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Chinese leader Xi Jinping is pushing forward what he casts as an ambitious blueprint for reshaping the world order, urging developing countries to join Beijing in leading an overhaul of the international system.
Over the past year, Beijing’s authoritarian leadership has grown increasingly bold in challenging the U.S.-led, post-World War II international order and the liberal values that underpin it. Depicting the United States and its allies as defending an unfair and exclusive status quo, it asserts that the Chinese Communist Party has the vision to remake the world system, with China at the center.
In his latest pitch, Mr. Xi called on the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to rally around China to become the “construction team” of a new, multipolar order.
“We should actively participate in reforming and developing the global governance system” to make it “more balanced and effective,” Mr. Xi told a conference of hundreds of foreign dignitaries, Chinese officials, and scholars gathered Friday in Beijing’s imposing Great Hall of the People. “International rules should be made and observed by all countries ... not dictated by those with more muscles.”
Without naming the U.S. or Europe, Mr. Xi criticized what he called “bloc confrontation, creating small circles, and forcing others to pick sides” – references to Washington’s network of security alliances, which China opposes. As an alternative model, he upheld his own plan to create “a community with a shared future for mankind,” first announced in 2013. Since then, China has expanded its international influence through a series of sweeping, global development programs, including the infrastructure-focused Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China’s long-range goal is a system, with the rights of sovereign states at the center, that better comports with Beijing’s economic interests, authoritarian political values, and national security priorities. Yet while welcomed by some countries, Mr. Xi’s blueprint also faces pushback from a world that, on the whole, remains wary of China’s rise and intentions, public opinion polls show.
“What we are talking about really is not China’s vision for how the world should work better; it’s a vision for China at the center of the world,” says Nadège Rolland, distinguished fellow in China Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research. “All the global initiatives are really about supporting China” and propelling its rise.
Spotty leadership record
Under Mr. Xi, China has invested and loaned an estimated $1 trillion throughout the Global South, mainly via the BRI but also via the Global Development Initiative (started in 2021), the Global Security Initiative (2022), and the Global Civilization Initiative (2023). These four programs now involve about 150 countries, in varying capacities.
China, which has the world’s second-largest economy and a rapidly growing military, is the best country to lead the charge for global governance reform, Mr. Xi asserted Friday. “Among the world’s major countries, China has the best track record with respect to peace and security,” he said. “Every increase of China’s strength is an increase of the prospects of world peace.”
Mr. Xi announced that China will deepen ties with the Global South by creating a Global South research center and offering 1,000 scholarships and 100,000 training opportunities over the next five years. China will seek more free-trade arrangements with developing countries, as China’s imports from the Global South are expected to exceed $8 trillion between now and 2030.
“China has answered the call of the times,” Mr. Xi told the audience from a podium decked with roses.
Yet the appeal of China’s overseas programs has been mixed.
While the BRI and development initiatives have helped meet massive infrastructure needs and advanced connectivity in poorer countries, some have generated criticism for worsening debt burdens and environmental pollution, and lax labor protections.
Also controversial are China’s efforts to promote an international system in which each state defines human rights as it sees fit. This undermines the United Nations’ concept of universal human rights, as well as the U.N.’s “responsibility to protect,” which justifies outside intervention in the case of mass atrocities and rights abuses.
“China emphasizes development and security but not the human rights pillar of the U.N.,” says Rosemary Foot, author of “China, the UN, and Human Protection: Beliefs, Power, Image.”
For example, in September, China released a white paper in which it attacked “the exclusive rules of bloc politics, the notion of might makes right, and the ‘universal values’ defined by a handful of Western countries.” Yet Dr. Foot calls this “a big distortion,” noting that a Chinese representative was involved at the creation of the U.N.’s Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and that China has signed a number of core human rights treaties.
Navigating conflict
On the topic of security, China’s stress on sovereign states also raises questions about how to handle disputes.
“If a state breaches an international treaty ... China emphasizes dialogue – which is great but it doesn’t deal with the hard questions,” says Dr. Foot, professor and senior research fellow in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. China’s decision not to condemn Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, while advocating talks, illustrates the limits to Beijing’s approach, she says.
