionally would review foreign research on
antibiotics and pharmaceuticals in connection with public health and civil defense
assessments.  For a few years beginning in 1949 we assessed foreign research on
LSD under Project ARTICHOKE  because of concern that such drugs might be
employed against Agency and other U.S. personnel.  Information relative to this work
had already been provided to relevant Committees.  In this early work we also
occasionally looked at foreign human experimentation; we long ago eliminated our
holdings on this subject and no collection requirements are any longer served.  As
consumer interest in this area has dropped off and higher priority areas need
attention, we have virtually no present coverage with the possible exception of an
occasional scanning of the literature for a specific program.  To the best of our
knowledge no other unit in the Intelligence Community is tracking this subject now.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  You don't know whether any of your agents anywhere in
the world have been subjected to any kind of procedure like this?

    Admiral TURNER.  We certainly know of other powers conducting research in
these areas, yes.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Do you know how they go about that research?

    Admiral TURNER.  It is pretty sketchy, the information we have.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Do you know of any other organization in this country or
any institution that has conducted extensive research on unwitting individuals and
through unwitting institutions?

    Admiral TURNER.  Well, I have read something in the newspapers about this, but I
have not familiarized myself with it in specifics.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  It is not a normal mode of operation for human research,
is it?

    Admiral TURNER.  No, sir.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Senator INOUYE.  Senator Wallop?

    Senator WALLOP.  Mr. Chairman, I only have one to follow up on Senator
Huddleston's questions and my earlier ones.  You are not really saying, are you,
Admiral Turner, that there are no mind-altering drugs or behavior modification
procedures which have been used by foreign powers?

    Admiral TURNER.  No, sir, I am not.

    Senator WALLOP.  I drew that inference partly in answer to my question that you
knew of no truth serum.  Maybe that is a misnomer, but surely, there are relaxants
that make tongues looser than they would otherwise be.  Isn't that true?  

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes.

    Senator WALLOP.  So I think it is fair to say, too, that the experience of many
American prisoners of war in the Korean conflict would indicate that there are
behavior modification procedures in use by foreign powers of a fairly advanced
degree of sophistication.

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir.

    Senator WALLOP.  Again, I will just go back and say I think this must have been
part of the motivation.  I don't think you would have mentioned Cardinal Mindszenty
had you thought his behavior was normal at the time or had anybody else.   So, I
would just again say I think it is a little bit scapegoating.  I don't think the object of
this hearing is in any way to lay blame on those passed or those dead or otherwise,
but I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say that it stopped with the directors of the
CIA or the DCI's of the time.  Also I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say they
didn't even know it, but that it was some lower echelon acting alone.

    I think this was a behavior pattern that was prevalent in those years, and I think the
object lesson is that we have discovered, we think and we hope, through your
assurances and other activities of the Congress, means of avoiding future incidents of
that kind.  I thank you, Mr. Chairman.   

    Senator INOUYE.  Senator Chafee?

    Senator CHAFEE.  No questions.

    Senator INOUYE.  Senator Kennedy, I think you have another question.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Just talking about the two safe houses on the east and west
coast as being the sources for the unwitting trials, now, the importance of this and the
magnitude of it, I think, is of significance, because we have seen from your records
that these were used over a period of 8 or 9 years, and the numbers could have been
considerable.  You are unable to determine, at least in your own research, what the
numbers would be and what the drugs were, how many people were involved, but it
could have been considerable during this period of time.

    It would certainly appear to me in examining the documents and the flow charts of
cash slips that were expended in these areas that it was considerable, but that is a
judgmental factor on it, but I think it is important to try and find out what the Agency
is attempting to do to get to the bottom of it.

    Now, the principal agent that was involved as I understand it is deceased and has
been deceased for 2 years.  The overall agent, Mr. Gottlieb, has indicated a fuzzy
memory about this whole area.  He has testified before the Intelligence Committee. 
Yet he was responsible for the whole program.  Then, the Director had indicated the
destruction of the various materials and unfamiliarity with the project.

    Now, you have indicated in your testimony today that there are two additional
agents on page 9 of your testimony, you indicated there are two agents which you
have uncovered at the bottom of it, and you say, the names of CIA officials who
approved or monitored the various projects.  You talk about the two additional agents
in your testimony.

    Now, I am just wondering if you intend to interview those agents to find out exactly
what is being done.  I suppose, first of all, shouldn't the project manager know what
was being done?

    Admiral TURNER.  Our first problem, Senator, is that we have been unable to
associate an individual with those names at this point.  We are still burrowing to find
out who these people are.  We haven't identified them as having been CIA
employees, and we don't know whether these were false names.

    Senator KENNEDY.  You are tracking that down, as I understand it?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir.

   Senator KENNEDY.  You are tracking that down, and you have every intention of
interviewing those people to find out whatever you can about the program and
project?

    Admiral TURNER.  My only hesitation here is whether I will do this or the Justice
Department.

    Senator KENNEDY.  It will be pursued, though, I understand?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Either through the Agency or through the Justice Department?

    Admiral TURNER.  [Nods in the affirmative.]

    Senator KENNEDY.  Is it plausible that the director of the program would not
understand or know about the details of the program?  Is it plausible that Dr. Gottlieb
would not understand the full range of activities in those particular safe houses?

    Admiral TURNER.  Let me say it is unlikely.  I don't know Mr. Gottlieb.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Has anybody in the Agency talked with Mr. Gottlieb to find out
about this?

    Admiral TURNER.  Not since this revelation has come out.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Not since this revelation?  Well, why not?

    Admiral TURNER.  He has left our employ, Senator.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Does that mean that anybody who leaves is, you know,
covered for lifetime?

    Admiral TURNER.  No, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Why wouldn't you talk with him and find out?  You have new
information about this program.  It has been a matter of considerable interest both to
our committee and to the Intelligence Committee.  Why wouldn't you talk to Mr.
Gottlieb?

    Admiral TURNER.  Well, again, I think the issue is whether this should be done by
the Justice Department or ourselves.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, are we wrestling around because you and Attorney
General Bell can't agree.....

    Admiral TURNER.  No, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY [continuing].  On who aught to do it?

    Admiral TURNER.  We are proceeding together in complete agreement as to how
to go.  I have, in connection with trying to find all of these Americans or others who
were unwittingly tested, I have some considerable concern about the CIA running
around this country interviewing and interrogating people, because I don't want to
give any impression that we are doing domestic intelligence.

    Senator KENNEDY.  I am just talking about one, in this case.  That was the man
who was responsible for the whole program, and to find out whether anyone within
the Agency since you have had this new material has talked to Gottlieb since 1975,
and if the answer is no, I want to know why not.

     Admiral TURNER.  The reason he was not interviewed in connection with the 1975
hearings was that he had left the employ of the CIA and there was a concern on the
part of the Agency that it would appear to the investigators that the CIA was in some
way trying to influence him and influence his testimony before the committee.  If these
committees have no objection, we would be happy to contact Dr. Gottlieb and see if
he can augment anything here in this new information, that he can add to as opposed
to what was available in 1975.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, you see, Admiral Turner, you come to the two
committees this morning and indicate that now at last we have the information.  We
don't have to be concerned about anything in the future on it.  Now, I don't know how
you can give those assurances to the members of these committees as well as to the
American people when you haven't since 1975 even talked to the principal person
that was in charge of the program, and the records were destroyed.  He is the fellow
that was running the program, and the Agency has not talked to him since the
development of this new material.  

    Admiral TURNER.  Our only concern here is the proprieties involved, and we will
dig into this and work with the Justice Department on who, if either of us, should get
into discussions with Dr. Gottlieb so as not to prejudice any legal rights that may be
involved here, or to appear in any way to be improper.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, do I understand you have not contacted the Justice
Department about this particular case since the development of this new material
about Gottlieb?

    Admiral TURNER.  Not about Gottlieb specifically.  We have contacted him.
  
    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, it is amazing to me.  I mean, can you understand the
difficulty that any of us might have in terms of comprehending that when you develop
a whole new series of materials that are on the front page of every newspaper in the
country and are on every television, I mean, that means something, but it does not
mean nearly as much as the interest that we have in the fact about the testing of
unwitting Americans, and every single document that the staff reviews has Mr.
Gottlieb's name on it and you come up to tell us that we don't have to worry any
more, we have these other final facts, and Mr. Gottlieb has not been talked to?

    Admiral TURNER.  Sir, I am not saying that these are in any way the final facts.  I
am saying these are all the facts we have available.

    Senator KENNEDY.  And you have not talked to the person who was in charge of
the program, so what kind of value or what kind of weight can we give it?

    Admiral TURNER.  We are happy to talk to him.  I think the issue here again is one
of propriety and how to go about this.  We have not, I believe, enough new
information about Gottlieb's participation here to signal that his interview would be
that much more revealing than what was revealed in 1975.

    Senator KENNEDY.  The importance of it, I think, from our point of view, is, he
would know the drugs that were administered, the volume of drugs, how it was
administered, and in terms of your ability to follow up to protect these people and
their health, to the extent that it can be done, that opportunity is being lost.

    I want to get on to some others, but will you give us the assurance that you will
get ahold of Gottlieb or that you will talk to Attorney General Bell and talk with
Gottlieb?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  And let us know as to the extent of it.  I don't see how we can
fulfill our responsibility in this area on the drug testing without our hearing from
Gottlieb as well, but I think it is important that you do so, particularly since all of the
materials have been destroyed.

    These other two agents, have they talked to them?

    Admiral TURNER.  We don't know who they are, sir.  We are trying to track down
and see whether these names can be related to anybody. 
 
    Senator KENNEDY.  That is under active investigation by the Agency?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  And you have the intention of talking to those people when
you locate them.  Is that correct?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir, under the same circumstances as Gottlieb.

    Senator KENNEDY.  And you have people working on it?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  With regards to the activities that took place in these safe
houses, as I understand from the records, two-way mirrors were used.  Is that your
understanding?

    Admiral TURNER.  Yes, sir.  We have records that construction was done to put in
two-way mirrors.

    Senator KENNEDY.  And they were placed in the bedroom, as I understand.

    [Pause.]

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, we have documents......  

    Admiral TURNER.  I believe that was in the Church record, but I don't have the
details.

    Senator KENNEDY.  And rather elaborate decorations were added, as I understand
at least, to the one in San Francisco, in the bedroom, which are French can-can
dancers, floral pictures, drapery, including installation of bedroom mirrors, three
framed Toulouse Lautrec posters with black silk mats, and a number of other...red
bedroom curtains and recording equipment, and then a series of documents which
were provided to the committee which indicate a wide proliferation of different cash
for $100, generally in the $100 range over any period of time on the particular checks. 
Even the names are blocked out, as to the person who is receiving it.  Cash for
undercover agents, operating expenses, drinks, entertainment while administering,
and then it is dashed out, and then the other documents that would suggest, at least
with the signature of your principal agent out there, that..."called to the operation,
midnight, and climax."

    What can you tell us that it might suggest to you about what techniques were
being used by the Agency in terms of reaching that sort of broad-based group of
Americans that were being evidently enticed for testing in terms of drugs and others? 
Do you draw any kind of conclusion about what might have been going on out there
in these safe houses?   

    Admiral TURNER.  No, sir.

    [General laughter.]

    Senator KENNEDY.  There is a light side to it, but there is also an enormously
serious side.  And that is that at least the techniques which are used or were used in
terms of testing, and trying to find out exactly the range of drugs used and the
numbers of people involved and exactly what that operation was abut, as well as the
constant reiteration of the use of small sums of cash at irregular intervals.  A variety of
different techniques were employed but there is an awful lot of documentation putting
these matters together.

    When you look at the fact that is a broad range population that has been tested,
tested in these two areas, with the kind of cash slips that were used in this, payment
mechanisms and decorations and all of the rest, we are not able to put a bottom line
on it but one thing is for sure, and that is, Gottlieb knows.  That is one thing for sure,
because his name appears on just about every one of these documents, and it is, I
think, very important to find out what his understanding is of the nature of that.  So,
we will hear more about that.

    Admiral TURNER.  I believe Gottlieb has been interviewed by the Congress.

    Senator KENNEDY.  That's right, he has, and in reviewing the record, it is not very
satisfactory, and it just seems with the new information
and the new documentation and the new memoranda--and he did not have the
checks at that time--and with the wide variety of different memoranda with his name
on it, his memory could be stimulated on that.

    Thank you.

    Senator INOUYE.  I would like to thank the admiral and his staff for participating in
this hearing.  I believe the record should show that this hearing was held at the
request of the Agency and the admiral.  It was not held because we insisted upon it. 
It was a volunteer effort on the part of the Agency.  I think the record should also
indicate that Admiral Turner has forwarded to this committee a classified file including
all of the names of the institutions and the persons involved as the experimenters.    
 
    I should also indicate that this hearing is just one step involved in the committee's
investigation of drug abuse.  Just as you have had much work in going over the
8,000 [ages. the staff of this committee has had equal problems, but I would like the
record to show that you have made these papers and documents available to the
committee.  I thank you for that.

    As part of the ongoing investigation, we had intended to call upon many dozens of
others, experimenters, or those officials in charge, and one of those will be Dr.
Gottlieb. 

    In thanking you, I would like to say this to the American people, that what we have
experienced this morning in this committee room is not being duplicated in any other
committee room in any other part of the world.  I doubt that very much.  Our Agency
and our intelligence community has been under much criticism and has been
subjected to much abuse, in many cases justified, but this is the most open society
that I can think of.  For example, in Great Britain there are about six people who are
aware of the identity of the man in charge of intelligence.  In other countries, similar
conditions exist.  Here in the United States we not only know Admiral Turner, we have
had open hearings with him, such as this.  The confirmation hearings were all open.

    In a few weeks, the Senate of the United states will debate a resolution to decide
upon whether we should disclose the amounts and funds being used for
counterintelligence and national intelligence.  I would hope that in presenting this
issue to the public, the media will take note that the Agency has cooperated and will
continue to.  The abuse that we have learned about this morning is one I hope will
never happen again, but without constant oversight on the part of the Executive
Office, on the part of the Congress, it could happen again.  It is important therefore
that we continue in this activity.

    So, once again,, Admiral, I thank you very much for helping us.  We will continue
to call upon you for your assistance.  We would like to submit to you several
questions that the members and staff have prepared.  We hope you will look them
over carefully and prepare responses for the record, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Mr. Chairman?

    Senator INOUYE.  Yes, sir?

    Senator KENNEDY.  I, too, want to thank Admiral Turner for his responsiveness.  I
have had meetings with him in the committees and also conversations, telephone
conversations, and private meetings, and I have found him personally to be extremely
responsive, and it is a very difficult challenge which he has accepted in heading this 
Agency. I want you to know, personally, I, too, would like to see this put behind us.  
I don't think we are quite there yet in terms of this partucular area that we are 
interested in. I think the Intelligence Committee has special responibilities in 
this area of the testing, so we look forward to working with you in expediting 
the time that we can put it behind, but it does seem to me that we have to dig in 
and finish the chapter.  So, I want to personally express my appreciation to you, 
Admiral Turner,and thank you for your cooperation and your help, and I look forward 
to working with you.

    Admiral TURNER.  Thank you.

    Senator HUDDLESTON.  Mr. Chairman, I am not sure you emphasized this
enough, but I think the record ought to show that Admiral Turner informed the Select
Committee on his own initiative when the new documentation was found.  The
documentation has been made availa ble to us voluntarily, in a spirit of cooperation.

    I think this shows a vast difference from the mode of operation that existed prior to
the formation at least of the Church Committee, and a difference that is very helpful.

    Senator INOUYE.  Thank you very much.  Thank you very much, Admiral.
    We would now like to call upon Mr. Philip Goldman and Mr. John Gittinger.
    Mr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger, will you please rise and take the oath.
    Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are abut to give is the truth, the
    whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I do.

    Mr. GITTINGER.  I do.

    Senator INOUYE.  Thank you, sir.

    Mr. Godman, will you identify yourself, and after that, Mr. Gittinger.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Before we start in, we had a third witness, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Pasternac, who planned to testify, traveled to Washington--he lives in Washington,
and was contacted recently--with the intention of testifying this morning.  And
something--he called us late this morning and indicated that he wanted to get a
counsel before he would wish to testify.

    Senator INOUYE.  Mr. Goldman.
    Mr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, sir.

TESTIMONY OF PHILIP GOLDMAN, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY 

    Mr. GOLDMAN.   I am Philip Goldman.

    Senator INOUYE.  And you are a former employee of the Central Intelligence
Agency?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Over 10 years ago.

    Senator INOUYE.  And you were employed at the time when MKULTRA was in
operation?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  There were some MKULTRA's in operation at the time I was there.

Senator INOUYE.  And Mr. John Gittinger, are you a former employee of the
Central Intelligence Agency?

TESTIMONY OF JOHN GITTINGER, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    Mr. GITTINGER.  I am.

    Senator INOUYE.  Are you still an employee an eployee?

    Mr. GITTINGER.  No.

    Senator INOUYE.  Were you a member of the Agency at the time MKULTRA was in
operation?    

    Mr. GITTINGER.  Yes.

    Senator INOUYE.  Thank you.  Senator Kennedy.

    Senator KENNEDY.  I want to welcome both of you to the committee.

    If we could start with Mr. Godman.  Were you the project engineer for the safe
houses in either San Franicso or New York?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I know of no safe house in San Francisco.

    Senator KENNEDY.  How aboout in new York?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I knew of one facility that was established there, but I didn't know
anything of its operation.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Were you a monitor on any testing of drugs on unwitting
persons in San Francisco?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  No.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, we have a classified document here that was provided
by the Agency that lists your name as a monitor of the program and I would
appreciate it if you would look...

    Mr. GODMAN.  I think the musunderstanding arises because I was project officer.
    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, would you take a look at that?

    [Mr. Godman inspected the document.]

    Mr. GODMAN.  This document as it states is correct.  However, my....

    Senator KENNEDY.  That document is correct?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  As far as I see on the first page, the project.  But my.... 

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, could I get it back, please.
    That would indicate that you were a monitor of the program.

    Mr. GOLDMAN.   I was in charge of disbursing the moneys to Morgan Hall.

    Senator KENNEDY.  To whom was that?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  To the individual whose name was listed at the top of that
document.

    Senator KENNEDY.  And you knew htat he was running the project in San
Francisco?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I knew he was the person who was in charge out there.
    Senator KENNEDY.  All right.

    Mr. GODMAN.  But I had no knowledge nor did I seek knowledge of actually what
he was doing, because there would be other things involved. 

    I did recieve...

    Senator KENNEDY.  What were you doing?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I was collecting...I had to be sure that all teh receipt that ever
were turned in balanced with the moneys htat were paid out to see that everything
was run all right.  There was no illegal use of funds as far as we could determine by
the receipts and cash.

    Senator KENNEDY.  So even though the Agency document indicates that you were
a monitor for the program, one of the few monitors of that particular program which
you mentioned for San Francisco and Mill Valley, Calif., you described your
responsibility only as a carrier of money, is that correct? 

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I would say as a disburser or carrying out...seeing that the
moneys were handled properly.  There was within that...I don't know what's done or
what he did do in conjuction with other people.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Were you responsible for the disbursement of all the funds?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I was responsible for turning over the check to him.

    Senator KENNEDY.  And what did you know of the program itself?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  The only thing I knew of the program was what he furnished us in
terms of receipts and that sort of thing.  I didn't indulge or concern myself in that.  

    Senator KENNEDY.  You still wrote, and I'll let you examine it--it's a classified
document'--but you wrote a rather substantive review of the program in May of 1963,
talking about the experiments, the factual data that had been collected, covert and
realistic field field traials, about the necessity of those particular--and talked about 
the effectiveness of the various programs, the efficiency of various delivery systems.  
That doesn't sound to me like someone who is only...

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Well, if you would refresh my memory, if I could read this I would
certainly agree with whatever is said there, if it was written.

    Senator KENNEDY.  I am trying to gather what your role was.  You've indicated
first of all that you didn't know about...you knew about a safe house in New York;
now we find out that you're the carrier for the resources as well and the agent in San
Francisco.  We find out now that the CIA put you as a monitor.  You're testifying htat
you only were the courier, and here we have just one document, and there are many
otheres that talk about the substance of that program with your name on it and I am
just trying to find out exactly what role you werer playing.  

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  The only think I can tell you about this and I am drawing
completely on my memory is that this individual who was in charge out there
conducted these things and reported them back to the Agency.  I didn't participate in
any of them.  All I know was that he furnished me with receipts for things that were
done and told of the work that they had done.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, that documetn covers more than receipts. 
 
    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Yes, it tells of what...they had conducted wourk out there.
    Senator KENNEDY.  It describes, does it not?  Read the paragraph 2.
    Mr. GOLDMAN.  "A number of covert"...

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, you can't read it, it's a classified document, and I don't
know why, quite frankly, but it relates to the substance
of those programs and your name is signed to the memorandums on it.  I am not
interested in you trying to review for us now what is in the document, but I think it
would be unfortunate if we were left with the opinion that all you were was a courier
of resources when we see a document with your name on it, signed, that talks about
the substance of the program.  And what we're interested in is the substance of the
program.  We have the recent documents that were provided by the Agency, which
do indicdate that you were at least involved in the substance, and I'm just trying to
find out whether you're willing to tell us about that. 

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I am perfectly willing to tell you everything that I can remember.

    Senator KENNEDY.  But you can't remember anything.

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I can't remember the substantive parts of these things, I really
can't. 

    Senator KENNEDY.  Of the program htat was taking place, do you have any
greater familiarity with what was happening in New York.

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  No, no.

    Senator KENNEDY.  And you have the same function with regards to New York.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Did you ever go to San Francisco?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Yes.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Did you meet with the agent in charge?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Yes.

    Senator KENNEDY.  And why did you meet with him?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  To discuss some of the receipts and things that were there to find
out if these were indeed true expenditures and to find out if everything was going
along all right for the work that was being done.

    Senator KENNEDY.  What work was being done?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  No, the reports of these things and whatever was being done.  I
don't know who he reported to but he did report to somebody.

    Senator KENNEDY.  You travel out there to find out about the work that's being
done, and what does he tell you, that the work is being done well and..
.
    Mr. GOLDMAN.  He told me that the work that they were doing was going along,
progressing satisfactorily, but to be very frank with you... 

    Senator KENNEDY.  But he didn't tell you what the work?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  To be very frank with you, Senator, I cannot remember the things
that happened back in those days.  I've been away from the company--from the
agency for over 10 years, and that is even farther back than that, and that was just
about the time when I first engaged in this, so it was my first.
...
    Senator KENNEDY.  Did they disburse a series of $100 checks, to your
recollection?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I don't recollect it, but if you ahve it there, then they did.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Did you know Dr. Gottlieb?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Yes.

    Senator KENNEDY.  How did you know Dr. Gottlieb?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  He had been head of the division when I was recruited.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Did you talk to him about these programs?  Did you have
anything to do with him during this period of time?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I didn't have anything to do with him until I would say probably in
the sixties.

    Senator KENNEDY.  And can you tell us what you had to do with him then?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Just what you see there on the papers.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, that is the request for the money and he approves it.

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  That is the request for money and he approves it, and I am quite
sure that I probably discussed with him whether the work was going along all right,
whether his reports were being turned in, and whether he was satisfied with the way
things were going and did he have any complaints about the way other people were
requesting him, but I did not engage myself in anything he was doing.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, did you get the impression that Gottlieb knew what was
going on?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I didn't ask.

    Senator KENNEDY.  But you told him that your impression that what was going on
even though you didn't know what was going on, was going on well, I guess?

[Laughter.]

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I told Gottlieb what you saw in there was that the things appeared
to be going along all right.  I was repeating and parroting back the words that were
given to me while I was there.  

    Senator KENNEDY.  What was the money being spent for, do you know?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  No; I can't recall that, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Would you remember if we told you it was red curtains and
can-can pictures....

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  No, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Floral pictures and the rest.

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  No, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  RECORDERS.

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  No, sir.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Recorders and two-way mirrors.

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Wait, hold on.  You're slipping a word in there now.

    Senator KENNEDY.  But you would ahve authorized those funds, would you not,
since you were the.... 
  
    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Did you say two-way mirrors?

    Senator KENNEDY.  Yes.

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Where?

    Senator KENNEDY.  In the safe houses.

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Where?

    Senator KENNEDY.  San Francisco.

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  No.

    Senator KENNEDY.  How about New York?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Yes.

    Senator KENNEDY.  You remember now that you approved expenditures for New
York?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Yes.

    Senator KENNEDY.  What were those expenditures for?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  That was a transfer of money over for the use in an apartment in
New York by the Bureau of Narcotics.  It was for their use.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Do you have any knowledge of what was going on in the
apartment?

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  No, sir, other than I know that it had been used, according to the
information that I have been given, it was used by the Bureau of Narcotics to make
meetings with individuals who they were interested in with regard to pushing dope--
not pushing dope, but sellingnarcotics and that sort of thing.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Well, I am sure you had many responsibilities and it's a long
time ago, but the Agency does indicate that you were project monitor for that
particular program.

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  That's correct.

    Senator KENNEDY.  Your own testimony indicates you went out to review the
expependitures of funds to find out whether they were being wisely used, that you
came back and talked to the project director, Mr. Gottlieb, to give him a progress
report about what was going on out there. 

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  Yes, sir, I did.

    Senator KENNEDY.  All those things are true, and yet you draw a complete blank
in terms of what was the project itself.  That's where the record is now.

    Mr. GOLDMAN.  I did not go out there to review the projects nor did I come back
and talk with Mr. Gottlieb and review what I had observed in terms of any projects
that they...that is, other parts of the Agency might have in operation there.  I simply
reported back those things which were told to me by the individual out there
who...and I carried them back and they are contained in the report that you have in
front of you, word for word, just as it was given to me. 




PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF
RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION


--------------


WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1977


U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE on INTELLIGENCE,
and SUBCOMMITTEE on HEALTH
and SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
of the COMMITTEE on HUMAN RESOURCES
Washington, D.C.


The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m. in room 1202, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Senator Daniel K. Inouye (chairman of the
Select Committee on Intelligence) presiding.


Present: Senators Inouye (presiding), Kennedy, Goldwater, Bayh, Hathaway,
Huddleston, Hart, Schweiker, Case, Garn, Chafee, Lugar and Wallop.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director, Select Committee on Intelligence;
Fr.Lawrence Horowitz, staff director, Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research;and
professional staff members of both committees.


Senator INOUYE. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is meeting today
and is joined by the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research chaired by
Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Senator Richard Schweiker of
Pennsylvania. Senator Hathaway and Senator Chafee are members of both
committees. We are to hear testimony from the Director of Central Intelligence,
Adm. Stanfield Turner, and from other Agency witnesses on issues concerning new
documents supplied to the committee in the last week on drug testing conducted by
the Central Intelligence Agency.


It should be made clear from the outset that in general, we are focusing on events
that happened over 12 or as long as 25 years ago. It should be emphasized that the
programs that are of greatest concern have stopped and that we are reviewing these
past events in order to better understand what statutes and other guidelines might be
necessary to prevent the recurrence of such abuses in the future. We also need to
know and understand what is now being done by the CIA in the field of behavioral
research to be certain that no current abuses are occurring.


I want to commend Admiral Turner for his full cooperation with this committee and
with the Subcommittee on Health in recognizing that this issue needed our attention.
The CIA has assisted our committees and staffs in their investigative efforts and in
arriving at remedies which will serve the best interests of our country.


The reappearance of reports of the abuses of the drug testing program and
reports of other previously unknown drug programs and projects for behavioral
control underline the necessity for effective oversight procedures both in the executive
branch and in the Congress. The Select Committee on Intelligence has been working
very closely with President Carter, the Vice President, and Admiral Turner and his
associates in developing basic concepts for statutory guidelines which will govern all
activities of the intelligence agencies of the united States.


In fact, it is my expectation that the President will soon announce his decisions on
how he has decided the intelligence agencies of the United States shall be organized.
This committee will be working closely with the President and Admiral Turner in
placing this new structure under the law and to develop effective oversight
procedures.


It is clear that effective oversight requires that information must be full and
forthcoming. Full and timely information is obviously necessary if the committee and
the public is to be confident that any transgressions can be dealt with quickly and
forcefully.


One purpose of this hearing is to give the committee and the public an
understanding of what new information has been discovered that adds to the
knowledge already available from previous Church and Kennedy inquiries, and to
hear the reasons why these documents were not available to the Church and
Kennedy committees. It is also the purpose of this hearing to address the issues
raised by any additional illegal or improper activities that have emerged from the files
and to develop remedies to prevent such improper activities from occurring again.
Finally, there is an obligation on the part of both this committee and the CIA to
make every effort to help those individuals or institutions that may have been harmed
by any of these improper or illegal activities. I am certain that Admiral Turner will
work with this committee to see that this will be done.


I would now like to welcome the most distinguished Senator from Massachusetts,
the chairman of the Health Subcommittee, Senator Kennedy.


Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We are delighted to
join together in this very important area of public inquiry and public interest.
Some 2 years ago, the Senate Health Subcommittee heard chilling testimony
about the human experimentation activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The
Deputy Director of the CIA revealed that over 30 universities and institutions ere
involved in an "extensive testing and experimentation" program which included covert
drug tests on unwitting citizens "at all social levels [ ] , native Americans and
foreign." Several of these [ ] the administration of LSD to "unwitting subjects
in [ ] situations."


At least one death, that of Dr. Olsen resulted from these activities. The
Agency itself acknowledged that these tests made little scientific sense. The agents
doing the monitoring were not qualified scientific observers. The test subjects were
seldom accessible beyond the first hours of the test. In a number of instances, the
test subject became ill for hours or days, and effective follow-up was impossible.
Other experiments were equally offensive. For example, heroin addicts were
enticed into participating in LSD experiments in order to get a reward--heroin.
Perhaps most disturbing of all was the fact that the extent of experimentation
on human subjects was unknown. The records of all experimentation on human
subjects was unknown. The records of all these activities were destroyed in January
1973, at the instruction of then CIA Director Richard Helms. in spite of persistent
inquiries by both the Health Subcommittee and the Intelligence Committee, no
additional records or information were forthcoming. And no one--no single individual-
-could be found who remembered the details, not the director of the CIA, who
ordered the documents destroyed, not the official responsible for the program, or a y
of his associates.


We believed that the record, incomplete as it was, was as complete as it was
going to be. Then one individual, through a Freedom of Information request,
accomplished what two U.S. Senate committees could not. He spurred the agency
into finding additional records pertaining to the CIA'S program of experimentation with
human subjects. These new records were discovered by the agency in March. Their
existence was not made known to the Congress until July.


The records reveal a far more extensive series of experiments than had previously
been thought. Eighty-six universities or institutions were involved. New instances of
unethical were revealed. The intelligence community of this Nation, which requires a
shroud of secrecy in order to operate, has a very sacred trust from the American
people. The CIA's program of human experimentation of the fifties and sixties
violated that trust. It was violated again on the day the bulk of the agency's records
were destroyed in 1973. It is violated each time a responsible official refuses to
recollect the details of the program. The best safeguard against abuses in the future
is a completed public accounting of the abuses of the past.


I think this is illustrated, as Chairman Inouye pointed out. These are issues, are
questions that happened in the fifties and sixties, and go back some 15,20 years ago,
but they are front page news today, as we see in the major news papers and on the
television and in the media of this country; and the reason they are, I think, is
because it just continuously begins to trickle out, sort of, month after month, and the
best way to put this period behind us, obviously, is to have the full information, and I
think that is the desire of Admiral Turner and of the members of this committee.
The Central Intelligence Agency drugged American citizens without their
knowledge or consent. It used university facilities and personnel without their
knowledge. It funded leading researchers, often without their knowledge.


These institutes, these individuals, have a right to know who they are and how and
when they were used. As of today the Agency itself refuses to declassify the names
of those institutions and individuals, quite appropriately, I might say, with regard to
the individuals under the Privacy Act. It seems to me to be a fundamental
responsibility to notify those individuals or institutions, rather. I think many of them
were caught up in an unwitting manner to do research for the Agency. Many
researchers, distinguished researchers, some of our most outstanding members of
our scientific community, involved in this network, now really l do not know whether
they were involved or not, and it seems to me that the whole health and climate in
terms of our university and our scientific and health facilities are entitled to that
response.


So, I intend to do all I can to persuade the Agency to, at the very least, officially
inform those institutions and individuals involved.


Two years ago, when these abuses were first revealed, I introduced legislation,
with Senator Schweiker and Senator Javits, designed to minimize the potential for any
similar abuses in the future. That legislation expanded the jurisdiction of the National
Commission on Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research to cover all
federally funded research involving human subjects. The research initially was just
directed toward HEW activities, but this legislation covered DOD as well as the CIA.
This Nation has a biomedical and behavioral research capability second to none.
It has had for subjects of HEW funded research for the past 3 years a system for the
protection of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research second to none,
and the Human Experimentation Commission has proven its value. Today's hearings
and the record already established underscore the need to expand its jurisdiction.


The CIA supported that legislation in 1975, and it passed the Senate
unanimously last year. I believe it is needed in order to assure all our people that
they will have the degree of protection in human experimentation that they deserve
and have every right to expect.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Now we will proceed with the
hearings. Admiral Turner
[The prepared statement of Admiral Turner follows:]


PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL STANFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.


Mr. Chairman: In my letter to you of July 15, 1977, I reported our recent discovery of
seven boxes of documents related to Project MKULTRA, a closely held IA project
conducted from 1953-1964. As you may recall, MKULTRA was an "umbrellas project"
under which certain sensitive subprojects were funded, involving among other things
research on drugs and behavioral modification. During the Rockefeller Commission
and Church Committee investigations in 1975, the cryptonym became publicly known
when details of the drug-related death of Dr. Frank Olson were publicized. In 1953
Dr. Olson, a civilian employee of the Army at Fort Detrick, leaped to his death
from a hotel room window in New York City about a week after having unwittingly
consumed LSD administered to him as an experiment at a meeting of LSD
researchers called by CIA.


Most of what was known about the Agency's involvement with behavioral drugs
during the investigation in 1975 was contained in report on Project MKULTRA
prepared by the Inspector General's office in 1963. As a result of that report's
recommendations, unwitting testing of drugs on U.S. citizens was subsequently
discontinued. The MKULTRA-related report was made available to the Church
Committee investigators and to the staff of Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on
Health. Until the recent discovery, it was believed that all of the MKULTRA files
dealing with behavioral modification had been destroyed in 1973 on the orders of the
then retiring Chief of the Office of Technical Service, with the authorization of the then
DCI, as has been previously reported. Almost all of the people who had had any
connection with the aspects of the project which interested Senate investigations in
1975 were no longer with the Agency at that time. This, there was little detailed
knowledge of the MKULTRA sub-projects available to CIA during the Church
Committee investigations. This lack of available details, moreover, was probable not
wholly attributable to the destruction of MKULTRA files in 1973; the 1963 report on
MKULTRA by the Inspector General notes on page 14: "Present practice is to maintain
no records of the planning and approval of test programs."


When I reported to you last on this matter, my staff had not yet had an opportunity
to review the newly located material in depth. This has now been accomplished, and
i am in a position to give you a description of the contents of the recovered material.
I believe you will be most interested in the following aspects of the recent discovery:
How the material was discovered and why it was not previously found;
The nature of this recently located material;


How much new information there is in the material which may not have been
previously known and reported to Senate investigations; and
What we believe the most significant aspects of this had to be.


To begin, as to how we discovered these materials. The material had been sent to
our Retired Records Center outside of Washington and was discovered there as a
result of the extensive search efforts of an employee charged with responsibility for
maintaining our holdings??? on behavioral drugs and for responding to Freedom of
Information Act requests on this subject. During the Church Committee investigation
in 1975, searches for MKULTRA-related material were made by examining both the
active and retired records of all branches of CIA considered at all likely to have had
association with MKULTRA documents. The retired records of the Budget and Fiscal
Section of the Branch responsible for such work were not searched, however. This
was because financial papers associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA
were normally maintained by the Branch itself under the project file, not by the
Budget and Fiscal Section. In the case at hand, however, the newly located material
was sent to the Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal Section as
part of its won retired holdings. The reason for this departure from normal procedure
is not known. As a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval and
destruction in 1973 by the then-retiring Director of the Office as well as discovery in
1975 by CIA officials responding to Senate investigators.


The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned in his
efforts to respond to FOIA requests. He reviewed all listings of material of this Branch
stored at the Retired Records Center, including those of the Budget and Fiscal
Section and, this, discovered the MKULTRA-related documents which had been
missed in previous searches. In sum, the Agency failed to uncover these particular
documents in 1973 in the process of attempting to destroy them; it similarly failed to
locate them in 1975 in response to the Church Committee hearings. I am convinced
that there was no attempt to conceal this material during the earlier searches.


Next, as to the nature of the recently located material, it is important to realize that
the recovered folders are finance folders. The bulk of the material in them consists of
approvals for advance of funds, vouchers, accountings, and the like--most of which
are not very informative as to the nature of the activities that were undertaken.
Occasional project proposals or memoranda commenting on some aspect of a
subproject are scattered throughout this material. In general, however, the recovered
material does not include status reports or other documents relating to operational
considerations or progress in the various subprojects, though some elaboration of the
activities contemplated does appear. The recovered documents fall roughly into three
categories:


First, there are 149 MKULTRA subprojects, many of which appear to have
some connection with research into behavioral modification, drug acquisition and
testing or administering drugs surreptitiously.


