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The New World Order

China’s “New Generation” AI-Brain Project

China is pursuing what its leaders call a “first-mover advantage” in artificial intelligence (AI), facilitated by a state-backed plan to achieve breakthroughs by modeling human cognition. While not unique to China, the research warrants concern since it raises the bar on AI safety, leverages ongoing U.S. research, and exposes U.S. deficiencies in tracking foreign technological threats.

The article begins with a review of the statutory basis for China’s AI-brain program, examines related scholarship, and analyzes the supporting science. China’s advantages are discussed along with the implications of this brain-inspired research. Recommendations to address our concerns are offered in conclusion. All claims are based on primary Chinese data.

China’s Plan to “Merge” Human and Artificial Intelligence

Analysts familiar with China’s technical development programs understand that in China things happen by plan, and that China is not reticent about announcing these plans. On July 8, 2017 China’s State Council released its “New Generation AI Development Plan” to advance Chinese artificial intelligence in three stages, at the end of which, in 2030, China would lead the world in AI theory, technology, and applications. The announcement piqued the interest of the world’s techno-literati in light of the plan’s unabashed goal of world hegemony, its state backing, and a well-founded belief that China is already a major AI player. Although China still lags in semi-conductor design and basic AI research, it is moving to address —or circumvent—these problems, lending credence to its long-term aspirations.

Buried in this plan, and absent entirely from the Western dialog on China AI, is what we see as that country’s most interesting and potentially significant research, namely, a top-down program to effect a “merger” (混合) of human and artificial intelligence. These efforts to use neuroscience to inform AI, and vice-versa, date to at least 19996 and precede China’s focus on AI as a standalone discipline. Whereas the earliest appearance of AI in a ministry notification was in July 2015, China’s “National Medium- and Long-term S&T Development Plan” issued in 2006 had already identified brain science and cognition among its top research priorities. The 2016 “Notification on National S&T Innovation Programs for the 13th Five-Year Plan” mentioned AI but did not count it among its major projects. What appeared instead was “brain science and brain-inspired research” defined as “brain-inspired computing” and “brain-computer intelligence.”

This timeline establishes “AI-brain research” as a line of inquiry in China before AI became a household word and a focus of state interest. In March 2016, the “China Brain Project” (中国脑计划) was approved, a 15-year effort that “prioritized brain-inspired AI over other approaches.” In May of the same year, Chinese president Xi Jinping publicly endorsed one of its key pillars:

“Connectomics is at the scientific forefront for understanding brain function and further exploring the nature of consciousness. Exploration in this area not only has important scientific significance, but also has a guiding role in the prevention and treatment of brain disease and the development of intelligent technology.” (our emphasis) Taking these circumstances into account, it is not surprising that the 2017 New Generation AI Development Plan uses the word “brain” 27 times and “brain-inspired/neuromorphic” (类脑) some 20 times. The plan’s “strategic goals” include “major breakthroughs in brain-inspired intelligence, autonomous intelligence, mixed [human-artificial] intelligence, swarm intelligence, and other areas so as to have an important impact in the area of international AI research, and occupy the commanding heights of AI technology.” The document goes on to explain:

“Brain-like intelligent computing theory focuses on breakthroughs in brain-like information coding, processing, memory, learning, and reasoning theories; on forming brain-like complex systems, brain-like control, and other theories and methods; and on establishing new models of large-scale brain-like intelligent computing and brain-inspired cognitive computing models.”

In terms of priorities, “AI-brain” occupies two of the plan’s eight “basic theory” categories: “(3) hybrid enhanced intelligent theory” and “(7) brain intelligent computing theory,” defined as:

“Research on ‘human-in-the-loop’ hybrid enhanced intelligence, human-computer intelligence symbiosis behavior enhancement and brain-computer collaboration, machine intuitive reasoning and causal models, associative memory models and knowledge evolution methods, hybrid enhanced intelligent learning methods for complex data and tasks, cloud robot collaborative computing methods, situational understanding in real-world environments, and human-machine group collaboration.”

and, 

“Research theories and methods of brain-like perception, brain-like learning, brain-like memory mechanisms and computational fusion, brain-like complex systems, and brain-like control.”

In sum, China’s New Generation AI plan aims to “build for China a first-mover advantage in artificial intelligence development,” which to us invokes the self-bootstrapping scenario—a mainstay of the AI safety literature—of a country with an early AI advantage leveraging its lead past the point where others are able to compete.

China’s AI-Brain Academic Research

2016 was a watershed year in terms of China’s AI-brain scholarship. We identified a core group of six papers published that year by leading Chinese researchers that define China’s approach to this hybrid area and signal acceptance of the paradigm:

“Retrospect and Outlook of Brain-inspired Intelligence Research” (类脑智能研究的回顾与展望).

“Brain Science and Brain-inspired Intelligence Technology-an Overview” (脑科学与类脑研究概述).

“Progress and Prospect on the Strategic Priority Research Program of ‘Mapping Brain Functional Connections and Intelligence Technology’.” (“脑功能联结图谱与类脑智能研究”先导专项研究进展和展望).

“The Human Brainnetome Atlas: A New Brain Atlas Based on Connectional Architecture.”