Indeed, as Mr. Xi pledged that China would remain peaceful and never seek hegemony, tensions simmered closer to home over China’s territorial disputes with India, the Philippines, and other Asian neighbors, leading some conference participants to appeal for restraint by Beijing.
After the morning meeting, Rommel Banlaoi, president of the Philippine Society for International Security Studies, told a government-organized forum that “peaceful coexistence is all the more relevant in the context of Philippines-China relations.” The escalation of tensions between Chinese and Filipino forces in the South China Sea is “regrettable,” he added.
“It’s imperative for China and the Philippines to explore ways to meet halfway ... to avoid violent conflict at sea,” he said at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing.
Friday’s conference – including Mr. Xi’s speech and the subsequent expert panels – was held to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the “five principles of peaceful coexistence,” a concept adopted by India, China, and other countries. The broad guidelines for relations between nations emphasize state sovereignty, nonaggression, and noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, and were later adopted by the nonaligned movement.
At the same afternoon forum, Indian scholar Avijit Banerjee, a professor of Chinese language at Visva-Bharati University, also raised concern over territorial disputes in Asia, including the border conflict between India and China that has led to deadly clashes in recent years. “All disputes should be settled peacefully, without the use of force,” he said.
Need for cooperation
Ultimately, experts stress, reforming global governance will require greater cooperation between China, the U.S., and other major powers, as well as from smaller countries.
“China is trying to showcase some more ambitious goals on global governance,” says Cui Hongjian, professor at Academy of Regional and Global Governance at Beijing Foreign Studies University and a former Chinese diplomat, who attended Mr. Xi’s speech. But overcoming intense mistrust and competition between the U.S. and China is “a very, very important precondition” for reform at the U.N., he adds.
Both countries consider themselves “exceptional,” and as a result “it’s going to be difficult within one system to put these two countries together and have them cohabit,” says Susan Thornton, a retired senior U.S. diplomat and senior fellow at the Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center. “But,” she says, “we don’t have a choice.”
For some time, she predicts, the U.S. is likely to remain the de facto leader of the international system, given what she described as China’s reluctance to dive into resolving crises.
“We’ve worked really hard ... to get China to answer the fire alarm in the past on some issues and [have] not gotten a lot of response,“ she says. “China tends to not want to stick its neck out and get involved in mediating disputes that are very thorny and risky,” she says. “I don’t think China’s ready to be a leader of the international system.”
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China unveils plan for new world order
Xi Jinping lashes out at ‘bullying behaviour’ in apparent attack on Trump’s tariff war against Beijing
China’s Xi Jinping has set out plans for a new world order to challenge the dominance of the US-led West.
At a summit attended by the strongman leaders of Russia and India, Mr Xi lashed out at the “bullying behaviour” and “Cold War mentality” of other countries – which appeared to be an attack on Donald Trump and his tariff war against Beijing and its allies.
He called for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to expand its role, touting its “mega-scale market”, at the annual meeting of more than 20 non-Western leaders in Tianjin, in northern China.
“Global governance has reached a new crossroads,” Mr Xi told leaders including Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, Narendra Modi of India, and Masoud Pezeshkian, the Iranian president.
“The shadows of Cold War mentality, bullying, are not dissipating, and there are new challenges that are increasing, not diminishing,” Mr Xi said at the summit.
China and the US hit each other with tariffs of more than 100 per cent before agreeing to lower them temporarily while trade negotiations take place.
President Trump has threatened Putin with crippling tariffs if a peace deal with Ukraine is not agreed, and slapped India with a 50 per cent tariff, one of the world’s highest, for buying discounted Russian crude oil.
Mr Xi said at the summit: “We must continue to take a clear stand against hegemonism and power politics, and practise true multilateralism.”
Putin and Mr Modi held hands as they walked side-by-side to greet Mr Xi before the trio huddled, laughing before the photographers.
“All countries, regardless of size, strength or wealth, should equally participate in, decide on and benefit from global governance,” the Chinese president said before sketching out his vision for an alternative world order that prioritised the “global South”.
Underlining his intention to maximise Chinese influence in poorer nations, Mr Xi announced plans for an SCO-run development bank, a cooperation platform for green and energy industries and $1.4bn (£1.3bn) in loans over the next three years to SCO members.