Second, there are two boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers, including
audit reports and financial statements from "cut-out" (i.e. intermediary) funding
mechanisms used to conceal CIA's sponsorship of various research projects.
Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain intelligence
activities previously funded under MKULTRA which have nothing to do either with
behavioral modification, drugs, and toxins or with any other related matters.


We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects
into categories under descriptive headings. In broad outline, at least, this presents
the contents of these files. The activities are placed in the following 15 categories:


1. Research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol:


17 subprojects probably not involving tests on human volunteers;
14 subprojects definitely involving tests on human volunteers.
19 subprojects probably including tests on human volunteers. While not known,
some of these subprojects may have included tests on unwitting subjects as well.


6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting subjects.


2. Research on hypnosis: 8 subprojects, including 2 involving hypnosis and drugs in
combination.
3. Acquisition of chemicals or drugs: 7 subprojects.
4. Aspects of magicians' art useful in covert operations: e.g. surreptitious delivery of
dug-related materials: 4 subprojects.
5. Studies of human behavior, sleep research, and behavioral changes during
psychotherapy: 9 subprojects.
6. Library searches and attendance at seminars and international conferences on
behavioral modification: 6 subprojects.


7. Motivational studies, studies of defectors, assessment, and training techniques:


23 subprojects.


8. Polygraph research: 3 subprojects.
9. Funding mechanisms for MKULTRA external research activities: 3 subprojects.
10. Research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals in human tissue: provision of exotic
pathogens and the capability to incorporate them in effective delivery systems: 6
subprojects.


11. Activities whose objectives cannot be determined from available documentation:


3 subprojects.


12. Subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities connected with
the Army's Special Operations Division at Ft. Detrick, Md. This activity is outlined in
Book I of the Church Committee Report, pp. 388-389. (See Appendix A. pp. 68-69.
Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI, the Army Assisted CIA in developing, testing, and
maintaining biological agents and delivery systems for use against humans as well as
against animals and crops. The objectives of these subprojects cannot be identified
from the recovered material beyond the fact that the money was to be used where
normal funding channels would require more written or oral justification than
appeared desirable for security reasons or where operational considerations dictated
short lead times for purchases. About $11,000 was involved during this period 1953-
1960: 3 subprojects.


13. Single subprojects in such areas as effects of electro-shock, harassment
techniques for offensive use, analysis of extrasensory perception, gas propelled
sprays and aerosols, and four subprojects involving crop and material sabotage.
14. One or two subprojects on each of the following:


"Blood Grouping" research, controlling the activity of animals, energy storage
and transfer in organic systems; and
stimulae and response in biological systems.


15. Three subprojects cancelled before any work was done on them having to do
with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and research on
biologically active materials to be tested through the skin on human volunteers.
Now, as to how much new the recovered material adds to what has previously
been reported to the Church Committee and to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on
Health on these topics, the answer is additional detail, for the most part: e.g., the
names of previously unidentified researchers and institutions associated on either a
witting or unwitting basis with MKULTRA activities, and the names of CIA officials who
approved or monitored the various subprojects. Some new substantive material is
also present: e.g., details concerning proposals for experimentation and clinical
testing associated with various research projects, and a possibly improper
contribution by CIA to a private institution. However, the principal types of activities
included have, for the most part, wither been outlined to some extent or generally
described in what was previously available to CIA in the way of documentation and
was supplied by CIA to Senate investigators.


For example:


Financial disbursement records for the period 1960-1964 for 76 of the 149
numbered MKULTRA subprojects had been recovered from the Office of Finance by
CIA and were made available to the Church Committee investigators in August or
September 1975.


The 1963 Inspector General report on MKULTRA made available to both the
Church Committee and Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee mentions electro-shock
and harassment substances (pp. 4, 16); covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens (pp.
7, 10-12); the search for new materials through arrangements with specialists in
universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and
private research organizations (pp. 7, 9); and the fact that the Technical Service
Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control of human behavior
between 1953-1963 (p.21).


The relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service
Division was also made available to the Church Committee staff. That report
discusses techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of
communication (p. 201); discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly
administered (pp 201-202); studies on magicians' arts as applied to covert operations
(p. 202); specific funding mechanisms for research performed outside of CIA (pp.
202-203,205); research being done on "K" (knockout) material, alcohol tolerance, and
hypnotism (p. 203); research on LSD (p. 204); anti-personnel harassment and
assassination delivery systems including aerosol generators and other spray devices
(pp. 206-208); the role of Fort Detrick in support of CIA's Biological/Chemical Warfare
capability (p. 208); and material sabotage research (p. 209). Much of this material is
reflected in the Church Committee Report, Book I, pp. 383-422. (See Appendix A, pp.
65-102).


The most significant new data discovered are, first, the names of researchers and
institutions who participated in the MKULTRA project and, secondly, a possibly
improper contribution by CIA to a private institution. We are now in possession of the
names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants who are identified in there
covered material dealing with the 149 subprojects. The names of 80 institutions
where work was done or with which these people were affiliated are also mentioned.


The institutions include 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or
chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics (in
addition to those associated with universities), and 3 penal institutions. While the
identities of some of these people and institutions were known previously, the
discovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.


The facts as they pertain to the possible improper contribution are as follows: One
project involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private medical
institution. The fact that a contribution was made was previously known; indeed it
was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division
of CIA, pertinent portions os which had been reviewed by the Church Committee staff.
The newly discovered material, however, makes it clear that this contribution was
made through an intermediary, which made it appear to be a private donation. As a
private donation, the contribution was then matched by federal funds. The institution
was not made aware of the true source of the gift. This project was approved by the
then DCI, and concurred in by CIA's top management at the time, including the then
General Counsel who wrote an opinion supporting the legality of the contribution.


The recently discovered documents give a greater insight into the scope of the
unwitting drug testing but contribute little more than that. We now have collaborating
information that some of the unwitting drug testing was carried on in safe-houses in
San Francisco and New York City, and we have identified that three individuals were
involved in this undertaking as opposed to the previously reported one person. We
also know now that some unwitting testing took place on criminal sexual psychopaths
confined at a State hospital and that, additionally, research was done on a knock-out
or "K" drug in parallel with research to develop pain killers for cancer patients.
These, then are the principal findings identified to date in our review of the
recovered material. As noted earlier, we believe the detail on the identities of
researchers and institutions involved in CIA's sponsorship of drugs and behavioral
modification is a new element and one which poses a considerable problem. Most of
the people and institutions involved are not aware of Agency sponsorship. We should
certainly assume that the researchers and institutions which cooperated with CIA on a
witting basis acted in good faith and in the belief that they were aiding their
government in a legitimate and proper purpose. I believe we all have a moral
obligation to these researchers and institutions to protect them from any unjustified
embarrassment or damage to their reputations which revelation of their identities
might bring. In addition, I have a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly
disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent. This is
especially true, of course, for those researchers and institutions which were unwitting
participants in CIA-sponsored activities.


Nevertheless, recognizing the right and the need of both the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Subcommittee on Health to investigate the
circumstance of these activities in whatever detail they consider necessary. I am
providing our Committee with al of the names on a classified basis. I hope that this
will facilitate your investigation while protecting the individuals and institutions
involved. Let me emphasize that the MKULTRA events are 12 to 25 years in past. I
assure you that the CIA is in no way engaged in either witting or unwitting testing of
drugs today.


Finally, I am working closely with the Attorney General and with the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare on this matter. We are making available to the
Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary to any investigation he
may choose to undertake. We are working with both the Attorney General and
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to determine whether it is practicable from
this new evidence to attempt to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have
been administered unwittingly. No such names are part of these records, but we are
working to determine if there are adequate clues to lead to their identification; and if
so, how to go about fulfilling to Governments's responsibilities in the matter.


TESTIMONY OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK LAUBINGER, OFFICE OF TECHNICAL
SERVICES; AL BRODY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL; ERNEST MAYERFIELD,
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL; AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL


Admiral TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by thanking you
and Senator Kennedy for having a joint hearing this morning. I hope this will expedite
and facilitate our getting all the information that both of your committees need to the
record quickly.


I would like also to thank you both for prefacing the remarks today by reminding
us all that the events about which we are here to talk are 12- to 24--years-old. They
in now way represent the current activities or policies of the Central Intelligence
Agency.


What we are here to do is to give you all the information that we now have and
which e did not previously have on a subject known as Project MKULTRA, a project
which took place from 1953 to 1964. It was an umbrella project under which there
were numerous subprojects for research, among other things, on drugs and
behavioral modification. What the new material that we offer today is a supplement to
the considerable material that was made available in 1975, during the Church
Committee hearings, and also to the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific
Research.


At that time, the CIA offered up all of the information and documents it believed it
had available. The principal one available at that time that gave the greatest amount
of information on this subject was a report of the CIA's Inspector General written in
1963, and which led directly to the termination of this activity in 1964, 13 years ago.


The information available in 1973, as detailed by Senator Kennedy a minute ago,
with the concurrence of the then Director of Central Intelligence and under the
supervision of the Director of the Office of Technical Services that supervised Project
MKULTRA.


The material in 1975 was also sparse because most of the CIA people who had
been involved in 1953 to 1964 in this activity had retired from the Agency. I would
further add that I think the material was sparse in part because it was the practice at
that time not to keep detailed records in this category.


For instance, the 1963 report of the Inspector General notes:


Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test
programs.


In brief, there were few records to begin with and less after the destruction of
1973.


What I would like to do now, though, is to proceed and let you know what the new
material adds to our knowledge of this topic, and I will start by describing how the
material was discovered and why it was not previously discovered. The material in
question, some seven boxes, had been sent to our Retired Records Center outside of
the Washington area. It was discovered there as the result of an extensive search by
an employee charged with the responsibility for maintaining our holdings on
behavioral drugs and for responding to Freedom of Information Act requests on this
subject.


During the Church Committee investigation of 1975, searches for MKULTRA-related
material were made by examining both the active and the retired records of all of the
branches of CIA considered likely to have had an association with MKULTRA
documents. The retired records of the Budget and Fiscal Section of the branch that
was responsible for such work were not searched, however. This was because the
financial paper associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA were normally
maintained by the branch itself under the project title, MKULTRA, not by the Budget
and Fiscal Section under a special budget file.


In the case at hand, however, this newly located material had been sent to the
Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal Section of this branch as
part of its own retired holdings. In short, what should have been filed by the branch
itself was filed by the Budget and Fiscal Section, and what should have been filed
under the project title, MKULTRA, was filed under budget and fiscal matters. The
reason for this departure from the normal procedure of that time is simply not known,
and as a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval and destruction in 1973,
as well as discovery in 1975.


The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned in his
efforts to respond to a Freedom of Information Act request, or several of them, in fact.
He reviewed all of the listings of material of this branch, stored at the Retired Records
Center, including those of the Budget and Fiscal Section, and thus discovered the
MKULTRA-related documents, which had been missed in the previous searches.
In sum, the agency failed to uncover these particular documents in 1973, in the
process of attempting to destroy them. It similarly failed to locate them in 1975, in
response to the Church Committee hearings. I am personally persuaded that there is
no evidence of any attempt to conceal this material during the earlier searches.


Moreover, as we will discuss as we proceed, I do not believe the material itself is
such that there would be a motive on the part of the CIA to withhold this, having
disclosed what it did in 1975.


Next, let me move to the nature of this recently located material. It is important to
remember what I have just noted, that these folders that were discovered are finance
folders. The bulk of he material them consists of approvals for the advance of funds,
vouchers, and accountings and such, most of which are not very informative as to the
nature of he activities that they were supporting. Occasional project proposals or
memoranda commenting on some aspect of a subproject are scattered throughout
this material. In general, however, the recovered material does not include overall
status reports or other documents relating to operational consideration, or to the
progress on various subprojects, though some elaboration of the activities
contemplated does appear from time to time.


There are roughly three categories of projects. First there are 149 MKULTRA
subprojects, many of which appear to have some connection with research into
behavioral modification, drug acquisition and testing, or administering drugs
surreptitiously. Second, there are two boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers,
including audit reports and financial statements from intermediary funding
mechanisms used to conceal CIA sponsorship of various research projects.


Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain intelligence activities
previously funded under MKULTRA but which have nothing to do either with
behavioral modifications, drugs and toxins, or any closely related matter.


We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects into
categories under descriptive headings. In broad outline, at least, this presents the
contents of these files. The following 15 categories are the ones we have divided
these into.


First, research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol. Within this,
there are 17 projects probably not involving human testing. There are 14 subprojects
definitely involving testing on human volunteers. There are 19 subprojects probably
including tests on human volunteers and 6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting
human beings.


Second, there is research on hypnosis, eight subprojects, including two involving
hypnosis and drugs in combination.


Third, there are seven projects on the acquisition of chemicals or drugs.
Fourth, four subprojects on the aspects of the magician's art, useful in covert
operations, for instance, the surreptitious delivery of drug-related materials.
Fifth, there are nine projects on studies of human behavior, sleep research, and
behavioral change during psychotherapy.


Sixth, there are projects on library searches and attendants at seminars and
international conferences on behavioral modifications.


Seventh there are 23 projects on motivational studies, studies of defectors,
assessments of behavior and training techniques.


Eighth, there are three subprojects on polygraph research.
Ninth, there are three subprojects on funding mechanisms for MKULTRA's external
research activities.


Tenth there are six subprojects on research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals n
human tissue, provision of exotic pathogens, and the capability to incorporate them in
effective delivery systems.


Eleventh, there are three subprojects on activities whose nature simply cannot be
determined.


Twelfth, there are subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities
conducted with the Army Special Operations Division at Fort Detrich, Md. This activity
is outlined in Book I of the Church Committee report, pagers 388 to 389. (See
Appendix A, pp. 68-69).


Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI, the Army assisted the IA in developing, testing,
and maintaining biological agents and delivery systems for use against humans as
well as against animals and crops.


Thirteenth, there are single subprojects in such areas as the effects of
electroshock, harassment techniques for offensive use, analysis of extrasensory
perception, gas propelled sprays and aerosols, and four subprojects involving crop
and material sabotage.


Fourteenth, one or two subprojects on each of the following: blood grouping
research; controlling the activities of animals; energy storage and transfer in organic
systems; and stimulus and response in biological systems.


Finally , 15th, there are three subprojects cancelled before any work was done on
them having to do with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and
research on biologically active materials.


Now, let me address how much this newly discovered material adds to what had
previously been reported to the Church Committee and to Senator Kennedy's
Subcommittee on Health. The answer is basically additional detail. The principal
types of activities included in these documents have for the most part been outlined
or to some extent generally described in what was previously available in the way of
documentation and which was supplied by the CIA to the Senate investigators.


For example, financial disbursement records for the period of 1960 to 1964 for 76
of these 149 subprojects had been recovered by the Office of Finance at CIA and
were made available to the Church Committee investigators. For example, the 1963
Inspector General report on MKULTRA made available to both the Church Committee
and the Subcommittee on Health mentions electroshock and harassment substances,
covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens, the search for new material through
arrangements with specialist in hospitals and universities, and the fact that the
Technical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control
of human behavior.


For instance also, the relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General report was also
made available to the Church Committee staff, and that report discusses the
techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of communication,
discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly administered, studies on
magicians' arts as applied to covert operations, and other similar topics.


The most significant new data that has been discovered are, first, the names of
researchers and institutions who participated in MKULTRA projects, and second,
a possibly improper contribution by the CIA to a private institution.


We are now in the possession of the names of 185 nongovernment
researchers and assistants who are identified in the recovered material dealing with
these 149 subprojects.


There are also names of 80 institutions where work was done or with which these
people were affiliated. The institutions include 44 colleges or universities, 15 research
foundation or chemical or pharmaceutical companies or the like, 12 hospitals or
clinics, in addition to those associated with the universities, and 3 penal institutions.


While the identities of some of these people and institutions were known
previously, the discovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.


The facts as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are as follows. One
project involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private medical
institution. The fact that that contribution was made was previously known. Indeed, it
was mentioned in the 1957 report of the Inspector General on the Technical Service
Division of CIA that supervised MKULTRA, and pertinent portions of this had been
reviewed by the Church Committee staff.


The newly discovered material, however, makes it clear that this contribution was
made through an intermediary, which made it appear to be a private donation. As a
private donation, the contribution was then matched by Federal funds. The institution
was not made aware of the true source of the gift. This project was approved by the
then Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by CIA's top management
including the then General Counsel, who wrote an opinion supporting the legality of
the contribution. The recently discovered documents also give greater insight into the
scope of the unwitting drug testing was carried out in what is known in the
intelligence trade as safe houses in San Francisco and in New York City, and we have
identified that three individuals were involved in this undertaking, whereas we
previously reported there was only one person.


We also know now that some unwitting testing took place on criminal sexual
psychopaths confined at a State hospital, and that additionally research was done on
a knockout or K drug in parallel with research to develop painkillers for cancer
patients.


These, then, are the principal findings identified to date in our review of this
recovered material. As noted earlier, we believe the detail on the identities of
researchers and institutions involved in CIA sponsorship of drug and behavioral
modification research is a new element and one which poses a considerable problem.
Most of the people and institutions involved were not aware of CIA sponsorship. We
should certainly assume that the researchers and institutions which cooperated with
CIA on a witting basis acted in good faith and in the belief that they were aiding their
Government in a legitimate and proper purpose.


I believe that we all have a moral obligation to these researchers and institutions to
protect them from any unjustified embarrassmentor damage to their reputations which
revelation of their identities might bring.


In addition, I have a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the
names of the individual researchers without their consent.


This is especially true, of course, for those researchers, and institutions which were
unwitting participants in CIA sponsored activities.


Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I certainly recognize the right and the need of both the
Senate Select Committee on intelligence and the Senate Subcommittee on health and
Scientific Research to investigate the circumstances of these activities in whatever
detail you consider necessary. I am providing your committee with all of the
documentation, including all of the names, on a classified basis. I hope that this will
facilitate your investigation while still protecting the individuals and the institutions
involved.


Let me emphasize again that the MKULTRA events are 12 to 24 years in the past,
and I assure you that CIA is in no way engaged in either witting or unwitting testing of
drugs today.


Finally, I am working closely with the Attorney General on this matter. We are
making available to the Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary
to any investigation that he may elect to undertake. Beyond that, we are also working
with the Attorney General to determine whether it is practicable from this new
evidence to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have been administered
unwittingly. No such names are part of these records. We have not identified the
individuals to whom drugs were administered, but we are trying now to determine if
there are adequate clues to lead to their identification, and if so how best to go abut
fulfilling the Government's responsibilities n this matter.


Mr. Chairman, as we proceed with that process of attempting to identify the
individuals and then determining what is our proper responsibility to them, I will keep
both of these committees fully advised. I thank you, sir.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much, Admiral Turner. Your spirit of
cooperation is much appreciated. I would like to announce to the committee that in
order to give every member an opportunity to participate in this hearing, that we
would set a time limit of 10 minutes per Senator.


Admiral Turner, please give this committee the genesis of MKULTRA. Who or what
committee or commission or agency was responsible or dreaming up this grandiose
and sinister project, and why was it necessary! What is t rationale or justification for
such a project and was the President of the United states aware of this!


Admiral TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask Mr. Brody on my right, who is
a long-time member of the CIA to address that in more detail. I believe everything
that we know about the genesis was turned over to the Church Committee and is
contained in that material. Basically, it was a CIA-initiated project. it started out of a
concern of our being taken advantage of by other powers who would use drugs
against our personnel, and it was approved in the Agency. I have asked the question
you just asked me and have been assured that there is no evidence within the
Agency of any involvement at higher echelons, the White House, for instance, or
specific approval. That does not say there was not, but we have no such evidence.
Mr. Brody, would you amplify on my comments there, please!


Mr. BRODY. Mr. Chairman, I really have very little to add to that. To my
knowledge, there was no Presidential knowledge of this projects at the time. it was a
CIA project, and as the admiral said, it was a project designed to attempt to
counteract what was then thought to be a serious threat by our enemies of using
drugs against us. Most of what else we know about it is in the Senate Church
Committee report.


Senator INOUYE. Were the authorized members of the Congress made aware of
this project through the budgetary process!


Mr. BRODY. We have no knowledge of that, sir.


Senator INOUYE. Are you suggesting that it was intentionally kept away from the
Congress and the President of the United States!


Admiral TURNER. No, sir. We are only saying that we have no evidence one way
or the other as to whether the Congress was informed of this particular project. There
are no records to indicate.


Senator INOUYE. Admiral Turner, are you personally satisfied by actual
investigation that this newly discovered information was not intentionally kept away
form the Senate of the United States!


Admiral TURNER. I have no way to prove that, sir. That is my conviction fro
everything I have seen of it.


Senator INOUYE. Now, we have been advised that these documents ere initially
discovered in March of this year, and you were notified in July of this year, or June of
this year, and the committee was notified in July. Can you tell us why the Director of
Central Intelligence was notified 3 months after its initial discovery, why the delay!


Admiral TURNER. yes, sir. All this started with several Freedom of Information Act
requests, and Mr. Laubinger on my left was the individual who took it upon himself to
pursue these requests with great diligence, and got permission to go to the Retired
Records Center, and then made the decision to look not only under that would be the
expected subject files, but through every file with which the branch that conducted
this type of activity had any conceivable connection.


Very late in March, he discovered these seven boxes. he arranged to have them
shipped from the Retired Records Center to Washington, to our headquarters. They
varied in early April. He advised his appropriate superiors, who asked him how long
he thought it would take would take him to go through these and screen them
appropriately, clear them for Freedom of Information Act release.


The are, we originally estimated, 5,000 pages here. We now think that was an
underestimation, and it may be closer to 8,000 pages. He estimated it would take
about 45 days or into the middle of May to do that. He was told to proceed, and as
he did so there was nothing uncovered in the beginning of these 149 cases that
appeared particularly startling or particularly additive to the knowledge that had
already been given to the Church Committee, some details, but no major revelations.


He and his associates proceeded with deliberateness, but not a great sense of
urgency. There were other interfering activities that came and demanded his time
also. He was not able to put 100 percent of his time on it and there did not appear to
be cause for a great rush here. We were trying to be responsive to the Freedom of
Information Act request within the limits of our manpower and our priorities.


In early June, however, he discovered two projects, the one related to K drugs and
the one related to the funding at the institution, and realized immediately that he had
substantial new information, and he immediately reported this to his superiors.


Two actions were taken. One was to notify the lawyers of the principal Freedom of
Information Act requestor that we would have substantial new material and that it
would be forthcoming as rapidly as possible, and the second was to start a
memorandum up the chain that indicated his belief that we should notify the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence of this discovery because of the character at least of
these two documents.


As that proceeded up from the 13th of June, at each echelon we had to go
through the legal office, the legislative liaison office and at each echelon about the
same question was asked of him: Have you gone through all of this, so that when we
notify the Senate Select Committee we do not notify half of the important revelations
and not the other half? The last thing I want, Mr. Chairman, is in any way to be on
any topic, give the appearance on any topic of being recalcitrant, reluctant, or having
to have you drag things out of me, and my subordinates, much to my pleasure, had
each asked, have you really gone through these 8,000 pages enough to know that we
are not going to uncover a bombshell down at the bottom?


By late June, about the 28th, this process reached my deputy. He notified me
after his review of it on the 7th of July, which is the first I knew of it. I began reading
into it. I asked the same probing question directly. I then notified my superiors, and
on the 15th delivered to you my letter letting you know that we had this, and we have
been working, many people, many hours since then to be sure that what we are
telling you today does include all the relevant material.


Senator INOUYE. I would like to commend Mr. Laubinger of his diligence and
expertise, abut was this diligence the result of the Freedom of Information Act or
could this diligence have been exercised during the Church hearings? Why was it not
exercised?


Admiral TURNER. There is no question that theoretically this diligence could have
been exercised at any time, and it may well be that the Freedom of Information Act
has made us more aware of this. Would you speak for yourself, please.


Mr. LAUBINGER. I really don't attribute it, Senator, to diligence os much as
thoroughness. If you can imagine the pressures under an organization trying to
respond, which I think the CIA did at the time of the Church Committee hearings, the
hallways of the floor I am on were full of boxes from our records center. Every box
that anyone thought could possibly contain anything was called up for search. It was
one of a frantic effort to comply.


When the pressure to that situation cools down, and you can start looking at
things systematically, you are apt to find things that you wouldn't under the heat of a
crash program, and that is what happened here.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Senator Kennedy?


Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Turner, this is an enormously distressing report that
you give to the American Congress and to the American people today. Granted, it
happened may years ago, but what we are basically talking about is an activity which
took place in the country that involved the perversion and the corruption of many of
our outstanding research centers in this country, with CIA funds, where some of our
top researchers were unwittingly involved in research sponsored by the Agency in
which they had no knowledge of the background or the support for.


Much of it was done with American citizens who were completely unknowing in
terms of taking various drugs, and there are perhaps any number of Americans who
are walking around today on the east coast or west coast who were given drugs, with
all the kinds of physical and psychological damage that can be caused. We have
gone over that in very careful detail, and it is significant and sever indeed.


I do not know what could be done in a less democratic country that would be
more alien to our own traditions than was really done in this narrow area, and as you
give this report to the committee, I would like to get some sense of your own concern
about this type of activity, and how you react, having assumed this important
responsibility with the confidence of President Carter and the overwhelming support,
obviously, of the Congress, under this set of circumstances.


I did not get much of a feeing in reviewing your statement here this morning of the
kind of abhorrence to this type of past activity which I think the American people
would certainly deplore and which I believe that you do, but could you comment
upon that question, and also perhaps give us what ideas you have to insure that it
cannot happen again?


Admiral TURNER. Senator Kennedy, it is totally abhorrent to me to think of using a
human n being as a guinea pig and in any way jeopardizing his life and his health no
matter how great the cause. I am not here to pass judgment on my predecessors,
but I can assure you that this is totally beyond the pale of my contemplation of
activities that the CIA or any other of our intelligence agencies should undertake.
I am taking and have taken what I believe are adequate steps to insure that such
things are not continuing today.


Senator KENNEDY. Could you tell us a little bit about that?


Admiral TURNER. I have asked for a special report assuring me that there are no
drug activities extant, that is, drug activities that involve experimentation. Obviously,
we collect intelligence about drugs and drug use in other countries, but these are no
experimentations being conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, and I have had
a special check made because of another incident that was uncovered some years
ago about the unauthorized retention of some toxic materials at the CIA. I have had
an actual inspection made of the storage places and the certification from the people
in charge of those that there are no such chemical biological materials present n our
keeping, and I have issued express orders that that shall not be the case.


Beyond that, I have to rely in large measure on my sense of command and
direction of the people and their knowledge of the attitude I have just expressed to
you in this regard.


Senator KENNEDY. I think that is very commendable.


Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. I think that is important that the American people understand
that You know, much of the research which is our area of interest that was being done
by the Agency and the whole involved sequence of activities done by the Agency, I
am convinced could have been done in a legitimate way through the research
programs of the National Institutes of Mental Health other sponsored activities. I
mean, that is some other question, but I think you went to an awful lot of trouble,
where these things could have been.


Let me ask you specifically, on the follow-up of MKULTRA, are there now--I think
you have answered, but I want to get a complete answer about any experimentations
that are being done on human beings, whether it is drugs or behavioral alterations or
patterns or any support, either directly or indirectly, being provided by the Agency in
terms of any experimentation on human beings.


Admiral TURNER. There is no experimentation with drugs on human beings,
witting or unwitting, being conducted in any way.


Senator KENNEDY. All right. Or being supported indirectly? I mean, are you
contracted out?


Admiral TURNER. Or being in any way supported.


Senator KENNEDY. All right. How about the nondrug experimentation our
Committee has seen--psychosurgery, for example, or psychological research?


Admiral TURNER. We are continually involved in what we call assessment of
behavior. For instance, we are trying to continually improve our polygraph
procedures to, you know, assess whether a person is lying or not. This does not
involve any tampering with the individual body. This involves studying records of
people's behavior under different circumstances, and so on, but it is not an
experimental thing. Have I described that accurately, Al?
Mr. BRODY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, it is limited to those areas?
Admiral TURNER. Yes; it does not involve attempting to modify behavior. I only
involves studying behavior conditions, but not trying to actively modify it, as was one
of the objectives of MKULTRA.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, we are scarce on time, but I am interested in the other
areas besides polygraph where you are doing it. Maybe you can either respond now
or submit it for the record, if you would do that. Would you provide that for the
record?


Admiral TURNER. Yes.


[The material on psychological assessments follows:]


Psychological assessments are performed as a service to officers in the operations
directorate who recruit and/or handle agents. Except for people involved in training
courses, the subjects of the assessments are foreign nationals. The assessments are
generally done to determine the most successful tactic to persuade the subject to
accept covert employment by the CIA, and to make an appraisal of his reliability and
truthfulness.


A majority of the work is done by a staff of trained psychologists, some of whom
are stationed overseas. The assessments they do may be either direct or indirect.
Direct assessments involve a personal interview of the subject by the psychologist.
When possible the subject is asked to complete a formal "intelligence test" which is
actually a disguised psychological test. Individuals being assessed are not given
drugs, now are they subjected to physical harassment or torture. When operating
conditions are such that a face-to-face interview in not possible, the psychologist may
do an indirect assessment, using as source materials descriptions of the subject by
others, interviews with people who know him, specimens of his writings, etc.


The other psychological assessments involve handwriting analysis or graphological
assessment. The work is done by a pair of trained graphologists, assisted by a small
number of measurement technicians. They generally require at least a page of
handwritten script by the subject. Measurements are made of about 30 different
writing characteristics, and these are charted and furnished to the graphologist for
assessments.


The psychologists also give courses in psychological assessment to group of
operations officers, to sharpen their own capabilities to size up people. As part of the
training course, the instructor does a psychological assessment of each student. The
students are witting participants, and results are discussed with them.


It is important to reiterate that psychological assessments are only a service to the
operations officers. In the final analysis, it is the responsibility of the operations officer
to decide how a potential agent should be approached, or to make a judgement as to
whether any agent is telling the truth.


Admiral TURNER. The kind of thing we are interested in is, what will motivate a
man to become an agent of the United States in a difficult situation. We have to be
familiar with that kind of attitudinal response that we can expect from people we
approach to for one reason or another become our spies, but I will be happy to
submit a very specific listing of these.


Senator KENNEDY. Would you do that for the Committee?


In the follow-ups, in the MKSEARCH, in the OFTEN, and the CHICKWIT, could you
give us also a report on those particular programs?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Did they involve experimentation, human experimentation?


Admiral TURNER. No, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. None of them?


Admiral TURNER. Let me say this that CHICKWIT program is the code name for
the CIA participation in what was basically a Department of Defense program. This
program was summarized and reported to the Church Committee, to the Congress,
and I have since they have been rementioned in the press in the last 2 days here, I
have not had time to go through and personally review then. I have ascertained that
al of the files that we had and made available before are intact, and I have put a
special order out that nobody will enter those files or in any way touch then without
my permission at this point, but they are in the Retired Records Center outside of
Washington and they are available.


I am not prepared to give you full details on it, because I simply haven't read into
that part of our history, but in addition I would suggest when we want to get into that
we should get the Department of Defense in with us.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, you will supply that information to the Intelligence
Committee, the relevant, I mean, the health aspects, obviously, and the research we
are interested in?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Will you let us know, Admiral Turner?


Admiral TURNER. I will he happy to.


[See p. 169 for the material referred to.]


Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. I am running out of time. Do you support the
extension of the protection of human subjects legislation to include the CIA and
DOD? You commented favorably on that 19 before, and I am hopeful we can get that
on the calendar early in December, and that is our strong interest.


Admiral TURNER. The CIA certainly has no objection to that proposed legislation,
sir. It is not my role in the administration to be the supporter of it or the endorser of
it.


Senator, KENNEDY. As a persona matter, since you have reviewed these
subjects, would you comment? I know it is maybe unusual, but you can understand
what we are attempting to do.


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. From your own experience in the agency, you can understand
the value of it.


Just finally, in your own testimony now with this additional information, it seems
quite apparent to me that you can reconstruct in very careful detail this whole project
in terms of the responsible CIA officials for the program. You have so indicated in
your testimony. Now with the additional information, and the people, that have been
revealed in the examination of the documents, it seems to pretty clear that you can
track that whole program in very careful detail, and I would hope, you know, that you
would want to get to the bottom of it, a the Congress does as well. I will come back
to that in my next round. Thank you very much.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Goldwater?


Senator GOLDWATER. I have no questions.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Schweiker?


Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Admiral Turner, I would like to go back to your testimony on page 12, where you
discuss the contribution to the building fund of a private medical institution. You
state, "Indeed, it was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical
Service Division of CIA, pertinent portions of which has been reviewed by the Church
Committee staff." I would like to have you consider this question very carefully. I
served as a member of the original Church Committee. My staffer did a lot of the
work that you are referring to here. He made notes on the IG's report. My question
to you is, are you saying that the section that specifically delineates an improper
contribution was in fact given to the Church Committee staff to see?


Admiral TURNER. The answer to your question is "Yes." The information that a
contribution had been made was made available, to the best of my knowledge.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Only certain sections of the report were made available.
The report had to be reviewed out at Langley; it was not reviewed here and copies
were not given to us here. I just want you to carefully consider what you are saying,
because the only record we have are the notes that the staff took on anything that
was of significance.


Admiral TURNER. My understanding was that Mr. Maxwell was shown the relevant
portion of this report that disclosed that the contribution had been made.


Senator SCHWEIKER. To follow this up further, I'd like to say that I think there was
a serious flaw in the way that the IG report was handled and the Church Committee
was limited. I am not making any accusations, but because of limited access to the
report, we have a situation where it is not even clear whether we actually saw that material
or not, simply because we could not keep a copy of the report under the procedures we had to
follow. We were limited by note-taking, and so it is rather ambiguous as to just what
was seen and what was not seen. I certainly hope that the new Intelligence
Committee will not be bound by procedures that so restrict its ability to exercise
effective oversight.


I have a second question. Does it concern you, Admiral, that we used a
subterfuge which resulted in the use of Federal construction grant funds to finance
facilities for these sorts of experiments on our own people? Because as I understand
what you are saying, while the CIA maybe only put up $375,000, this triggered a
response on the part of the Federal Government to provide on a good faith basis
matching hospital funds at the same level. We put up more than $1 million of
matching funds, some based on an allegedly private donation which was really CIA
money.


Isn't there something basically wrong with that?


Admiral TURNER. I certainly believe there is. As I stated, the General Counsel of
the CIA at that time rendered a legal opinion that this was a legal opinion that this
was a legal undertaking, and again I am hesitant to go back and revisit the
atmosphere, the laws, the attitudes at that time, so whether the counsel was on good
legal ground or not, I am not enough of a lawyer to be sure, but it certainly would
occur to me if it happened to day as a very questionable activity.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I think those of us who worked on and amended the
Hill-Burton Act and other hospital construction assistance laws over the years, would
have a rather different opinion on the legal intent or object of Congress in passing
laws to provide hospital construction project money. These funds weren't intended
for this.


It reminds me a little bit of the shellfish toxin situation which turned up when I was
on the Church Committee. The Public Health Service was used to produce a deadly
poison with Public Health money. Here are using general hospital construction
money to carry on a series of drug experiments.


Admiral TURNER. Excuse me, sir. If I could just be, I think, accurate, I don't think
any of this $375,000 or the matching funds were used to conduct drug experiments.
They were used to build the hospital. Now, the CIA then put more money into a
foundation that was conducting research on the CIA's behalf supposedly in that
hospital, so the intent was certainly there, but the money was not used for
experimentation.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I understand it was used for bricks and mortar, but
the bricks were used to build the facility where the experiments were carried on; were
they not?


Admiral TURNER. We do not have positive evidence that they were. It certainly
would seem that that was the intent, but I do not want to draw inferences here----


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, why else would they give this money for the building
fund if the building was not used for a purpose that benefited the CIA program?
Admiral TURNER. I certainly draw the inference that the CIA expected to benefit
from it, and some of the wording says the General Counsel's opinion was that this was
legal only if the CIA was going to derive adequate benefit from it, but, sir, there is no
evidence of what benefit was derived.


Senator SCHWEIKER. There must have been some pretty good benefits at stake.
The Atomic Energy Commission was to bear a share of the cost, and when they
backed out for some reason or another, the CIA picked up part of their tab. So, at
two different points there were indications that CIA decision makers thought was great
benefit to be derived from whatever happened within the brick and mortar walls of
that facility.


Admiral TURNER. You are absolutely right. I am only taking the position that I
cannot substantiate that there was benefit derived.


Senator SCHWEIKER. The agreement documents say that the CIA would have
access to one-sixth of the space involved in the construction of the wing, so how
would you enter into an agreement that specifically says that you will have access to
and use of one-sixth of the space and not perform something in that space? I cannot
believe it was empty.