“Neuroscience and Brain-inspired Artificial Intelligence: Challenges and Opportunities” (神经科学和类脑人工智能发展:机遇与挑战).

“China Brain Project: Basic Neuroscience, Brain Diseases, and Brain-inspired Computing” (全面解读中国脑计划:从基础神经科学到脑启发计算).

The content of these and other key studies is described in our technical review of China’s AI-brain program; these samples give a sense of the topics and players. That same year—2016—saw the start of an upward trend in the number of papers by Chinese scientists on brain-inspired AI specifically, one of the discipline’s three defining elements.

Meanwhile, China’s National Natural Science Foundation (NNSF), the main sponsor of state grants to individual scholars, in August 2017 solicited proposals for 25 AI projects, most of which are brain-related, within the following ten approved research areas:

Multi-modal, efficient cross domain perception and augmented intelligence

Machine understanding of perception and behavior under uncertain conditions

New methods for complex task planning and reasoning

Machine learning theory and methods based on new mechanisms (deep reinforcement learning, adversarial learning, brain-like / natural learning)

New brain-inspired computing architectures and methods

New methods of human-machine hybrid intelligence

Chinese semantic computing and deep understanding (machine reading comprehension and Chinese text creation, human-computer dialogue, etc.)

New computing devices and chips for artificial intelligence

Heterogeneous multi-core parallel processing methods and intelligent computing platforms

Machine intelligence test models and evaluation methods

In January 2018, NNSF funding guidelines recognized AI for the first time as an independent category, but also listed nine specific subcategories for “cognitive and neuroscience-inspired AI.” Here are the topics and their respective funding codes:

China NNSF cognitive-neuroscience-inspired AI funding subcategories

F060701 computational modeling of cognitive mechanisms (基于认知机理的计算模型)

F060702 modeling attention, learning, and memory (脑认知的注意、学习 与记忆机制的建模)

F060703 audiovisual perception modeling (视听觉感知模型)

F060704 neural information encoding and decoding (神经信息编码与解码)

F060705 neural system modeling and analysis (神经系统建模与分析)

F060706 neuromorphic engineering (神经形态工程)

F060707 neuromorphic chips (类脑芯片)

F060708 brain-like computing (类脑计算)

F060709 BCI and neural engineering (脑机接口与神经工程)

Besides NNSF support, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), and local municipalities also announced grants for AI-brain research. In terms of scholarship and support, it is clear that China has committed to this alternative paradigm.

What Constitutes “AI-Brain” Science in China?

As confirmed by a survey of its practitioners, three areas of research contribute to China’s AI-brain program: brain-inspired artificial intelligence (BI-AI, 类脑智能), connectomics (“brain mapping”人脑连接组), and brain-computer interfaces (BCI, 脑机接口).

BI-AI seeks mathematical descriptions of brain processes that contribute to behavior. This is understood literally, not as metaphor—the models match the actual “computation performed by biological wetware.”

Connectomics involves empirical and computational efforts to replicate brain structure and functioning. The link with AI derives from a need to invoke AI to test simulations, and from AI’s role in interpreting (aligning) images of brain sections. BCIs acquire electrical signals from the brain, interpret them, and optionally transform the signals into actions. Their link with AI is two-fold: AI is used to process brain signals and, potentially, support direct access to computing resources.

Although some goals of this research mirror mainstream AI, the difference is while the latter may seek to replicate brain behavior, the new approach emulates the actual neuronal functioning that gives rise to behavior. The motivation for BI-AI (and its companion discipline connectomics) is the empirical observation that the human brain, with minimal resources, effortlessly performs many high-order tasks beyond the reach of today’s machine learning (ML).

A short list of these tasks, culled from standard references, includes object/scene vision, attention modeling, continual learning, episodic memory, intuitive understanding, imagination, planning, and sensemaking. Two other goals are effective BCI (minimally invasive interfaces with useful throughput) and neuromorphic computing (hybrid digital-analog chips that mimic brain structure). In this context, we examined 561 Chinese papers and found 352 of them binning into one or more of the aforementioned categories, indicating that Chinese BI-AI research aligns with worldwide scientific aspirations.

Further testimony to China’s commitment comes from the number of institutes, state and university affiliated, engaged in BI-AI, connectomics, or BCI as their primary research area. We identified 30 such institutes, including concentrations in Beijing and Shanghai, and in provincial locations such as Chengdu, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Harbin, Hefei, Nanjing, Qingdao, Shenzhen, Suzhou, Tianjin, Wuhan, Xiamen, and Zhengzhou, exclusive of facilities working the disciplines peripherally.

We are struck by the caliber of personnel, collaborative networks, and research directions at three of these “outlying” institutes: the Fujian Key Laboratory for Brain-like Intelligent Systems (福建省仿脑智能系统重点实验) operating since 2009 in Xiamen; the HUST-Suzhou Institute for Brainsmatics (华中科技大学苏州脑空间信息研究院) established 2016 at Wuhan’s Huazhong University of S&T; and Hefei’s National Engineering Laboratory for Brain-inspired Intelligence Technology and Application (NEL-BITA) (类脑智能技术及应用国家工程实验室), a government-sponsored lab set up in 2017 with China’s major AI companies and Microsoft Research Asia.