Mr Xi also said he was opening the way for the ten SCO member states to use China’s BeiDou satellite system, an alternative to the US-controlled GPS.
His comments were speedily welcomed by Putin, a pariah in the West who enjoys a “friendship without limits” alliance with Mr Xi.
Putin said Mr Xi’s vision laid the foundation for a “new system of stability and security in Eurasia”.
“This security system, unlike Euro-centric and Euro-Atlantic models, would genuinely consider the interests of a broad range of countries, be truly balanced, and would not allow one country to ensure its own security at the expense of others,” he said.
Western sanctions on Russia since the illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have made Putin dependent on China, and India, for sales of Russian crude oil.
The West accuses China and India of funding Putin’s war machine in Ukraine by buying the oil.
Putin wants trade settlement mechanisms that avoid the US dollar and euro, after Western sanctions on payment systems and Chinese banks hit Russian trade and called on SCO to sell joint bonds.
“All this will increase the effectiveness of our economic exchanges and protect them from fluctuations in the external environment,” Putin said in a speech where he blamed the West for the war in Ukraine.
“This crisis wasn’t triggered by Russia’s attack on Ukraine, but was a result of a coup in Ukraine, which was supported and provoked by the West,” he said.
“The second reason for the crisis is the West’s constant attempts to drag Ukraine into Nato,” Putin said. He also claimed he wanted peace, thanking Mr Modi and Mr Xi for their efforts to end the war, and said he had reached “understandings” with Mr Trump at the Alaska summit.
He also praised Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey, the sole Nato leader at the summit, for his mediation efforts after the men held bilateral talks.
Relations between Washington and New Delhi are strained over the US tariffs, some of the highest in the world, and also Mr Trump’s claims to have ended India’s conflict with Pakistan.
India defends the oil imports as necessary to meet the needs of 1.4 billion people and insists it is not profiteering from the war.
Meanwhile, Putin gave Mr Modi – who has moved to repair relations with China after a long-running border feud – a lift to the venue for their bilateral talks in his armour plated limousine.
The two men spoke alone in the car for a further 50 minutes in a conversation described in Russia as “only for their ears” and by Mr Modi as “insightful”.
The Indian leader said the relationship with Moscow was “special and privileged.” Putin called him a “dear friend” on the second day of the SCO summit.
The SCO, set up in 2001, is the successor to the Shanghai Five, a grouping of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, set up in 1996. It now also includes India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus and Uzbekistan.
Iran, China and Russia signed a joint letter on Monday to the United Nations, calling a European attempt to invoke “snapback” sanctions on Iran legally baseless and politically destructive.
Putin will stay on in China to be the “main guest” at a military parade on Wednesday, in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War.
Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, will also be a guest of honour at the parade, which will unveil a series of ship-killing hypersonic missiles in a thinly-veiled warning to the West.
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How China is pursuing a new world order among the geopolitical ruins
“Perhaps Europe should ask whether it would do well to join an organisation like BRICS?”
China has issued calls for peace and is willing to negotiate between the parties in the Middle East conflict, but it has refrained from any real intervention. It’s a smart strategy. Since the West is rapidly losing its moral authority following its unconditional support for Israel – which is battling the Hamas terrorist organisation with tens of thousands of Palestinian civilian deaths as a consequence – a growing number of countries is feeling attracted to Beijing’s dream of a new, multipolar world order. A world order in which the hegemony of the West is a thing of the past, and liberalism and democracy are no longer sacrosanct.
But appearances can be deceptive. Although Beijing seems to be keeping a low profile as regards the Middle East, it does appear to be pursuing a strategy that extends far beyond the region. What does this strategy look like?
‘China wants to present a friendly face and to maintain good relations with all countries in the Middle East. It also claims to not want to interfere with other civilisations and other political systems. China does not want to become co-responsible for what is happening in those countries,’ says Ties Dams, geopolitical expert and China expert, affiliated with Clingendael Institute and Leiden University.
‘Beijing is currently sitting back and watching the West get tangled up in all sorts of problems. It also sees how European and American societies are becoming polarised over the conflict between Israel and Hamas. In the meantime China is successfully pursuing its own ideal of a post-Western, multipolar world order.’