Admiral TURNER. Sir I am not disputing you at all, but both of us are saying that
the inference is that one-sixth of the space was used, that experimentation was done,
and so on, but there is no factual evidence of what went on as a result of that
payment or what went on in that hospital. It is just missing. It is not that it didn't
happen.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Admiral Turner, one other----


Senator KENNEDY. Would the Senator yield on that point?


Senator SCHWEIKER. I understand that in the agency's documents on the
agreement it was explicitly stated that one-sixth of the facility would be designated for
CIA use and made available for CIA research. Are you familiar---


Mr. BRODY. Senator, as I recall, you are right in that there is a mention of one-
sixth, but any mention at all has to do with planning. There are no subsequent
reports as to what happened after the construction took place.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Admiral Turner, I read in the New York Times that part of
this series of MKULTRA experiments involved an arrangement with the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics to test LSD surreptitiously on unwitting patrons in bars in New York and
San Francisco. Some of the subjects became violently ill and were hospitalized. I
wonder if you would just briefly describe what we were doing there and how it was
carried out? I assume it was through a safe house operation. I don't believe your
statement went into much detail.


Admiral TURNER. I did mention the safe house operation in my statement, sir, and
that is how these were carried out. What we have learned from the new
documentation is the location and the dates at which the safe houses were run by the
CIA and the identification of three individuals who were associated with running those
safe houses. We know something about the construction work that was done in them
because there were contracts for this. Beyond that, we are pretty much drawing
inferences as to the things that went on as to what you are saying here.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, the subjects were unwitting. You can infer that much,
right?


Admiral TURNER. Right.


Senator SCHWEIKER. If you happened to be at the wrong bar at the wrong place
and time, you got it.


Mr. BRODY. Senator, that would be--contacts were made, as we understand it, in
bars, it cetera, and then the people may have been invited to these safe houses.
There really isn't any indication as to the fact that this took place in the bars.


Admiral TURNER. We are trying to be very precise with you, sir, and not draw an
inference here. There are 6 cases of these 149 where we have enough evidence in
this new documentation t substantiate that there was unwitting testing and some of
that involves these safe houses. There are other cases where it is ambiguous as to
whether the testing was witting or voluntary. There are others where it was clearly
voluntary.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Of course, after a few drinks, it is questionable whether
informed consent means anything to a person in a bar anyway.


Admiral TURNER. Well, we don't have any indication that all these cases where it
is ambiguous involved drinking of any kind. There are cases in penal institutions
where it is not clear whether the prisoner was given a choice or not. I don't know that
he wasn't given a choice, but I don't positively know that he was, and I classify that
as an ambiguous incident.


Senator INOUYE. Your time is up, Senator.


Senator Huddleston?


Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Admiral Turner, you stated in your testimony that you are convinced there was no
attempt to conceal this recently discovered documentation during the earlier
searches. Did you question the individuals connected with the earlier search before
you made that judgment?


Admiral TURNER. Yes; I haven't, I don't think, questioned everybody who looked
in the files or is still on our payroll who looked in the files back in 1975, but Mr.
Laubinger on my left is the best authority on this, and I have gone over it with him in
some detail.


Senator HUDDLESTON. but you have inquired, you think, sufficiently to assure
yourself that there was no intent on the pat of any person to conceal these records
from the previous committee?


Admiral TURNER. I am persuaded of that both by my questioning of people and
by the circumstances and the way in which these documents were filed, by the fact
which I did not and should have mentioned in my testimony, that these were not the
official files. The ones that we have received or retrieved were copies of files that
were working files that somebody had used, and therefore were slipped into a
different location, and again I say to you, sir, I can't imagine their deliberately
concealing these particular files and revealing the other things that they did reveal in
1975. I don't see the motive for that, because these are not that damning compared
with the overall material that was provided.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Is this the kind of operation that if it were continuing now
or if there were anything similar to it, that you would feel compelled to report to the
Select Committee on Intelligence?


Admiral TURNER. Yes sir. You mean, if I discovered that something like this were
going on without my knowledge? Yes, I would feel absolutely the requirement to---
Senator HUDDLESTON. But if it were going on with your knowledge, would you
report it to the committee? I assume you would.


Admiral TURNER. Yes. Well, it would not be going on with my knowledge, but
theoretically the answer is yes, sir.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, then, what suggestions would you have as we
devise charters for the various intelligence agencies? What provision would you
suggest to prohibit this kind of activity from taking place? Would you suggest that it
ought to be specifically outlined in a statutory charter setting out the parameters of
the permissible operation of the various agencies?


Admiral TURNER. I thank that certainly is something we must consider as we look
at the legislation for charters. I am not on the face of it opposed of it. I think we
would have to look at the particular wording a e are going to have to deal with the
whole charter issue as to exactly how precise you want to be in delineating restraints
and curbs on the intelligence activities.


Senator HUDDLESTON. In the case of sensitive type operations, which this
certainly was, which might be going on today, is the oversight activity of the agency
more intensive now than it was at that time?


Admiral TURNER. Much more so. I mean, I have briefed you, sir, and the
committee on our sensitive operations. We have the Intelligence Oversight Board.
We have a procedure in the National Security Council for approval of very sensitive
operations. I think the amount of spotlight focused on these activities is many,
manyfold what it was in these 12 to 24 years ago.


Senator HUDDLESTON. How about the record keeping?


Admiral TURNER. Yes; I can't imagine anyone having the gall to think that he can
just blithely destroy records today with all of the attention that has come to this, and
certainly we are emphasizing that that is not the case.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Admiral, I was particularly interested in the activity that
took place at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Ky., in which a Dr.
Harris Isbell conducted experiments on people who were presumably patients there.
There was narcotics institution, I take it, and Dr Isbel was, according to the New York
Times story, carrying on a secret series of correspondence with an individual at the
Agency by the name of Ray. Have you identified who that person is?


Admiral TURNER. Sir, I find myself in a difficult position here at a public hearing to
confirm or deny these names in view of my legal responsibilities under the Privacy Act
not to disclose the names of individuals here.


Senator HUDDLESTON. I am just asking you if you have identified the person
referred to in that article as Ray. I am not asking you who he was. I just want to
know if you know who he is.


Admiral TURNER. No. I am sorry, was this W-r-a-y or R-a-y?


Senator HUDDLESTON. It is listed in the news article as R-a-y, in quotations.


Admiral TURNER. No, sir, we have not identified him.


Senator HUDDLESTON. So you have no knowledge of whether or not he is still a
member of your staff or connected with the Agency in any way. Have you attempted
to identify him?


[Pause]


Admiral TURNER. Senator, we have a former employee whose first name is Ray
who may have had some connection with these activities.


Senator HUDDLESTON. You suspect that but you have not verified that at this
time, or at least you are not in a position to indicate that you have verified it?


Admiral TURNER. That is correct.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you.


Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Wallop?


Senator WALLOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Admiral Turner, not all of the--and in no way trying to excuse you of the hideous
nature of some of these projects, but not all of the projects under MKULTRA are of a
sinister or even a moral nature. Is that a fair statement?


Admiral TURNER. That is correct.


Senator WALLOP. Looking down through some of these 17 projects not involving
human testing, aspects of the magician's art, it doesn't seem as though there is
anything very sinister about that. Studies of human behavior and sleep research,
library searches. Now, those things in their way are still of interest, are they not, to
the process of intelligence gathering?


Admiral TURNER. Yes sir. I have not tried to indicate that we either are not doing
or would not do any of the things that were involved in MKULTRA, but when it comes
to the witting or unwitting testing of people with drugs, that is certainly verboten, but
there are other things.


Senator WALLOP. Even with volunteer patients? I mean, I am not trying to put
you on the spot to say whether it is going on, but I mean, it is not an uncommon
thing, is it, in the prisons of the United States for the Public Health Service to conduct
various kinds of experiments with vaccines and, say, sunburn creams? I know n
Arizona they have done so.


Admiral TURNER. My understanding is, lots of that is authorized, but I am not of
the opinion that this is not the CIA's business, and that if we need some information
in that category, I would prefer to go to the other appropriate authorities of the
Government and ask them to get if for us rather than to in any way---


Senator WALLOP. Well, you know, you have library searches and attendants at
the national seminars. This is why I wanted to ask you if the bulk of these projects
were in any way the kinds of things that the Agency might not do now. A President
would not have been horrified by the list of the legitimate types of things. Isn't that probably
the case?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator WALLOP. And if it did in fact appear in the IG report, is there any reason
to suppose that the President did not know of this project? You said there was no
reason to suppose that they did, but let me reverse that. Is there any reason to
suppose that they did not?


Admiral TURNER. No.


Senator WALLOP. Well, you know, I just cannot imagine you or literally anybody
undertaking projects of the magnitude of dollars here and just not knowing about it,
not informing your superior that these were going on, especially when certain items of
it appear in the Inspector General's report on budget matters.


Admiral TURNER. Well, I find it difficult when it is that far back to hypothesize
what the procedures that the Director was using in terms of informing his superiors
were. It is quite a different climate from today, and I think we do a lot more informing
today than they did back then, but I find it very difficult to guess what the level of
knowledge was.


Senator WALLOP. I am really not asking you to second-guess it, but it just seems
to me that, while the past is past, and thank goodness we are operating under
different sets of circumstances, I think it is naive for us to suppose that these things
were conducted entirely without the knowledge of the Presidents of the United States
during those times. It is just the kinds of research information that was being sought
was vital to the United States, not the means, but the information that they were trying
to find.


Admiral TURNER. I am sorry. Your question, is, was this vital? Did we view it a
vital?


Senator WALLOP. Well, your implication at the beginning was that it was a
response to the kinds of behavior that were seen in Cardinal Mindszenty's trial and
other things. I mean, somebody must have thought that this was an important
defensive reaction, if nothing else, on the part of the United States.


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I am sure they did, but again I just don't know how
high that permeated the executive branch.


Senator WALLOP. But the kinds of information are still important to you. I mean, I
am not suggesting that anyone go back and do that kind of thing again, but I'm
certain


it would be of use to you to know what was going to happen to one of your agents
assuming someone had put one of these things into his bloodstream, or tried to
modify his behavior.


Admiral TURNER Absolutely, and you know, we would be very concerned if we
thought there were things like truth serums or other things that our agents or others
could be subjected to by use or improper use of drugs by other powers against our
people or agents.


Senator WALLOP. Are there? I don't ask you to name them, but are there such
serums?


Admiral TURNER. I don't know of them if there are. I would have to answer that
for the record, sir.


Senator WALLOP. I would appreciate that.
[The material referred to follows:]


"TRUTH" DRUGS IN INTERROGATION


The search for effective aids to interrogation is probably as old as man's need to
obtain information from an uncooperative source and a persistent as his impatience to
shortcut any tortuous path. In the annals of police investigation, physical coercion
has at times been substituted for painstaking and time-consuming inquiry in the belief
that direct methods produce quick results. Sir James Stephens, writing in 1883,
rationalizes a grisly example of "third degree" practices by the police of India: "It is far
pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper in a poor devil's eyes
than to go almost in the sun hunting up evidence."


More recently, police officials in some countries have turned to drugs for assistance
in extracting confessions from accused persons, drugs which are assumed to relax
the individual's defenses to the point that he unknowingly reveals truths he has been
trying to conceal. This investigative technique, however humanitarian as an
alternative to physical torture, still raises serious questions of individual rights and
liberties. In this country, where drugs have gained only marginal acceptance in police
work, their use has provoked cries of "psychological third degree" and has
precipitated medico-legal controversies that after a quarter of a century still
occasionally flare into the open.


The use of so-called "truth" drugs in police work is similar to the accepted
psychiatric practice of narco-analysis; the difference in the two procedures lies in their
different objectives. The police investigator is concerned with empirical truth that
may be used against the suspect, and therefore almost solely with probative truth: the
usefulness of the suspect's revelations depends ultimately on their acceptance in
evidence by a court of law. The psychiatrist, on the other hand, using the name
"truth" drugs in diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill, is primarily concerned with
psychological truth or psychological reality rather than empirical fact. A patient's
aberrations are reality for him at the time they occur, and an accurate account of
these fantasies and delusions, rather than reliable recollection of past events, can be
the key to recovery.


The notion of drugs capable of illuminating hidden recesses of the mind, helping to
heal the mentally ill and preventing or reversing the miscarriage of justice, has
provided an exceedingly durable theme for the press and popular literature. While
acknowledging that "truth serum" is a misnomer twice over--the drugs are not sera
and they do not necessarily bring forth probative truth--journalistic accounts continue
to exploit the appeal of the term. The formula is to play up a few spectacular "truth"
drug sucessess and to imply that the drugs are more maligned than need be and
more widely employed in criminal investigation than can officially be admitted.


Any technique that promises an increment of success in extracting information from
an uncompliant source is ipso facto of interest in intelligence operations. If the ethical
considerations which in Western countries inhibit the use of narco-interrogation in
police work are felt also in intelligence, the Western services must at least be
prepared against its possible employment by the adversary. An understanding of
"truth" drugs, their characteristic actions, and their potentialities, positive an negative,
for eliciting useful information is fundamental to an adequate defense against them.
This discussion meant to help toward such an understanding, draws primarily upon
openly published materials. It has the limitations of projecting from criminal
investigation practices and from the permissive atmosphere of drug psycho-therapy.


SCOPOLAMINE AS "TRUTH SERUM"


Early in this century physicians began to employ scopolamine, along with morphine
and chloroform, to induce a state of "twilight sleep" during childbirth. A constituent of
[chemical word unclear (beohroe? ], scopolamine was known to produce sedation
and drowsiness, confusion and disorientation, incoordination, and amnesia for events
experienced during intoxication. Yet physicians noted that women in twilight sleep
answered questions accurately and often volunteered exceedingly candid remarks.
In 1922 it occurred to Robert House, a Dallas, Texas obstetrician, that a similar
technique might be employed in the interrogation of suspected criminals, and he
arranged to interview under scopolamine two prisoners in the Dallas county jail whose
guilt seemed clearly confirmed. Under the drug, both men denied the charges on
which they were held; and both, upon trial, were found not guilty. Enthusiastic at this
success, House concluded that a patient under the influence of scopolamine "cannot
create a lie...and there is no power to think or reason." [14] His experiment and this
conclusion attracted wide attention, and the idea of a "truth" drug was thus launched
upon the public consciousness.


The phrase "truth serum" is believed to have appeared first in a news report of
House's experiment in the Los Angeles Record, sometime in 1922. House resisted
the term for a while but eventually came to employ it regularly himself. He published
some eleven articles on scopolamine in the years 1921-1929, with a noticeable
increase in polemical seal as time went on. What had began as something of a
scientific statement turned finally into a dedicated crusade by the "father of truth
serum" on behalf of his offspring, wherein he was "grossly indulgent of its wayward
behavior and stubbornly proud of its minor achievements." [11]


Only a handful of cases in which scopolamine was used for police interrogation
came to public notice, though there is evidence suggesting that some police forces
may have used it extensively. [2,16] One police writer claims that the threat of
scopolamine interrogation has been effective in extracting confessions from criminal
suspects, who are told they will first be rendered unconscious by chloral hydrate
placed covertly in their coffee or drinking water. [16]


Because of a number of undesirable side effects, scopolamine was shortly
disqualified as a "truth" drug. Among the most disabling of the side effects are
hallucinations, disturbed perception, somnolence, and physiological phenomena such
as headache, rapid heart, and blurred vision, which distract the subject from the
central purpose of the interview. Furthermore, the physical action is long, far
outlasting the psychological effects. Scopolamine continues, in some cases, to make
anesthesia and surgery safer by drying the mouth and throat and reducing secretions
that might obstruct the air passages. But the fantastically, almost painfully, dry
"desert" mouth brought on by the drug is hardly conducive to free talking, even in a
tractable subject.


BARBITURATES


The first suggestions that drugs might facilitate communication with emotionally
disturbed patients came quite by accident in 1916. Arthur S. Lovenhart and his
associates at the University of Wisconsin, experimenting with respiratory stimulanta,
were surprised when, after an injection of sodium cyanide, a catatonic patient who
had long been mute and rigid suddenly relaxed, opened his eyes, and even
answered a few questions. By the early 1930's a number of psychiatrists were
experimenting with drugs as a adjunct to established methods of therapy.


At about this time police officials, still attracted by the possibility that drugs might
help in the interrogation of suspects and witnesses, turned to a class of depressant
drugs known as the barbiturates. By 1935 Clarence W. Muehlberger, head of the
Michigan Crime Detection Laboratory at East Lansing, was using barbiturates on
reluctant suspects, though police work continued to be hampered by the courts'
rejection of drug-induced confessions except in a few carefully circumscribed
instances.


The barbiturates, first synthesized in 1903, are among the oldest of modern drugs
and the most versatile of all depressants. In this half-century some 2,500 have been
prepared, and about two dozen of these have won an important place in medicine.
An estimated three to four billion doses of barbiturates are prescribed by physicians
in the United States each year, and they have come to be known by a variety of
commercial names and colorful slang expressions: "goof-balls, Luminal, Nembutal,
"red devils," "yellow jackets," "pink ladies, " etc. Three of them which are used in
narcoanalysis and have seen service as "truth" drugs are sodium amytal
(amobarbital), pentothal sodium (thiopental), and to a lesser extent seconal
(secobarbital).


As one pharmacologist explains it, a subject coming under the influence of a
barbiturate injected intravenously goes through all the states of progressive
drunkenness, but the time scale is on the order of minutes instead of hours.
Outwardly the sedation effect is dramatic, especially if the subject is a psychiatric
patient in tension. His features slacken, his body relaxes. Some people are
momentarily excited; a few become silly and giggly. This usually passes, and most
subjects fall asleep, emerging later in disoriented semi-wakefulness.


The descent into narcosis and beyond with progressively larger doses can be
divided as follows:


I. Sedative state.
II. Unconsciousness, with exaggerated reflexes (hyperactive stage).
III. Unconsciousness, without reflex even to painful stimuli.
IV. Death.


Whether all these stages can be distinguished in any given subject depends largely
on the dose and the rapidity with which the drug is induced. In anesthesia, stages I
and II may last only two or three seconds.


The first or sedative stage can be further divided:


Plane 1. No evident effect, or slight sedative effect.


Plane 2. Cloudiness, calmness, amnesia. (Upon recovery, the subject will not
remember what happened at this or "lower" planes or stages.)


Plane 3. Slurred speech, old thought patterns disrupted, inability to integrate or
learn new patterns. Poor coordination. Subject becomes unaware of painful stimuli.


Plane 3 is the psychiatric "work" stage. I may last only a few minutes, but it can be
extended by farther slow injection of drug. The usual practice is to bring the subject
quickly to Stage II and to conduct the interview as he passes back into the sedative
stage on the way to full consciousness.


CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES


The general abhorrence in Western countries for the use of chemical agents "to
make people do things against their will" has precluded serious systematic study (at
least as published openly) of the potentialities of drugs for interrogation. Louis A.
Gottschalk, surveying their use in information-seeking interviews, [13] cites 136
references; but only two touch upon the extraction of intelligence information, and
one of these concludes merely that Russian techniques in interrogation and
indoctrination are derived from age-old police methods and do not depend on the
use of drugs. On the validity of confessions obtained with drugs, Gottschalk found
only three published experimental studies that eh deemed worth reporting.


One of these reported experiments by D.P. Morris in which intravenous sodium
amytal was helpful in detecting malingerers. [12] The subjects, soldiers, were at first
sullen, negativistic, and non-productive under amytal, but as the interview proceeded
they revealed the fact of and causes for their malingering. Usually the interviews
turned up a neurotic or psychotic basis for the deception.


The other two confession studies, being more relevant to the highly specialized,
untouched area of drugs in intelligence interrogation, deserve more detailed review.


Gerson and Victoroff [12] conducted amytal interviews with 17 neuropsychiatric
patients, soldiers who had charges against them, at Tilton General Hospital, Fort Dix.
First they were interviewed without amytal by a psychiatrist, who neither ignoring nor
stressing their situation a prisoners or suspects under scrutiny, urged each of them t
discuss his social and family background, his army career, and his version of the
charges pending against him.


The patients were told only a few minutes in advance that narcoanalysis would be
performed. The doctor was considerate, but positive and forthright. He indicated that
they had no choice but to submit to the procedure. Their attitudes varied from
unquestioning compliance to downright refusal.


Each patient was brought to complete narcosis and permitted to sleep. As he
became semiconscious and could be stimulated to speak, he was held in this stage
with additional amytal while the questioning proceeded. He was questioned first
about innocuous matters from his background that he had discussed before receiving
the drug. Whenever possible, he was manipulated into bringing up himself the
charges pending against him before being questioned about them. If he did this in a
too fully conscious state, it proved more effective to ask him to "talk about that later"
and to interpose a topic that would diminish suspicion, delaying the interrogation on
his criminal activity until he was back in the proper stage of narcosis.


The procedure differed from therapeutic narcoanalysis in several ways: the setting,
the type of patients, and the kind of "truth" sought. Also, the subjects were kept in
twilight consciousness longer than usual. This state proved richest in yield of
admissions prejudicial to the subject. In it his speech was thick, mumbling, and
disconnected, but his discretion was markedly reduced. This valuable interrogation
period, lasting only five to ten minutes at a time, could be reinduced by injecting
more amytal and putting the patient back to sleep.


The interrogation technique varied from case to case according to background
information about the patient, the seriousness of the charges, the patient's attitude
under narcosis, and his rapport with the doctor. Sometimes it was useful to pretend,
as the patient grew more fully conscious, that he had already confessed during the
amnestic period of the interrogation, and to urge him, while his memory and sense of
self-protection were still limited, to continue to elaborate the details of what he had
"already described." When it was obvious that a subject was withholding the truth, his
denials were quickly passed over and ignored, and the key questions would be
reworded in a new approach.


Several patients revealed fantasies, fears, and delusions approaching delirium,
much of which could readily be distinguished from reality. But sometimes there was
no way for the examiner to distinguish truth from fantasy except by reference to other
sources. One subject claimed to have a child that did not exist,
another threatened to kill on sight a stepfather who had been dead a year, and yet
another confessed to participating in a robbery when in fact he had only purchased
goods from the participants. Testimony concerning dates and specific places was
untrustworthy and often contradictory because of the patient's loss of time-sense. His
veracity in citing names and events proved questionable. Because of his confusion
about actual events and what he thought or feared had happened, the patient at
times managed to conceal the truth unintentionally.


As the subject revived, he would become aware that he was being questioned
about his secrets and, depending upon his personality, his fear of discovery, or the
degree of his disillusionment with the doctor, grow negativistic, hostile, or physically
aggressive. Occasionally patients had to e forcible restrained during this period to
prevent injury to themselves or others as the doctor continued to interrogate. Some
patients, moved by fierce and diffuse anger, the assumption that they had already
been tricked into confessing, and a still limited sense of discretion, defiantly
acknowledged their guilt and challenged the observer to "do something about it." As
the excitement passed, some fell back on their original stories and others verified the
confessed material. During the follow-up interview nine of the 17 admitted the validity
of their confessions; eight repudiated their confessions and reaffirmed their earlier
accounts.


With respect to the reliability of the results of such interrogation, Gerson and
Victoroff conclude that persistent careful questioning can reduce ambiguities in drug
interrogation, but cannot eliminate them altogether.


At least one experiment has shown that subjects are capable of maintaining a lie
while under the influence of a barbiturate. Redlich and his associates at Yale [25]
administered sodium amytal to nine volunteers, students and professionals, who had
previously, for purposes of the experiment, revealed shameful and guilt-producing
episodes of their past and then invented false self-protective stories to cover them. In
nearly every case the cover story retained some elements of the guilt inherent in the
true story.


Under the influence of the drug, the subjects were cross-examined on their cover
stories by a second investigator. The results, though not definitive, showed that
normal individuals who had good defenses and no overt pathological traits could
stick to their invented stories and refuse confession. Neurotic individuals with strong
unconscious self-punitive tendencies, on the other hand, both confessed more easily
and were and were inclined to substitute fantasy for the truth, confessing to offenses
never actually committed.


In recent years drug therapy has made some use of stimulants, most notably
amphetamine (Benzedrine) and its relative methamphetamine (Methedrine). These
drugs, used either alone or following intravenous barbiturates, produce an outpouring
of ideas, emotions, and memories which have been of help in diagnosing mental
disorders. The potential of stimulants in interrogation has received little attention,
unless in unpublished work. In one study of their psychiatric use Brussel et al. [7]
maintain that Methedrine gives the liar no time to think or to organize his deceptions.
Once the drug takes hold, they say, an insurmountable urge to pour out speech traps
the malingerer. Gottschalk, on the other hand, says that this claim is extravagant,
asserting without elaboration that the study lacked proper controls. [13] It is evident
that the combined use of barbiturates and stimulants, perhaps along with ataraxics
(tranquilizers), should be further explored.


OBSERVATIONS FROM PRACTICE


J.M. MacDonald, who as a psychiatrist for the District Courts of Denver has had
extensive experience with narcoanalysis, says that drug interrogation is of doubtful
value in obtaining confessions to crimes. Criminal suspects under the influence of
barbiturates may deliberately withhold information, persist in giving untruthful
answers, or falsely confess to crimes they did not commit. The psychopathic
personality in particular, appears to resist successfully the influence of drugs.
MacDonald tells of a criminal psychopath who, having agreed to narco-
interrogation, received 1.5 grams of sodium amytal over a period of five hours. This
man feigned amnesia and gave a false account of a murder. "He displayed little or
no remorse as he (falsely) described the crime, including burial of the body. Indeed
he was very self-possessed and he appeared almost to enjoy the examination. From
time to time he would request that more amytal be injected." [21]


MacDonald concludes that a person who gives false information prior to receiving
drugs is likely to give false information also under narcosis, that the drugs are of little
value for revealing deceptions, and that they are more effective in releasing
unconsciously repressed material than in evoking consciously suppressed
information.


Another psychiatrist known for his work with criminals, L.X. Freedman, gave sodium
amytal to men accused of various civil and military antisocial acts. The subjects were
mentally unstable, their conditions ranging from character disorders to neuroses and
psychoses. The drug interviews proved psychiatrically beneficial to the patients, but
Freedman found that his view of objective reality was seldom improved by their
revelations. He was unable to say on the basis of the narco-interrogation whether a
given act had or had not occurred. Like MacDonald, he found that psychopathic
individuals can deny to the point of unconsciousness crimes that every objective sign
indicates they have committed.


F.G. Inbau, Professor of Law at Northwestern university, who has had considerable
experience observing and participating in "truth" drug tests, claims that they are
occasionally effective on persons who would have disclosed the truth anyway had
they been properly interrogated, but that a person determined to lie will usually be
able to continue the deception under drugs.


The two military psychiatrists who made the most extensive use of narco-analysis
during the war years, Roy R. Grinker and John C. Spiegel concluded that in almost all
cases they could obtain from their patients essentially the same material and give
them the same emotional release by therapy without the use of drugs, provided they
had sufficient times.


The essence of these comments from professionals of long experience is that
drugs provide rapid access to information that is psychiatrically useful but of doubtful
validity as empirical truth. The same psychological information and a less adulterated
empirical truth can be obtained from fully conscious subjects through non-drug
psychotherapy and skillful police interrogation.


APPLICATION TO CK INTERROGATION


The almost total absence of controlled experimental studies of "truth" drugs and the
spotty and anecdotal nature of psychiatric and police evidence require that
extrapolations to intelligence operations be made with care. Still, enough is known
about the drugs' action to suggest certain considerations affecting the possibilities for
their use in interrogations.


It should be clear from the foregoing that at best a drug can only serve as an aid
to an interrogator who has a sure understanding of the psychology and techniques of
normal interrogation. In some respects, indeed, the demand on his skill will be
increased by the baffling mixture of truth and fantasy in drug-induced output. And the
tendency against which he must guard in the interrogate to give the responses that
deem to be wanted without regard for facts will be heightened by drugs: the literature
abounds with warnings that a subject in narcosis is extremely suggestible.


It seems possible that this suggestibility and the lowered guard of the narcotic state
might be put to advantage in the case of a subject feigning ignorance of a language
or some other skill that had become automatic with him. Lipton [20] found sodium
amytal helpful in determining whether a foreign subject was merely pretending not to
understand English. By extension, one can guess that a drugged interrogatee might
have difficulty maintaining the pretense that he did not comprehend the idiom of a
profession he was trying to hide.


There is the further problem of hostility in the interrogator's relationship to a
resistance source. The accumulated knowledge about "truth" drug reaction has come
largely from patient-physician relationships of trust and confidence. The subject in
narco-analysis is usually motivated a priori to cooperate with the psychiatrist, either to
obtain relief rom mental suffering or to contribute to a scientific study. Even in police
work, where an atmosphere of anxiety and threat may be dominant, a relationship of
trust frequently asserts itself: the drug is administered by a medical man bound by a
strict code of ethics; the suspect agreeing to undergo narcoanalysis in a desperate
bid for corroboration of his testimony trusts both drug and psychiatrist, however
apprehensively; and finally, as Freedman and MacDonald have indicated, the police
psychiatrist frequently deals with a "sick" criminal, and some order of patient-physician
relationship necessarily evolves.


Rarely has a drug interrogation involved "normal" individuals in a hostile or
genuinely threatening milieu. It was from a non-threatening experimental setting that
Krie Lindemann could say that his "normal" subjects "reported a general sense of
euphoria, ease and confidence, an they exhibited a marked increase in talkativeness
and communicability." [18] Gerson and Victoroff list poor doctor-patient rapport as
one factor interfering with the completeness and authenticity of confessions by the
Fort Dix soldiers, caught as they were in a command performance and told they had
no choice but to submit to narco-interrogation.


From all indications, subject-interrogator rapport is usually crucial to obtaining the
psychological release which may lead to unguarded disclosures. Role-playing on the
part of the interrogator might be a possible solution to the problem of establishing
rapport with a drugged subject. In therapy, the British narco-analyst William Sargent
recommends that the therapist deliberately distort the facts of the patient's life-
experience to achieve heightened emotional response and at reaction. [27] In the
drunken state of narco-analysis patients are prone to accept the therapist's false
constructions. There is reason to expect that a drugged subject would communicate
freely with an interrogator playing the role of relative, colleague, physician, immediate
superior, or any other person to whom his background indicated he would be
responsive.


Even when rapport is poor, however, there remains one facet of drug action
eminently exploitable in interrogation---the fact that subjects emerge from narcosis
feeling they have revealed a great deal, even when they have not. As Gerson and
Victoroff demonstrated at Fort Dix, this psychological set provides a major opening for
obtaining genuine confessions.


POSSIBLE VARIATIONS


In studies by Beecher and his associates, [3-6] one-third to one-half the individuals
tested proved to be placebo reactors, subjects who respond with symptomatic relief
to the administration of any syringe, pill, or capsule, regardless of what it contains.
Although no studies are known to have been made of the placebo phenomenon as
applied to narco-interrogation, it seems reasonable that when a subject's sense of
guilt interferes with productive interrogation, a placebo for pseudo-narcosis could
have the effect of absolving him of the responsibility for his acts and thus clear the
way for free communication. It is notable that placebos are most likely to be effective
in situations of stress. The individual most likely to react to placebos are the more
anxious, more self-centered, more dependent on outside stimulation, those who
express their needs more freely socially, talkers who drain off anxiety by conversing
with others. The non-reactors are those clinically more rigid and with better than
average emotional control. No sex or I.Q. differences between reactors and non-
reactors have been found.


Another possibility might be the combined use of drugs with hypnotic trance and
post-hypnotic suggestion: hypnosis could presumably prevent any recollection of the
drug experience. Whether a subject can be brought to trance against his will or
unaware, however, is a matter of some disagreement. Orne, in a survey of the
potential uses of hypnosis in interrogation, [23] asserts that it is doubtful, despite
many apparent indications to the contrary, that trance can be induced in resistant
subjects. It may be possible, he adds, to hypnotise a subject unaware, but this would
require a positive relationship with the hypnotist not likely to be found in the
interrogation setting.


In medical hypnosis, pentothal sodium is sometimes employed when only light
trance has been induced and deeper narcosis is desired. This procedure is a
possibility for interrogation, but if a satisfactory level of narcosis could be achieved
through hypnotic trance there would appear to be no need for drugs.


DEFENSIVE MEASURES


There is no known way of building tolerance for a "truth" drug without creating a
disabling addiction, or of arresting the action of a barbiturate once induced. The only
full safeguard against narco-interrogation is to prevent the administration of the drug.
Short of this, the best defense is to make use of the same knowledge that suggests
drugs for offensive operations: if a subject knows that on emerging from narcosis he
will have an exaggerated notion of how much he has revealed he can better resolve
to deny he has said anything.


The disadvantages and shortcomings of drugs in offensive operations become
positive features of the defense posture. A subject in narco-interrogation is
intoxicated, wavering between deep sleep and semi-wakefulness. His speech is
garbled and irrational, the amount of output drastically diminished. Drugs disrupt
established thought patterns, including the will to resist, but they do so
indiscriminately and thus also interfere with the patterns of substantive information the
interrogator seeks. Even under the conditions most favorable for the interrogator,
output will be contaminated by fantasy, distortion, and untruth.


Possibly the most effective way to arm oneself against narco-interrogation would be
to undergo a "dry run." A trial drug interrogation with output taped for playback
would familiarize an individual with his own reactions to "truth" drugs, and this
familiarity would help to reduce the effects of harassment by the interrogator before
and after the drug has been administered. From the viewpoint of the intelligence
service, the trail exposure of a particular operative to drugs might provide a rough
benchmark for assessing the kind and amount of information he would divulge in
narcosis.


There may be concern over the possibility of drug addiction intentionally or
accidentally induced by an adversary service. Most drugs will cause addiction with
prolonged use, and the barbiturates are no exception. In recent studies at the U.S.
Public Health Service Hospital for addicts in Lexington, Ky., subjects received large
doses of barbiturates over a period of months. Upon removal of the drug, they
experienced acute withdrawal symptoms and behaved in every respect like chronic
alcoholics.


Because their action is extremely short, however, and because there is little
likelihood that they would be administered regularly over a prolonged period,
barbiturate "truth" drugs present slight risk of operational addiction. If the adversary
service were intent on creating addiction in order to exploit withdrawal, it would have
other, more rapid means of producing states as unpleasant as withdrawal symptoms.


The hallucinatory and psychotomimetic drugs such as mescaline, marihuana, LSD-
25, and microtine are sometimes mistakenly associated with narcoanalytic
interrogation. These drugs distort the perception and interpretation of the sensory
input to the central nervous system and affect vision, audition, smell, the sensation of
the size of body parts and their position in space, etc. Mescaline and LSD-25 have
been used to create experimental "psychotic states," and in a minor way as aids in
psychotherapy.


Since information obtained from a person in a psychotic drug state would be
unrealistic, bizarre, and extremely difficult to assess, the self-administration of LSD-25,
which is effective in minute dosages, might in special circumstances offer an
operative temporary protection against interrogation. Conceivably, on the other hand,
an adversary service could use such drugs to produce anxiety or terror in medically
unsophisticated subjects unable to distinguish drug-induced psychosis from actual
insanity. An enlightened operative could not be thus frightened, however, knowing
that the effect of these hallucinogenic agents is transient in normal individuals.
Most broadly, there is evidence that drugs have least effect on well-adjusted
individuals with good defenses and good emotional control, and that anyone who can
withstand the stress of competent interrogation in the waking state can do so in
narcosis. The essential resources for resistance thus appears to lie within the
individual.


CONCLUSIONS


The salient points that emerge from this discussion are the following. No such
magic brew as the popular notion of truth serum exists. The barbiturates, by
disrupting defensive patterns, may sometimes be helpful in interrogation, but even
under the best conditions they will elicit an output contaminated by deception, fantasy
garbled speech etc. A major vulnerability they produce in the subject is a tendency
to believe he has revealed more than he has. It is possible, however, for both
normal individuals and psychopaths to resist drug interrogation; it seems likely that
any individual who can withstand ordinary intensive interrogation can hold out in
narcosis. The best aid to a defense against narco-interrogation is foreknowledge of
the process and its limitations. There is an acute need for controlled experimental
studies of drug reaction, not only to depressants but also to stimulants and to
combinations of depressants, stimulants, and ataraxics.


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Senator WALLOP. If they are, I would assume that you would still try to find from
either theirs or somebody else's information how to protect our people from that kind
of activity.
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator WALLOP. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Chafee?
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Admiral Turner, I appreciate that these tawdry activities were taking place long
before your watch, and I think you have correctly labeled them as abhorrent, but not
only were they abhorrent, it seems to me they were rather bungled, amateurish
experiments that don't seem to have been handled in a very scientific way, al least
from the scanty evidence we have.


It seems to me that there were the minimum of reports and the Agency didn't have
the ability to call it quits. It went on for some 12 years, as you as you mentioned.
What I would like to get to is, are you convinced now in your Agency that those
scientific experiments, legitimate ones that you were conducting with polygraph and
so forth, were being conducted in a scientific manner and that you are handling it in a
correct manner to get the best information that you are seeking in the end?