NEL-BITA researches brain cognition and neural computing, brain-inspired multimodal sensing and information processing, brain-inspired chips and systems, “quantum artificial intelligence,” and brain-inspired intelligent robots. The HUST-Suzhou “Brainsmatics” facility, whose work has been praised by the Allen Institute’s chief scientist, has pioneered research in micro-optical sectioning tomography on its way to creating a high-resolution mammalian brain atlas. Bear in mind that these are institutes outside the main research nexus.

Meanwhile, Pu Muming’s Center for Excellence in Brain Science and Intelligence Technology (中国科学院脑科学与智能技术卓越创新中心), one of three major complexes in Shanghai, is host to a “G60 Brain Intelligence Innovation Park” established in 2018 with a U.S. $1.5 billion budget for BI-AI research and $2.85 billion more promised in 2020. The facility uses cloned monkeys. A final example, from Beijing, is Tsinghua University’s Center for Brain-inspired Computing Research (清华大学类脑计算研究中心), established in 2014 to study neural coding, ML algorithms, and chip architecture.

The China-ROW Balance Sheet

China enjoys several advantages over other nations in AI-brain research. We lay this out for consideration without judgment on how these advantages may play out. Similar research is being conducted worldwide and we have no crystal ball to foretell what nation will prevail in the global AI competition (if “prevail” is the right way to frame the matter). For China, seven such factors come to mind, the first three being the usual staples about China’s more permissive experimental ethos, abundance of data, fewer privacy concerns on data collection and use, and the fourth being national commitment, which we have been at pains to demonstrate. The other advantages require elaboration.

Fifth, and most obvious, is China’s AI talent, as shown in a breakdown of papers accepted at the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence’s (AAAI) 2020 conference, a central event for the world’s AI community.

The key takeaway is that ownership of the event has slipped from U.S. institutions, which dominated previous years. A China-ROW comparison of papers at the NeurIPS 2019 conference, a more focused gathering where China is a relative newcomer, had scholars from Tsinghua University placing 13th in number of accepted papers. In 2020, Tsinghua papers ranked 7th behind AI giants Google, Stanford University, MIT, Microsoft, UC Berkeley, and Carnegie Mellon, all of which are targets of PRC “talent” co-option programs, if not actively cooperating with China already (see technology transfer discussion below).

Both the AAAI and NeurIPS conferences had roughly the same paper acceptance rate (20.6 percent and 21.2 percent), so it is clear China is playing with the best. Chinese participation at these two key events would be skewed more in China’s favor if we account for co-authorship and the national origins of authors with non-China affiliations. Here is another breakdown of the AAAI 2020 event that accommodates co-authorship:

Papers by authors with China-only affiliations are 26 percent of the total. Papers by authors with China affiliations collaborating with authors claiming other (rest-of-world) affiliations constitute another 24 percent. Together they account for half of the papers. Statistics for the NeurIPS 2019 gathering show 42 percent of accepted papers having “Chinese authorship” (华人作者). The importance of Chinese AI talent can also be measured by the stream of arguments from our own Georgetown center for measures to retain Chinese students and other diaspora talent to keep the U.S. competitive, a position we wholly support.

A sixth advantage is China’s near monopoly on non-human primates (NHP) regarded by most AI-brain researchers as essential. By 2016, when China’s AI-brain project had come into its own, high-tech primate facilities already existed in Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Shenzhen, Suzhou, and elsewhere in Guangxi, Hainan, and Yunnan. While other countries were scaling back NHP production, China was raising laboratory grade monkeys in volume at a fraction of the cost for export and as a lure to foreign scientists, inhibited by domestic restrictions, to conduct their research in China

Nikos Logothesis, director of the Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, one of several brain scientists who migrated some or all of their research to China, announced plans to co-direct with Shanghai neuroscientist Pu Muming (Mu-ming Poo) an International Center for Primate Brain Research44 built at a cost of U.S. $106 million. Pu’s success in cloning monkeys, which speeds breeding and eliminates genetic variation, is another draw.

Finally, we consider foreign technology transfer, generally seen as a sign of weakness but which we regard—from China’s perspective—as a stunning advantage. For more than six decades China has operated a comprehensive program of foreign technology appropriation to remedy shortcomings in indigenous science and technology without the cost, risk, and political challenges incurred by the world’s liberal democracies. The phenomenon has been documented in scholarly and government studies both in general and for AI. It has been briefed to U.S. and allied elected and counterintelligence officials, who are well-informed on the matter, and is a mainstay of media reporting, so that the discussion turns not on whether these illegal and extralegal transactions take place but rather on what to do about it.

We raise the matter to emphasize that whatever else one thinks of it, China’s hybrid system of indigenous innovation and foreign “borrowing” has been extraordinarily effective. China through its outreach efforts, talent programs, diaspora exploitation, cooperative ventures, open source tracking, overseas support guilds, indigenization enclaves, “two-bases” and “short-term return” schemas, and other hidden or barely disguised practices has mastered the skill of adapting useful technologies created abroad into its own (under-rated) indigenous enterprises.