Beijing does aspire to play a diplomatic role in the Middle East. Last year saw a rapprochement between the archenemies Iran and Saudi Arabia, thanks in part to Beijing’s mediating role. And now China has repeatedly called for a ceasefire in Gaza and for things to calm down in the Red Sea. There, pro-Palestinian Houthi rebels – allies of Iran – are constantly attacking freight ships.
Washington has asked Beijing – which maintains strong relations with Iran – to put the authorities in Tehran under pressure to call off the Houthis. Iranian sources report that Beijing indeed relayed the request to the Iranian government, but it remains unclear how much pressure was actually exercised on Iran.
China’s diplomatic influence and power in the region therefore appear to be fairly limited. Dams: ‘From an American perspective on power, it is true that China does not have the kind of influence over for instance Iran as some parties wish it did.’
‘China cannot get a grip on the Houthis, but nor can the United States. A safe passage through the Red Sea is as important to China as it is to the United States. However, because Beijing does not provide military support to Israel, it is only Western and not Chinese freight ships that are coming under attack. That’s smart politics too.’
How does China envision its longed-for post-Western world order?
Dams: ‘Beijing is aiming for a multipolar world order in which countries refrain from interfering in the internal politics of other countries. In which the notion of ‘universal values’ is viewed with scepticism, and where the United States is just one of the players.’
‘In this new world order, democracy and liberalism are no longer a universal ideal, but only hold sway over certain parts of the world. The liberal world order will transform into a regional order.’
‘Autocratic forms of government will no longer be rejected out of hand, and the rules in this multipolar world order will mainly be set by China and its partners.’
China wants to play a leading role in this post-Western world, but without getting drawn into all sorts of conflicts?
Dams: ‘Beijing is convinced that the United States will succumb to the tension between the military, diplomatic and moral responsibilities it has assumed in the world and the care for its own people.’
‘China therefore does not aspire to the same kind of hegemony that the United States once enjoyed, but has a different kind of agenda. Beijing wants to be a military superpower mainly in South-East Asia, and in other parts of the world it wants to mainly have economic influence and to offer countries an alternative to the United States.’
Why is Xi so opposed to the Western world order from which China has also benefited so much, for instance by being part of the World Trade Organization (WTO)?
According to Xi, the liberal international order is based on arrogant Western standards, such as democracy as the ideal political system. These values and standards were first imposed on many countries by the European colonial powers and subsequently, and often hard-handedly, by the Americans. This has mainly benefited the United States and other wealthy capitalist nations. But now China has the power to influence and shape that order to its own liking. So it’s not so much about chucking out the world order, but recycling it.
China is pursuing the post-Western world order by means of a multi-pronged strategy. What is the overall tactical plan?
Tactic 1: China has assumed a leading role within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is mainly devoted to matters of security and politics. Other members are Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan and Iran. Belarus is in the waiting room.
China also plays an important role in BRICS. This intergovernmental organization originally comprised the ‘emerging economies’ of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Now, the organization has expanded to include Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Argentina and Ethiopia.
Besides offering a platform for consultation, BRICS is also devoted to economic cooperation. It has established its own bank, the New Development Bank, to offer financial support to developing nations, certainly since many economies suffered severe setbacks in the wake of the COVID pandemic and the war in Ukraine.
SCO and BRICS are not based on liberal values and member states can have autocratic governments just as well as democratic ones. Whereas Iran is boycotted by the West on account of its nuclear programme, it is a member of both organisations. This is due in part to China’s support, with which Iran concluded an investment and energy treaty in 2021, since China very much needs Iranian oil.
Partly through SCO and BRICS, the authoritarian states of Iran, Russia and China have bonded together more closely than ever before. This is a worrying development, especially for the Americans. By teaming up, these countries can oppose the US and exercise their own power more vigorously.
According to Dams, China is eager to use the channels provided by these organisations to spread its own vision of the world. ‘The popularity of SCO and BRICS shows how lots of countries, despite significant ideological differences, are attracted to the kind of diplomacy propagated by Beijing: Ã la carte, based on self-interest, and without Western interference.’
Tactic 2: Xi Jinping shows a great deal of concern for ‘non-wealthy countries still developing’ – also referred to as the ‘Global South’ – by launching a series of new initiatives aimed at those countries.