Admiral TURNER. yes, I am, and I also have a sense of confidence that we are
limiting ourselves to the areas where we need to be involved as opposed to areas
where we can rely on others.


Senator CHAFEE. I am convinced of that from your report. I just do hope that
you have people who are trained in not only handing this type of experiment, but in
preparing the proper reports and drawing the proper data from the reports. You are
convinced that you have this type of people?


Admiral TURNER. yes, sir.


Senator CHAFEE. The second point I am interested in was the final lines your
testimony here, which I believe are very important, and that is that the Agency is
doing all it can in cooperation with other branches of the Government to go about
tracking down the identity of those who were in some way adversely affected, and
see what can be done to fulfill the government's responsibilities in that respect. I
might add that I commend you in that, and I hope you will pursue it vigorously.
A hospital in my State was involved in these proceedings, and it is unclear exactly
what did take place, so I have both a parochial interest in this and a national interest
as well, and I do hope you will press on with it. It involves not only you, I appreciate,
but also HEW and perhaps the Attorney General.


Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir. We will.


Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much.


Admiral TURNER. MKULTRA subproject 3 was a project involving the surreptitious
administration of LSD on unwitting persons, was it not?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator INOUYE. In February 1954, and this was in the very early stages of
MKULTRA, the Director of Central intelligence wrote to the technical services staff
officials criticizing their judgment because they had participated in an experiment
involving the administration of LSD on an unwitting basis to Dr. Frank Olson, who
later committed suicide. Now, the individuals criticized were the same individuals
who were responsible for this subproject 3, involving exactly the same practices.
Even though these individuals were clearly aware of the dangers of surreptitious
administration and had been criticized by the Director of Central Intelligence, subproject
3 was not terminated immediately after Dr. Olson's death.


In fact, according to documents, it continued for a number of years. Can you
provide this committee with any explanation of how such testing could have
continued under these circumstances?


Admiral TURNER. No, sir, I really can't.


Senator INOUYE. Are the individuals in the technical services who carried on
subproject 3 still on the CIA payroll?


Admiral TURNER. I am sorry. Are you asking, are they today?


Senator INOUYE. Yes.


Admiral TURNER. No, sir.


Senator INOUYE. What would you do if you criticized officials of the technical
services staff and they continued to carry on experimentation for a number of years?


Admiral TURNER. I would do two things, sir. One is, I would be sure at the
beginning that I was explicit enough that they knew that I didn't want that to be
continued anywhere else, and two, if I found it being continued, I would roll some
heads.


Senator INOUYE. Could you provide this committee with information as to whether
the individuals involved had their heads rolled?


Admiral TURNER. I don't believe there is any evidence they did, but I will double
check that.


[See p 170 for material referred to.]


Senator INOUYE. As you know, Senator Huddleston and his subcommittee are
deeply involved in the drafting of charters and guidelines for the intelligence
community. We will be meeting with the President tomorrow. Our concern is, I think,
a basic one. Can anything like this occur again?


Admiral TURNER. I think it would be very, very unlikely, first, because we are all
much more conscious of these issues than we were back in the fifties, second,
because we have such thorough oversight procedures. I cannot imagine that this of
activity could take place today without some member of the CIA itself bypassing me,
if I were authorizing this, and writing to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and blowing
the whistle on this kind of activity.


I am also doing my very best, sir, to encourage an openness with myself and a
free communication in the Agency, so that I am the one who finds these things if they
should happen. The fact is that we must keep you and your committee and now the
new committee in the House informed of our sensitive activities. I think all of these
add up to a degree of scrutiny such that this kind of extensive and flagrant activity
could not happen today without it coming to the attention of the proper authorities to
stop it.


Senator INOUYE. A sad aspect of the MKULTRA project was that it naturally
involved the people who unwittingly or wittingly got involved in experimentation. I
would appreciate it if you would report back to this committee in 3 months on what
the Agency has done to notify these individuals and these institutions, and
furthermore, to notify us as to what steps have been taken to identify victims, and if
identified, what you have done to assist them, monetarily or otherwise.


Admiral TURNER. All right, sir. I will be happy to.


Senator GOLDWATER. Will the Senator yield?


Senator INOUYE. Yes, sir.


Senator GOLDWATER. I wonder if he could include in that report for our
information only a complete listing of the individuals and the experiments done on
them, and whether they were witting or unwitting, volunteer or nonvolunteer, and what
has been the result in each case. I think that would be interesting.


Admiral TURNER. Fine. Yes, sir.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Kennedy?


Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. It is your intention to notify the individuals who
have been the subjects of the research, is that right, Admiral Turner? Do you intend
to notify those individuals?


Admiral TURNER. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. If you can identify them, you intend to notify them?


Admiral TURNER. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. And you intend to notify the universities or research centers
as well?


Admiral TURNER. Senator, I am torn on that. I understand your opening
statement. I put myself in the position of the president of one of those universities,
let's say. If he were witting---if his university had been witting of this activity with us,
he has access to all that information today. If he were not witting, I wonder if the
process of informing him might put his institution's reputation in more jeopardy than
letting them go on the way they are today, not knowing. I really don't know the
equities here.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, the problem is, all you have to do is pick up the
newspapers and you see these universities mentioned. In many instances, I think you
are putting the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage, where there is a
complete change of administration, and they may for one reason or another not have
information that they are under suspicion. There is innuendo; there is rumor. I
cannot help but believe that it will just get smeared all over the newspapers in spite of
all the security steps that have been taken.


It seems to me that those universities should be entitled to that information, so that
the ones with other administrations can adapt procedures to protect those
universities. The importance of preserving the independence of our research areas
and the communities seems to me to be a very fundamental kind of question about
the protection of the integrity of our universities and our research centers.


Admiral TURNER. You are saying that you feel that if we identify them privately to
themselves, we can benefit them in an adequate way to cover the risk that this will
lead to a more public disclosure? There are lots of the 80 who have not been
identified publicly at this point.


Senator KENNEDY. I think the universities themselves should be notified. I think
then the universities can take whatever steps in terms of their getting up the
procedures to protect their own kinds of integrity in terms of the future. I would
certainly hope that they would feel that they could make a public comment or a
public statement on it. I think it is of general public interest, particularly for the people
that are involved in those universities, to have some kind of awareness of whether
they were used or were not used and how they were used.


I think they are entitled to it, and quite frankly, if there is a public official or an
official of the university that you notify and he wants for his own particular reasons
not to have it public, I don't see why those in a lesser echelon or lower echelon
who have been effectively used by it should not have the information as well.


So, I would hope that you would notify the universities and then also indicate to
the public. I can't conceive that this information will not be put out in the
newspapers, and it puts the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage, and
of curse some of it is wrong, which is the fact of the matter, and I think some
university official saying, well, it isn't so, is a lot different that if they know it is
confirmed or it is not confirmed in terms of the Agency itself. I think that there is a
responsibility there.


Admiral TURNER. I have great sympathy with what you are saying. I have already
notified one institution because the involvement was so extensive that I thought they
really needed to protect themselves, and I am most anxious to do this in whatever
way will help all of the people who were perhaps unwitting participants in this, and
the difficulty I will have is, I can't quite do, I think, what you suggested, in that I may
not be able to tell an institution of the extent and nature of its participation.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, you can tell them to the best of your information, and it
seems to me that just because the university or an individual is going to be
embarrassed is not a reason for classifying the information. So, I would hope---I
mean, I obviously speak as an individual Senator, but I feel that that is an incredible
disservice to the innocent individuals and, I think, a disservice to the integrity of the
universities unless they are notified, to be able to develop procedures you are
developing with regards to your own institution and we are trying to in terms of the
Congress. Certainly the universities are entitled to the same.


Admiral TURNER. Yes. Not all of these, of course, were unwitting.


Senator KENNEDY. That's right.


Admiral TURNER. Many of them were witting, and therefore they can take all
those precautionary steps on their own, but I am perfectly open to doing this. I am
only interested in doing it in a way that when identifying a university it will not lead to
the public disclosure of the individuals, whom I am not allowed to disclose, and so
on.


Senator KENNEDY. That could be done, it seems to me.


Admiral TURNER. So, we will see if we can devise a way of notifying these
institutions on a private basis so that they can then make their decision whether their
equities are best served by their announcing it publicly or their attempting to maintain
it----


Senator KENNEDY. Or you. I wonder. What if they were to ask you to announce
or indicate?


Admiral TURNER. My personal conscience, sir, at this time, is that I would be
doing a disservice to these universities if I notified the public.


Senator KENNEDY. Would you meet with some university officials and ask what
their views are or whether they feel that the preservation of the integrity or the
universities would be better served or not? I think that would be useful to find out
from small, large, private, and public universities' officials how they view the integrity--


Admiral TURNER. Fine. I will phone several university presidents today who are
my friends and who are not involved in this, and ask them what they think the equities
would be.


Senator KENNEDY. Al right. You let us know, too.


Admiral TURNER. But I am not sure that I see that there is any great benefit in my
notifying the public as opposed to the university notifying them. Let him have his
choice whether he wants---each institution wants to have it made public.


Senator KENNEDY. Yes. the fact would remain that the institution's credibility
would be better served if the institution's president were to deny it and the university
indicated that it did not participate in that program than if the university were to deny
it and the Agency says nothing. It seems to me that that would be the strongest, and
the only way that that is going to be credible. I would value it if you would get some
input from universities as to what they believe is the fairest way in terms of the
preservation of the integrity of the universities.


Let me, if I could, ask on the question of the users of these safe houses, as I
understand from information that was provided to us in the course of our last
committee, the testing of various drugs on individuals happened at all social levels,
high and low, it happened on native Americans and also on foreign nationals. That is
what I understand was the nature of the project itself.


Now, I am just wondering whether those tests were conducted at the two locations
on the east coast and the west coast which were known as safe houses. To your
knowledge, is that correct?


Admiral TURNER. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. In terms of the research in this particular program, it did not
go beyond the safe houses located on the eat coast and the west coast? I believe I
am correct on that.


Admiral TURNER. That type of unwitting testing of sort of randomly selected
individuals, yes.


Senator KENNEDY. It was just located in those two places?


Admiral TURNER. To the best of our knowledge, there were only two locations.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, how do we interpret randomly selected?


Admiral TURNER. Well, as opposed to prisoners in a prison who were somehow
selected.


Senator KENNEDY. All right. Do you know from this information how many
people were recruited during this period?


Admiral TURNER. No idea.


Senator KENNEDY. Do you know approximately?


Admiral TURNER. I asked that question the other day, and we just don't have--
apparently we are very--well, either there were no records kept of the actual numbers
and types of people tested or they were destroyed.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Schweiker.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Admiral Turner, I would like to come back to the experiments which may have
been conducted at the hospital research facilities which the CIA helped to finance. It
wasn't clear to me from your previous answers what kind of work was done there. I
gather you are unclear on that, too, from your remarks, yet I find in the CIA
documentation which you have supplied us, a list describing some of the advantages
the Agency hoped to gain. It says:


(a) One-sixth of the total space in the new hospital wing will be available to the
Chemical Division of TSS * * * ; (b) Agency sponsorship of sensitive research
projects will be completely deniable; (c) Full professional cover will be provided for up
to three biochemical employees of the Chemical Division; (d) Human patients and
volunteers for experimental use will be available under controlled clinical conditions
with the full supervision of and there is a blank , something has been deleted.


It seems pretty clear to me what they intended to do in that particular wing.
Doesn't it to you? Why would you go to such elaborate preparations, to buy part of
the wing, bring three of your own personnel there, give them a cover, and give them
access to patients? Why would you go to such trouble and expense to arrange all
that, if you weren't planning to experiment on people in the hospital?


Admiral TURNER. I agree with you 100 percent, air. Those were clearly the
intentions. I have no evidence that it was carried out in that way. I am not trying to
be defensive, Senator. I am only trying to be absolutely precise here.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, then, as to the nature of what was done there, the last
paragraph on the same page of the document says, "The facilities of the hospital and
the ability to conduct controlled experimentations under safe clinical conditions using
material with which any agency connection must be completely deniable will augment
and complement other programs recently taken over by TSS, such as," and then
there's another deletion.


Now, the words following "such as" have been deleted. That is still classified, or al
least it was removed when this document was sanitized and released. It seems to be
that whatever was deleted right there would give you a pretty good clue as to what
they were doing, since it says that the activities would "augment and complement
other programs" undertaken by TSS. So, I have trouble understanding why you don't
know what was contemplated Just the fact that similar programs are referred to in
the document, though what they are is still deleted, should enable you to check it out.
You could look at what went on in the similar programs mentioned following the
"such as " in the classified version of this document.


Admiral TURNER. Senator, I have not said that we don't know what was
contemplated being done there. We do not know what was done there.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Why did you delete that reference? Why is that still
classified, that particular project of whatever it is?


Admiral TURNER. I don't know this particular case. We will get you the exact
answer to that one and inform you about it, but it is quite probable that that other
case is unrelated to this in the...well, not unrelated, but that that was a project that still
deserves to be classified.


[The material referred to follows:]


Construction of the Gorman Annex was begun in 1937 and the Annex was
dedicated in March 1950. Of the several MKULTRA projects conducted at
Georgetown only one involving human testing covered a time span subsequent t
March 1959. Subproject 15 ran from 1955 to 1963, thus it is possible that the final
four years (1959-1963) of the subproject could have been spent in the Gorman
Annex. However, there is no reference to the Gorman Annex or a "new Annex" in
Subproject 15 papers, neither is there any mention of the subproject moving to a new
location in 1959 or later years.


Authorization to contribute CIA funds toward construction of the Gorman Annex is
contained in Subproject 35 of MKULTRA. Recently discovered material indicated that
Dr. Grachikter continued his research for sleep and amnesia-producing drugs under
Project MKSEARCH through July 1967 at Georgetown University Hospital. But is
impossible to determine if the facilities of the Gorman Annex were involved.


Senator SCHWEIKER. I think that would give us a pretty good clue as to what was
going to be done in the wing the CIA helped to finance.


Was there any indication al all in the records you found that the project ultimately
used cancer patients or terminally ill patients in connection with this facility?


Admiral TURNER. I'm sorry. I missed your question because I was trying to get
the data on the last one. I will read you the blank.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Go ahead.


Admiral TURNER. QKHILLTOP. It doesn't help you, but...


Senator SCHWEIKER. Can you tell us what that is, or is it still classified?


Admiral TURNER. I don't know, and I assume from the fact that we deleted it, it is
still classified, but I will get you that answer, sir.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you. I'd like to see that information.


[See p. 171 for material referred to.]


Now my next question was: Is there any indication, Admiral, that projects in that
particular center involved experimentation on terminally ill cancer patients?


Admiral TURNER. I missed the first part of your question, sir, I am very sorry.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Do you have any indication that some experiments in the
facility used terminally ill cancer patients as subjects?


You do acknowledge in your statement and it is clear from other documents that
these kinds of experiments were at some point being done somewhere. My question
is, is there any indication that cancer patients or terminally ill patients were
experimented with in this wing?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, it does appear there is a connection here, sir.


Senator SCHWEIKER. The other question I had relates to the development of
something which has ben called the perfect concussion. A series of experiments
toward that end were described in the CIA documents I wonder if you would just tell
us what your understanding of perfect concussion is.


Admiral TURNER. Is that in my testimony, sir, or in some other document?


Senator SCHWEIKER. Subproject 54, MKULTRA, which involved examination of
techniques to cause brain concussions and amnesia by using weapons or sound
waves to strike individuals without giving warning and without leaving any clear
physical marks. Someone dubbed it "perfect concussion"--maybe that was poetic
license on the part of our staff rather than your poets over there. I wonder if you
could tell us what brain concussion experiments were about?


Admiral TURNER. This project, No. 54, was canceled, and never carried out.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I do believe the first year of the project in 1955 was
carried out by the Office of Naval Research, according to the information that you
supplied us. The CIA seems to have been participating in some way at that point,
because the records go on to say that the experimenter at ONR found out about
CIA's role, discovered that it was a cover, and then the project was transferred to
MKULTRA in 1956. Again, this is all from the backup material you have given us. So,
it was canceled at some time. I am not disagreeing with that, but apparently for
at least a year or two, somebody was investigating the production of brain concussions
with special black-jacks, sound waves, and other methods as detailed in the backup material.


Admiral TURNER. The data available to me is that this project was never funded
by the CIA, but I will double-check that and furnish the information for the record for
you as to whether there was ever any connection here and if so, what the nature of
the work was.


[The material referred to follows:]


Mr. Laubinger corrected his testimony regarding Subproject 54 during the
September 21, 1977 hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific
Research of the Human Resources Committee. The relevant portion is reproduced
below:


Mr. LAUBINGER. On project 54, it has got a rather sensational proposal in there, in
terms of the work that they propose to do, and you asked about the proposal and I
said, in fact, it was never funded under MKULTRA. Now, I overlooked...at least, my
memory did not serve me correctly when I went through that file folder to see one
memorandum dated January 10, 1956, which makes it quite clear, as a matter of fact,
that that proposal was based on prior work that was funded by the Agency.


Senator SCHWEIKER. By what?


Mr. LAUBINGER. By the CIA. So, that information was in their file folder. It did not
happen to be in my head when I testified.


Senator SCHWEIKER. I think I might have read you that, and that is why I argued at
the time with you, because I think I had in front of me, a I recall, some indication that
it was funded there. I did read that to you. So, you did supply it to us; there is no
argument about that information.


Mr. LAUBINGER. Perhaps I am sort of headstrong, myself, and in my own view, I
am reading under the ULTRA project, that if it had been funded under ULTRA, it
would have had a project number and identified a such. The thing that threw me was
that it was funded, apparently, outside of any MKULTRA activity and it was under the
normal contracting process, so that it was not included in MKULTRA as any work
done under that funding umbrella.


The file folder that you have and I have, right here, makes it quite clear, however,
that a year's work was done through navy funding--a navy funding mechanism--on
which the proposal was based that ultimately came into the MKULTRA program. That
second proposal was never funded. So, there was conflict and I, personally, I think,
introduced a little bit of confusion in that in my testimony.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, do you agree or not agree with DOD's statement here
that even though the initial funding was navy, it was really a conduit for the CIA?


Mr. LAUBINGER. I think that is correct.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes; I would appreciate that. I would like to know how it
went from ONR to CIA after a year. Somebody made a decision to make that
transfer, and to make this an MKULTRA subject. There had to be some sort of review
that led to a decision to continue that kind of concussion--total blackout, maximum
amnesia, and whatever else it was you were interested in--study and testing.


Mr. LAUBINGER. Senator, if I may try to say a few words on that, the files that
were available to us for inspection, which are limited, indicated that there was a
project being carried on by the Navy having to do with the effects of brain
concussion. The CIA developed an interest in that, and considered funding it, but
actually never did, and as the admiral testified, the MKULTRA is merely a funding
mechanism, a place they go for money to do such things, but there is no evidence
that I know of that that project was ever funded.




Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I am confused, because here again is another quote
from a document that we have seen, which you have released and supplied to us:


Following is the technical progress made under the current [deleted] contract: (a)
Specialized instrumentation and numerous testing techniques have been developed
to obtain the desired dynamic data; (b) considerable data has now been obtained
supporting the resonance-cavitation theory of brain concussion; and (c) preliminary
acceleration threshold data has been obtained for a fluid-filled glass simulated skull.


It goes on to talk about a blast range and a 2,500-square-foot laboratory. The
document notes that "Three blast test series have been run to date." It describes a
special blackjack device, "a pancake-type blackjack giving a high peak impact force
with a low unit surface pressure."


I agree the records are inconclusive as to the results of this work, but it certainly
seems that some testing was done.


Mr. LAUBINGER. Senator, you are putting us in the same position I think you were
stating that you were in earlier in referring to documents not before us, but I believe
you are quoting from a proposal that someone sent to the Agency to fund this work,
and he is referring to past work. The past work would have encompassed a lot of
things like that, but CIA was not involved with that.


Senator SCHWEIKER: What do you mean, Admiral, on page 6 of your testimony
when you say past work on projects using magician's art? How do magicians get
into [word unclear] work business?


Admiral TURNER. [word unclear] interpreted this as to how to slip the mickey into
the finn, but I would like to ask my advisers here to comment.


Mr. BRODY. I think that is essentially it, Senator. It id surreptitious administration
of material to someone, deceptive practices, how to distract someone's attention
while you are doing something else, as I understand it. It was also some type of a
covert communication project involved with the study of how magicians and their
assistants perhaps communicate information to one another without having other
people know it. This is the type of thing that was involved, sir.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Huddleston?


Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Admiral, in your checking these newly discovered documents and interviewing
members of the CIA staff, did you find information that would confirm the contention
described by the reporters for the New York Times that this type of experimentation
was begun out of a fear at the Agency that foreign powers might have had drugs
which would allow them to alter the behavior of American citizens or agents or
members of the Armed Forces who were taken into custody, and which would have
resulted in false confessions and the like? Is my question clear?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I haven't personally read the documentation on that.
In my discussions with the people who are well informed in this area at the Agency, I
am told that that is the case.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Was there any evidence or any indication that there were
other motives that the agency might also be looking for drugs that could be applied
for other purposes, such as debilitating an individual or even killing another person?
Was this part of this kind of experimentation?


Admiral TURNER. Yes; I think there is. I have not seen in this series of
documentation evidence of desire to kill, but I think the project turned its character
from a defensive to an offensive one as it went along, and there certainly was an
intention here to develop drugs that could be of use.


Senator HUDDLESTON. The project continued for some time after it was learned
that, in fact, foreign powers did not have such a drug as was at first feared, didn't it?


Admiral TURNER. That is my understanding. Yes, sir.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Is there any indication that knowledge gained as a result
of these experiments has been useful or is being applied in any way to present
operations?
Mr. BRODY. Senator, I am not sure if there is any body of knowledge. A great
deal of what there was, I gather, was destroyed in 1973. I would like to defer to
Frank here. Do you know of any?


Mr. LAUBINGER. I know of no drugs or anything like that developed under this
program that ever reached operational use or are in use today.


Senator HUDDLESTON. So apparently any information that was gathered was
apparently useless and not worth continuing, not worth further development on the
part of the Agency.


Mr. LAUBINGER. I am having difficulty hearing your questions.


Senator HUDDLESTON. I can hardly hear myself.


Admiral TURNER. I think the answer to your question is that we have no evidence
of great usefulness on this, and yet I think we should remember....


Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, is it accurate to say that this experimentation
produced few useful results or had little application at all to the operations of the
Agency or anybody else as far as we know?


Admiral TURNER. I think that is basically correct. At the same time, I would point
out that we had two CIA prisoners in China and one in the Soviet Union at this time,
and we were concerned as to what kinds of things might be done to them, but I am
not saying that....


Senator HUDDLESTON. Have you detected any sign that any other nation is
continuing or has in the past conducted experiments similar to this or with a similar
objective?


Admiral TURNER. I am not prepared to answer that one off the top of my head,
sir, but I will get it to you.


[The material referred to follows:]


We maintain no files of up-to-date information on the testing of drugs in foreign
countries. Some years ago we occasionally would review foreign research on
antibiotics and pharmaceuticals in connection with public health and civil defense
assessments. For a few years beginning in 1949 we assessed foreign research on
LSD under Project ARTICHOKE because of concern that such drugs might be
employed against Agency and other U.S. personnel. Information relative to this work
had already been provided to relevant Committees. In this early work we also
occasionally looked at foreign human experimentation; we long ago eliminated our
holdings on this subject and no collection requirements are any longer served. As
consumer interest in this area has dropped off and higher priority areas need
attention, we have virtually no present coverage with the possible exception of an
occasional scanning of the literature for a specific program. To the best of our
knowledge no other unit in the Intelligence Community is tracking this subject now.


Senator HUDDLESTON. You don't know whether any of your agents anywhere in
the world have been subjected to any kind of procedure like this?


Admiral TURNER. We certainly know of other powers conducting research in
these areas, yes.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know how they go about that research?


Admiral TURNER. It is pretty sketchy, the information we have.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know of any other organization in this country or
any institution that has conducted extensive research on unwitting individuals and
through unwitting institutions?


Admiral TURNER. Well, I have read something in the newspapers about this, but I
have not familiarized myself with it in specifics.


Senator HUDDLESTON. It is not a normal mode of operation for human research,
is it?


Admiral TURNER. No, sir.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Wallop?


Senator WALLOP. Mr. Chairman, I only have one to follow up on Senator
Huddleston's questions and my earlier ones. You are not really saying, are you,
Admiral Turner, that there are no mind-altering drugs or behavior modification
procedures which have been used by foreign powers?


Admiral TURNER. No, sir, I am not.


Senator WALLOP. I drew that inference partly in answer to my question that you
knew of no truth serum. Maybe that is a misnomer, but surely, there are relaxants
that make tongues looser than they would otherwise be. Isn't that true?


Admiral TURNER. Yes.


Senator WALLOP. So I think it is fair to say, too, that the experience of many
American prisoners of war in the Korean conflict would indicate that there are
behavior modification procedures in use by foreign powers of a fairly advanced
degree of sophistication.


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator WALLOP. Again, I will just go back and say I think this must have been
part of the motivation. I don't think you would have mentioned Cardinal Mindszenty
had you thought his behavior was normal at the time or had anybody else. So, I
would just again say I think it is a little bit scapegoating. I don't think the object of
this hearing is in any way to lay blame on those passed or those dead or otherwise,
but I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say that it stopped with the directors of the
CIA or the DCI's of the time. Also I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say they
didn't even know it, but that it was some lower echelon acting alone.


I think this was a behavior pattern that was prevalent in those years, and I think the
object lesson is that we have discovered, we think and we hope, through your
assurances and other activities of the Congress, means of avoiding future incidents of
that kind. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Chafee?


Senator CHAFEE. No questions.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Kennedy, I think you have another question.


Senator KENNEDY. Just talking about the two safe houses on the east and west
coast as being the sources for the unwitting trials, now, the importance of this and the
magnitude of it, I think, is of significance, because we have seen from your records
that these were used over a period of 8 or 9 years, and the numbers could have been
considerable. You are unable to determine, at least in your own research, what the
numbers would be and what the drugs were, how many people were involved, but it
could have been considerable during this period of time.


It would certainly appear to me in examining the documents and the flow charts of
cash slips that were expended in these areas that it was considerable, but that is a
judgmental factor on it, but I think it is important to try and find out what the Agency
is attempting to do to get to the bottom of it.


Now, the principal agent that was involved as I understand it is deceased and has
been deceased for 2 years. The overall agent, Mr. Gottlieb, has indicated a fuzzy
memory about this whole area. He has testified before the Intelligence Committee.
Yet he was responsible for the whole program. Then, the Director had indicated the
destruction of the various materials and unfamiliarity with the project.


Now, you have indicated in your testimony today that there are two additional
agents on page 9 of your testimony, you indicated there are two agents which you
have uncovered at the bottom of it, and you say, the names of CIA officials who
approved or monitored the various projects. You talk about the two additional agents
in your testimony.


Now, I am just wondering if you intend to interview those agents to find out exactly
what is being done. I suppose, first of all, shouldn't the project manager know what
was being done?


Admiral TURNER. Our first problem, Senator, is that we have been unable to
associate an individual with those names at this point. We are still burrowing to find
out who these people are. We haven't identified them as having been CIA
employees, and we don't know whether these were false names.


Senator KENNEDY. You are tracking that down, as I understand it?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. You are tracking that down, and you have every intention of
interviewing those people to find out whatever you can about the program and
project?


Admiral TURNER. My only hesitation here is whether I will do this or the Justice
Department.


Senator KENNEDY. It will be pursued, though, I understand?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Either through the Agency or through the Justice Department?


Admiral TURNER. [Nods in the affirmative.]


Senator KENNEDY. Is it plausible that the director of the program would not
understand or know about the details of the program? Is it plausible that Dr. Gottlieb
would not understand the full range of activities in those particular safe houses?


Admiral TURNER. Let me say it is unlikely. I don't know Mr. Gottlieb.


Senator KENNEDY. Has anybody in the Agency talked with Mr. Gottlieb to find out
about this?


Admiral TURNER. Not since this revelation has come out.


Senator KENNEDY. Not since this revelation? Well, why not?


Admiral TURNER. He has left our employ, Senator.


Senator KENNEDY. Does that mean that anybody who leaves is, you know,
covered for lifetime?


Admiral TURNER. No, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Why wouldn't you talk with him and find out? You have new
information about this program. It has been a matter of considerable interest both to
our committee and to the Intelligence Committee. Why wouldn't you talk to Mr.
Gottlieb?


Admiral TURNER. Well, again, I think the issue is whether this should be done by
the Justice Department or ourselves.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, are we wrestling around because you and Attorney
General Bell can't agree.....


Admiral TURNER. No, sir.


Senator KENNEDY [continuing]. On who aught to do it?


Admiral TURNER. We are proceeding together in complete agreement as to how
to go. I have, in connection with trying to find all of these Americans or others who
were unwittingly tested, I have some considerable concern about the CIA running
around this country interviewing and interrogating people, because I don't want to
give any impression that we are doing domestic intelligence.


Senator KENNEDY. I am just talking about one, in this case. That was the man
who was responsible for the whole program, and to find out whether anyone within
the Agency since you have had this new material has talked to Gottlieb since 1975,
and if the answer is no, I want to know why not.


Admiral TURNER. The reason he was not interviewed in connection with the 1975
hearings was that he had left the employ of the CIA and there was a concern on the
part of the Agency that it would appear to the investigators that the CIA was in some
way trying to influence him and influence his testimony before the committee. If these
committees have no objection, we would be happy to contact Dr. Gottlieb and see if
he can augment anything here in this new information, that he can add to as opposed
to what was available in 1975.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, you see, Admiral Turner, you come to the two
committees this morning and indicate that now at last we have the information. We
don't have to be concerned about anything in the future on it. Now, I don't know how
you can give those assurances to the members of these committees as well as to the
American people when you haven't since 1975 even talked to the principal person
that was in charge of the program, and the records were destroyed. He is the fellow
that was running the program, and the Agency has not talked to him since the
development of this new material.


Admiral TURNER. Our only concern here is the proprieties involved, and we will
dig into this and work with the Justice Department on who, if either of us, should get
into discussions with Dr. Gottlieb so as not to prejudice any legal rights that may be
involved here, or to appear in any way to be improper.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, do I understand you have not contacted the Justice
Department about this particular case since the development of this new material
about Gottlieb?


Admiral TURNER. Not about Gottlieb specifically. We have contacted him.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, it is amazing to me. I mean, can you understand the
difficulty that any of us might have in terms of comprehending that when you develop
a whole new series of materials that are on the front page of every newspaper in the
country and are on every television, I mean, that means something, but it does not
mean nearly as much as the interest that we have in the fact about the testing of
unwitting Americans, and every single document that the staff reviews has Mr.
Gottlieb's name on it and you come up to tell us that we don't have to worry any
more, we have these other final facts, and Mr. Gottlieb has not been talked to?


Admiral TURNER. Sir, I am not saying that these are in any way the final facts. I
am saying these are all the facts we have available.


Senator KENNEDY. And you have not talked to the person who was in charge of
the program, so what kind of value or what kind of weight can we give it?


Admiral TURNER. We are happy to talk to him. I think the issue here again is one
of propriety and how to go about this. We have not, I believe, enough new
information about Gottlieb's participation here to signal that his interview would be
that much more revealing than what was revealed in 1975.


Senator KENNEDY. The importance of it, I think, from our point of view, is, he
would know the drugs that were administered, the volume of drugs, how it was
administered, and in terms of your ability to follow up to protect these people and
their health, to the extent that it can be done, that opportunity is being lost.


I want to get on to some others, but will you give us the assurance that you will
get ahold of Gottlieb or that you will talk to Attorney General Bell and talk with
Gottlieb?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. And let us know as to the extent of it. I don't see how we can
fulfill our responsibility in this area on the drug testing without our hearing from
Gottlieb as well, but I think it is important that you do so, particularly since all of the
materials have been destroyed.


These other two agents, have they talked to them?


Admiral TURNER. We don't know who they are, sir. We are trying to track down
and see whether these names can be related to anybody.


Senator KENNEDY. That is under active investigation by the Agency?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. And you have the intention of talking to those people when
you locate them. Is that correct?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, under the same circumstances as Gottlieb.


Senator KENNEDY. And you have people working on it?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. With regards to the activities that took place in these safe
houses, as I understand from the records, two-way mirrors were used. Is that your
understanding?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. We have records that construction was done to put in
two-way mirrors.


Senator KENNEDY. And they were placed in the bedroom, as I understand.


[Pause.]


Senator KENNEDY. Well, we have documents......


Admiral TURNER. I believe that was in the Church record, but I don't have the
details.


Senator KENNEDY. And rather elaborate decorations were added, as I understand
at least, to the one in San Francisco, in the bedroom, which are French can-can
dancers, floral pictures, drapery, including installation of bedroom mirrors, three
framed Toulouse Lautrec posters with black silk mats, and a number of other...red
bedroom curtains and recording equipment, and then a series of documents which
were provided to the committee which indicate a wide proliferation of different cash
for $100, generally in the $100 range over any period of time on the particular checks.
Even the names are blocked out, as to the person who is receiving it. Cash for
undercover agents, operating expenses, drinks, entertainment while administering,
and then it is dashed out, and then the other documents that would suggest, at least
with the signature of your principal agent out there, that..."called to the operation,
midnight, and climax."


What can you tell us that it might suggest to you about what techniques were
being used by the Agency in terms of reaching that sort of broad-based group of
Americans that were being evidently enticed for testing in terms of drugs and others?
Do you draw any kind of conclusion about what might have been going on out there
in these safe houses?


Admiral TURNER. No, sir.


[General laughter.]


Senator KENNEDY. There is a light side to it, but there is also an enormously
serious side. And that is that at least the techniques which are used or were used in
terms of testing, and trying to find out exactly the range of drugs used and the
numbers of people involved and exactly what that operation was abut, as well as the
constant reiteration of the use of small sums of cash at irregular intervals. A variety of
different techniques were employed but there is an awful lot of documentation putting
these matters together.


When you look at the fact that is a broad range population that has been tested,
tested in these two areas, with the kind of cash slips that were used in this, payment
mechanisms and decorations and all of the rest, we are not able to put a bottom line
on it but one thing is for sure, and that is, Gottlieb knows. That is one thing for sure,
because his name appears on just about every one of these documents, and it is, I
think, very important to find out what his understanding is of the nature of that. So,
we will hear more about that.


Admiral TURNER. I believe Gottlieb has been interviewed by the Congress.


Senator KENNEDY. That's right, he has, and in reviewing the record, it is not very
satisfactory, and it just seems with the new information
and the new documentation and the new memoranda--and he did not have the
checks at that time--and with the wide variety of different memoranda with his name
on it, his memory could be stimulated on that.


Thank you.


Senator INOUYE. I would like to thank the admiral and his staff for participating in
this hearing. I believe the record should show that this hearing was held at the
request of the Agency and the admiral. It was not held because we insisted upon it.
It was a volunteer effort on the part of the Agency. I think the record should also
indicate that Admiral Turner has forwarded to this committee a classified file including
all of the names of the institutions and the persons involved as the experimenters.


I should also indicate that this hearing is just one step involved in the committee's
investigation of drug abuse. Just as you have had much work in going over the
8,000 [ages. the staff of this committee has had equal problems, but I would like the
record to show that you have made these papers and documents available to the
committee. I thank you for that.


As part of the ongoing investigation, we had intended to call upon many dozens of
others, experimenters, or those officials in charge, and one of those will be Dr.
Gottlieb.


In thanking you, I would like to say this to the American people, that what we have
experienced this morning in this committee room is not being duplicated in any other
committee room in any other part of the world. I doubt that very much. Our Agency
and our intelligence community has been under much criticism and has been
subjected to much abuse, in many cases justified, but this is the most open society
that I can think of. For example, in Great Britain there are about six people who are
aware of the identity of the man in charge of intelligence. In other countries, similar
conditions exist. Here in the United States we not only know Admiral Turner, we have
had open hearings with him, such as this. The confirmation hearings were all open.


In a few weeks, the Senate of the United states will debate a resolution to decide
upon whether we should disclose the amounts and funds being used for
counterintelligence and national intelligence. I would hope that in presenting this
issue to the public, the media will take note that the Agency has cooperated and will
continue to. The abuse that we have learned about this morning is one I hope will
never happen again, but without constant oversight on the part of the Executive
Office, on the part of the Congress, it could happen again. It is important therefore
that we continue in this activity.


So, once again,, Admiral, I thank you very much for helping us. We will continue
to call upon you for your assistance. We would like to submit to you several
questions that the members and staff have prepared. We hope you will look them
over carefully and prepare responses for the record, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman?


Senator INOUYE. Yes, sir?


Senator KENNEDY. I, too, want to thank Admiral Turner for his responsiveness. I
have had meetings with him in the committees and also conversations, telephone
conversations, and private meetings, and I have found him personally to be extremely
responsive, and it is a very difficult challenge which he has accepted in heading this
Agency. I want you to know, personally, I, too, would like to see this put behind us.
I don't think we are quite there yet in terms of this partucular area that we are
interested in. I think the Intelligence Committee has special responibilities in
this area of the testing, so we look forward to working with you in expediting
the time that we can put it behind, but it does seem to me that we have to dig in
and finish the chapter. So, I want to personally express my appreciation to you,
Admiral Turner,and thank you for your cooperation and your help, and I look forward
to working with you.