If these are China’s advantages, what are its disadvantages? Two deficits are commonly cited: chip design and fabrication, and foundational research. We defer judgment on the former, which is outside our fields of expertise. As for the latter, China is seen as weak in basic research, specifically in AI theory, by the country’s top practitioners. Sinovation founder and best-selling AI author Kai-Fu Lee argues that China’s forte is its ability to create practical AI products, not revolutionize the field. His point is supported by top Chinese scientists. Here is a sample:

Sun Maosong (孙茂松), Tsinghua University professor of computer science, argues that China lacks leaders in world-class scientific research and falls behind other countries in training “top talent in the basic sciences.”

Tan Tieniu (谭铁牛), deputy director of CAS (see below), claims “At present, China is still in the ‘follow-up’ position in terms of frontier theoretical innovation of artificial intelligence. Most of the innovations are focused on technology applications.”

Xu Kuangdi (徐匡迪) former head of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) said, “The cornerstone of artificial intelligence is mathematics, and the key element is algorithms. But China’s investment in this field is far behind the United States.” Yau Shing-Tung (丘成桐), Harvard professor and Fields Medal winner, concludes that China “is still some distance from the United States and Britain in terms of basic theory and algorithm innovation.”

Zheng Nanning (郑南宁), another CAE academician, believes it will take China another 5 to 10 years to reach world levels in basic theoretical and algorithmic research. Hardware design is also an issue.

We regard these complaints as valid but vacuous: theory cannot be embargoed and there is no will to do so either by governments or by scientists, who embrace collaboration as part of their enterprise. Accordingly, to the extent this is a problem at all, China is addressing it as it always has, by a robust program of foreign interaction, cooperation, co-option, licit and illicit transfers, and—like everyone else—by monitoring publicly available information.

The Chimera of AGI

China’s decision to focus on AI-brain research leads to speculation that the effort may be aimed at the “holy grail” of artificial general (human level) intelligence (AGI), or will end up there as an unintended consequence of this brain-centric pursuit. Indeed, as will be shown, that view is held by many Chinese researchers. The issue in a nutshell is this: in contrast to AI, which focuses on narrow problems of “creating programs that demonstrate intelligence in one or another specialized area,”  AGI aims at, “the construction of a software program that can solve a variety of complex problems in a variety of different domains, and that controls itself autonomously, with its own thoughts, worries, feelings, strengths, weaknesses and predispositions.”

In other words, the elements of human cognition—with instant access to the sum of the world’s knowledge and ability to process that information at lightning speed. Since BI-AI models brain function to enhance AI programs, there is a tendency among scientists working in brain-inspired AI to equate their research with this outcome. A survey of China’s AI scientists revealed 74 percent believe BI-AI will lead to general AI. The number rises to 83 percent among China’s BI specialists. These figures are buttressed by statements from BI-AI principals of standing:

Xu Bo (徐波), director of the CAS Institute of Automation—host to Beijing’s Research Center for Brain-inspired Intelligence (home of the “Brainnetome” connectomics project), Associate Director of Shanghai’s Center for Excellence in Brain Science and Intelligence Technology (中国科学院脑科学与智能技术卓越创新中心, CEBSIT), and chair of the “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Strategic Advisory Committee” is cited in the Ministry of Science and Technology’s official newspaper S&T Daily:

“As General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out in the collective study of the Politburo, artificial intelligence research must explore ‘unmanned areas.’ In the areas of swarm intelligence, human-machine hybrid intelligence and autonomous intelligence, there are large unmanned areas to be explored… We believe that autonomous evolution is a bridge from weak artificial intelligence to general artificial intelligence.”

Shi Luping (施路平), director of the Center for Brain-inspired Computing Research, Tsinghua University and leader of the research group that created the Tianjic neuromorphic chip, has a novel epistemological take on the emergence of AGI: “Our human intelligence is built on carbon, and we have built the current digital universe on silicon. The structure of carbon and silicon is very similar, so we believe what can be realized on carbon, must be possible on silicon… Moreover, nanodevices have enabled us to develop electronic devices such as neurons and synapses at the level of human brain energy consumption, so now is the best time to develop artificial general intelligence.”

Tan Tieniu (谭铁牛), deputy director of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, deputy chief of the PRC’s liaison office in Hong Kong, and a leading AI figure, explained in Qiushi, the Communist Party’s main theoretical journal:

“How to make the leap from narrow artificial intelligence to general artificial intelligence is the inevitable trend in the development of the next generation of artificial intelligence. It is also a major challenge in the field of research and application.”

Zeng Yi (曾毅), deputy director of CAS’s Research Center for Brain-inspired Intelligence, 2019 member of the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Governance Expert Committee, and keynote speaker at “AGI-19,” the 12th annual international conference on AGI:

“Whether to develop general artificial intelligence, or limit it to specific AI is a major point of divergence among many proposals for artificial intelligence guidelines… In fact, the development of dedicated [专用, ‘narrow’] AI does not completely avoid risk, because the system is likely to encounter unexpected scenarios in its application. Having a certain general ability may improve the robustness and adaptiveness of an intelligent system.”