First, in 2013 Xi launched the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), soon dubbed ‘the new Silk Road’. It comprises a development strategy for a huge network of ports, railways, pipelines, industrial parks, power stations and roads, that connects continents and stimulates world trade.
Countries submitted requests for infrastructural projects, China provided loans and had Chinese constructors and workers carry out the projects. A thorough justification of the need and utility of the projects – commonly demanded by Western donors – was not required.
The ‘new Silk Road’ is still under construction, but the development strategy saw three new follow-up initiatives in recent years. According to the Chinese government’s mouthpiece, the Global Times newspaper, these initiatives will create stability and ‘bring new hope in a world of turmoil and transformation.’
The Global Development Initiative holds that all countries deserve advancement in wide-ranging areas, from food safety and medicines to the latest technological developments. There doesn’t seem to be much difference with the Sustainable Development Goals, launched in 2015 by the United Nations. The GDI could give an additional impetus to achieving these goals.
China presented the GDI at the United Nations in 2021, at a time when the West prioritised itself over poorer parts of the world in the allocation of vaccines during the COVID pandemic.
Seventy countries have now embraced the GDI, according to a voluminous report in which China also lists numerous aid projects that it has already carried out.
The Global Security Initiative (GSI) was launched in April 2022, two months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In a paper, Beijing describes six fairly obvious principles aimed at ‘eliminating conflicts from the world and achieving lasting peace’. The document is full of grandiose statements such as, ‘Stay committed to the vision of a communal, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable peace and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries.’ For China, the GSI mainly offers the opportunity to pursue an active diplomatic role. Presenting a peace plan for the war in Ukraine (February 2023) and restoring relations between archenemies Iran and Saudi Arabia (March 2023) are examples.
‘Within the United Nations, China has been very successful at changing the general approach to for instance human rights.’
Finally, the Global Civilization Initiative was launched in March 2023, informally dubbed Xivilization, with China as the guardian of a new ideology. According to Xi’s vision, countries must stop imposing their own values and political governance models on other countries, and should show mutual respect for the diversity of civilisations. The Western sense of superiority must end.
Tactic 3: China influences Western institutions and global organisations from within, and in that way achieves major changes.
In exchange for the BRI loans, Beijing expects the recipient countries to remain loyal to China at the United Nations. And they do. Countries that are strongly indebted to
China will think twice before criticising Beijing.
Dams: ‘Within the United Nations, China has been very successful at changing the general approach to for instance human rights.’
For the Chinese Communist Party, pivotal human rights are not the freedom of expression or individual liberty, but economic development and ending poverty. Steadily more countries at the United Nations are adopting this view.
Dams: ‘Other non-Western countries are becoming increasingly vocal with regard to international jurisdiction as well. See for instance how South Africa accused Israel of committing genocide in Gaza at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. This is South Africa’s way of showing that the West no longer has a monopoly on moral leadership.
What does a prospective multipolar world order mean for the West?
It is a fact that the global power relations are shifting. Dams: ‘Much depends on the attitude taken by the US and Europe. The American president Biden continues to cling to the idea of American moral leadership in the world, even though he cannot live up to that commitment in various respects. Especially not considering the American electorate’s waning support for the astronomical sums the country spends on defence.’
‘On the global stage, Biden still sees himself as engaged in a contest between good and evil, and seems to see the future in terms of a bipolar world order – the US versus China – in which the democratic world is expected to side with the US. But the democratic world is no longer willing to fully support this narrative.’
According to Dams, Europe needs to carve out its own future, and should start to open up to the possibility that a multipolar world order is not necessarily a bad thing.
Through its pioneering role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, and by launching the global initiatives in infrastructure, development and security, China has created a ‘diplomatic order’ to parallel the Western forums such as the G7.
‘The challenge posed by organisations like the SCO and BRICS might be indirect, but that doesn’t make it any less significant. Europe might find itself relegated to the sidelines as a global player if it fails to engage with China’s new diplomatic order.’
‘Perhaps Europe should ask whether it would do well to join an organisation like BRICS? Perhaps it wouldn’t, but these questions are becoming increasingly relevant. What we must do in any case is to start looking at the world and at ourselves more often through the eyes of other important non-Western countries. That’s what China is forcing us to do.’