Admiral TURNER. Thank you.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure you emphasized this
enough, but I think the record ought to show that Admiral Turner informed the Select
Committee on his own initiative when the new documentation was found. The
documentation has been made availa ble to us voluntarily, in a spirit of cooperation.


I think this shows a vast difference from the mode of operation that existed prior to
the formation at least of the Church Committee, and a difference that is very helpful.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Admiral.
We would now like to call upon Mr. Philip Goldman and Mr. John Gittinger.
Mr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger, will you please rise and take the oath.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are abut to give is the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I do.


Mr. GITTINGER. I do.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you, sir.


Mr. Godman, will you identify yourself, and after that, Mr. Gittinger.


Senator KENNEDY. Before we start in, we had a third witness, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Pasternac, who planned to testify, traveled to Washington--he lives in Washington,
and was contacted recently--with the intention of testifying this morning. And
something--he called us late this morning and indicated that he wanted to get a
counsel before he would wish to testify.


Senator INOUYE. Mr. Goldman.
Mr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, sir.


TESTIMONY OF PHILIP GOLDMAN, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


Mr. GOLDMAN. I am Philip Goldman.


Senator INOUYE. And you are a former employee of the Central Intelligence
Agency?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Over 10 years ago.


Senator INOUYE. And you were employed at the time when MKULTRA was in
operation?


Mr. GOLDMAN. There were some MKULTRA's in operation at the time I was there.


Senator INOUYE. And Mr. John Gittinger, are you a former employee of the
Central Intelligence Agency?


TESTIMONY OF JOHN GITTINGER, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


Mr. GITTINGER. I am.


Senator INOUYE. Are you still an employee an eployee?


Mr. GITTINGER. No.


Senator INOUYE. Were you a member of the Agency at the time MKULTRA was in
operation?


Mr. GITTINGER. Yes.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you. Senator Kennedy.


Senator KENNEDY. I want to welcome both of you to the committee.


If we could start with Mr. Godman. Were you the project engineer for the safe
houses in either San Franicso or New York?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I know of no safe house in San Francisco.


Senator KENNEDY. How aboout in new York?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I knew of one facility that was established there, but I didn't know
anything of its operation.


Senator KENNEDY. Were you a monitor on any testing of drugs on unwitting
persons in San Francisco?


Mr. GOLDMAN. No.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, we have a classified document here that was provided
by the Agency that lists your name as a monitor of the program and I would
appreciate it if you would look...


Mr. GODMAN. I think the musunderstanding arises because I was project officer.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, would you take a look at that?


[Mr. Godman inspected the document.]


Mr. GODMAN. This document as it states is correct. However, my....


Senator KENNEDY. That document is correct?


Mr. GOLDMAN. As far as I see on the first page, the project. But my....


Senator KENNEDY. Well, could I get it back, please.
That would indicate that you were a monitor of the program.


Mr. GOLDMAN. I was in charge of disbursing the moneys to Morgan Hall.


Senator KENNEDY. To whom was that?


Mr. GOLDMAN. To the individual whose name was listed at the top of that
document.


Senator KENNEDY. And you knew htat he was running the project in San
Francisco?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I knew he was the person who was in charge out there.
Senator KENNEDY. All right.


Mr. GODMAN. But I had no knowledge nor did I seek knowledge of actually what
he was doing, because there would be other things involved.


I did recieve...


Senator KENNEDY. What were you doing?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I was collecting...I had to be sure that all teh receipt that ever
were turned in balanced with the moneys htat were paid out to see that everything
was run all right. There was no illegal use of funds as far as we could determine by
the receipts and cash.


Senator KENNEDY. So even though the Agency document indicates that you were
a monitor for the program, one of the few monitors of that particular program which
you mentioned for San Francisco and Mill Valley, Calif., you described your
responsibility only as a carrier of money, is that correct?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I would say as a disburser or carrying out...seeing that the
moneys were handled properly. There was within that...I don't know what's done or
what he did do in conjuction with other people.


Senator KENNEDY. Were you responsible for the disbursement of all the funds?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I was responsible for turning over the check to him.


Senator KENNEDY. And what did you know of the program itself?


Mr. GOLDMAN. The only thing I knew of the program was what he furnished us in
terms of receipts and that sort of thing. I didn't indulge or concern myself in that.


Senator KENNEDY. You still wrote, and I'll let you examine it--it's a classified
document'--but you wrote a rather substantive review of the program in May of 1963,
talking about the experiments, the factual data that had been collected, covert and
realistic field field traials, about the necessity of those particular--and talked about
the effectiveness of the various programs, the efficiency of various delivery systems.
That doesn't sound to me like someone who is only...


Mr. GOLDMAN. Well, if you would refresh my memory, if I could read this I would
certainly agree with whatever is said there, if it was written.


Senator KENNEDY. I am trying to gather what your role was. You've indicated
first of all that you didn't know about...you knew about a safe house in New York;
now we find out that you're the carrier for the resources as well and the agent in San
Francisco. We find out now that the CIA put you as a monitor. You're testifying htat
you only were the courier, and here we have just one document, and there are many
otheres that talk about the substance of that program with your name on it and I am
just trying to find out exactly what role you werer playing.


Mr. GOLDMAN. The only think I can tell you about this and I am drawing
completely on my memory is that this individual who was in charge out there
conducted these things and reported them back to the Agency. I didn't participate in
any of them. All I know was that he furnished me with receipts for things that were
done and told of the work that they had done.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, that documetn covers more than receipts.


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes, it tells of what...they had conducted wourk out there.
Senator KENNEDY. It describes, does it not? Read the paragraph 2.
Mr. GOLDMAN. "A number of covert"...


Senator KENNEDY. Well, you can't read it, it's a classified document, and I don't
know why, quite frankly, but it relates to the substance
of those programs and your name is signed to the memorandums on it. I am not
interested in you trying to review for us now what is in the document, but I think it
would be unfortunate if we were left with the opinion that all you were was a courier
of resources when we see a document with your name on it, signed, that talks about
the substance of the program. And what we're interested in is the substance of the
program. We have the recent documents that were provided by the Agency, which
do indicdate that you were at least involved in the substance, and I'm just trying to
find out whether you're willing to tell us about that.


Mr. GOLDMAN. I am perfectly willing to tell you everything that I can remember.


Senator KENNEDY. But you can't remember anything.


Mr. GOLDMAN. I can't remember the substantive parts of these things, I really
can't.


Senator KENNEDY. Of the program htat was taking place, do you have any
greater familiarity with what was happening in New York.


Mr. GOLDMAN. No, no.


Senator KENNEDY. And you have the same function with regards to New York.


Senator KENNEDY. Did you ever go to San Francisco?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. Did you meet with the agent in charge?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. And why did you meet with him?


Mr. GOLDMAN. To discuss some of the receipts and things that were there to find
out if these were indeed true expenditures and to find out if everything was going
along all right for the work that was being done.


Senator KENNEDY. What work was being done?


Mr. GOLDMAN. No, the reports of these things and whatever was being done. I
don't know who he reported to but he did report to somebody.


Senator KENNEDY. You travel out there to find out about the work that's being
done, and what does he tell you, that the work is being done well and..
.
Mr. GOLDMAN. He told me that the work that they were doing was going along,
progressing satisfactorily, but to be very frank with you...


Senator KENNEDY. But he didn't tell you what the work?


Mr. GOLDMAN. To be very frank with you, Senator, I cannot remember the things
that happened back in those days. I've been away from the company--from the
agency for over 10 years, and that is even farther back than that, and that was just
about the time when I first engaged in this, so it was my first.
...
Senator KENNEDY. Did they disburse a series of $100 checks, to your
recollection?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I don't recollect it, but if you ahve it there, then they did.


Senator KENNEDY. Did you know Dr. Gottlieb?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. How did you know Dr. Gottlieb?


Mr. GOLDMAN. He had been head of the division when I was recruited.


Senator KENNEDY. Did you talk to him about these programs? Did you have
anything to do with him during this period of time?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I didn't have anything to do with him until I would say probably in
the sixties.


Senator KENNEDY. And can you tell us what you had to do with him then?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Just what you see there on the papers.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, that is the request for the money and he approves it.


Mr. GOLDMAN. That is the request for money and he approves it, and I am quite
sure that I probably discussed with him whether the work was going along all right,
whether his reports were being turned in, and whether he was satisfied with the way
things were going and did he have any complaints about the way other people were
requesting him, but I did not engage myself in anything he was doing.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, did you get the impression that Gottlieb knew what was
going on?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I didn't ask.


Senator KENNEDY. But you told him that your impression that what was going on
even though you didn't know what was going on, was going on well, I guess?


[Laughter.]


Mr. GOLDMAN. I told Gottlieb what you saw in there was that the things appeared
to be going along all right. I was repeating and parroting back the words that were
given to me while I was there.


Senator KENNEDY. What was the money being spent for, do you know?


Mr. GOLDMAN. No; I can't recall that, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Would you remember if we told you it was red curtains and
can-can pictures....


Mr. GOLDMAN. No, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Floral pictures and the rest.


Mr. GOLDMAN. No, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. RECORDERS.


Mr. GOLDMAN. No, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Recorders and two-way mirrors.


Mr. GOLDMAN. Wait, hold on. You're slipping a word in there now.


Senator KENNEDY. But you would ahve authorized those funds, would you not,
since you were the....


Mr. GOLDMAN. Did you say two-way mirrors?


Senator KENNEDY. Yes.


Mr. GOLDMAN. Where?


Senator KENNEDY. In the safe houses.


Mr. GOLDMAN. Where?


Senator KENNEDY. San Francisco.


Mr. GOLDMAN. No.


Senator KENNEDY. How about New York?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. You remember now that you approved expenditures for New
York?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. What were those expenditures for?


Mr. GOLDMAN. That was a transfer of money over for the use in an apartment in
New York by the Bureau of Narcotics. It was for their use.


Senator KENNEDY. Do you have any knowledge of what was going on in the
apartment?


Mr. GOLDMAN. No, sir, other than I know that it had been used, according to the
information that I have been given, it was used by the Bureau of Narcotics to make
meetings with individuals who they were interested in with regard to pushing dope--
not pushing dope, but sellingnarcotics and that sort of thing.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, I am sure you had many responsibilities and it's a long
time ago, but the Agency does indicate that you were project monitor for that
particular program.


Mr. GOLDMAN. That's correct.


Senator KENNEDY. Your own testimony indicates you went out to review the
expependitures of funds to find out whether they were being wisely used, that you
came back and talked to the project director, Mr. Gottlieb, to give him a progress
report about what was going on out there.


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes, sir, I did.


Senator KENNEDY. All those things are true, and yet you draw a complete blank
in terms of what was the project itself. That's where the record is now.


Mr. GOLDMAN. I did not go out there to review the projects nor did I come back
and talk with Mr. Gottlieb and review what I had observed in terms of any projects
that they...that is, other parts of the Agency might have in operation there. I simply
reported back those things which were told to me by the individual out there
who...and I carried them back and they are contained in the report that you have in
front of you, word for word, just as it was given to me.




PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF
RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION


--------------


WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1977


U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE on INTELLIGENCE,
and SUBCOMMITTEE on HEALTH
and SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
of the COMMITTEE on HUMAN RESOURCES
Washington, D.C.


The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m. in room 1202, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Senator Daniel K. Inouye (chairman of the
Select Committee on Intelligence) presiding.


Present: Senators Inouye (presiding), Kennedy, Goldwater, Bayh, Hathaway,
Huddleston, Hart, Schweiker, Case, Garn, Chafee, Lugar and Wallop.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director, Select Committee on Intelligence;
Fr.Lawrence Horowitz, staff director, Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research;and
professional staff members of both committees.


Senator INOUYE. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is meeting today
and is joined by the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research chaired by
Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Senator Richard Schweiker of
Pennsylvania. Senator Hathaway and Senator Chafee are members of both
committees. We are to hear testimony from the Director of Central Intelligence,
Adm. Stanfield Turner, and from other Agency witnesses on issues concerning new
documents supplied to the committee in the last week on drug testing conducted by
the Central Intelligence Agency.


It should be made clear from the outset that in general, we are focusing on events
that happened over 12 or as long as 25 years ago. It should be emphasized that the
programs that are of greatest concern have stopped and that we are reviewing these
past events in order to better understand what statutes and other guidelines might be
necessary to prevent the recurrence of such abuses in the future. We also need to
know and understand what is now being done by the CIA in the field of behavioral
research to be certain that no current abuses are occurring.


I want to commend Admiral Turner for his full cooperation with this committee and
with the Subcommittee on Health in recognizing that this issue needed our attention.
The CIA has assisted our committees and staffs in their investigative efforts and in
arriving at remedies which will serve the best interests of our country.


The reappearance of reports of the abuses of the drug testing program and
reports of other previously unknown drug programs and projects for behavioral
control underline the necessity for effective oversight procedures both in the executive
branch and in the Congress. The Select Committee on Intelligence has been working
very closely with President Carter, the Vice President, and Admiral Turner and his
associates in developing basic concepts for statutory guidelines which will govern all
activities of the intelligence agencies of the united States.


In fact, it is my expectation that the President will soon announce his decisions on
how he has decided the intelligence agencies of the United States shall be organized.
This committee will be working closely with the President and Admiral Turner in
placing this new structure under the law and to develop effective oversight
procedures.


It is clear that effective oversight requires that information must be full and
forthcoming. Full and timely information is obviously necessary if the committee and
the public is to be confident that any transgressions can be dealt with quickly and
forcefully.


One purpose of this hearing is to give the committee and the public an
understanding of what new information has been discovered that adds to the
knowledge already available from previous Church and Kennedy inquiries, and to
hear the reasons why these documents were not available to the Church and
Kennedy committees. It is also the purpose of this hearing to address the issues
raised by any additional illegal or improper activities that have emerged from the files
and to develop remedies to prevent such improper activities from occurring again.
Finally, there is an obligation on the part of both this committee and the CIA to
make every effort to help those individuals or institutions that may have been harmed
by any of these improper or illegal activities. I am certain that Admiral Turner will
work with this committee to see that this will be done.


I would now like to welcome the most distinguished Senator from Massachusetts,
the chairman of the Health Subcommittee, Senator Kennedy.


Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We are delighted to
join together in this very important area of public inquiry and public interest.
Some 2 years ago, the Senate Health Subcommittee heard chilling testimony
about the human experimentation activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The
Deputy Director of the CIA revealed that over 30 universities and institutions ere
involved in an "extensive testing and experimentation" program which included covert
drug tests on unwitting citizens "at all social levels [ ] , native Americans and
foreign." Several of these [ ] the administration of LSD to "unwitting subjects
in [ ] situations."


At least one death, that of Dr. Olsen resulted from these activities. The
Agency itself acknowledged that these tests made little scientific sense. The agents
doing the monitoring were not qualified scientific observers. The test subjects were
seldom accessible beyond the first hours of the test. In a number of instances, the
test subject became ill for hours or days, and effective follow-up was impossible.
Other experiments were equally offensive. For example, heroin addicts were
enticed into participating in LSD experiments in order to get a reward--heroin.
Perhaps most disturbing of all was the fact that the extent of experimentation
on human subjects was unknown. The records of all experimentation on human
subjects was unknown. The records of all these activities were destroyed in January
1973, at the instruction of then CIA Director Richard Helms. in spite of persistent
inquiries by both the Health Subcommittee and the Intelligence Committee, no
additional records or information were forthcoming. And no one--no single individual-
-could be found who remembered the details, not the director of the CIA, who
ordered the documents destroyed, not the official responsible for the program, or a y
of his associates.


We believed that the record, incomplete as it was, was as complete as it was
going to be. Then one individual, through a Freedom of Information request,
accomplished what two U.S. Senate committees could not. He spurred the agency
into finding additional records pertaining to the CIA'S program of experimentation with
human subjects. These new records were discovered by the agency in March. Their
existence was not made known to the Congress until July.


The records reveal a far more extensive series of experiments than had previously
been thought. Eighty-six universities or institutions were involved. New instances of
unethical were revealed. The intelligence community of this Nation, which requires a
shroud of secrecy in order to operate, has a very sacred trust from the American
people. The CIA's program of human experimentation of the fifties and sixties
violated that trust. It was violated again on the day the bulk of the agency's records
were destroyed in 1973. It is violated each time a responsible official refuses to
recollect the details of the program. The best safeguard against abuses in the future
is a completed public accounting of the abuses of the past.


I think this is illustrated, as Chairman Inouye pointed out. These are issues, are
questions that happened in the fifties and sixties, and go back some 15,20 years ago,
but they are front page news today, as we see in the major news papers and on the
television and in the media of this country; and the reason they are, I think, is
because it just continuously begins to trickle out, sort of, month after month, and the
best way to put this period behind us, obviously, is to have the full information, and I
think that is the desire of Admiral Turner and of the members of this committee.
The Central Intelligence Agency drugged American citizens without their
knowledge or consent. It used university facilities and personnel without their
knowledge. It funded leading researchers, often without their knowledge.


These institutes, these individuals, have a right to know who they are and how and
when they were used. As of today the Agency itself refuses to declassify the names
of those institutions and individuals, quite appropriately, I might say, with regard to
the individuals under the Privacy Act. It seems to me to be a fundamental
responsibility to notify those individuals or institutions, rather. I think many of them
were caught up in an unwitting manner to do research for the Agency. Many
researchers, distinguished researchers, some of our most outstanding members of
our scientific community, involved in this network, now really l do not know whether
they were involved or not, and it seems to me that the whole health and climate in
terms of our university and our scientific and health facilities are entitled to that
response.


So, I intend to do all I can to persuade the Agency to, at the very least, officially
inform those institutions and individuals involved.


Two years ago, when these abuses were first revealed, I introduced legislation,
with Senator Schweiker and Senator Javits, designed to minimize the potential for any
similar abuses in the future. That legislation expanded the jurisdiction of the National
Commission on Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research to cover all
federally funded research involving human subjects. The research initially was just
directed toward HEW activities, but this legislation covered DOD as well as the CIA.
This Nation has a biomedical and behavioral research capability second to none.
It has had for subjects of HEW funded research for the past 3 years a system for the
protection of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research second to none,
and the Human Experimentation Commission has proven its value. Today's hearings
and the record already established underscore the need to expand its jurisdiction.


The CIA supported that legislation in 1975, and it passed the Senate
unanimously last year. I believe it is needed in order to assure all our people that
they will have the degree of protection in human experimentation that they deserve
and have every right to expect.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Now we will proceed with the
hearings. Admiral Turner
[The prepared statement of Admiral Turner follows:]


PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL STANFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.


Mr. Chairman: In my letter to you of July 15, 1977, I reported our recent discovery of
seven boxes of documents related to Project MKULTRA, a closely held IA project
conducted from 1953-1964. As you may recall, MKULTRA was an "umbrellas project"
under which certain sensitive subprojects were funded, involving among other things
research on drugs and behavioral modification. During the Rockefeller Commission
and Church Committee investigations in 1975, the cryptonym became publicly known
when details of the drug-related death of Dr. Frank Olson were publicized. In 1953
Dr. Olson, a civilian employee of the Army at Fort Detrick, leaped to his death
from a hotel room window in New York City about a week after having unwittingly
consumed LSD administered to him as an experiment at a meeting of LSD
researchers called by CIA.


Most of what was known about the Agency's involvement with behavioral drugs
during the investigation in 1975 was contained in report on Project MKULTRA
prepared by the Inspector General's office in 1963. As a result of that report's
recommendations, unwitting testing of drugs on U.S. citizens was subsequently
discontinued. The MKULTRA-related report was made available to the Church
Committee investigators and to the staff of Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on
Health. Until the recent discovery, it was believed that all of the MKULTRA files
dealing with behavioral modification had been destroyed in 1973 on the orders of the
then retiring Chief of the Office of Technical Service, with the authorization of the then
DCI, as has been previously reported. Almost all of the people who had had any
connection with the aspects of the project which interested Senate investigations in
1975 were no longer with the Agency at that time. This, there was little detailed
knowledge of the MKULTRA sub-projects available to CIA during the Church
Committee investigations. This lack of available details, moreover, was probable not
wholly attributable to the destruction of MKULTRA files in 1973; the 1963 report on
MKULTRA by the Inspector General notes on page 14: "Present practice is to maintain
no records of the planning and approval of test programs."


When I reported to you last on this matter, my staff had not yet had an opportunity
to review the newly located material in depth. This has now been accomplished, and
i am in a position to give you a description of the contents of the recovered material.
I believe you will be most interested in the following aspects of the recent discovery:
How the material was discovered and why it was not previously found;
The nature of this recently located material;


How much new information there is in the material which may not have been
previously known and reported to Senate investigations; and
What we believe the most significant aspects of this had to be.


To begin, as to how we discovered these materials. The material had been sent to
our Retired Records Center outside of Washington and was discovered there as a
result of the extensive search efforts of an employee charged with responsibility for
maintaining our holdings??? on behavioral drugs and for responding to Freedom of
Information Act requests on this subject. During the Church Committee investigation
in 1975, searches for MKULTRA-related material were made by examining both the
active and retired records of all branches of CIA considered at all likely to have had
association with MKULTRA documents. The retired records of the Budget and Fiscal
Section of the Branch responsible for such work were not searched, however. This
was because financial papers associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA
were normally maintained by the Branch itself under the project file, not by the
Budget and Fiscal Section. In the case at hand, however, the newly located material
was sent to the Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal Section as
part of its won retired holdings. The reason for this departure from normal procedure
is not known. As a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval and
destruction in 1973 by the then-retiring Director of the Office as well as discovery in
1975 by CIA officials responding to Senate investigators.


The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned in his
efforts to respond to FOIA requests. He reviewed all listings of material of this Branch
stored at the Retired Records Center, including those of the Budget and Fiscal
Section and, this, discovered the MKULTRA-related documents which had been
missed in previous searches. In sum, the Agency failed to uncover these particular
documents in 1973 in the process of attempting to destroy them; it similarly failed to
locate them in 1975 in response to the Church Committee hearings. I am convinced
that there was no attempt to conceal this material during the earlier searches.


Next, as to the nature of the recently located material, it is important to realize that
the recovered folders are finance folders. The bulk of the material in them consists of
approvals for advance of funds, vouchers, accountings, and the like--most of which
are not very informative as to the nature of the activities that were undertaken.
Occasional project proposals or memoranda commenting on some aspect of a
subproject are scattered throughout this material. In general, however, the recovered
material does not include status reports or other documents relating to operational
considerations or progress in the various subprojects, though some elaboration of the
activities contemplated does appear. The recovered documents fall roughly into three
categories:


First, there are 149 MKULTRA subprojects, many of which appear to have
some connection with research into behavioral modification, drug acquisition and
testing or administering drugs surreptitiously.


Second, there are two boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers, including
audit reports and financial statements from "cut-out" (i.e. intermediary) funding
mechanisms used to conceal CIA's sponsorship of various research projects.
Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain intelligence
activities previously funded under MKULTRA which have nothing to do either with
behavioral modification, drugs, and toxins or with any other related matters.


We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects
into categories under descriptive headings. In broad outline, at least, this presents
the contents of these files. The activities are placed in the following 15 categories:


1. Research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol:


17 subprojects probably not involving tests on human volunteers;
14 subprojects definitely involving tests on human volunteers.
19 subprojects probably including tests on human volunteers. While not known,
some of these subprojects may have included tests on unwitting subjects as well.


6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting subjects.


2. Research on hypnosis: 8 subprojects, including 2 involving hypnosis and drugs in
combination.
3. Acquisition of chemicals or drugs: 7 subprojects.
4. Aspects of magicians' art useful in covert operations: e.g. surreptitious delivery of
dug-related materials: 4 subprojects.
5. Studies of human behavior, sleep research, and behavioral changes during
psychotherapy: 9 subprojects.
6. Library searches and attendance at seminars and international conferences on
behavioral modification: 6 subprojects.


7. Motivational studies, studies of defectors, assessment, and training techniques:


23 subprojects.


8. Polygraph research: 3 subprojects.
9. Funding mechanisms for MKULTRA external research activities: 3 subprojects.
10. Research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals in human tissue: provision of exotic
pathogens and the capability to incorporate them in effective delivery systems: 6
subprojects.


11. Activities whose objectives cannot be determined from available documentation:


3 subprojects.


12. Subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities connected with
the Army's Special Operations Division at Ft. Detrick, Md. This activity is outlined in
Book I of the Church Committee Report, pp. 388-389. (See Appendix A. pp. 68-69.
Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI, the Army Assisted CIA in developing, testing, and
maintaining biological agents and delivery systems for use against humans as well as
against animals and crops. The objectives of these subprojects cannot be identified
from the recovered material beyond the fact that the money was to be used where
normal funding channels would require more written or oral justification than
appeared desirable for security reasons or where operational considerations dictated
short lead times for purchases. About $11,000 was involved during this period 1953-
1960: 3 subprojects.


13. Single subprojects in such areas as effects of electro-shock, harassment
techniques for offensive use, analysis of extrasensory perception, gas propelled
sprays and aerosols, and four subprojects involving crop and material sabotage.
14. One or two subprojects on each of the following:


"Blood Grouping" research, controlling the activity of animals, energy storage
and transfer in organic systems; and
stimulae and response in biological systems.


15. Three subprojects cancelled before any work was done on them having to do
with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and research on
biologically active materials to be tested through the skin on human volunteers.
Now, as to how much new the recovered material adds to what has previously
been reported to the Church Committee and to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on
Health on these topics, the answer is additional detail, for the most part: e.g., the
names of previously unidentified researchers and institutions associated on either a
witting or unwitting basis with MKULTRA activities, and the names of CIA officials who
approved or monitored the various subprojects. Some new substantive material is
also present: e.g., details concerning proposals for experimentation and clinical
testing associated with various research projects, and a possibly improper
contribution by CIA to a private institution. However, the principal types of activities
included have, for the most part, wither been outlined to some extent or generally
described in what was previously available to CIA in the way of documentation and
was supplied by CIA to Senate investigators.


For example:


Financial disbursement records for the period 1960-1964 for 76 of the 149
numbered MKULTRA subprojects had been recovered from the Office of Finance by
CIA and were made available to the Church Committee investigators in August or
September 1975.


The 1963 Inspector General report on MKULTRA made available to both the
Church Committee and Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee mentions electro-shock
and harassment substances (pp. 4, 16); covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens (pp.
7, 10-12); the search for new materials through arrangements with specialists in
universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and
private research organizations (pp. 7, 9); and the fact that the Technical Service
Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control of human behavior
between 1953-1963 (p.21).


The relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service
Division was also made available to the Church Committee staff. That report
discusses techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of
communication (p. 201); discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly
administered (pp 201-202); studies on magicians' arts as applied to covert operations
(p. 202); specific funding mechanisms for research performed outside of CIA (pp.
202-203,205); research being done on "K" (knockout) material, alcohol tolerance, and
hypnotism (p. 203); research on LSD (p. 204); anti-personnel harassment and
assassination delivery systems including aerosol generators and other spray devices
(pp. 206-208); the role of Fort Detrick in support of CIA's Biological/Chemical Warfare
capability (p. 208); and material sabotage research (p. 209). Much of this material is
reflected in the Church Committee Report, Book I, pp. 383-422. (See Appendix A, pp.
65-102).


The most significant new data discovered are, first, the names of researchers and
institutions who participated in the MKULTRA project and, secondly, a possibly
improper contribution by CIA to a private institution. We are now in possession of the
names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants who are identified in there
covered material dealing with the 149 subprojects. The names of 80 institutions
where work was done or with which these people were affiliated are also mentioned.


The institutions include 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or
chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics (in
addition to those associated with universities), and 3 penal institutions. While the
identities of some of these people and institutions were known previously, the
discovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.


The facts as they pertain to the possible improper contribution are as follows: One
project involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private medical
institution. The fact that a contribution was made was previously known; indeed it
was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division
of CIA, pertinent portions os which had been reviewed by the Church Committee staff.
The newly discovered material, however, makes it clear that this contribution was
made through an intermediary, which made it appear to be a private donation. As a
private donation, the contribution was then matched by federal funds. The institution
was not made aware of the true source of the gift. This project was approved by the
then DCI, and concurred in by CIA's top management at the time, including the then
General Counsel who wrote an opinion supporting the legality of the contribution.


The recently discovered documents give a greater insight into the scope of the
unwitting drug testing but contribute little more than that. We now have collaborating
information that some of the unwitting drug testing was carried on in safe-houses in
San Francisco and New York City, and we have identified that three individuals were
involved in this undertaking as opposed to the previously reported one person. We
also know now that some unwitting testing took place on criminal sexual psychopaths
confined at a State hospital and that, additionally, research was done on a knock-out
or "K" drug in parallel with research to develop pain killers for cancer patients.
These, then are the principal findings identified to date in our review of the
recovered material. As noted earlier, we believe the detail on the identities of
researchers and institutions involved in CIA's sponsorship of drugs and behavioral
modification is a new element and one which poses a considerable problem. Most of
the people and institutions involved are not aware of Agency sponsorship. We should
certainly assume that the researchers and institutions which cooperated with CIA on a
witting basis acted in good faith and in the belief that they were aiding their
government in a legitimate and proper purpose. I believe we all have a moral
obligation to these researchers and institutions to protect them from any unjustified
embarrassment or damage to their reputations which revelation of their identities
might bring. In addition, I have a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly
disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent. This is
especially true, of course, for those researchers and institutions which were unwitting
participants in CIA-sponsored activities.


Nevertheless, recognizing the right and the need of both the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Subcommittee on Health to investigate the
circumstance of these activities in whatever detail they consider necessary. I am
providing our Committee with al of the names on a classified basis. I hope that this
will facilitate your investigation while protecting the individuals and institutions
involved. Let me emphasize that the MKULTRA events are 12 to 25 years in past. I
assure you that the CIA is in no way engaged in either witting or unwitting testing of
drugs today.


Finally, I am working closely with the Attorney General and with the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare on this matter. We are making available to the
Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary to any investigation he
may choose to undertake. We are working with both the Attorney General and
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to determine whether it is practicable from
this new evidence to attempt to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have
been administered unwittingly. No such names are part of these records, but we are
working to determine if there are adequate clues to lead to their identification; and if
so, how to go about fulfilling to Governments's responsibilities in the matter.


TESTIMONY OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK LAUBINGER, OFFICE OF TECHNICAL
SERVICES; AL BRODY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL; ERNEST MAYERFIELD,
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL; AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL


Admiral TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by thanking you
and Senator Kennedy for having a joint hearing this morning. I hope this will expedite
and facilitate our getting all the information that both of your committees need to the
record quickly.


I would like also to thank you both for prefacing the remarks today by reminding
us all that the events about which we are here to talk are 12- to 24--years-old. They
in now way represent the current activities or policies of the Central Intelligence
Agency.


What we are here to do is to give you all the information that we now have and
which e did not previously have on a subject known as Project MKULTRA, a project
which took place from 1953 to 1964. It was an umbrella project under which there
were numerous subprojects for research, among other things, on drugs and
behavioral modification. What the new material that we offer today is a supplement to
the considerable material that was made available in 1975, during the Church
Committee hearings, and also to the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific
Research.


At that time, the CIA offered up all of the information and documents it believed it
had available. The principal one available at that time that gave the greatest amount
of information on this subject was a report of the CIA's Inspector General written in
1963, and which led directly to the termination of this activity in 1964, 13 years ago.


The information available in 1973, as detailed by Senator Kennedy a minute ago,
with the concurrence of the then Director of Central Intelligence and under the
supervision of the Director of the Office of Technical Services that supervised Project
MKULTRA.


The material in 1975 was also sparse because most of the CIA people who had
been involved in 1953 to 1964 in this activity had retired from the Agency. I would
further add that I think the material was sparse in part because it was the practice at
that time not to keep detailed records in this category.


For instance, the 1963 report of the Inspector General notes:


Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test
programs.


In brief, there were few records to begin with and less after the destruction of
1973.


What I would like to do now, though, is to proceed and let you know what the new
material adds to our knowledge of this topic, and I will start by describing how the
material was discovered and why it was not previously discovered. The material in
question, some seven boxes, had been sent to our Retired Records Center outside of
the Washington area. It was discovered there as the result of an extensive search by
an employee charged with the responsibility for maintaining our holdings on
behavioral drugs and for responding to Freedom of Information Act requests on this
subject.


During the Church Committee investigation of 1975, searches for MKULTRA-related
material were made by examining both the active and the retired records of all of the
branches of CIA considered likely to have had an association with MKULTRA
documents. The retired records of the Budget and Fiscal Section of the branch that
was responsible for such work were not searched, however. This was because the
financial paper associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA were normally
maintained by the branch itself under the project title, MKULTRA, not by the Budget
and Fiscal Section under a special budget file.


In the case at hand, however, this newly located material had been sent to the
Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal Section of this branch as
part of its own retired holdings. In short, what should have been filed by the branch
itself was filed by the Budget and Fiscal Section, and what should have been filed
under the project title, MKULTRA, was filed under budget and fiscal matters. The
reason for this departure from the normal procedure of that time is simply not known,
and as a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval and destruction in 1973,
as well as discovery in 1975.


The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned in his
efforts to respond to a Freedom of Information Act request, or several of them, in fact.
He reviewed all of the listings of material of this branch, stored at the Retired Records
Center, including those of the Budget and Fiscal Section, and thus discovered the
MKULTRA-related documents, which had been missed in the previous searches.
In sum, the agency failed to uncover these particular documents in 1973, in the
process of attempting to destroy them. It similarly failed to locate them in 1975, in
response to the Church Committee hearings. I am personally persuaded that there is
no evidence of any attempt to conceal this material during the earlier searches.


Moreover, as we will discuss as we proceed, I do not believe the material itself is
such that there would be a motive on the part of the CIA to withhold this, having
disclosed what it did in 1975.


Next, let me move to the nature of this recently located material. It is important to
remember what I have just noted, that these folders that were discovered are finance
folders. The bulk of he material them consists of approvals for the advance of funds,
vouchers, and accountings and such, most of which are not very informative as to the
nature of he activities that they were supporting. Occasional project proposals or
memoranda commenting on some aspect of a subproject are scattered throughout
this material. In general, however, the recovered material does not include overall
status reports or other documents relating to operational consideration, or to the
progress on various subprojects, though some elaboration of the activities
contemplated does appear from time to time.


There are roughly three categories of projects. First there are 149 MKULTRA
subprojects, many of which appear to have some connection with research into
behavioral modification, drug acquisition and testing, or administering drugs
surreptitiously. Second, there are two boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers,
including audit reports and financial statements from intermediary funding
mechanisms used to conceal CIA sponsorship of various research projects.


Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain intelligence activities
previously funded under MKULTRA but which have nothing to do either with
behavioral modifications, drugs and toxins, or any closely related matter.


We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects into
categories under descriptive headings. In broad outline, at least, this presents the
contents of these files. The following 15 categories are the ones we have divided
these into.


First, research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol. Within this,
there are 17 projects probably not involving human testing. There are 14 subprojects
definitely involving testing on human volunteers. There are 19 subprojects probably
including tests on human volunteers and 6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting
human beings.


Second, there is research on hypnosis, eight subprojects, including two involving
hypnosis and drugs in combination.


Third, there are seven projects on the acquisition of chemicals or drugs.
Fourth, four subprojects on the aspects of the magician's art, useful in covert
operations, for instance, the surreptitious delivery of drug-related materials.
Fifth, there are nine projects on studies of human behavior, sleep research, and
behavioral change during psychotherapy.


Sixth, there are projects on library searches and attendants at seminars and
international conferences on behavioral modifications.


Seventh there are 23 projects on motivational studies, studies of defectors,
assessments of behavior and training techniques.


Eighth, there are three subprojects on polygraph research.
Ninth, there are three subprojects on funding mechanisms for MKULTRA's external
research activities.


Tenth there are six subprojects on research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals n
human tissue, provision of exotic pathogens, and the capability to incorporate them in
effective delivery systems.


Eleventh, there are three subprojects on activities whose nature simply cannot be
determined.


Twelfth, there are subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities
conducted with the Army Special Operations Division at Fort Detrich, Md. This activity
is outlined in Book I of the Church Committee report, pagers 388 to 389. (See
Appendix A, pp. 68-69).


Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI, the Army assisted the IA in developing, testing,
and maintaining biological agents and delivery systems for use against humans as
well as against animals and crops.


Thirteenth, there are single subprojects in such areas as the effects of
electroshock, harassment techniques for offensive use, analysis of extrasensory
perception, gas propelled sprays and aerosols, and four subprojects involving crop
and material sabotage.


Fourteenth, one or two subprojects on each of the following: blood grouping
research; controlling the activities of animals; energy storage and transfer in organic
systems; and stimulus and response in biological systems.


Finally , 15th, there are three subprojects cancelled before any work was done on
them having to do with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and
research on biologically active materials.