Huang Tiejun (黄铁军), chair of Peking University’s Department of Computer Science, dean of the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence, and also a 2019 member of the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Governance Expert Committee:

“My point is different from that of the other colleagues. Absolutely we should [build superintelligence]. Our human race is only at one stage. Why stop? Humans evolve too slowly. It’s impossible for humans to compare to machine-based superintelligence. It will happen sooner or later, so why wait? Even from the perspective of human centrism or human exceptionalism, superintelligence is needed to face big challenges that we can’t figure out. That’s why I support the idea.” (Future of Life conference)

Other such prognostications are commonplace. As part of the trajectory, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology and the Beijing city government in 2020 stood up a “Beijing Institute for General Artificial Intelligence” (北京通用人工智能研究院, BIGAI) headed by returned UCLA professor and renowned AI scientist Zhu Songchun (朱松纯), in concert with Peking University’s Institute for Artificial Intelligence and Tsinghua University’s own (planned) AGI institute. The facility is in Beijing’s Haidian districts and will be staffed by some 1,000 researchers drawn from China and, as usual, “all over the world.”

The move will lead to clones, first in Shanghai then the other major cities and provinces. Our concerns are two-fold. Firstly, AI hype tends to outpace its accomplishments, and the former should not become the basis for fear and countermeasures. In our view, a move toward AGI is a natural feature of AI research, in China or anywhere, as AIs become more capable. While the research warrants scrutiny, we believe AGI, understood literally, is not imminent (five years out) but possible in some form by the end of the decade.

Secondly—and more ominously—AGI may not be the best way to envision the result of brain-inspired or other lines of AI research. One need not subscribe to an AGI scenario to appreciate that all AI research entails risks. Nor is AGI a necessary condition for “superintelligence.” Here is one scenario, for example, which is plausible over a shorter term and comes directly from a credible Chinese source:

“Speaking of the brain-computer interaction of tomorrow, we will move from intelligence [of one type] to intelligence [of another] (从智能而来,到智能而去). The future is not about replacing human beings with artificial intelligence, but making AI a part of human beings through interconnection and interoperability. A blend of human and computer without barriers is the inevitable end of the future.”

This potential outcome, a way station on the path to AGI, portends fundamental changes in the human condition, indeed, in the nature of humanity and is cause for concern by itself.

Policy recommendations

The authors are daunted by the expectation that we propose policies addressing the issues we write about—something not encouraged in our former lives. Here are three, offered in good faith.

1. Pay greater attention to AI safety

We assess the likelihood of China achieving artificial general intelligence (AGI) through BI-AI within the next five years as improbable. Chinese scientists agree. The project is in its infancy and there is nothing in the open literature to suggest China has made breakthroughs in key areas. We are less confident other troublesome aspects of this research will not emerge sooner rather than later. We encourage the U.S. government, allied nations, and scientists worldwide to draw China and its AI cadre into a strong safeguards regime to manage these common dangers.

2. Mitigate greyzone technology transfers

China’s appetite for foreign technology, obtained with or without permission, is insatiable and we see no indication that China’s status as an emerging S&T power will impact this behavior. Absent a concerted effort to control technology transfers, the rest of the world is disadvantaged as it invests resources in technologies that China acquires gratis. We propose the creation of dedicated centers, nationally and internationally, to monitor “informal” technology transfers and refer them to cognizant authorities. The framework should also encompass legal transfers of sensitive technology where national security is at risk.

3. Build a “National S&T Analysis Center”

China’s AI-brain project blossomed in 2016, yet there has been no significant reporting about it outside China. As we describe elsewhere, U.S. intelligence agencies, unlike China’s, are ill-equipped to detect emerging technologies because their secrets-based platforms, a Cold War relic, are not tuned to capture worldwide scientific trends. Open source intelligence, by contrast, is well poised to provide the “indications and warnings” to reduce technology surprise. Realizing its full value will happen under the auspices of an organization established outside the IC to provide assessments and forecasts of S&T developments without institutional biases. PRISM

Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World

National Intelligence Council

The international system—as constructed following the Second World War—will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, an historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of nonstate actors.  By 2025, the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries.

Concurrent with the shift in power among nation-states, the relative power of various nonstate actors—including businesses, tribes, religious organizations, and criminal networks—is increasing.  The players are changing, but so too are the scope and breadth of transnational issues important for continued global prosperity.  Potentially slowing global economic growth; aging populations in the developed world; growing energy, food, and water constraints; and worries about climate change will limit and diminish what will still be an historically unprecedented age of prosperity. 

Executive Summary

Historically, emerging multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones.  Despite the recent financial volatility—which could end up accelerating many ongoing trends—we do not believe that we are headed towards a complete breakdown of the international system—as occurred in 1914-1918 when an earlier phase of globalization came to a halt.  But, the next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught with risks.  Strategic rivalries are most likely to revolve around trade, investments, and technological innovation and acquisition, but we cannot rule out a 19th century-like scenario of arms races, territorial expansion, and military rivalries. 

This is a story with no clear outcome, as illustrated by a series of vignettes we use to map out divergent futures.  Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States’ relative strength—even in the military realm—will decline and US leverage will become more constrained.  At the same time, the extent to which other actors—both state and nonstate—will be willing or able to shoulder increased burdens is unclear.  Policymakers and publics will have to cope with a growing demand for multilateral cooperation when the international system will be stressed by the incomplete transition from the old to a still forming new order.