Now, let me address how much this newly discovered material adds to what had
previously been reported to the Church Committee and to Senator Kennedy's
Subcommittee on Health. The answer is basically additional detail. The principal
types of activities included in these documents have for the most part been outlined
or to some extent generally described in what was previously available in the way of
documentation and which was supplied by the CIA to the Senate investigators.


For example, financial disbursement records for the period of 1960 to 1964 for 76
of these 149 subprojects had been recovered by the Office of Finance at CIA and
were made available to the Church Committee investigators. For example, the 1963
Inspector General report on MKULTRA made available to both the Church Committee
and the Subcommittee on Health mentions electroshock and harassment substances,
covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens, the search for new material through
arrangements with specialist in hospitals and universities, and the fact that the
Technical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control
of human behavior.


For instance also, the relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General report was also
made available to the Church Committee staff, and that report discusses the
techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of communication,
discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly administered, studies on
magicians' arts as applied to covert operations, and other similar topics.


The most significant new data that has been discovered are, first, the names of
researchers and institutions who participated in MKULTRA projects, and second,
a possibly improper contribution by the CIA to a private institution.


We are now in the possession of the names of 185 nongovernment
researchers and assistants who are identified in the recovered material dealing with
these 149 subprojects.


There are also names of 80 institutions where work was done or with which these
people were affiliated. The institutions include 44 colleges or universities, 15 research
foundation or chemical or pharmaceutical companies or the like, 12 hospitals or
clinics, in addition to those associated with the universities, and 3 penal institutions.


While the identities of some of these people and institutions were known
previously, the discovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.


The facts as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are as follows. One
project involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private medical
institution. The fact that that contribution was made was previously known. Indeed, it
was mentioned in the 1957 report of the Inspector General on the Technical Service
Division of CIA that supervised MKULTRA, and pertinent portions of this had been
reviewed by the Church Committee staff.


The newly discovered material, however, makes it clear that this contribution was
made through an intermediary, which made it appear to be a private donation. As a
private donation, the contribution was then matched by Federal funds. The institution
was not made aware of the true source of the gift. This project was approved by the
then Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by CIA's top management
including the then General Counsel, who wrote an opinion supporting the legality of
the contribution. The recently discovered documents also give greater insight into the
scope of the unwitting drug testing was carried out in what is known in the
intelligence trade as safe houses in San Francisco and in New York City, and we have
identified that three individuals were involved in this undertaking, whereas we
previously reported there was only one person.


We also know now that some unwitting testing took place on criminal sexual
psychopaths confined at a State hospital, and that additionally research was done on
a knockout or K drug in parallel with research to develop painkillers for cancer
patients.


These, then, are the principal findings identified to date in our review of this
recovered material. As noted earlier, we believe the detail on the identities of
researchers and institutions involved in CIA sponsorship of drug and behavioral
modification research is a new element and one which poses a considerable problem.
Most of the people and institutions involved were not aware of CIA sponsorship. We
should certainly assume that the researchers and institutions which cooperated with
CIA on a witting basis acted in good faith and in the belief that they were aiding their
Government in a legitimate and proper purpose.


I believe that we all have a moral obligation to these researchers and institutions to
protect them from any unjustified embarrassmentor damage to their reputations which
revelation of their identities might bring.


In addition, I have a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the
names of the individual researchers without their consent.


This is especially true, of course, for those researchers, and institutions which were
unwitting participants in CIA sponsored activities.


Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I certainly recognize the right and the need of both the
Senate Select Committee on intelligence and the Senate Subcommittee on health and
Scientific Research to investigate the circumstances of these activities in whatever
detail you consider necessary. I am providing your committee with all of the
documentation, including all of the names, on a classified basis. I hope that this will
facilitate your investigation while still protecting the individuals and the institutions
involved.


Let me emphasize again that the MKULTRA events are 12 to 24 years in the past,
and I assure you that CIA is in no way engaged in either witting or unwitting testing of
drugs today.


Finally, I am working closely with the Attorney General on this matter. We are
making available to the Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary
to any investigation that he may elect to undertake. Beyond that, we are also working
with the Attorney General to determine whether it is practicable from this new
evidence to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have been administered
unwittingly. No such names are part of these records. We have not identified the
individuals to whom drugs were administered, but we are trying now to determine if
there are adequate clues to lead to their identification, and if so how best to go abut
fulfilling the Government's responsibilities n this matter.


Mr. Chairman, as we proceed with that process of attempting to identify the
individuals and then determining what is our proper responsibility to them, I will keep
both of these committees fully advised. I thank you, sir.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much, Admiral Turner. Your spirit of
cooperation is much appreciated. I would like to announce to the committee that in
order to give every member an opportunity to participate in this hearing, that we
would set a time limit of 10 minutes per Senator.


Admiral Turner, please give this committee the genesis of MKULTRA. Who or what
committee or commission or agency was responsible or dreaming up this grandiose
and sinister project, and why was it necessary! What is t rationale or justification for
such a project and was the President of the United states aware of this!


Admiral TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask Mr. Brody on my right, who is
a long-time member of the CIA to address that in more detail. I believe everything
that we know about the genesis was turned over to the Church Committee and is
contained in that material. Basically, it was a CIA-initiated project. it started out of a
concern of our being taken advantage of by other powers who would use drugs
against our personnel, and it was approved in the Agency. I have asked the question
you just asked me and have been assured that there is no evidence within the
Agency of any involvement at higher echelons, the White House, for instance, or
specific approval. That does not say there was not, but we have no such evidence.
Mr. Brody, would you amplify on my comments there, please!


Mr. BRODY. Mr. Chairman, I really have very little to add to that. To my
knowledge, there was no Presidential knowledge of this projects at the time. it was a
CIA project, and as the admiral said, it was a project designed to attempt to
counteract what was then thought to be a serious threat by our enemies of using
drugs against us. Most of what else we know about it is in the Senate Church
Committee report.


Senator INOUYE. Were the authorized members of the Congress made aware of
this project through the budgetary process!


Mr. BRODY. We have no knowledge of that, sir.


Senator INOUYE. Are you suggesting that it was intentionally kept away from the
Congress and the President of the United States!


Admiral TURNER. No, sir. We are only saying that we have no evidence one way
or the other as to whether the Congress was informed of this particular project. There
are no records to indicate.


Senator INOUYE. Admiral Turner, are you personally satisfied by actual
investigation that this newly discovered information was not intentionally kept away
form the Senate of the United States!


Admiral TURNER. I have no way to prove that, sir. That is my conviction fro
everything I have seen of it.


Senator INOUYE. Now, we have been advised that these documents ere initially
discovered in March of this year, and you were notified in July of this year, or June of
this year, and the committee was notified in July. Can you tell us why the Director of
Central Intelligence was notified 3 months after its initial discovery, why the delay!


Admiral TURNER. yes, sir. All this started with several Freedom of Information Act
requests, and Mr. Laubinger on my left was the individual who took it upon himself to
pursue these requests with great diligence, and got permission to go to the Retired
Records Center, and then made the decision to look not only under that would be the
expected subject files, but through every file with which the branch that conducted
this type of activity had any conceivable connection.


Very late in March, he discovered these seven boxes. he arranged to have them
shipped from the Retired Records Center to Washington, to our headquarters. They
varied in early April. He advised his appropriate superiors, who asked him how long
he thought it would take would take him to go through these and screen them
appropriately, clear them for Freedom of Information Act release.


The are, we originally estimated, 5,000 pages here. We now think that was an
underestimation, and it may be closer to 8,000 pages. He estimated it would take
about 45 days or into the middle of May to do that. He was told to proceed, and as
he did so there was nothing uncovered in the beginning of these 149 cases that
appeared particularly startling or particularly additive to the knowledge that had
already been given to the Church Committee, some details, but no major revelations.


He and his associates proceeded with deliberateness, but not a great sense of
urgency. There were other interfering activities that came and demanded his time
also. He was not able to put 100 percent of his time on it and there did not appear to
be cause for a great rush here. We were trying to be responsive to the Freedom of
Information Act request within the limits of our manpower and our priorities.


In early June, however, he discovered two projects, the one related to K drugs and
the one related to the funding at the institution, and realized immediately that he had
substantial new information, and he immediately reported this to his superiors.


Two actions were taken. One was to notify the lawyers of the principal Freedom of
Information Act requestor that we would have substantial new material and that it
would be forthcoming as rapidly as possible, and the second was to start a
memorandum up the chain that indicated his belief that we should notify the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence of this discovery because of the character at least of
these two documents.


As that proceeded up from the 13th of June, at each echelon we had to go
through the legal office, the legislative liaison office and at each echelon about the
same question was asked of him: Have you gone through all of this, so that when we
notify the Senate Select Committee we do not notify half of the important revelations
and not the other half? The last thing I want, Mr. Chairman, is in any way to be on
any topic, give the appearance on any topic of being recalcitrant, reluctant, or having
to have you drag things out of me, and my subordinates, much to my pleasure, had
each asked, have you really gone through these 8,000 pages enough to know that we
are not going to uncover a bombshell down at the bottom?


By late June, about the 28th, this process reached my deputy. He notified me
after his review of it on the 7th of July, which is the first I knew of it. I began reading
into it. I asked the same probing question directly. I then notified my superiors, and
on the 15th delivered to you my letter letting you know that we had this, and we have
been working, many people, many hours since then to be sure that what we are
telling you today does include all the relevant material.


Senator INOUYE. I would like to commend Mr. Laubinger of his diligence and
expertise, abut was this diligence the result of the Freedom of Information Act or
could this diligence have been exercised during the Church hearings? Why was it not
exercised?


Admiral TURNER. There is no question that theoretically this diligence could have
been exercised at any time, and it may well be that the Freedom of Information Act
has made us more aware of this. Would you speak for yourself, please.


Mr. LAUBINGER. I really don't attribute it, Senator, to diligence os much as
thoroughness. If you can imagine the pressures under an organization trying to
respond, which I think the CIA did at the time of the Church Committee hearings, the
hallways of the floor I am on were full of boxes from our records center. Every box
that anyone thought could possibly contain anything was called up for search. It was
one of a frantic effort to comply.


When the pressure to that situation cools down, and you can start looking at
things systematically, you are apt to find things that you wouldn't under the heat of a
crash program, and that is what happened here.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Senator Kennedy?


Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Turner, this is an enormously distressing report that
you give to the American Congress and to the American people today. Granted, it
happened may years ago, but what we are basically talking about is an activity which
took place in the country that involved the perversion and the corruption of many of
our outstanding research centers in this country, with CIA funds, where some of our
top researchers were unwittingly involved in research sponsored by the Agency in
which they had no knowledge of the background or the support for.


Much of it was done with American citizens who were completely unknowing in
terms of taking various drugs, and there are perhaps any number of Americans who
are walking around today on the east coast or west coast who were given drugs, with
all the kinds of physical and psychological damage that can be caused. We have
gone over that in very careful detail, and it is significant and sever indeed.


I do not know what could be done in a less democratic country that would be
more alien to our own traditions than was really done in this narrow area, and as you
give this report to the committee, I would like to get some sense of your own concern
about this type of activity, and how you react, having assumed this important
responsibility with the confidence of President Carter and the overwhelming support,
obviously, of the Congress, under this set of circumstances.


I did not get much of a feeing in reviewing your statement here this morning of the
kind of abhorrence to this type of past activity which I think the American people
would certainly deplore and which I believe that you do, but could you comment
upon that question, and also perhaps give us what ideas you have to insure that it
cannot happen again?


Admiral TURNER. Senator Kennedy, it is totally abhorrent to me to think of using a
human n being as a guinea pig and in any way jeopardizing his life and his health no
matter how great the cause. I am not here to pass judgment on my predecessors,
but I can assure you that this is totally beyond the pale of my contemplation of
activities that the CIA or any other of our intelligence agencies should undertake.
I am taking and have taken what I believe are adequate steps to insure that such
things are not continuing today.


Senator KENNEDY. Could you tell us a little bit about that?


Admiral TURNER. I have asked for a special report assuring me that there are no
drug activities extant, that is, drug activities that involve experimentation. Obviously,
we collect intelligence about drugs and drug use in other countries, but these are no
experimentations being conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, and I have had
a special check made because of another incident that was uncovered some years
ago about the unauthorized retention of some toxic materials at the CIA. I have had
an actual inspection made of the storage places and the certification from the people
in charge of those that there are no such chemical biological materials present n our
keeping, and I have issued express orders that that shall not be the case.


Beyond that, I have to rely in large measure on my sense of command and
direction of the people and their knowledge of the attitude I have just expressed to
you in this regard.


Senator KENNEDY. I think that is very commendable.


Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. I think that is important that the American people understand
that You know, much of the research which is our area of interest that was being done
by the Agency and the whole involved sequence of activities done by the Agency, I
am convinced could have been done in a legitimate way through the research
programs of the National Institutes of Mental Health other sponsored activities. I
mean, that is some other question, but I think you went to an awful lot of trouble,
where these things could have been.


Let me ask you specifically, on the follow-up of MKULTRA, are there now--I think
you have answered, but I want to get a complete answer about any experimentations
that are being done on human beings, whether it is drugs or behavioral alterations or
patterns or any support, either directly or indirectly, being provided by the Agency in
terms of any experimentation on human beings.


Admiral TURNER. There is no experimentation with drugs on human beings,
witting or unwitting, being conducted in any way.


Senator KENNEDY. All right. Or being supported indirectly? I mean, are you
contracted out?


Admiral TURNER. Or being in any way supported.


Senator KENNEDY. All right. How about the nondrug experimentation our
Committee has seen--psychosurgery, for example, or psychological research?


Admiral TURNER. We are continually involved in what we call assessment of
behavior. For instance, we are trying to continually improve our polygraph
procedures to, you know, assess whether a person is lying or not. This does not
involve any tampering with the individual body. This involves studying records of
people's behavior under different circumstances, and so on, but it is not an
experimental thing. Have I described that accurately, Al?
Mr. BRODY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, it is limited to those areas?
Admiral TURNER. Yes; it does not involve attempting to modify behavior. I only
involves studying behavior conditions, but not trying to actively modify it, as was one
of the objectives of MKULTRA.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, we are scarce on time, but I am interested in the other
areas besides polygraph where you are doing it. Maybe you can either respond now
or submit it for the record, if you would do that. Would you provide that for the
record?


Admiral TURNER. Yes.


[The material on psychological assessments follows:]


Psychological assessments are performed as a service to officers in the operations
directorate who recruit and/or handle agents. Except for people involved in training
courses, the subjects of the assessments are foreign nationals. The assessments are
generally done to determine the most successful tactic to persuade the subject to
accept covert employment by the CIA, and to make an appraisal of his reliability and
truthfulness.


A majority of the work is done by a staff of trained psychologists, some of whom
are stationed overseas. The assessments they do may be either direct or indirect.
Direct assessments involve a personal interview of the subject by the psychologist.
When possible the subject is asked to complete a formal "intelligence test" which is
actually a disguised psychological test. Individuals being assessed are not given
drugs, now are they subjected to physical harassment or torture. When operating
conditions are such that a face-to-face interview in not possible, the psychologist may
do an indirect assessment, using as source materials descriptions of the subject by
others, interviews with people who know him, specimens of his writings, etc.


The other psychological assessments involve handwriting analysis or graphological
assessment. The work is done by a pair of trained graphologists, assisted by a small
number of measurement technicians. They generally require at least a page of
handwritten script by the subject. Measurements are made of about 30 different
writing characteristics, and these are charted and furnished to the graphologist for
assessments.


The psychologists also give courses in psychological assessment to group of
operations officers, to sharpen their own capabilities to size up people. As part of the
training course, the instructor does a psychological assessment of each student. The
students are witting participants, and results are discussed with them.


It is important to reiterate that psychological assessments are only a service to the
operations officers. In the final analysis, it is the responsibility of the operations officer
to decide how a potential agent should be approached, or to make a judgement as to
whether any agent is telling the truth.


Admiral TURNER. The kind of thing we are interested in is, what will motivate a
man to become an agent of the United States in a difficult situation. We have to be
familiar with that kind of attitudinal response that we can expect from people we
approach to for one reason or another become our spies, but I will be happy to
submit a very specific listing of these.


Senator KENNEDY. Would you do that for the Committee?


In the follow-ups, in the MKSEARCH, in the OFTEN, and the CHICKWIT, could you
give us also a report on those particular programs?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Did they involve experimentation, human experimentation?


Admiral TURNER. No, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. None of them?


Admiral TURNER. Let me say this that CHICKWIT program is the code name for
the CIA participation in what was basically a Department of Defense program. This
program was summarized and reported to the Church Committee, to the Congress,
and I have since they have been rementioned in the press in the last 2 days here, I
have not had time to go through and personally review then. I have ascertained that
al of the files that we had and made available before are intact, and I have put a
special order out that nobody will enter those files or in any way touch then without
my permission at this point, but they are in the Retired Records Center outside of
Washington and they are available.


I am not prepared to give you full details on it, because I simply haven't read into
that part of our history, but in addition I would suggest when we want to get into that
we should get the Department of Defense in with us.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, you will supply that information to the Intelligence
Committee, the relevant, I mean, the health aspects, obviously, and the research we
are interested in?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Will you let us know, Admiral Turner?


Admiral TURNER. I will he happy to.


[See p. 169 for the material referred to.]


Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. I am running out of time. Do you support the
extension of the protection of human subjects legislation to include the CIA and
DOD? You commented favorably on that 19 before, and I am hopeful we can get that
on the calendar early in December, and that is our strong interest.


Admiral TURNER. The CIA certainly has no objection to that proposed legislation,
sir. It is not my role in the administration to be the supporter of it or the endorser of
it.


Senator, KENNEDY. As a persona matter, since you have reviewed these
subjects, would you comment? I know it is maybe unusual, but you can understand
what we are attempting to do.


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. From your own experience in the agency, you can understand
the value of it.


Just finally, in your own testimony now with this additional information, it seems
quite apparent to me that you can reconstruct in very careful detail this whole project
in terms of the responsible CIA officials for the program. You have so indicated in
your testimony. Now with the additional information, and the people, that have been
revealed in the examination of the documents, it seems to pretty clear that you can
track that whole program in very careful detail, and I would hope, you know, that you
would want to get to the bottom of it, a the Congress does as well. I will come back
to that in my next round. Thank you very much.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Goldwater?


Senator GOLDWATER. I have no questions.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Schweiker?


Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Admiral Turner, I would like to go back to your testimony on page 12, where you
discuss the contribution to the building fund of a private medical institution. You
state, "Indeed, it was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical
Service Division of CIA, pertinent portions of which has been reviewed by the Church
Committee staff." I would like to have you consider this question very carefully. I
served as a member of the original Church Committee. My staffer did a lot of the
work that you are referring to here. He made notes on the IG's report. My question
to you is, are you saying that the section that specifically delineates an improper
contribution was in fact given to the Church Committee staff to see?


Admiral TURNER. The answer to your question is "Yes." The information that a
contribution had been made was made available, to the best of my knowledge.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Only certain sections of the report were made available.
The report had to be reviewed out at Langley; it was not reviewed here and copies
were not given to us here. I just want you to carefully consider what you are saying,
because the only record we have are the notes that the staff took on anything that
was of significance.


Admiral TURNER. My understanding was that Mr. Maxwell was shown the relevant
portion of this report that disclosed that the contribution had been made.


Senator SCHWEIKER. To follow this up further, I'd like to say that I think there was
a serious flaw in the way that the IG report was handled and the Church Committee
was limited. I am not making any accusations, but because of limited access to the
report, we have a situation where it is not even clear whether we actually saw that material
or not, simply because we could not keep a copy of the report under the procedures we had to
follow. We were limited by note-taking, and so it is rather ambiguous as to just what
was seen and what was not seen. I certainly hope that the new Intelligence
Committee will not be bound by procedures that so restrict its ability to exercise
effective oversight.


I have a second question. Does it concern you, Admiral, that we used a
subterfuge which resulted in the use of Federal construction grant funds to finance
facilities for these sorts of experiments on our own people? Because as I understand
what you are saying, while the CIA maybe only put up $375,000, this triggered a
response on the part of the Federal Government to provide on a good faith basis
matching hospital funds at the same level. We put up more than $1 million of
matching funds, some based on an allegedly private donation which was really CIA
money.


Isn't there something basically wrong with that?


Admiral TURNER. I certainly believe there is. As I stated, the General Counsel of
the CIA at that time rendered a legal opinion that this was a legal opinion that this
was a legal undertaking, and again I am hesitant to go back and revisit the
atmosphere, the laws, the attitudes at that time, so whether the counsel was on good
legal ground or not, I am not enough of a lawyer to be sure, but it certainly would
occur to me if it happened to day as a very questionable activity.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I think those of us who worked on and amended the
Hill-Burton Act and other hospital construction assistance laws over the years, would
have a rather different opinion on the legal intent or object of Congress in passing
laws to provide hospital construction project money. These funds weren't intended
for this.


It reminds me a little bit of the shellfish toxin situation which turned up when I was
on the Church Committee. The Public Health Service was used to produce a deadly
poison with Public Health money. Here are using general hospital construction
money to carry on a series of drug experiments.


Admiral TURNER. Excuse me, sir. If I could just be, I think, accurate, I don't think
any of this $375,000 or the matching funds were used to conduct drug experiments.
They were used to build the hospital. Now, the CIA then put more money into a
foundation that was conducting research on the CIA's behalf supposedly in that
hospital, so the intent was certainly there, but the money was not used for
experimentation.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I understand it was used for bricks and mortar, but
the bricks were used to build the facility where the experiments were carried on; were
they not?


Admiral TURNER. We do not have positive evidence that they were. It certainly
would seem that that was the intent, but I do not want to draw inferences here----


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, why else would they give this money for the building
fund if the building was not used for a purpose that benefited the CIA program?
Admiral TURNER. I certainly draw the inference that the CIA expected to benefit
from it, and some of the wording says the General Counsel's opinion was that this was
legal only if the CIA was going to derive adequate benefit from it, but, sir, there is no
evidence of what benefit was derived.


Senator SCHWEIKER. There must have been some pretty good benefits at stake.
The Atomic Energy Commission was to bear a share of the cost, and when they
backed out for some reason or another, the CIA picked up part of their tab. So, at
two different points there were indications that CIA decision makers thought was great
benefit to be derived from whatever happened within the brick and mortar walls of
that facility.


Admiral TURNER. You are absolutely right. I am only taking the position that I
cannot substantiate that there was benefit derived.


Senator SCHWEIKER. The agreement documents say that the CIA would have
access to one-sixth of the space involved in the construction of the wing, so how
would you enter into an agreement that specifically says that you will have access to
and use of one-sixth of the space and not perform something in that space? I cannot
believe it was empty.


Admiral TURNER. Sir I am not disputing you at all, but both of us are saying that
the inference is that one-sixth of the space was used, that experimentation was done,
and so on, but there is no factual evidence of what went on as a result of that
payment or what went on in that hospital. It is just missing. It is not that it didn't
happen.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Admiral Turner, one other----


Senator KENNEDY. Would the Senator yield on that point?


Senator SCHWEIKER. I understand that in the agency's documents on the
agreement it was explicitly stated that one-sixth of the facility would be designated for
CIA use and made available for CIA research. Are you familiar---


Mr. BRODY. Senator, as I recall, you are right in that there is a mention of one-
sixth, but any mention at all has to do with planning. There are no subsequent
reports as to what happened after the construction took place.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Admiral Turner, I read in the New York Times that part of
this series of MKULTRA experiments involved an arrangement with the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics to test LSD surreptitiously on unwitting patrons in bars in New York and
San Francisco. Some of the subjects became violently ill and were hospitalized. I
wonder if you would just briefly describe what we were doing there and how it was
carried out? I assume it was through a safe house operation. I don't believe your
statement went into much detail.


Admiral TURNER. I did mention the safe house operation in my statement, sir, and
that is how these were carried out. What we have learned from the new
documentation is the location and the dates at which the safe houses were run by the
CIA and the identification of three individuals who were associated with running those
safe houses. We know something about the construction work that was done in them
because there were contracts for this. Beyond that, we are pretty much drawing
inferences as to the things that went on as to what you are saying here.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, the subjects were unwitting. You can infer that much,
right?


Admiral TURNER. Right.


Senator SCHWEIKER. If you happened to be at the wrong bar at the wrong place
and time, you got it.


Mr. BRODY. Senator, that would be--contacts were made, as we understand it, in
bars, it cetera, and then the people may have been invited to these safe houses.
There really isn't any indication as to the fact that this took place in the bars.


Admiral TURNER. We are trying to be very precise with you, sir, and not draw an
inference here. There are 6 cases of these 149 where we have enough evidence in
this new documentation t substantiate that there was unwitting testing and some of
that involves these safe houses. There are other cases where it is ambiguous as to
whether the testing was witting or voluntary. There are others where it was clearly
voluntary.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Of course, after a few drinks, it is questionable whether
informed consent means anything to a person in a bar anyway.


Admiral TURNER. Well, we don't have any indication that all these cases where it
is ambiguous involved drinking of any kind. There are cases in penal institutions
where it is not clear whether the prisoner was given a choice or not. I don't know that
he wasn't given a choice, but I don't positively know that he was, and I classify that
as an ambiguous incident.


Senator INOUYE. Your time is up, Senator.


Senator Huddleston?


Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Admiral Turner, you stated in your testimony that you are convinced there was no
attempt to conceal this recently discovered documentation during the earlier
searches. Did you question the individuals connected with the earlier search before
you made that judgment?


Admiral TURNER. Yes; I haven't, I don't think, questioned everybody who looked
in the files or is still on our payroll who looked in the files back in 1975, but Mr.
Laubinger on my left is the best authority on this, and I have gone over it with him in
some detail.


Senator HUDDLESTON. but you have inquired, you think, sufficiently to assure
yourself that there was no intent on the pat of any person to conceal these records
from the previous committee?


Admiral TURNER. I am persuaded of that both by my questioning of people and
by the circumstances and the way in which these documents were filed, by the fact
which I did not and should have mentioned in my testimony, that these were not the
official files. The ones that we have received or retrieved were copies of files that
were working files that somebody had used, and therefore were slipped into a
different location, and again I say to you, sir, I can't imagine their deliberately
concealing these particular files and revealing the other things that they did reveal in
1975. I don't see the motive for that, because these are not that damning compared
with the overall material that was provided.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Is this the kind of operation that if it were continuing now
or if there were anything similar to it, that you would feel compelled to report to the
Select Committee on Intelligence?


Admiral TURNER. Yes sir. You mean, if I discovered that something like this were
going on without my knowledge? Yes, I would feel absolutely the requirement to---
Senator HUDDLESTON. But if it were going on with your knowledge, would you
report it to the committee? I assume you would.


Admiral TURNER. Yes. Well, it would not be going on with my knowledge, but
theoretically the answer is yes, sir.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, then, what suggestions would you have as we
devise charters for the various intelligence agencies? What provision would you
suggest to prohibit this kind of activity from taking place? Would you suggest that it
ought to be specifically outlined in a statutory charter setting out the parameters of
the permissible operation of the various agencies?


Admiral TURNER. I thank that certainly is something we must consider as we look
at the legislation for charters. I am not on the face of it opposed of it. I think we
would have to look at the particular wording a e are going to have to deal with the
whole charter issue as to exactly how precise you want to be in delineating restraints
and curbs on the intelligence activities.


Senator HUDDLESTON. In the case of sensitive type operations, which this
certainly was, which might be going on today, is the oversight activity of the agency
more intensive now than it was at that time?


Admiral TURNER. Much more so. I mean, I have briefed you, sir, and the
committee on our sensitive operations. We have the Intelligence Oversight Board.
We have a procedure in the National Security Council for approval of very sensitive
operations. I think the amount of spotlight focused on these activities is many,
manyfold what it was in these 12 to 24 years ago.


Senator HUDDLESTON. How about the record keeping?


Admiral TURNER. Yes; I can't imagine anyone having the gall to think that he can
just blithely destroy records today with all of the attention that has come to this, and
certainly we are emphasizing that that is not the case.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Admiral, I was particularly interested in the activity that
took place at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Ky., in which a Dr.
Harris Isbell conducted experiments on people who were presumably patients there.
There was narcotics institution, I take it, and Dr Isbel was, according to the New York
Times story, carrying on a secret series of correspondence with an individual at the
Agency by the name of Ray. Have you identified who that person is?


Admiral TURNER. Sir, I find myself in a difficult position here at a public hearing to
confirm or deny these names in view of my legal responsibilities under the Privacy Act
not to disclose the names of individuals here.


Senator HUDDLESTON. I am just asking you if you have identified the person
referred to in that article as Ray. I am not asking you who he was. I just want to
know if you know who he is.


Admiral TURNER. No. I am sorry, was this W-r-a-y or R-a-y?


Senator HUDDLESTON. It is listed in the news article as R-a-y, in quotations.


Admiral TURNER. No, sir, we have not identified him.


Senator HUDDLESTON. So you have no knowledge of whether or not he is still a
member of your staff or connected with the Agency in any way. Have you attempted
to identify him?


[Pause]


Admiral TURNER. Senator, we have a former employee whose first name is Ray
who may have had some connection with these activities.


Senator HUDDLESTON. You suspect that but you have not verified that at this
time, or at least you are not in a position to indicate that you have verified it?


Admiral TURNER. That is correct.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you.


Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Wallop?


Senator WALLOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Admiral Turner, not all of the--and in no way trying to excuse you of the hideous
nature of some of these projects, but not all of the projects under MKULTRA are of a
sinister or even a moral nature. Is that a fair statement?


Admiral TURNER. That is correct.


Senator WALLOP. Looking down through some of these 17 projects not involving
human testing, aspects of the magician's art, it doesn't seem as though there is
anything very sinister about that. Studies of human behavior and sleep research,
library searches. Now, those things in their way are still of interest, are they not, to
the process of intelligence gathering?


Admiral TURNER. Yes sir. I have not tried to indicate that we either are not doing
or would not do any of the things that were involved in MKULTRA, but when it comes
to the witting or unwitting testing of people with drugs, that is certainly verboten, but
there are other things.


Senator WALLOP. Even with volunteer patients? I mean, I am not trying to put
you on the spot to say whether it is going on, but I mean, it is not an uncommon
thing, is it, in the prisons of the United States for the Public Health Service to conduct
various kinds of experiments with vaccines and, say, sunburn creams? I know n
Arizona they have done so.


Admiral TURNER. My understanding is, lots of that is authorized, but I am not of
the opinion that this is not the CIA's business, and that if we need some information
in that category, I would prefer to go to the other appropriate authorities of the
Government and ask them to get if for us rather than to in any way---


Senator WALLOP. Well, you know, you have library searches and attendants at
the national seminars. This is why I wanted to ask you if the bulk of these projects
were in any way the kinds of things that the Agency might not do now. A President
would not have been horrified by the list of the legitimate types of things. Isn't that probably
the case?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator WALLOP. And if it did in fact appear in the IG report, is there any reason
to suppose that the President did not know of this project? You said there was no
reason to suppose that they did, but let me reverse that. Is there any reason to
suppose that they did not?


Admiral TURNER. No.


Senator WALLOP. Well, you know, I just cannot imagine you or literally anybody
undertaking projects of the magnitude of dollars here and just not knowing about it,
not informing your superior that these were going on, especially when certain items of
it appear in the Inspector General's report on budget matters.


Admiral TURNER. Well, I find it difficult when it is that far back to hypothesize
what the procedures that the Director was using in terms of informing his superiors
were. It is quite a different climate from today, and I think we do a lot more informing
today than they did back then, but I find it very difficult to guess what the level of
knowledge was.


Senator WALLOP. I am really not asking you to second-guess it, but it just seems
to me that, while the past is past, and thank goodness we are operating under
different sets of circumstances, I think it is naive for us to suppose that these things
were conducted entirely without the knowledge of the Presidents of the United States
during those times. It is just the kinds of research information that was being sought
was vital to the United States, not the means, but the information that they were trying
to find.


Admiral TURNER. I am sorry. Your question, is, was this vital? Did we view it a
vital?


Senator WALLOP. Well, your implication at the beginning was that it was a
response to the kinds of behavior that were seen in Cardinal Mindszenty's trial and
other things. I mean, somebody must have thought that this was an important
defensive reaction, if nothing else, on the part of the United States.


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I am sure they did, but again I just don't know how
high that permeated the executive branch.


Senator WALLOP. But the kinds of information are still important to you. I mean, I
am not suggesting that anyone go back and do that kind of thing again, but I'm
certain


it would be of use to you to know what was going to happen to one of your agents
assuming someone had put one of these things into his bloodstream, or tried to
modify his behavior.


Admiral TURNER Absolutely, and you know, we would be very concerned if we
thought there were things like truth serums or other things that our agents or others
could be subjected to by use or improper use of drugs by other powers against our
people or agents.


Senator WALLOP. Are there? I don't ask you to name them, but are there such
serums?


Admiral TURNER. I don't know of them if there are. I would have to answer that
for the record, sir.


Senator WALLOP. I would appreciate that.
[The material referred to follows:]


"TRUTH" DRUGS IN INTERROGATION


The search for effective aids to interrogation is probably as old as man's need to
obtain information from an uncooperative source and a persistent as his impatience to
shortcut any tortuous path. In the annals of police investigation, physical coercion
has at times been substituted for painstaking and time-consuming inquiry in the belief
that direct methods produce quick results. Sir James Stephens, writing in 1883,
rationalizes a grisly example of "third degree" practices by the police of India: "It is far
pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper in a poor devil's eyes
than to go almost in the sun hunting up evidence."


More recently, police officials in some countries have turned to drugs for assistance
in extracting confessions from accused persons, drugs which are assumed to relax
the individual's defenses to the point that he unknowingly reveals truths he has been
trying to conceal. This investigative technique, however humanitarian as an
alternative to physical torture, still raises serious questions of individual rights and
liberties. In this country, where drugs have gained only marginal acceptance in police
work, their use has provoked cries of "psychological third degree" and has
precipitated medico-legal controversies that after a quarter of a century still
occasionally flare into the open.


The use of so-called "truth" drugs in police work is similar to the accepted
psychiatric practice of narco-analysis; the difference in the two procedures lies in their
different objectives. The police investigator is concerned with empirical truth that
may be used against the suspect, and therefore almost solely with probative truth: the
usefulness of the suspect's revelations depends ultimately on their acceptance in
evidence by a court of law. The psychiatrist, on the other hand, using the name
"truth" drugs in diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill, is primarily concerned with
psychological truth or psychological reality rather than empirical fact. A patient's
aberrations are reality for him at the time they occur, and an accurate account of
these fantasies and delusions, rather than reliable recollection of past events, can be
the key to recovery.


The notion of drugs capable of illuminating hidden recesses of the mind, helping to
heal the mentally ill and preventing or reversing the miscarriage of justice, has
provided an exceedingly durable theme for the press and popular literature. While
acknowledging that "truth serum" is a misnomer twice over--the drugs are not sera
and they do not necessarily bring forth probative truth--journalistic accounts continue
to exploit the appeal of the term. The formula is to play up a few spectacular "truth"
drug sucessess and to imply that the drugs are more maligned than need be and
more widely employed in criminal investigation than can officially be admitted.


Any technique that promises an increment of success in extracting information from
an uncompliant source is ipso facto of interest in intelligence operations. If the ethical
considerations which in Western countries inhibit the use of narco-interrogation in
police work are felt also in intelligence, the Western services must at least be
prepared against its possible employment by the adversary. An understanding of
"truth" drugs, their characteristic actions, and their potentialities, positive an negative,
for eliciting useful information is fundamental to an adequate defense against them.
This discussion meant to help toward such an understanding, draws primarily upon
openly published materials. It has the limitations of projecting from criminal
investigation practices and from the permissive atmosphere of drug psycho-therapy.


SCOPOLAMINE AS "TRUTH SERUM"


Early in this century physicians began to employ scopolamine, along with morphine
and chloroform, to induce a state of "twilight sleep" during childbirth. A constituent of
[chemical word unclear (beohroe? ], scopolamine was known to produce sedation
and drowsiness, confusion and disorientation, incoordination, and amnesia for events
experienced during intoxication. Yet physicians noted that women in twilight sleep
answered questions accurately and often volunteered exceedingly candid remarks.
In 1922 it occurred to Robert House, a Dallas, Texas obstetrician, that a similar
technique might be employed in the interrogation of suspected criminals, and he
arranged to interview under scopolamine two prisoners in the Dallas county jail whose
guilt seemed clearly confirmed. Under the drug, both men denied the charges on
which they were held; and both, upon trial, were found not guilty. Enthusiastic at this
success, House concluded that a patient under the influence of scopolamine "cannot
create a lie...and there is no power to think or reason." [14] His experiment and this
conclusion attracted wide attention, and the idea of a "truth" drug was thus launched
upon the public consciousness.


The phrase "truth serum" is believed to have appeared first in a news report of
House's experiment in the Los Angeles Record, sometime in 1922. House resisted
the term for a while but eventually came to employ it regularly himself. He published
some eleven articles on scopolamine in the years 1921-1929, with a noticeable
increase in polemical seal as time went on. What had began as something of a
scientific statement turned finally into a dedicated crusade by the "father of truth
serum" on behalf of his offspring, wherein he was "grossly indulgent of its wayward
behavior and stubbornly proud of its minor achievements." [11]


Only a handful of cases in which scopolamine was used for police interrogation
came to public notice, though there is evidence suggesting that some police forces
may have used it extensively. [2,16] One police writer claims that the threat of
scopolamine interrogation has been effective in extracting confessions from criminal
suspects, who are told they will first be rendered unconscious by chloral hydrate
placed covertly in their coffee or drinking water. [16]


Because of a number of undesirable side effects, scopolamine was shortly
disqualified as a "truth" drug. Among the most disabling of the side effects are
hallucinations, disturbed perception, somnolence, and physiological phenomena such
as headache, rapid heart, and blurred vision, which distract the subject from the
central purpose of the interview. Furthermore, the physical action is long, far
outlasting the psychological effects. Scopolamine continues, in some cases, to make
anesthesia and surgery safer by drying the mouth and throat and reducing secretions
that might obstruct the air passages. But the fantastically, almost painfully, dry
"desert" mouth brought on by the drug is hardly conducive to free talking, even in a
tractable subject.


BARBITURATES


The first suggestions that drugs might facilitate communication with emotionally
disturbed patients came quite by accident in 1916. Arthur S. Lovenhart and his
associates at the University of Wisconsin, experimenting with respiratory stimulanta,
were surprised when, after an injection of sodium cyanide, a catatonic patient who
had long been mute and rigid suddenly relaxed, opened his eyes, and even
answered a few questions. By the early 1930's a number of psychiatrists were
experimenting with drugs as a adjunct to established methods of therapy.


At about this time police officials, still attracted by the possibility that drugs might
help in the interrogation of suspects and witnesses, turned to a class of depressant
drugs known as the barbiturates. By 1935 Clarence W. Muehlberger, head of the
Michigan Crime Detection Laboratory at East Lansing, was using barbiturates on
reluctant suspects, though police work continued to be hampered by the courts'
rejection of drug-induced confessions except in a few carefully circumscribed
instances.


The barbiturates, first synthesized in 1903, are among the oldest of modern drugs
and the most versatile of all depressants. In this half-century some 2,500 have been
prepared, and about two dozen of these have won an important place in medicine.
An estimated three to four billion doses of barbiturates are prescribed by physicians
in the United States each year, and they have come to be known by a variety of
commercial names and colorful slang expressions: "goof-balls, Luminal, Nembutal,
"red devils," "yellow jackets," "pink ladies, " etc. Three of them which are used in
narcoanalysis and have seen service as "truth" drugs are sodium amytal
(amobarbital), pentothal sodium (thiopental), and to a lesser extent seconal
(secobarbital).


As one pharmacologist explains it, a subject coming under the influence of a
barbiturate injected intravenously goes through all the states of progressive
drunkenness, but the time scale is on the order of minutes instead of hours.
Outwardly the sedation effect is dramatic, especially if the subject is a psychiatric
patient in tension. His features slacken, his body relaxes. Some people are
momentarily excited; a few become silly and giggly. This usually passes, and most
subjects fall asleep, emerging later in disoriented semi-wakefulness.


The descent into narcosis and beyond with progressively larger doses can be
divided as follows:


I. Sedative state.
II. Unconsciousness, with exaggerated reflexes (hyperactive stage).
III. Unconsciousness, without reflex even to painful stimuli.
IV. Death.


Whether all these stages can be distinguished in any given subject depends largely
on the dose and the rapidity with which the drug is induced. In anesthesia, stages I
and II may last only two or three seconds.


The first or sedative stage can be further divided:


Plane 1. No evident effect, or slight sedative effect.


Plane 2. Cloudiness, calmness, amnesia. (Upon recovery, the subject will not
remember what happened at this or "lower" planes or stages.)


Plane 3. Slurred speech, old thought patterns disrupted, inability to integrate or
learn new patterns. Poor coordination. Subject becomes unaware of painful stimuli.


Plane 3 is the psychiatric "work" stage. I may last only a few minutes, but it can be
extended by farther slow injection of drug. The usual practice is to bring the subject
quickly to Stage II and to conduct the interview as he passes back into the sedative
stage on the way to full consciousness.


CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES


The general abhorrence in Western countries for the use of chemical agents "to
make people do things against their will" has precluded serious systematic study (at
least as published openly) of the potentialities of drugs for interrogation. Louis A.
Gottschalk, surveying their use in information-seeking interviews, [13] cites 136
references; but only two touch upon the extraction of intelligence information, and
one of these concludes merely that Russian techniques in interrogation and
indoctrination are derived from age-old police methods and do not depend on the
use of drugs. On the validity of confessions obtained with drugs, Gottschalk found
only three published experimental studies that eh deemed worth reporting.


One of these reported experiments by D.P. Morris in which intravenous sodium
amytal was helpful in detecting malingerers. [12] The subjects, soldiers, were at first
sullen, negativistic, and non-productive under amytal, but as the interview proceeded
they revealed the fact of and causes for their malingering. Usually the interviews
turned up a neurotic or psychotic basis for the deception.


The other two confession studies, being more relevant to the highly specialized,
untouched area of drugs in intelligence interrogation, deserve more detailed review.


Gerson and Victoroff [12] conducted amytal interviews with 17 neuropsychiatric
patients, soldiers who had charges against them, at Tilton General Hospital, Fort Dix.
First they were interviewed without amytal by a psychiatrist, who neither ignoring nor
stressing their situation a prisoners or suspects under scrutiny, urged each of them t
discuss his social and family background, his army career, and his version of the
charges pending against him.


The patients were told only a few minutes in advance that narcoanalysis would be
performed. The doctor was considerate, but positive and forthright. He indicated that
they had no choice but to submit to the procedure. Their attitudes varied from
unquestioning compliance to downright refusal.


Each patient was brought to complete narcosis and permitted to sleep. As he
became semiconscious and could be stimulated to speak, he was held in this stage
with additional amytal while the questioning proceeded. He was questioned first
about innocuous matters from his background that he had discussed before receiving
the drug. Whenever possible, he was manipulated into bringing up himself the
charges pending against him before being questioned about them. If he did this in a
too fully conscious state, it proved more effective to ask him to "talk about that later"
and to interpose a topic that would diminish suspicion, delaying the interrogation on
his criminal activity until he was back in the proper stage of narcosis.


The procedure differed from therapeutic narcoanalysis in several ways: the setting,
the type of patients, and the kind of "truth" sought. Also, the subjects were kept in
twilight consciousness longer than usual. This state proved richest in yield of
admissions prejudicial to the subject. In it his speech was thick, mumbling, and
disconnected, but his discretion was markedly reduced. This valuable interrogation
period, lasting only five to ten minutes at a time, could be reinduced by injecting
more amytal and putting the patient back to sleep.


The interrogation technique varied from case to case according to background
information about the patient, the seriousness of the charges, the patient's attitude
under narcosis, and his rapport with the doctor. Sometimes it was useful to pretend,
as the patient grew more fully conscious, that he had already confessed during the
amnestic period of the interrogation, and to urge him, while his memory and sense of
self-protection were still limited, to continue to elaborate the details of what he had
"already described." When it was obvious that a subject was withholding the truth, his
denials were quickly passed over and ignored, and the key questions would be
reworded in a new approach.


Several patients revealed fantasies, fears, and delusions approaching delirium,
much of which could readily be distinguished from reality. But sometimes there was
no way for the examiner to distinguish truth from fantasy except by reference to other
sources. One subject claimed to have a child that did not exist,
another threatened to kill on sight a stepfather who had been dead a year, and yet
another confessed to participating in a robbery when in fact he had only purchased
goods from the participants. Testimony concerning dates and specific places was
untrustworthy and often contradictory because of the patient's loss of time-sense. His
veracity in citing names and events proved questionable. Because of his confusion
about actual events and what he thought or feared had happened, the patient at
times managed to conceal the truth unintentionally.


As the subject revived, he would become aware that he was being questioned
about his secrets and, depending upon his personality, his fear of discovery, or the
degree of his disillusionment with the doctor, grow negativistic, hostile, or physically
aggressive. Occasionally patients had to e forcible restrained during this period to
prevent injury to themselves or others as the doctor continued to interrogate. Some
patients, moved by fierce and diffuse anger, the assumption that they had already
been tricked into confessing, and a still limited sense of discretion, defiantly
acknowledged their guilt and challenged the observer to "do something about it." As
the excitement passed, some fell back on their original stories and others verified the
confessed material. During the follow-up interview nine of the 17 admitted the validity
of their confessions; eight repudiated their confessions and reaffirmed their earlier
accounts.


With respect to the reliability of the results of such interrogation, Gerson and
Victoroff conclude that persistent careful questioning can reduce ambiguities in drug
interrogation, but cannot eliminate them altogether.


At least one experiment has shown that subjects are capable of maintaining a lie
while under the influence of a barbiturate. Redlich and his associates at Yale [25]
administered sodium amytal to nine volunteers, students and professionals, who had
previously, for purposes of the experiment, revealed shameful and guilt-producing
episodes of their past and then invented false self-protective stories to cover them. In
nearly every case the cover story retained some elements of the guilt inherent in the
true story.


Under the influence of the drug, the subjects were cross-examined on their cover
stories by a second investigator. The results, though not definitive, showed that
normal individuals who had good defenses and no overt pathological traits could
stick to their invented stories and refuse confession. Neurotic individuals with strong
unconscious self-punitive tendencies, on the other hand, both confessed more easily
and were and were inclined to substitute fantasy for the truth, confessing to offenses
never actually committed.


In recent years drug therapy has made some use of stimulants, most notably
amphetamine (Benzedrine) and its relative methamphetamine (Methedrine). These
drugs, used either alone or following intravenous barbiturates, produce an outpouring
of ideas, emotions, and memories which have been of help in diagnosing mental
disorders. The potential of stimulants in interrogation has received little attention,
unless in unpublished work. In one study of their psychiatric use Brussel et al. [7]
maintain that Methedrine gives the liar no time to think or to organize his deceptions.
Once the drug takes hold, they say, an insurmountable urge to pour out speech traps
the malingerer. Gottschalk, on the other hand, says that this claim is extravagant,
asserting without elaboration that the study lacked proper controls. [13] It is evident
that the combined use of barbiturates and stimulants, perhaps along with ataraxics
(tranquilizers), should be further explored.


OBSERVATIONS FROM PRACTICE


J.M. MacDonald, who as a psychiatrist for the District Courts of Denver has had
extensive experience with narcoanalysis, says that drug interrogation is of doubtful
value in obtaining confessions to crimes. Criminal suspects under the influence of
barbiturates may deliberately withhold information, persist in giving untruthful
answers, or falsely confess to crimes they did not commit. The psychopathic
personality in particular, appears to resist successfully the influence of drugs.
MacDonald tells of a criminal psychopath who, having agreed to narco-
interrogation, received 1.5 grams of sodium amytal over a period of five hours. This
man feigned amnesia and gave a false account of a murder. "He displayed little or
no remorse as he (falsely) described the crime, including burial of the body. Indeed
he was very self-possessed and he appeared almost to enjoy the examination. From
time to time he would request that more amytal be injected." [21]


MacDonald concludes that a person who gives false information prior to receiving
drugs is likely to give false information also under narcosis, that the drugs are of little
value for revealing deceptions, and that they are more effective in releasing
unconsciously repressed material than in evoking consciously suppressed
information.


Another psychiatrist known for his work with criminals, L.X. Freedman, gave sodium
amytal to men accused of various civil and military antisocial acts. The subjects were
mentally unstable, their conditions ranging from character disorders to neuroses and
psychoses. The drug interviews proved psychiatrically beneficial to the patients, but
Freedman found that his view of objective reality was seldom improved by their
revelations. He was unable to say on the basis of the narco-interrogation whether a
given act had or had not occurred. Like MacDonald, he found that psychopathic
individuals can deny to the point of unconsciousness crimes that every objective sign
indicates they have committed.


F.G. Inbau, Professor of Law at Northwestern university, who has had considerable
experience observing and participating in "truth" drug tests, claims that they are
occasionally effective on persons who would have disclosed the truth anyway had
they been properly interrogated, but that a person determined to lie will usually be
able to continue the deception under drugs.


The two military psychiatrists who made the most extensive use of narco-analysis
during the war years, Roy R. Grinker and John C. Spiegel concluded that in almost all
cases they could obtain from their patients essentially the same material and give
them the same emotional release by therapy without the use of drugs, provided they
had sufficient times.


The essence of these comments from professionals of long experience is that
drugs provide rapid access to information that is psychiatrically useful but of doubtful
validity as empirical truth. The same psychological information and a less adulterated
empirical truth can be obtained from fully conscious subjects through non-drug
psychotherapy and skillful police interrogation.


APPLICATION TO CK INTERROGATION


The almost total absence of controlled experimental studies of "truth" drugs and the
spotty and anecdotal nature of psychiatric and police evidence require that
extrapolations to intelligence operations be made with care. Still, enough is known
about the drugs' action to suggest certain considerations affecting the possibilities for
their use in interrogations.


It should be clear from the foregoing that at best a drug can only serve as an aid
to an interrogator who has a sure understanding of the psychology and techniques of
normal interrogation. In some respects, indeed, the demand on his skill will be
increased by the baffling mixture of truth and fantasy in drug-induced output. And the
tendency against which he must guard in the interrogate to give the responses that
deem to be wanted without regard for facts will be heightened by drugs: the literature
abounds with warnings that a subject in narcosis is extremely suggestible.


It seems possible that this suggestibility and the lowered guard of the narcotic state
might be put to advantage in the case of a subject feigning ignorance of a language
or some other skill that had become automatic with him. Lipton [20] found sodium
amytal helpful in determining whether a foreign subject was merely pretending not to
understand English. By extension, one can guess that a drugged interrogatee might
have difficulty maintaining the pretense that he did not comprehend the idiom of a
profession he was trying to hide.


There is the further problem of hostility in the interrogator's relationship to a
resistance source. The accumulated knowledge about "truth" drug reaction has come
largely from patient-physician relationships of trust and confidence. The subject in
narco-analysis is usually motivated a priori to cooperate with the psychiatrist, either to
obtain relief rom mental suffering or to contribute to a scientific study. Even in police
work, where an atmosphere of anxiety and threat may be dominant, a relationship of
trust frequently asserts itself: the drug is administered by a medical man bound by a
strict code of ethics; the suspect agreeing to undergo narcoanalysis in a desperate
bid for corroboration of his testimony trusts both drug and psychiatrist, however
apprehensively; and finally, as Freedman and MacDonald have indicated, the police
psychiatrist frequently deals with a "sick" criminal, and some order of patient-physician
relationship necessarily evolves.


Rarely has a drug interrogation involved "normal" individuals in a hostile or
genuinely threatening milieu. It was from a non-threatening experimental setting that
Krie Lindemann could say that his "normal" subjects "reported a general sense of
euphoria, ease and confidence, an they exhibited a marked increase in talkativeness
and communicability." [18] Gerson and Victoroff list poor doctor-patient rapport as
one factor interfering with the completeness and authenticity of confessions by the
Fort Dix soldiers, caught as they were in a command performance and told they had
no choice but to submit to narco-interrogation.


From all indications, subject-interrogator rapport is usually crucial to obtaining the
psychological release which may lead to unguarded disclosures. Role-playing on the
part of the interrogator might be a possible solution to the problem of establishing
rapport with a drugged subject. In therapy, the British narco-analyst William Sargent
recommends that the therapist deliberately distort the facts of the patient's life-
experience to achieve heightened emotional response and at reaction. [27] In the
drunken state of narco-analysis patients are prone to accept the therapist's false
constructions. There is reason to expect that a drugged subject would communicate
freely with an interrogator playing the role of relative, colleague, physician, immediate
superior, or any other person to whom his background indicated he would be
responsive.


Even when rapport is poor, however, there remains one facet of drug action
eminently exploitable in interrogation---the fact that subjects emerge from narcosis
feeling they have revealed a great deal, even when they have not. As Gerson and
Victoroff demonstrated at Fort Dix, this psychological set provides a major opening for
obtaining genuine confessions.


POSSIBLE VARIATIONS


In studies by Beecher and his associates, [3-6] one-third to one-half the individuals
tested proved to be placebo reactors, subjects who respond with symptomatic relief
to the administration of any syringe, pill, or capsule, regardless of what it contains.
Although no studies are known to have been made of the placebo phenomenon as
applied to narco-interrogation, it seems reasonable that when a subject's sense of
guilt interferes with productive interrogation, a placebo for pseudo-narcosis could
have the effect of absolving him of the responsibility for his acts and thus clear the
way for free communication. It is notable that placebos are most likely to be effective
in situations of stress. The individual most likely to react to placebos are the more
anxious, more self-centered, more dependent on outside stimulation, those who
express their needs more freely socially, talkers who drain off anxiety by conversing
with others. The non-reactors are those clinically more rigid and with better than
average emotional control. No sex or I.Q. differences between reactors and non-
reactors have been found.


Another possibility might be the combined use of drugs with hypnotic trance and
post-hypnotic suggestion: hypnosis could presumably prevent any recollection of the
drug experience. Whether a subject can be brought to trance against his will or
unaware, however, is a matter of some disagreement. Orne, in a survey of the
potential uses of hypnosis in interrogation, [23] asserts that it is doubtful, despite
many apparent indications to the contrary, that trance can be induced in resistant
subjects. It may be possible, he adds, to hypnotise a subject unaware, but this would
require a positive relationship with the hypnotist not likely to be found in the
interrogation setting.


In medical hypnosis, pentothal sodium is sometimes employed when only light
trance has been induced and deeper narcosis is desired. This procedure is a
possibility for interrogation, but if a satisfactory level of narcosis could be achieved
through hypnotic trance there would appear to be no need for drugs.


DEFENSIVE MEASURES


There is no known way of building tolerance for a "truth" drug without creating a
disabling addiction, or of arresting the action of a barbiturate once induced. The only
full safeguard against narco-interrogation is to prevent the administration of the drug.
Short of this, the best defense is to make use of the same knowledge that suggests
drugs for offensive operations: if a subject knows that on emerging from narcosis he
will have an exaggerated notion of how much he has revealed he can better resolve
to deny he has said anything.


The disadvantages and shortcomings of drugs in offensive operations become
positive features of the defense posture. A subject in narco-interrogation is
intoxicated, wavering between deep sleep and semi-wakefulness. His speech is
garbled and irrational, the amount of output drastically diminished. Drugs disrupt
established thought patterns, including the will to resist, but they do so
indiscriminately and thus also interfere with the patterns of substantive information the
interrogator seeks. Even under the conditions most favorable for the interrogator,
output will be contaminated by fantasy, distortion, and untruth.


Possibly the most effective way to arm oneself against narco-interrogation would be
to undergo a "dry run." A trial drug interrogation with output taped for playback
would familiarize an individual with his own reactions to "truth" drugs, and this
familiarity would help to reduce the effects of harassment by the interrogator before
and after the drug has been administered. From the viewpoint of the intelligence
service, the trail exposure of a particular operative to drugs might provide a rough
benchmark for assessing the kind and amount of information he would divulge in
narcosis.


There may be concern over the possibility of drug addiction intentionally or
accidentally induced by an adversary service. Most drugs will cause addiction with
prolonged use, and the barbiturates are no exception. In recent studies at the U.S.
Public Health Service Hospital for addicts in Lexington, Ky., subjects received large
doses of barbiturates over a period of months. Upon removal of the drug, they
experienced acute withdrawal symptoms and behaved in every respect like chronic
alcoholics.


Because their action is extremely short, however, and because there is little
likelihood that they would be administered regularly over a prolonged period,
barbiturate "truth" drugs present slight risk of operational addiction. If the adversary
service were intent on creating addiction in order to exploit withdrawal, it would have
other, more rapid means of producing states as unpleasant as withdrawal symptoms.


The hallucinatory and psychotomimetic drugs such as mescaline, marihuana, LSD-
25, and microtine are sometimes mistakenly associated with narcoanalytic
interrogation. These drugs distort the perception and interpretation of the sensory
input to the central nervous system and affect vision, audition, smell, the sensation of
the size of body parts and their position in space, etc. Mescaline and LSD-25 have
been used to create experimental "psychotic states," and in a minor way as aids in
psychotherapy.


Since information obtained from a person in a psychotic drug state would be
unrealistic, bizarre, and extremely difficult to assess, the self-administration of LSD-25,
which is effective in minute dosages, might in special circumstances offer an
operative temporary protection against interrogation. Conceivably, on the other hand,
an adversary service could use such drugs to produce anxiety or terror in medically
unsophisticated subjects unable to distinguish drug-induced psychosis from actual
insanity. An enlightened operative could not be thus frightened, however, knowing
that the effect of these hallucinogenic agents is transient in normal individuals.
Most broadly, there is evidence that drugs have least effect on well-adjusted
individuals with good defenses and good emotional control, and that anyone who can
withstand the stress of competent interrogation in the waking state can do so in
narcosis. The essential resources for resistance thus appears to lie within the
individual.


CONCLUSIONS


The salient points that emerge from this discussion are the following. No such
magic brew as the popular notion of truth serum exists. The barbiturates, by
disrupting defensive patterns, may sometimes be helpful in interrogation, but even
under the best conditions they will elicit an output contaminated by deception, fantasy
garbled speech etc. A major vulnerability they produce in the subject is a tendency
to believe he has revealed more than he has. It is possible, however, for both
normal individuals and psychopaths to resist drug interrogation; it seems likely that
any individual who can withstand ordinary intensive interrogation can hold out in
narcosis. The best aid to a defense against narco-interrogation is foreknowledge of
the process and its limitations. There is an acute need for controlled experimental
studies of drug reaction, not only to depressants but also to stimulants and to
combinations of depressants, stimulants, and ataraxics.


REFERENCES


1. Adams, E. Barbiturates. Sci. Am., Jan. 1958, 198 (1), 60-64.
2. Barkham, J. Truth Drugs: The new crime solver Coronet, Jan. 1951, 29, 73-76.
3. Beecher, H. K. Anesthesia. Sci. Am., Jan. 1957, 198, p. 70.
4. ----. Appraisal of drugs intended to alter subjective responses, symptoms. J.
Amer. Med. Assn., 1955, 158, 399-401.
5. ----. Evidence for increased effectiveness of placebos with increased stress.
Amer. J. Physiol., 1956. 187, 163-169.
6. ---. Experimental pharmacology and measurement of the subjective response.
Science, 1953, 116. 157-162.
7. Brussel, J. A., Wilson, D.C., Jr., & Shankel, L.W. The use of Methedrine in
psychiatric practice. Psychiat. Quart., 1954. 28, 381-394.
8. Delay, J. Pharmacologic explorations or the personality. Psychanalysis and
"Methedrine" shock. Proc. Roy, Soc. Med., 1949, 42, 492-?.
9. deRopp, R.S. Drugs and the Mind. New York: Grove [2 words unclear]., 1960.
10 Freedman. [abr. unclear] Z. "Truth" drugs. Sci. Am., March [date unclear], 43-
154.
11. Geis, G. In scopolamine verital. The early history [word unclear] drug-induced
statements. J. of Crim. Law, Criminal, & Pol. Sci., Nov, Dec. [numbers unclear] (4),
347-358.
12. Gerson, M. J., & Victoroff, V. Experimental investigations into the validity of
confessions obtained under sodium amytal narcosis. J. Cli?. and Exp. Psychopath.,
1348, 9, 350-375.
13. Gottschalk, L.A. The use of drugs in information-seeking interviews. Technical
report #2, ARDC Study SR 177-D Contract AF 18 (600) 1797. Dec. 1958. Bureau of
Social Science Research Inc.
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15. Houston, F. A. preliminary investigation into abreaction comparing Methedrine
and sodium amytal with other methods. J. Ment. Sci., 1952, 98. 707-710.
16. Inbau, F. G. Self-incrimination. Springfield: C.C. Thomas, 1950.
17. Kidd., W.R. Police interrogation. 1940.
18. Legal dose of truth. Newsweek, Feb. 23, 1959, 28.
19. Lindemann, E. Psychological changes in normal and abnormal individuals
under the influence of sodium amytal interview. A review. Amer. Practit, Digest Treat.,
1950, 1, 148-163.
21. MacDonald, J. M. Narcoanalysis and criminal law. Amer. J. Psychiat., 1954,
111, 283-288.
22. Morris, D.P. Intravenous barbiturates: an aid in the diagnosis and treatment of
conversion hysteria and malingering. Mil. Surg., 1945, 96, 509-513.
23. Orne, M. T. The potential uses of hypnosis in interrogation. An evaluation.
ARDC Study SR 177-D Contract AF 18 (600) 1797, Dec. 1938. Bureau of Social
Science Research, Inc.
24. Pelikan, E. W., & Kensler, C. J. Sedatives: Their pharmacology and uses.
Reprint from The Medical Clinics of North America. W. B. Saunders Company, Sept.
1958.
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Psychiat., 1951, 107, 586-593.
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Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960.


Senator WALLOP. If they are, I would assume that you would still try to find from
either theirs or somebody else's information how to protect our people from that kind
of activity.
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator WALLOP. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Chafee?
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Admiral Turner, I appreciate that these tawdry activities were taking place long
before your watch, and I think you have correctly labeled them as abhorrent, but not
only were they abhorrent, it seems to me they were rather bungled, amateurish
experiments that don't seem to have been handled in a very scientific way, al least
from the scanty evidence we have.


It seems to me that there were the minimum of reports and the Agency didn't have
the ability to call it quits. It went on for some 12 years, as you as you mentioned.
What I would like to get to is, are you convinced now in your Agency that those
scientific experiments, legitimate ones that you were conducting with polygraph and
so forth, were being conducted in a scientific manner and that you are handling it in a
correct manner to get the best information that you are seeking in the end?


Admiral TURNER. yes, I am, and I also have a sense of confidence that we are
limiting ourselves to the areas where we need to be involved as opposed to areas
where we can rely on others.


Senator CHAFEE. I am convinced of that from your report. I just do hope that
you have people who are trained in not only handing this type of experiment, but in
preparing the proper reports and drawing the proper data from the reports. You are
convinced that you have this type of people?


Admiral TURNER. yes, sir.


Senator CHAFEE. The second point I am interested in was the final lines your
testimony here, which I believe are very important, and that is that the Agency is
doing all it can in cooperation with other branches of the Government to go about
tracking down the identity of those who were in some way adversely affected, and
see what can be done to fulfill the government's responsibilities in that respect. I
might add that I commend you in that, and I hope you will pursue it vigorously.
A hospital in my State was involved in these proceedings, and it is unclear exactly
what did take place, so I have both a parochial interest in this and a national interest
as well, and I do hope you will press on with it. It involves not only you, I appreciate,
but also HEW and perhaps the Attorney General.


Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir. We will.


Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much.


Admiral TURNER. MKULTRA subproject 3 was a project involving the surreptitious
administration of LSD on unwitting persons, was it not?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator INOUYE. In February 1954, and this was in the very early stages of
MKULTRA, the Director of Central intelligence wrote to the technical services staff
officials criticizing their judgment because they had participated in an experiment
involving the administration of LSD on an unwitting basis to Dr. Frank Olson, who
later committed suicide. Now, the individuals criticized were the same individuals
who were responsible for this subproject 3, involving exactly the same practices.
Even though these individuals were clearly aware of the dangers of surreptitious
administration and had been criticized by the Director of Central Intelligence, subproject
3 was not terminated immediately after Dr. Olson's death.


In fact, according to documents, it continued for a number of years. Can you
provide this committee with any explanation of how such testing could have
continued under these circumstances?


Admiral TURNER. No, sir, I really can't.


Senator INOUYE. Are the individuals in the technical services who carried on
subproject 3 still on the CIA payroll?


Admiral TURNER. I am sorry. Are you asking, are they today?


Senator INOUYE. Yes.


Admiral TURNER. No, sir.


Senator INOUYE. What would you do if you criticized officials of the technical
services staff and they continued to carry on experimentation for a number of years?


Admiral TURNER. I would do two things, sir. One is, I would be sure at the
beginning that I was explicit enough that they knew that I didn't want that to be
continued anywhere else, and two, if I found it being continued, I would roll some
heads.


Senator INOUYE. Could you provide this committee with information as to whether
the individuals involved had their heads rolled?


Admiral TURNER. I don't believe there is any evidence they did, but I will double
check that.


[See p 170 for material referred to.]


Senator INOUYE. As you know, Senator Huddleston and his subcommittee are
deeply involved in the drafting of charters and guidelines for the intelligence
community. We will be meeting with the President tomorrow. Our concern is, I think,
a basic one. Can anything like this occur again?


Admiral TURNER. I think it would be very, very unlikely, first, because we are all
much more conscious of these issues than we were back in the fifties, second,
because we have such thorough oversight procedures. I cannot imagine that this of
activity could take place today without some member of the CIA itself bypassing me,
if I were authorizing this, and writing to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and blowing
the whistle on this kind of activity.


I am also doing my very best, sir, to encourage an openness with myself and a
free communication in the Agency, so that I am the one who finds these things if they
should happen. The fact is that we must keep you and your committee and now the
new committee in the House informed of our sensitive activities. I think all of these
add up to a degree of scrutiny such that this kind of extensive and flagrant activity
could not happen today without it coming to the attention of the proper authorities to
stop it.


Senator INOUYE. A sad aspect of the MKULTRA project was that it naturally
involved the people who unwittingly or wittingly got involved in experimentation. I
would appreciate it if you would report back to this committee in 3 months on what
the Agency has done to notify these individuals and these institutions, and
furthermore, to notify us as to what steps have been taken to identify victims, and if
identified, what you have done to assist them, monetarily or otherwise.


Admiral TURNER. All right, sir. I will be happy to.


Senator GOLDWATER. Will the Senator yield?


Senator INOUYE. Yes, sir.


Senator GOLDWATER. I wonder if he could include in that report for our
information only a complete listing of the individuals and the experiments done on
them, and whether they were witting or unwitting, volunteer or nonvolunteer, and what
has been the result in each case. I think that would be interesting.


Admiral TURNER. Fine. Yes, sir.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Kennedy?


Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. It is your intention to notify the individuals who
have been the subjects of the research, is that right, Admiral Turner? Do you intend
to notify those individuals?


Admiral TURNER. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. If you can identify them, you intend to notify them?


Admiral TURNER. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. And you intend to notify the universities or research centers
as well?


Admiral TURNER. Senator, I am torn on that. I understand your opening
statement. I put myself in the position of the president of one of those universities,
let's say. If he were witting---if his university had been witting of this activity with us,
he has access to all that information today. If he were not witting, I wonder if the
process of informing him might put his institution's reputation in more jeopardy than
letting them go on the way they are today, not knowing. I really don't know the
equities here.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, the problem is, all you have to do is pick up the
newspapers and you see these universities mentioned. In many instances, I think you
are putting the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage, where there is a
complete change of administration, and they may for one reason or another not have
information that they are under suspicion. There is innuendo; there is rumor. I
cannot help but believe that it will just get smeared all over the newspapers in spite of
all the security steps that have been taken.


It seems to me that those universities should be entitled to that information, so that
the ones with other administrations can adapt procedures to protect those
universities. The importance of preserving the independence of our research areas
and the communities seems to me to be a very fundamental kind of question about
the protection of the integrity of our universities and our research centers.


Admiral TURNER. You are saying that you feel that if we identify them privately to
themselves, we can benefit them in an adequate way to cover the risk that this will
lead to a more public disclosure? There are lots of the 80 who have not been
identified publicly at this point.


Senator KENNEDY. I think the universities themselves should be notified. I think
then the universities can take whatever steps in terms of their getting up the
procedures to protect their own kinds of integrity in terms of the future. I would
certainly hope that they would feel that they could make a public comment or a
public statement on it. I think it is of general public interest, particularly for the people
that are involved in those universities, to have some kind of awareness of whether
they were used or were not used and how they were used.


I think they are entitled to it, and quite frankly, if there is a public official or an
official of the university that you notify and he wants for his own particular reasons
not to have it public, I don't see why those in a lesser echelon or lower echelon
who have been effectively used by it should not have the information as well.


So, I would hope that you would notify the universities and then also indicate to
the public. I can't conceive that this information will not be put out in the
newspapers, and it puts the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage, and
of curse some of it is wrong, which is the fact of the matter, and I think some
university official saying, well, it isn't so, is a lot different that if they know it is
confirmed or it is not confirmed in terms of the Agency itself. I think that there is a
responsibility there.


Admiral TURNER. I have great sympathy with what you are saying. I have already
notified one institution because the involvement was so extensive that I thought they
really needed to protect themselves, and I am most anxious to do this in whatever
way will help all of the people who were perhaps unwitting participants in this, and
the difficulty I will have is, I can't quite do, I think, what you suggested, in that I may
not be able to tell an institution of the extent and nature of its participation.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, you can tell them to the best of your information, and it
seems to me that just because the university or an individual is going to be
embarrassed is not a reason for classifying the information. So, I would hope---I
mean, I obviously speak as an individual Senator, but I feel that that is an incredible
disservice to the innocent individuals and, I think, a disservice to the integrity of the
universities unless they are notified, to be able to develop procedures you are
developing with regards to your own institution and we are trying to in terms of the
Congress. Certainly the universities are entitled to the same.


Admiral TURNER. Yes. Not all of these, of course, were unwitting.


Senator KENNEDY. That's right.


Admiral TURNER. Many of them were witting, and therefore they can take all
those precautionary steps on their own, but I am perfectly open to doing this. I am
only interested in doing it in a way that when identifying a university it will not lead to
the public disclosure of the individuals, whom I am not allowed to disclose, and so
on.


Senator KENNEDY. That could be done, it seems to me.


Admiral TURNER. So, we will see if we can devise a way of notifying these
institutions on a private basis so that they can then make their decision whether their
equities are best served by their announcing it publicly or their attempting to maintain
it----


Senator KENNEDY. Or you. I wonder. What if they were to ask you to announce
or indicate?


Admiral TURNER. My personal conscience, sir, at this time, is that I would be
doing a disservice to these universities if I notified the public.


Senator KENNEDY. Would you meet with some university officials and ask what
their views are or whether they feel that the preservation of the integrity or the
universities would be better served or not? I think that would be useful to find out
from small, large, private, and public universities' officials how they view the integrity--


Admiral TURNER. Fine. I will phone several university presidents today who are
my friends and who are not involved in this, and ask them what they think the equities
would be.


Senator KENNEDY. Al right. You let us know, too.


Admiral TURNER. But I am not sure that I see that there is any great benefit in my
notifying the public as opposed to the university notifying them. Let him have his
choice whether he wants---each institution wants to have it made public.


Senator KENNEDY. Yes. the fact would remain that the institution's credibility
would be better served if the institution's president were to deny it and the university
indicated that it did not participate in that program than if the university were to deny
it and the Agency says nothing. It seems to me that that would be the strongest, and
the only way that that is going to be credible. I would value it if you would get some
input from universities as to what they believe is the fairest way in terms of the
preservation of the integrity of the universities.


Let me, if I could, ask on the question of the users of these safe houses, as I
understand from information that was provided to us in the course of our last
committee, the testing of various drugs on individuals happened at all social levels,
high and low, it happened on native Americans and also on foreign nationals. That is
what I understand was the nature of the project itself.


Now, I am just wondering whether those tests were conducted at the two locations
on the east coast and the west coast which were known as safe houses. To your
knowledge, is that correct?


Admiral TURNER. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. In terms of the research in this particular program, it did not
go beyond the safe houses located on the eat coast and the west coast? I believe I
am correct on that.


Admiral TURNER. That type of unwitting testing of sort of randomly selected
individuals, yes.


Senator KENNEDY. It was just located in those two places?


Admiral TURNER. To the best of our knowledge, there were only two locations.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, how do we interpret randomly selected?


Admiral TURNER. Well, as opposed to prisoners in a prison who were somehow
selected.


Senator KENNEDY. All right. Do you know from this information how many
people were recruited during this period?


Admiral TURNER. No idea.


Senator KENNEDY. Do you know approximately?


Admiral TURNER. I asked that question the other day, and we just don't have--
apparently we are very--well, either there were no records kept of the actual numbers
and types of people tested or they were destroyed.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Schweiker.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Admiral Turner, I would like to come back to the experiments which may have
been conducted at the hospital research facilities which the CIA helped to finance. It
wasn't clear to me from your previous answers what kind of work was done there. I
gather you are unclear on that, too, from your remarks, yet I find in the CIA
documentation which you have supplied us, a list describing some of the advantages
the Agency hoped to gain. It says:


(a) One-sixth of the total space in the new hospital wing will be available to the
Chemical Division of TSS * * * ; (b) Agency sponsorship of sensitive research
projects will be completely deniable; (c) Full professional cover will be provided for up
to three biochemical employees of the Chemical Division; (d) Human patients and
volunteers for experimental use will be available under controlled clinical conditions
with the full supervision of and there is a blank , something has been deleted.


It seems pretty clear to me what they intended to do in that particular wing.
Doesn't it to you? Why would you go to such elaborate preparations, to buy part of
the wing, bring three of your own personnel there, give them a cover, and give them
access to patients? Why would you go to such trouble and expense to arrange all
that, if you weren't planning to experiment on people in the hospital?