Economic Growth Fueling Rise of Emerging Players

In terms of size, speed, and directional flow, the transfer of global wealth and economic power now under way—roughly from West to East—is without precedent in modern history.  This shift derives from two sources.  First, increases in oil and commodity prices have generated windfall profits for the Gulf States and Russia.  Second, lower costs combined with government policies have shifted the locus of manufacturing and some service industries to Asia.

Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India, and China indicate they will collectively match the original G-7’s share of global GDP by 2040-2050.  China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next 20 years than any other country.  If current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world’s second largest economy and will be a leading military power.  It also could be the largest importer of natural resources and the biggest polluter.  India probably will continue to enjoy relatively rapid economic growth and will strive for a multipolar world in which New Delhi is one of the poles.  China and India must decide the extent to which they are willing and capable of playing increasing global roles and how each will relate to the other.  Russia has the potential to be richer, more powerful, and more self-assured in 2025.  If it invests in human capital, expands and diversifies its economy, and integrates with global markets, by 2025 Russia could boast a GDP approaching that of the UK and France.  On the other hand, Russia could experience a significant decline if it fails to take these steps and oil and gas prices remain in the $50-70 per barrel range. No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia, and none is likely to match their individual global clout.  We expect, however, to see the political and economic power of other countries—such as Indonesia, Iran, and Turkey—increase. 

For the most part, China, India, and Russia are not following the Western liberal model for self-development but instead are using a different model, “state capitalism.”  State capitalism is a loose term used to describe a system of economic management that gives a prominent role to the state.  Other rising powers—South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore—also used state capitalism to develop their economies.  However, the impact of China following this path is potentially much greater owing to its size and approach to “democratization.”  Nevertheless, we remain optimistic about the long-term prospects for greater democratization, even though advances are likely to be slow and globalization is subjecting many recently democratized countries to increasing social and economic pressures with the potential to undermine liberal institutions.

Many other countries will fall further behind economically.  Sub-Saharan Africa will remain the region most vulnerable to economic disruption, population stresses, civil conflict, and political instability.  Despite increased global demand for commodities for which Sub-Saharan Africa will be a major supplier, local populations are unlikely to experience significant economic gain.  Windfall profits arising from sustained increases in commodity prices might further entrench corrupt or otherwise ill-equipped governments in several regions, diminishing the prospects for democratic and market-based reforms.  Although many of Latin America’s major countries will have become middle income powers  by 2025, others, particularly those such as Venezuela and Bolivia which have embraced populist policies for a protracted period, will lag behind—and some, such as Haiti, will have become even poorer and less governable.  Overall, Latin America will continue to lag behind Asia and other fast-growing areas in terms of economic competitiveness.    

Asia, Africa, and Latin America will account for virtually all population growth over the next 20 years; less than 3 percent of the growth will occur in the West.  Europe and Japan will continue to far outdistance the emerging powers of China and India in per capita wealth, but they will struggle to maintain robust growth rates because the size of their working-age populations will decrease.  The US will be a partial exception to the aging of populations in the developed world because it will experience higher birth rates and more immigration.  The number of migrants seeking to move from disadvantaged to relatively privileged countries is likely to increase.

The number of countries with youthful age structures in the current “arc of instability” is projected to decline by as much as 40 percent.  Three of every four youth-bulge countries that remain will be located in Sub-Saharan Africa, nearly all of the remainder will be located in the core of the Middle East, scattered through southern and central Asia, and in the Pacific Islands.

New Transnational Agenda

Resource issues will gain prominence on the international agenda.  Unprecedented global economic growth—positive in so many other regards—will continue to put pressure on a number of highly strategic resources, including energy, food, and water, and demand is projected to outstrip easily available supplies over the next decade or so.  For example, non-OPEC liquid hydrocarbon production—crude oil, natural gas liquids, and unconventionals such as tar sands—will not grow commensurate with demand.  Oil and gas production of many traditional energy producers already is declining.  Elsewhere—in China, India, and Mexico—production has flattened.  Countries capable of significantly expanding production will dwindle; oil and gas production will be concentrated in unstable areas.  As a result of this and other factors, the world will be in the midst of a fundamental energy transition away from oil toward natural gas and coal and other alternatives.

The World Bank estimates that demand for food will rise by 50 percent by 2030, as a result of growing world population, rising affluence, and the shift to Western dietary preferences by a larger middle class.  Lack of access to stable supplies of water is reaching critical proportions, particularly for agricultural purposes, and the problem will worsen because of rapid urbanization worldwide and the roughly 1.2 billion persons to be added over the next 20 years.  Today, experts consider 21 countries, with a combined population of about 600 million, to be either cropland or freshwater scarce.  Owing to continuing population growth, 36 countries, with about 1.4 billion people, are projected to fall into this category by 2025.

Climate change is expected to exacerbate resource scarcities.  Although the impact of climate change will vary by region, a number of regions will begin to suffer harmful effects, particularly water scarcity and loss of agricultural production.  Regional differences in agricultural production are likely to become more pronounced over time with declines disproportionately concentrated in developing countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Agricultural losses are expected to mount over time with substantial impacts forecast by most economists by late this century.  For many developing countries, decreased agricultural output will be devastating because agriculture accounts for a large share of their economies and many of their citizens live close to subsistence levels. 