Admiral TURNER. I agree with you 100 percent, air. Those were clearly the
intentions. I have no evidence that it was carried out in that way. I am not trying to
be defensive, Senator. I am only trying to be absolutely precise here.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, then, as to the nature of what was done there, the last
paragraph on the same page of the document says, "The facilities of the hospital and
the ability to conduct controlled experimentations under safe clinical conditions using
material with which any agency connection must be completely deniable will augment
and complement other programs recently taken over by TSS, such as," and then
there's another deletion.


Now, the words following "such as" have been deleted. That is still classified, or al
least it was removed when this document was sanitized and released. It seems to be
that whatever was deleted right there would give you a pretty good clue as to what
they were doing, since it says that the activities would "augment and complement
other programs" undertaken by TSS. So, I have trouble understanding why you don't
know what was contemplated Just the fact that similar programs are referred to in
the document, though what they are is still deleted, should enable you to check it out.
You could look at what went on in the similar programs mentioned following the
"such as " in the classified version of this document.


Admiral TURNER. Senator, I have not said that we don't know what was
contemplated being done there. We do not know what was done there.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Why did you delete that reference? Why is that still
classified, that particular project of whatever it is?


Admiral TURNER. I don't know this particular case. We will get you the exact
answer to that one and inform you about it, but it is quite probable that that other
case is unrelated to this in the...well, not unrelated, but that that was a project that still
deserves to be classified.


[The material referred to follows:]


Construction of the Gorman Annex was begun in 1937 and the Annex was
dedicated in March 1950. Of the several MKULTRA projects conducted at
Georgetown only one involving human testing covered a time span subsequent t
March 1959. Subproject 15 ran from 1955 to 1963, thus it is possible that the final
four years (1959-1963) of the subproject could have been spent in the Gorman
Annex. However, there is no reference to the Gorman Annex or a "new Annex" in
Subproject 15 papers, neither is there any mention of the subproject moving to a new
location in 1959 or later years.


Authorization to contribute CIA funds toward construction of the Gorman Annex is
contained in Subproject 35 of MKULTRA. Recently discovered material indicated that
Dr. Grachikter continued his research for sleep and amnesia-producing drugs under
Project MKSEARCH through July 1967 at Georgetown University Hospital. But is
impossible to determine if the facilities of the Gorman Annex were involved.


Senator SCHWEIKER. I think that would give us a pretty good clue as to what was
going to be done in the wing the CIA helped to finance.


Was there any indication al all in the records you found that the project ultimately
used cancer patients or terminally ill patients in connection with this facility?


Admiral TURNER. I'm sorry. I missed your question because I was trying to get
the data on the last one. I will read you the blank.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Go ahead.


Admiral TURNER. QKHILLTOP. It doesn't help you, but...


Senator SCHWEIKER. Can you tell us what that is, or is it still classified?


Admiral TURNER. I don't know, and I assume from the fact that we deleted it, it is
still classified, but I will get you that answer, sir.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you. I'd like to see that information.


[See p. 171 for material referred to.]


Now my next question was: Is there any indication, Admiral, that projects in that
particular center involved experimentation on terminally ill cancer patients?


Admiral TURNER. I missed the first part of your question, sir, I am very sorry.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Do you have any indication that some experiments in the
facility used terminally ill cancer patients as subjects?


You do acknowledge in your statement and it is clear from other documents that
these kinds of experiments were at some point being done somewhere. My question
is, is there any indication that cancer patients or terminally ill patients were
experimented with in this wing?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, it does appear there is a connection here, sir.


Senator SCHWEIKER. The other question I had relates to the development of
something which has ben called the perfect concussion. A series of experiments
toward that end were described in the CIA documents I wonder if you would just tell
us what your understanding of perfect concussion is.


Admiral TURNER. Is that in my testimony, sir, or in some other document?


Senator SCHWEIKER. Subproject 54, MKULTRA, which involved examination of
techniques to cause brain concussions and amnesia by using weapons or sound
waves to strike individuals without giving warning and without leaving any clear
physical marks. Someone dubbed it "perfect concussion"--maybe that was poetic
license on the part of our staff rather than your poets over there. I wonder if you
could tell us what brain concussion experiments were about?


Admiral TURNER. This project, No. 54, was canceled, and never carried out.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I do believe the first year of the project in 1955 was
carried out by the Office of Naval Research, according to the information that you
supplied us. The CIA seems to have been participating in some way at that point,
because the records go on to say that the experimenter at ONR found out about
CIA's role, discovered that it was a cover, and then the project was transferred to
MKULTRA in 1956. Again, this is all from the backup material you have given us. So,
it was canceled at some time. I am not disagreeing with that, but apparently for
at least a year or two, somebody was investigating the production of brain concussions
with special black-jacks, sound waves, and other methods as detailed in the backup material.


Admiral TURNER. The data available to me is that this project was never funded
by the CIA, but I will double-check that and furnish the information for the record for
you as to whether there was ever any connection here and if so, what the nature of
the work was.


[The material referred to follows:]


Mr. Laubinger corrected his testimony regarding Subproject 54 during the
September 21, 1977 hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific
Research of the Human Resources Committee. The relevant portion is reproduced
below:


Mr. LAUBINGER. On project 54, it has got a rather sensational proposal in there, in
terms of the work that they propose to do, and you asked about the proposal and I
said, in fact, it was never funded under MKULTRA. Now, I overlooked...at least, my
memory did not serve me correctly when I went through that file folder to see one
memorandum dated January 10, 1956, which makes it quite clear, as a matter of fact,
that that proposal was based on prior work that was funded by the Agency.


Senator SCHWEIKER. By what?


Mr. LAUBINGER. By the CIA. So, that information was in their file folder. It did not
happen to be in my head when I testified.


Senator SCHWEIKER. I think I might have read you that, and that is why I argued at
the time with you, because I think I had in front of me, a I recall, some indication that
it was funded there. I did read that to you. So, you did supply it to us; there is no
argument about that information.


Mr. LAUBINGER. Perhaps I am sort of headstrong, myself, and in my own view, I
am reading under the ULTRA project, that if it had been funded under ULTRA, it
would have had a project number and identified a such. The thing that threw me was
that it was funded, apparently, outside of any MKULTRA activity and it was under the
normal contracting process, so that it was not included in MKULTRA as any work
done under that funding umbrella.


The file folder that you have and I have, right here, makes it quite clear, however,
that a year's work was done through navy funding--a navy funding mechanism--on
which the proposal was based that ultimately came into the MKULTRA program. That
second proposal was never funded. So, there was conflict and I, personally, I think,
introduced a little bit of confusion in that in my testimony.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, do you agree or not agree with DOD's statement here
that even though the initial funding was navy, it was really a conduit for the CIA?


Mr. LAUBINGER. I think that is correct.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes; I would appreciate that. I would like to know how it
went from ONR to CIA after a year. Somebody made a decision to make that
transfer, and to make this an MKULTRA subject. There had to be some sort of review
that led to a decision to continue that kind of concussion--total blackout, maximum
amnesia, and whatever else it was you were interested in--study and testing.


Mr. LAUBINGER. Senator, if I may try to say a few words on that, the files that
were available to us for inspection, which are limited, indicated that there was a
project being carried on by the Navy having to do with the effects of brain
concussion. The CIA developed an interest in that, and considered funding it, but
actually never did, and as the admiral testified, the MKULTRA is merely a funding
mechanism, a place they go for money to do such things, but there is no evidence
that I know of that that project was ever funded.




Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I am confused, because here again is another quote
from a document that we have seen, which you have released and supplied to us:


Following is the technical progress made under the current [deleted] contract: (a)
Specialized instrumentation and numerous testing techniques have been developed
to obtain the desired dynamic data; (b) considerable data has now been obtained
supporting the resonance-cavitation theory of brain concussion; and (c) preliminary
acceleration threshold data has been obtained for a fluid-filled glass simulated skull.


It goes on to talk about a blast range and a 2,500-square-foot laboratory. The
document notes that "Three blast test series have been run to date." It describes a
special blackjack device, "a pancake-type blackjack giving a high peak impact force
with a low unit surface pressure."


I agree the records are inconclusive as to the results of this work, but it certainly
seems that some testing was done.


Mr. LAUBINGER. Senator, you are putting us in the same position I think you were
stating that you were in earlier in referring to documents not before us, but I believe
you are quoting from a proposal that someone sent to the Agency to fund this work,
and he is referring to past work. The past work would have encompassed a lot of
things like that, but CIA was not involved with that.


Senator SCHWEIKER: What do you mean, Admiral, on page 6 of your testimony
when you say past work on projects using magician's art? How do magicians get
into [word unclear] work business?


Admiral TURNER. [word unclear] interpreted this as to how to slip the mickey into
the finn, but I would like to ask my advisers here to comment.


Mr. BRODY. I think that is essentially it, Senator. It id surreptitious administration
of material to someone, deceptive practices, how to distract someone's attention
while you are doing something else, as I understand it. It was also some type of a
covert communication project involved with the study of how magicians and their
assistants perhaps communicate information to one another without having other
people know it. This is the type of thing that was involved, sir.


Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Huddleston?


Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Admiral, in your checking these newly discovered documents and interviewing
members of the CIA staff, did you find information that would confirm the contention
described by the reporters for the New York Times that this type of experimentation
was begun out of a fear at the Agency that foreign powers might have had drugs
which would allow them to alter the behavior of American citizens or agents or
members of the Armed Forces who were taken into custody, and which would have
resulted in false confessions and the like? Is my question clear?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I haven't personally read the documentation on that.
In my discussions with the people who are well informed in this area at the Agency, I
am told that that is the case.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Was there any evidence or any indication that there were
other motives that the agency might also be looking for drugs that could be applied
for other purposes, such as debilitating an individual or even killing another person?
Was this part of this kind of experimentation?


Admiral TURNER. Yes; I think there is. I have not seen in this series of
documentation evidence of desire to kill, but I think the project turned its character
from a defensive to an offensive one as it went along, and there certainly was an
intention here to develop drugs that could be of use.


Senator HUDDLESTON. The project continued for some time after it was learned
that, in fact, foreign powers did not have such a drug as was at first feared, didn't it?


Admiral TURNER. That is my understanding. Yes, sir.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Is there any indication that knowledge gained as a result
of these experiments has been useful or is being applied in any way to present
operations?
Mr. BRODY. Senator, I am not sure if there is any body of knowledge. A great
deal of what there was, I gather, was destroyed in 1973. I would like to defer to
Frank here. Do you know of any?


Mr. LAUBINGER. I know of no drugs or anything like that developed under this
program that ever reached operational use or are in use today.


Senator HUDDLESTON. So apparently any information that was gathered was
apparently useless and not worth continuing, not worth further development on the
part of the Agency.


Mr. LAUBINGER. I am having difficulty hearing your questions.


Senator HUDDLESTON. I can hardly hear myself.


Admiral TURNER. I think the answer to your question is that we have no evidence
of great usefulness on this, and yet I think we should remember....


Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, is it accurate to say that this experimentation
produced few useful results or had little application at all to the operations of the
Agency or anybody else as far as we know?


Admiral TURNER. I think that is basically correct. At the same time, I would point
out that we had two CIA prisoners in China and one in the Soviet Union at this time,
and we were concerned as to what kinds of things might be done to them, but I am
not saying that....


Senator HUDDLESTON. Have you detected any sign that any other nation is
continuing or has in the past conducted experiments similar to this or with a similar
objective?


Admiral TURNER. I am not prepared to answer that one off the top of my head,
sir, but I will get it to you.


[The material referred to follows:]


We maintain no files of up-to-date information on the testing of drugs in foreign
countries. Some years ago we occasionally would review foreign research on
antibiotics and pharmaceuticals in connection with public health and civil defense
assessments. For a few years beginning in 1949 we assessed foreign research on
LSD under Project ARTICHOKE because of concern that such drugs might be
employed against Agency and other U.S. personnel. Information relative to this work
had already been provided to relevant Committees. In this early work we also
occasionally looked at foreign human experimentation; we long ago eliminated our
holdings on this subject and no collection requirements are any longer served. As
consumer interest in this area has dropped off and higher priority areas need
attention, we have virtually no present coverage with the possible exception of an
occasional scanning of the literature for a specific program. To the best of our
knowledge no other unit in the Intelligence Community is tracking this subject now.


Senator HUDDLESTON. You don't know whether any of your agents anywhere in
the world have been subjected to any kind of procedure like this?


Admiral TURNER. We certainly know of other powers conducting research in
these areas, yes.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know how they go about that research?


Admiral TURNER. It is pretty sketchy, the information we have.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know of any other organization in this country or
any institution that has conducted extensive research on unwitting individuals and
through unwitting institutions?


Admiral TURNER. Well, I have read something in the newspapers about this, but I
have not familiarized myself with it in specifics.


Senator HUDDLESTON. It is not a normal mode of operation for human research,
is it?


Admiral TURNER. No, sir.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Wallop?


Senator WALLOP. Mr. Chairman, I only have one to follow up on Senator
Huddleston's questions and my earlier ones. You are not really saying, are you,
Admiral Turner, that there are no mind-altering drugs or behavior modification
procedures which have been used by foreign powers?


Admiral TURNER. No, sir, I am not.


Senator WALLOP. I drew that inference partly in answer to my question that you
knew of no truth serum. Maybe that is a misnomer, but surely, there are relaxants
that make tongues looser than they would otherwise be. Isn't that true?


Admiral TURNER. Yes.


Senator WALLOP. So I think it is fair to say, too, that the experience of many
American prisoners of war in the Korean conflict would indicate that there are
behavior modification procedures in use by foreign powers of a fairly advanced
degree of sophistication.


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator WALLOP. Again, I will just go back and say I think this must have been
part of the motivation. I don't think you would have mentioned Cardinal Mindszenty
had you thought his behavior was normal at the time or had anybody else. So, I
would just again say I think it is a little bit scapegoating. I don't think the object of
this hearing is in any way to lay blame on those passed or those dead or otherwise,
but I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say that it stopped with the directors of the
CIA or the DCI's of the time. Also I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say they
didn't even know it, but that it was some lower echelon acting alone.


I think this was a behavior pattern that was prevalent in those years, and I think the
object lesson is that we have discovered, we think and we hope, through your
assurances and other activities of the Congress, means of avoiding future incidents of
that kind. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Chafee?


Senator CHAFEE. No questions.


Senator INOUYE. Senator Kennedy, I think you have another question.


Senator KENNEDY. Just talking about the two safe houses on the east and west
coast as being the sources for the unwitting trials, now, the importance of this and the
magnitude of it, I think, is of significance, because we have seen from your records
that these were used over a period of 8 or 9 years, and the numbers could have been
considerable. You are unable to determine, at least in your own research, what the
numbers would be and what the drugs were, how many people were involved, but it
could have been considerable during this period of time.


It would certainly appear to me in examining the documents and the flow charts of
cash slips that were expended in these areas that it was considerable, but that is a
judgmental factor on it, but I think it is important to try and find out what the Agency
is attempting to do to get to the bottom of it.


Now, the principal agent that was involved as I understand it is deceased and has
been deceased for 2 years. The overall agent, Mr. Gottlieb, has indicated a fuzzy
memory about this whole area. He has testified before the Intelligence Committee.
Yet he was responsible for the whole program. Then, the Director had indicated the
destruction of the various materials and unfamiliarity with the project.


Now, you have indicated in your testimony today that there are two additional
agents on page 9 of your testimony, you indicated there are two agents which you
have uncovered at the bottom of it, and you say, the names of CIA officials who
approved or monitored the various projects. You talk about the two additional agents
in your testimony.


Now, I am just wondering if you intend to interview those agents to find out exactly
what is being done. I suppose, first of all, shouldn't the project manager know what
was being done?


Admiral TURNER. Our first problem, Senator, is that we have been unable to
associate an individual with those names at this point. We are still burrowing to find
out who these people are. We haven't identified them as having been CIA
employees, and we don't know whether these were false names.


Senator KENNEDY. You are tracking that down, as I understand it?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. You are tracking that down, and you have every intention of
interviewing those people to find out whatever you can about the program and
project?


Admiral TURNER. My only hesitation here is whether I will do this or the Justice
Department.


Senator KENNEDY. It will be pursued, though, I understand?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Either through the Agency or through the Justice Department?


Admiral TURNER. [Nods in the affirmative.]


Senator KENNEDY. Is it plausible that the director of the program would not
understand or know about the details of the program? Is it plausible that Dr. Gottlieb
would not understand the full range of activities in those particular safe houses?


Admiral TURNER. Let me say it is unlikely. I don't know Mr. Gottlieb.


Senator KENNEDY. Has anybody in the Agency talked with Mr. Gottlieb to find out
about this?


Admiral TURNER. Not since this revelation has come out.


Senator KENNEDY. Not since this revelation? Well, why not?


Admiral TURNER. He has left our employ, Senator.


Senator KENNEDY. Does that mean that anybody who leaves is, you know,
covered for lifetime?


Admiral TURNER. No, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Why wouldn't you talk with him and find out? You have new
information about this program. It has been a matter of considerable interest both to
our committee and to the Intelligence Committee. Why wouldn't you talk to Mr.
Gottlieb?


Admiral TURNER. Well, again, I think the issue is whether this should be done by
the Justice Department or ourselves.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, are we wrestling around because you and Attorney
General Bell can't agree.....


Admiral TURNER. No, sir.


Senator KENNEDY [continuing]. On who aught to do it?


Admiral TURNER. We are proceeding together in complete agreement as to how
to go. I have, in connection with trying to find all of these Americans or others who
were unwittingly tested, I have some considerable concern about the CIA running
around this country interviewing and interrogating people, because I don't want to
give any impression that we are doing domestic intelligence.


Senator KENNEDY. I am just talking about one, in this case. That was the man
who was responsible for the whole program, and to find out whether anyone within
the Agency since you have had this new material has talked to Gottlieb since 1975,
and if the answer is no, I want to know why not.


Admiral TURNER. The reason he was not interviewed in connection with the 1975
hearings was that he had left the employ of the CIA and there was a concern on the
part of the Agency that it would appear to the investigators that the CIA was in some
way trying to influence him and influence his testimony before the committee. If these
committees have no objection, we would be happy to contact Dr. Gottlieb and see if
he can augment anything here in this new information, that he can add to as opposed
to what was available in 1975.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, you see, Admiral Turner, you come to the two
committees this morning and indicate that now at last we have the information. We
don't have to be concerned about anything in the future on it. Now, I don't know how
you can give those assurances to the members of these committees as well as to the
American people when you haven't since 1975 even talked to the principal person
that was in charge of the program, and the records were destroyed. He is the fellow
that was running the program, and the Agency has not talked to him since the
development of this new material.


Admiral TURNER. Our only concern here is the proprieties involved, and we will
dig into this and work with the Justice Department on who, if either of us, should get
into discussions with Dr. Gottlieb so as not to prejudice any legal rights that may be
involved here, or to appear in any way to be improper.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, do I understand you have not contacted the Justice
Department about this particular case since the development of this new material
about Gottlieb?


Admiral TURNER. Not about Gottlieb specifically. We have contacted him.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, it is amazing to me. I mean, can you understand the
difficulty that any of us might have in terms of comprehending that when you develop
a whole new series of materials that are on the front page of every newspaper in the
country and are on every television, I mean, that means something, but it does not
mean nearly as much as the interest that we have in the fact about the testing of
unwitting Americans, and every single document that the staff reviews has Mr.
Gottlieb's name on it and you come up to tell us that we don't have to worry any
more, we have these other final facts, and Mr. Gottlieb has not been talked to?


Admiral TURNER. Sir, I am not saying that these are in any way the final facts. I
am saying these are all the facts we have available.


Senator KENNEDY. And you have not talked to the person who was in charge of
the program, so what kind of value or what kind of weight can we give it?


Admiral TURNER. We are happy to talk to him. I think the issue here again is one
of propriety and how to go about this. We have not, I believe, enough new
information about Gottlieb's participation here to signal that his interview would be
that much more revealing than what was revealed in 1975.


Senator KENNEDY. The importance of it, I think, from our point of view, is, he
would know the drugs that were administered, the volume of drugs, how it was
administered, and in terms of your ability to follow up to protect these people and
their health, to the extent that it can be done, that opportunity is being lost.


I want to get on to some others, but will you give us the assurance that you will
get ahold of Gottlieb or that you will talk to Attorney General Bell and talk with
Gottlieb?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. And let us know as to the extent of it. I don't see how we can
fulfill our responsibility in this area on the drug testing without our hearing from
Gottlieb as well, but I think it is important that you do so, particularly since all of the
materials have been destroyed.


These other two agents, have they talked to them?


Admiral TURNER. We don't know who they are, sir. We are trying to track down
and see whether these names can be related to anybody.


Senator KENNEDY. That is under active investigation by the Agency?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. And you have the intention of talking to those people when
you locate them. Is that correct?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, under the same circumstances as Gottlieb.


Senator KENNEDY. And you have people working on it?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. With regards to the activities that took place in these safe
houses, as I understand from the records, two-way mirrors were used. Is that your
understanding?


Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. We have records that construction was done to put in
two-way mirrors.


Senator KENNEDY. And they were placed in the bedroom, as I understand.


[Pause.]


Senator KENNEDY. Well, we have documents......


Admiral TURNER. I believe that was in the Church record, but I don't have the
details.


Senator KENNEDY. And rather elaborate decorations were added, as I understand
at least, to the one in San Francisco, in the bedroom, which are French can-can
dancers, floral pictures, drapery, including installation of bedroom mirrors, three
framed Toulouse Lautrec posters with black silk mats, and a number of other...red
bedroom curtains and recording equipment, and then a series of documents which
were provided to the committee which indicate a wide proliferation of different cash
for $100, generally in the $100 range over any period of time on the particular checks.
Even the names are blocked out, as to the person who is receiving it. Cash for
undercover agents, operating expenses, drinks, entertainment while administering,
and then it is dashed out, and then the other documents that would suggest, at least
with the signature of your principal agent out there, that..."called to the operation,
midnight, and climax."


What can you tell us that it might suggest to you about what techniques were
being used by the Agency in terms of reaching that sort of broad-based group of
Americans that were being evidently enticed for testing in terms of drugs and others?
Do you draw any kind of conclusion about what might have been going on out there
in these safe houses?


Admiral TURNER. No, sir.


[General laughter.]


Senator KENNEDY. There is a light side to it, but there is also an enormously
serious side. And that is that at least the techniques which are used or were used in
terms of testing, and trying to find out exactly the range of drugs used and the
numbers of people involved and exactly what that operation was abut, as well as the
constant reiteration of the use of small sums of cash at irregular intervals. A variety of
different techniques were employed but there is an awful lot of documentation putting
these matters together.


When you look at the fact that is a broad range population that has been tested,
tested in these two areas, with the kind of cash slips that were used in this, payment
mechanisms and decorations and all of the rest, we are not able to put a bottom line
on it but one thing is for sure, and that is, Gottlieb knows. That is one thing for sure,
because his name appears on just about every one of these documents, and it is, I
think, very important to find out what his understanding is of the nature of that. So,
we will hear more about that.


Admiral TURNER. I believe Gottlieb has been interviewed by the Congress.


Senator KENNEDY. That's right, he has, and in reviewing the record, it is not very
satisfactory, and it just seems with the new information
and the new documentation and the new memoranda--and he did not have the
checks at that time--and with the wide variety of different memoranda with his name
on it, his memory could be stimulated on that.


Thank you.


Senator INOUYE. I would like to thank the admiral and his staff for participating in
this hearing. I believe the record should show that this hearing was held at the
request of the Agency and the admiral. It was not held because we insisted upon it.
It was a volunteer effort on the part of the Agency. I think the record should also
indicate that Admiral Turner has forwarded to this committee a classified file including
all of the names of the institutions and the persons involved as the experimenters.


I should also indicate that this hearing is just one step involved in the committee's
investigation of drug abuse. Just as you have had much work in going over the
8,000 [ages. the staff of this committee has had equal problems, but I would like the
record to show that you have made these papers and documents available to the
committee. I thank you for that.


As part of the ongoing investigation, we had intended to call upon many dozens of
others, experimenters, or those officials in charge, and one of those will be Dr.
Gottlieb.


In thanking you, I would like to say this to the American people, that what we have
experienced this morning in this committee room is not being duplicated in any other
committee room in any other part of the world. I doubt that very much. Our Agency
and our intelligence community has been under much criticism and has been
subjected to much abuse, in many cases justified, but this is the most open society
that I can think of. For example, in Great Britain there are about six people who are
aware of the identity of the man in charge of intelligence. In other countries, similar
conditions exist. Here in the United States we not only know Admiral Turner, we have
had open hearings with him, such as this. The confirmation hearings were all open.


In a few weeks, the Senate of the United states will debate a resolution to decide
upon whether we should disclose the amounts and funds being used for
counterintelligence and national intelligence. I would hope that in presenting this
issue to the public, the media will take note that the Agency has cooperated and will
continue to. The abuse that we have learned about this morning is one I hope will
never happen again, but without constant oversight on the part of the Executive
Office, on the part of the Congress, it could happen again. It is important therefore
that we continue in this activity.


So, once again,, Admiral, I thank you very much for helping us. We will continue
to call upon you for your assistance. We would like to submit to you several
questions that the members and staff have prepared. We hope you will look them
over carefully and prepare responses for the record, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman?


Senator INOUYE. Yes, sir?


Senator KENNEDY. I, too, want to thank Admiral Turner for his responsiveness. I
have had meetings with him in the committees and also conversations, telephone
conversations, and private meetings, and I have found him personally to be extremely
responsive, and it is a very difficult challenge which he has accepted in heading this
Agency. I want you to know, personally, I, too, would like to see this put behind us.
I don't think we are quite there yet in terms of this partucular area that we are
interested in. I think the Intelligence Committee has special responibilities in
this area of the testing, so we look forward to working with you in expediting
the time that we can put it behind, but it does seem to me that we have to dig in
and finish the chapter. So, I want to personally express my appreciation to you,
Admiral Turner,and thank you for your cooperation and your help, and I look forward
to working with you.


Admiral TURNER. Thank you.


Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure you emphasized this
enough, but I think the record ought to show that Admiral Turner informed the Select
Committee on his own initiative when the new documentation was found. The
documentation has been made availa ble to us voluntarily, in a spirit of cooperation.


I think this shows a vast difference from the mode of operation that existed prior to
the formation at least of the Church Committee, and a difference that is very helpful.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Admiral.
We would now like to call upon Mr. Philip Goldman and Mr. John Gittinger.
Mr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger, will you please rise and take the oath.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are abut to give is the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I do.


Mr. GITTINGER. I do.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you, sir.


Mr. Godman, will you identify yourself, and after that, Mr. Gittinger.


Senator KENNEDY. Before we start in, we had a third witness, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Pasternac, who planned to testify, traveled to Washington--he lives in Washington,
and was contacted recently--with the intention of testifying this morning. And
something--he called us late this morning and indicated that he wanted to get a
counsel before he would wish to testify.


Senator INOUYE. Mr. Goldman.
Mr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, sir.


TESTIMONY OF PHILIP GOLDMAN, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


Mr. GOLDMAN. I am Philip Goldman.


Senator INOUYE. And you are a former employee of the Central Intelligence
Agency?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Over 10 years ago.


Senator INOUYE. And you were employed at the time when MKULTRA was in
operation?


Mr. GOLDMAN. There were some MKULTRA's in operation at the time I was there.


Senator INOUYE. And Mr. John Gittinger, are you a former employee of the
Central Intelligence Agency?


TESTIMONY OF JOHN GITTINGER, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


Mr. GITTINGER. I am.


Senator INOUYE. Are you still an employee an eployee?


Mr. GITTINGER. No.


Senator INOUYE. Were you a member of the Agency at the time MKULTRA was in
operation?


Mr. GITTINGER. Yes.


Senator INOUYE. Thank you. Senator Kennedy.


Senator KENNEDY. I want to welcome both of you to the committee.


If we could start with Mr. Godman. Were you the project engineer for the safe
houses in either San Franicso or New York?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I know of no safe house in San Francisco.


Senator KENNEDY. How aboout in new York?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I knew of one facility that was established there, but I didn't know
anything of its operation.


Senator KENNEDY. Were you a monitor on any testing of drugs on unwitting
persons in San Francisco?


Mr. GOLDMAN. No.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, we have a classified document here that was provided
by the Agency that lists your name as a monitor of the program and I would
appreciate it if you would look...


Mr. GODMAN. I think the musunderstanding arises because I was project officer.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, would you take a look at that?


[Mr. Godman inspected the document.]


Mr. GODMAN. This document as it states is correct. However, my....


Senator KENNEDY. That document is correct?


Mr. GOLDMAN. As far as I see on the first page, the project. But my....


Senator KENNEDY. Well, could I get it back, please.
That would indicate that you were a monitor of the program.


Mr. GOLDMAN. I was in charge of disbursing the moneys to Morgan Hall.


Senator KENNEDY. To whom was that?


Mr. GOLDMAN. To the individual whose name was listed at the top of that
document.


Senator KENNEDY. And you knew htat he was running the project in San
Francisco?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I knew he was the person who was in charge out there.
Senator KENNEDY. All right.


Mr. GODMAN. But I had no knowledge nor did I seek knowledge of actually what
he was doing, because there would be other things involved.


I did recieve...


Senator KENNEDY. What were you doing?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I was collecting...I had to be sure that all teh receipt that ever
were turned in balanced with the moneys htat were paid out to see that everything
was run all right. There was no illegal use of funds as far as we could determine by
the receipts and cash.


Senator KENNEDY. So even though the Agency document indicates that you were
a monitor for the program, one of the few monitors of that particular program which
you mentioned for San Francisco and Mill Valley, Calif., you described your
responsibility only as a carrier of money, is that correct?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I would say as a disburser or carrying out...seeing that the
moneys were handled properly. There was within that...I don't know what's done or
what he did do in conjuction with other people.


Senator KENNEDY. Were you responsible for the disbursement of all the funds?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I was responsible for turning over the check to him.


Senator KENNEDY. And what did you know of the program itself?


Mr. GOLDMAN. The only thing I knew of the program was what he furnished us in
terms of receipts and that sort of thing. I didn't indulge or concern myself in that.


Senator KENNEDY. You still wrote, and I'll let you examine it--it's a classified
document'--but you wrote a rather substantive review of the program in May of 1963,
talking about the experiments, the factual data that had been collected, covert and
realistic field field traials, about the necessity of those particular--and talked about
the effectiveness of the various programs, the efficiency of various delivery systems.
That doesn't sound to me like someone who is only...


Mr. GOLDMAN. Well, if you would refresh my memory, if I could read this I would
certainly agree with whatever is said there, if it was written.


Senator KENNEDY. I am trying to gather what your role was. You've indicated
first of all that you didn't know about...you knew about a safe house in New York;
now we find out that you're the carrier for the resources as well and the agent in San
Francisco. We find out now that the CIA put you as a monitor. You're testifying htat
you only were the courier, and here we have just one document, and there are many
otheres that talk about the substance of that program with your name on it and I am
just trying to find out exactly what role you werer playing.


Mr. GOLDMAN. The only think I can tell you about this and I am drawing
completely on my memory is that this individual who was in charge out there
conducted these things and reported them back to the Agency. I didn't participate in
any of them. All I know was that he furnished me with receipts for things that were
done and told of the work that they had done.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, that documetn covers more than receipts.


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes, it tells of what...they had conducted wourk out there.
Senator KENNEDY. It describes, does it not? Read the paragraph 2.
Mr. GOLDMAN. "A number of covert"...


Senator KENNEDY. Well, you can't read it, it's a classified document, and I don't
know why, quite frankly, but it relates to the substance
of those programs and your name is signed to the memorandums on it. I am not
interested in you trying to review for us now what is in the document, but I think it
would be unfortunate if we were left with the opinion that all you were was a courier
of resources when we see a document with your name on it, signed, that talks about
the substance of the program. And what we're interested in is the substance of the
program. We have the recent documents that were provided by the Agency, which
do indicdate that you were at least involved in the substance, and I'm just trying to
find out whether you're willing to tell us about that.


Mr. GOLDMAN. I am perfectly willing to tell you everything that I can remember.


Senator KENNEDY. But you can't remember anything.


Mr. GOLDMAN. I can't remember the substantive parts of these things, I really
can't.


Senator KENNEDY. Of the program htat was taking place, do you have any
greater familiarity with what was happening in New York.


Mr. GOLDMAN. No, no.


Senator KENNEDY. And you have the same function with regards to New York.


Senator KENNEDY. Did you ever go to San Francisco?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. Did you meet with the agent in charge?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. And why did you meet with him?


Mr. GOLDMAN. To discuss some of the receipts and things that were there to find
out if these were indeed true expenditures and to find out if everything was going
along all right for the work that was being done.


Senator KENNEDY. What work was being done?


Mr. GOLDMAN. No, the reports of these things and whatever was being done. I
don't know who he reported to but he did report to somebody.


Senator KENNEDY. You travel out there to find out about the work that's being
done, and what does he tell you, that the work is being done well and..
.
Mr. GOLDMAN. He told me that the work that they were doing was going along,
progressing satisfactorily, but to be very frank with you...


Senator KENNEDY. But he didn't tell you what the work?


Mr. GOLDMAN. To be very frank with you, Senator, I cannot remember the things
that happened back in those days. I've been away from the company--from the
agency for over 10 years, and that is even farther back than that, and that was just
about the time when I first engaged in this, so it was my first.
...
Senator KENNEDY. Did they disburse a series of $100 checks, to your
recollection?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I don't recollect it, but if you ahve it there, then they did.


Senator KENNEDY. Did you know Dr. Gottlieb?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. How did you know Dr. Gottlieb?


Mr. GOLDMAN. He had been head of the division when I was recruited.


Senator KENNEDY. Did you talk to him about these programs? Did you have
anything to do with him during this period of time?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I didn't have anything to do with him until I would say probably in
the sixties.


Senator KENNEDY. And can you tell us what you had to do with him then?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Just what you see there on the papers.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, that is the request for the money and he approves it.


Mr. GOLDMAN. That is the request for money and he approves it, and I am quite
sure that I probably discussed with him whether the work was going along all right,
whether his reports were being turned in, and whether he was satisfied with the way
things were going and did he have any complaints about the way other people were
requesting him, but I did not engage myself in anything he was doing.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, did you get the impression that Gottlieb knew what was
going on?


Mr. GOLDMAN. I didn't ask.


Senator KENNEDY. But you told him that your impression that what was going on
even though you didn't know what was going on, was going on well, I guess?


[Laughter.]


Mr. GOLDMAN. I told Gottlieb what you saw in there was that the things appeared
to be going along all right. I was repeating and parroting back the words that were
given to me while I was there.


Senator KENNEDY. What was the money being spent for, do you know?


Mr. GOLDMAN. No; I can't recall that, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Would you remember if we told you it was red curtains and
can-can pictures....


Mr. GOLDMAN. No, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Floral pictures and the rest.


Mr. GOLDMAN. No, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. RECORDERS.


Mr. GOLDMAN. No, sir.


Senator KENNEDY. Recorders and two-way mirrors.


Mr. GOLDMAN. Wait, hold on. You're slipping a word in there now.


Senator KENNEDY. But you would ahve authorized those funds, would you not,
since you were the....


Mr. GOLDMAN. Did you say two-way mirrors?


Senator KENNEDY. Yes.


Mr. GOLDMAN. Where?


Senator KENNEDY. In the safe houses.


Mr. GOLDMAN. Where?


Senator KENNEDY. San Francisco.


Mr. GOLDMAN. No.


Senator KENNEDY. How about New York?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. You remember now that you approved expenditures for New
York?


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.


Senator KENNEDY. What were those expenditures for?


Mr. GOLDMAN. That was a transfer of money over for the use in an apartment in
New York by the Bureau of Narcotics. It was for their use.


Senator KENNEDY. Do you have any knowledge of what was going on in the
apartment?


Mr. GOLDMAN. No, sir, other than I know that it had been used, according to the
information that I have been given, it was used by the Bureau of Narcotics to make
meetings with individuals who they were interested in with regard to pushing dope--
not pushing dope, but sellingnarcotics and that sort of thing.


Senator KENNEDY. Well, I am sure you had many responsibilities and it's a long
time ago, but the Agency does indicate that you were project monitor for that
particular program.


Mr. GOLDMAN. That's correct.


Senator KENNEDY. Your own testimony indicates you went out to review the
expependitures of funds to find out whether they were being wisely used, that you
came back and talked to the project director, Mr. Gottlieb, to give him a progress
report about what was going on out there.


Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes, sir, I did.


Senator KENNEDY. All those things are true, and yet you draw a complete blank
in terms of what was the project itself. That's where the record is now.


Mr. GOLDMAN. I did not go out there to review the projects nor did I come back
and talk with Mr. Gottlieb and review what I had observed in terms of any projects
that they...that is, other parts of the Agency might have in operation there. I simply
reported back those things which were told to me by the individual out there
who...and I carried them back and they are contained in the report that you have in
front of you, word for word, just as it was given to me.




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