New technologies could again provide solutions, such as viable alternatives to fossil fuels or means to overcome food and water constraints.  However, all current technologies are inadequate for replacing the traditional energy architecture on the scale needed, and new energy technologies probably will not be commercially viable and widespread by 2025.  The pace of technological innovation will be key.  Even with a favorable policy and funding environment for biofuels, clean coal, or hydrogen, the transition to new fuels will be slow.  Major technologies historically have had an “adoption lag.”  In the energy sector, a recent study found that it takes an average of 25 years for a new production technology to become widely adopted. 

Despite what are seen as long odds now, we cannot rule out the possibility of an energy transition by 2025 that would avoid the costs of an energy infrastructure overhaul.  The greatest possibility for a relatively quick and inexpensive transition during the period comes from better renewable generation sources (photovoltaic and wind) and improvements in battery technology.  With many of these technologies, the infrastructure cost hurdle for individual projects would be lower, enabling many small economic actors to develop their own energy transformation projects that directly serve their interests—e.g., stationary fuel cells powering homes and offices, recharging plug-in hybrid autos, and selling energy back to the grid.   Also, energy conversion schemes—such as plans to generate hydrogen for automotive fuel cells from electricity in the homeowner’s garage—could avoid the need to develop complex hydrogen transportation infrastructure.   

Prospects for Terrorism, Conflict, and Proliferation

Terrorism, proliferation, and conflict will remain key concerns even as resource issues move up on the international agenda.  Islamic terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025, but its appeal could diminish if economic growth continues and youth unemployment is mitigated in the Middle East.  Economic opportunities for youth and greater political pluralism probably would dissuade some from joining terrorists’ ranks, but others—motivated by a variety of factors, such as a desire for revenge or to become “martyrs”—will continue to turn to violence to pursue their objectives.

In the absence of employment opportunities and legal means for political expression, conditions will be ripe for disaffection, growing radicalism, and possible recruitment of youths into terrorist groups.  Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long-established groups—that inherit organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks—and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized.  For those terrorist groups that are active in 2025, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach.  One of our greatest concerns continues to be that terrorist or other malevolent groups might acquire and employ biological agents, or less likely, a nuclear device, to create mass casualties. 

Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, other countries’ worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions.  It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear-weapons capable Iran.  Episodes of low-intensity conflict taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established.

We believe ideological conflicts akin to the Cold War are unlikely to take root in a world in which most states will be preoccupied with the pragmatic challenges of globalization and shifting global power alignments.  The force of ideology is likely to be strongest in the Muslim world—particularly the Arab core.  In those countries that are likely to struggle with youth bulges and weak economic underpinnings—such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Yemen—the radical Salafi trend of Islam is likely to gain traction.

Types of conflict we have not seen for awhile—such as over resources—could reemerge.  Perceptions of energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies.  In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regimes.  However, even actions short of war will have important geopolitical consequences.  Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue-water naval capabilities.  The buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes.  With water becoming more scarce in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to become more difficult within and between states. 

The risk of nuclear weapon use over the next 20 years, although remaining very low, is likely to be greater than it is today as a result of several converging trends.  The spread of nuclear technologies and expertise is generating concerns about the potential emergence of new nuclear weapon states and the acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorist groups.  Ongoing low-intensity clashes between India and Pakistan continue to raise the specter that such events could escalate to a broader conflict between those nuclear powers.  The possibility of a future disruptive regime change or collapse occurring in a nuclear weapon state such as North Korea also continues to raise questions regarding the ability of weak states to control and secure their nuclear arsenals.

If nuclear weapons are used in the next 15-20 years, the international system will be shocked as it experiences immediate humanitarian, economic, and political-military repercussions.  A future use of nuclear weapons probably would bring about significant geopolitical changes as some states would seek to establish or reinforce security alliances with existing nuclear powers and others would push for global nuclear disarmament.

A More Complex International System

The trend toward greater diffusion of authority and power that has been occurring for a couple decades is likely to accelerate because of the emergence of new global players, the worsening institutional deficit, potential expansion of regional blocs, and enhanced strength of nonstate actors and networks.  The multiplicity of actors on the international scene could add strength—in terms of filling gaps left by aging post-World War II institutions—or further fragment the international system and incapacitate international cooperation.  The diversity in type of actor raises the likelihood of fragmentation occurring over the next two decades, particularly given the wide array of transnational challenges facing the international community. 

The rising BRIC powers are unlikely to challenge the international system as did Germany and Japan in the 19th and 20th centuries, but because of their growing geopolitical and economic clout, they will have a high degree of freedom to customize their political and economic policies rather than fully adopting Western norms.  They also are likely to want to preserve their policy freedom to maneuver, allowing others to carry the primary burden for dealing with such issues as terrorism, climate change, proliferation, and energy security. 

Existing multilateral institutions—which are large and cumbersome and were designed for a different geopolitical order—appear unlikely to have the capacity to adapt quickly to undertake new missions, accommodate changing memberships, and augment their resources. 

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—concentrating on specific issues—increasingly will be a part of the landscape, but NGO networks are likely to be limited in their ability to effect change in the absence of concerted efforts by multilateral institutions or governments.  Efforts at greater inclusiveness—to reflect the emergence of the newer powers—may make it harder for international organizations to tackle transnational challenges.  Respect for the dissenting views of member nations will continue to shape the agenda of organizations and limit the kinds of solutions that can be attempted. 

Greater Asian regionalism—possible by 2025—would have global implications, sparking or reinforcing a trend toward three trade and financial clusters that could become quasi-blocs:  North America, Europe, and East Asia.  Establishment of such quasi-blocs would have implications for the ability to achieve future global World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements.  Regional clusters could compete in setting trans-regional product standards for information technology, biotech, nanotech, intellectual property rights, and other aspects of the “new economy.”  On the other hand, an absence of regional cooperation in Asia could help spur competition among China, India, and Japan over resources such as energy. 

Intrinsic to the growing complexity of the overlapping roles of state, institutions, and nonstate actors is the proliferation of political identities, which is leading to establishment of new networks and rediscovered communities.  No one political identity is likely to be dominant in most societies by 2025.  Religion-based networks may be quintessential issue networks and overall may play a more powerful role on many transnational issues such as the environment and inequalities than secular groupings.

The United States:  Less Dominant Power 

By 2025 the US will find itself as one of a number of important actors, albeit still the most powerful one, on the world stage.  Even in the military realm, where the US will continue to possess considerable advantages in 2025, advances by others in science and technology, expanded adoption of irregular warfare tactics by both state and nonstate actors, proliferation of long-range precision weapons, and growing use of cyber warfare attacks increasingly will constrict US freedom of action.  A more constrained US role has implications for others and the likelihood of new agenda issues being tackled effectively.  Despite the recent rise in anti-Americanism, the US probably will continue to be seen as a much-needed regional balancer in the Middle East and Asia.  The US will continue to be expected to play a significant role in using its military power to counter global terrorism.  On newer security issues like climate change, US leadership will widely perceived as critical to leveraging competing and divisive views to find solutions.  At the same time, the multiplicity of influential actors and distrust of vast power means less room for the US to call the shots without the support of strong partnerships.  Developments in the rest of the world, including internal developments in a number of key states—particularly China and Russia—are also likely to be crucial determinants of US policy. 

2025—What Kind of Future? 

The above trends suggest major discontinuities, shocks, and surprises, which we highlight throughout the text.  Examples include nuclear weapons use or a pandemic.  In some cases, the surprise element is only a matter of timing:  an energy transition, for example is inevitable; the only questions are when and how abruptly or smoothly such a transition occurs.  An energy transition from one type of fuel (fossil fuels) to another (alternative) is an event that historically has only happened once a century at most with momentous consequences.  The transition from wood to coal helped trigger industrialization.  In this case, a transition—particularly an abrupt one—out of fossil fuels would have major repercussions for energy producers in the Middle East and Eurasia, potentially causing permanent decline of some states as global and regional powers. 

Other discontinuities are less predictable.  They are likely to result from an interaction of several trends and depend on the quality of leadership.  We put uncertainties such as whether China or Russia becomes a democracy in this category.  China’s growing middle class increases the chances but does not make such a development inevitable.  Political pluralism seems less likely in Russia in the absence of economic diversification.  Pressure from below may force the issue, or a leader might begin or enhance the democratization process to sustain the economy or spur economic growth.  A sustained plunge in the price of oil and gas would alter the outlook and increase prospects for greater political and economic liberalization in Russia.  If either country were to democratize, it would represent another wave of democratization with wide significance for many other developing states. 

Also uncertain are the outcomes of demographic challenges facing Europe, Japan, and even Russia.  In none of these cases does demography have to spell destiny with less regional and global power an inevitable outcome.  Technology, the role of immigration, public health improvements, and laws encouraging greater female participation in the economy are some of the measures that could change the trajectory of current trends pointing toward less economic growth, increased social tensions, and possible decline. 

Whether global institutions adapt and revive—another key uncertainty—also is a function of leadership.  Current trends suggest a dispersion of power and authority will create a global governance deficit.  Reversing those trend lines would require strong leadership in the international community by a number of powers, including the emerging ones.

Some uncertainties would have greater consequences—should they occur—than would others.  In this work, we emphasize the overall potential for greater conflict—some forms of which could threaten globalization.  We put WMD terrorism and a Middle East nuclear arms race in this category.  The key uncertainties and possible impacts are discussed in the text and summarized in the textbox on page vii on relative certainties.  In the four fictionalized scenarios, we have highlighted new challenges that could emerge as a result of the ongoing global transformation.  They present new situations, dilemmas, or predicaments that represent departures from recent developments.  As a set, they do not cover all possible futures.  None of these is inevitable or even necessarily likely; but, as with many other uncertainties, the scenarios are potential game-changers.

    In A World Without the West, the new powers supplant the West as the leaders on the world stage.

    October Surprise illustrates the impact of inattention to global climate change; unexpected major impacts narrow the world’s range of options.

    In BRICs’ Bust-Up, disputes over vital resources emerge as a source of conflict between major powers—in this case two emerging heavyweights—India and China.

    In Politics is Not Always Local, nonstate networks emerge to set the international agenda on the environment, eclipsing governments.

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